Minibond? Megabomb? Fraud?

證監會譴責京華山, 京華山一全購雷曼產品

2011-05-13T23:22:00.000-07:00

1.（轉）信報： 2011年5月13日

京華山一全購雷曼產品涉960萬

再有金融機構向客戶回購雷曼相關結構性產品。京華山一國際（香港）承諾百分百回購迷債、精明債券及Constellation債券，涉及960萬元。同時，證監會譴責該行在銷售這些產品期間的行為。

京華山一銷售雷曼迷債、精明債券及Constellation債券的總額為約1395萬元。根據證監會與京華山一昨天達成的回購協議，該行將向所有合資格客戶提出，全數回購他們手上未到期的雷曼相關結構性產品，回購價是投資本金，扣除任何已收取的票息。

部分客戶的產品已被強制贖回，或於雷曼兄弟破產後已沽出，京華山一提出，就他們之前持有的相關產品支付賠償款項，金額是投資本金，扣除任何已收取的票息、剩餘價格及／或出售所得金額。

該行在不承認任何責任下，提出上述兩項回購及賠償建議，涉及金額約960萬元。

經過調查後，證監會質疑，京華山一向客戶銷售雷曼相關結構性產品前所進行的盡職審查是否足夠、向銷售人員提供的培訓和指引是否足夠，以確保他們理解產品投資回報的特點、結構及風險概況。證監會亦未能確定，該行有否為相關產品的銷售和推廣活動訂立適當的監察程序，以及有否實施。

京華山一同意，立即實施加強的特別投訴處理程序，並聘請獨立顧問檢討銷售程序，然後落實有關建議。京華山一是繼新鴻基投資服務、凱基證券及高信投資後，第四家與證監會達成回購協議的雷曼相關產品的證券行。

2. Core Pacific-Yamaichi International agrees with SFC to repurchase Minibonds, Octave Notes and Constellation Notes from clients at original value

SFC: http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=11PR49,

The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has issued a reprimand to Core Pacific-Yamaichi International (H.K.) Limited (CPYI) in respect of its internal systems and controls relating to sales of Minibonds, Octave Notes and Constellation Notes (collectively, Lehman Brothers-related structured products) following an investigation by the SFC (Notes 1 & 2).

The investigation of the SFC raised a number of concerns with CPYI’s internal systems and controls relating to the sale of Lehman Brothers-related structured products. Specifically, SFC’s concerns were related to:
the adequacy of product due diligence on Lehman Brothers-related structured products before they were sold to clients;
the adequacy of training and guidance given to its sales staff to enable them to understand the investment return characteristics, structure and risk profile of Lehman Brothers-related structured products; and
the establishment and implementation of proper guidelines and monitoring procedures on the sale and marketing of Lehman Brothers-related structured products to clients.

CPYI does not admit any liability arising from these matters, but acknowledges the seriousness of these concerns. CPYI has agreed with the SFC to:
offer to repurchase from all its eligible customers (Note 3) all outstanding Lehman Brothers-related structured products at a price equal to the principal amount invested by them, less any coupon payments received; and
offer to pay compensation to all its eligible former customers (Note 4) in respect of their previous holding(s) in Lehman Brothers-related structured products in an amount equal to the principal amount invested by them, less any coupon payments, residual value and/or sale proceeds received.

The total amount that CPYI offers pursuant to the repurchase and compensation offers is approximately HK$9.6 million.

CPYI has also agreed to:
immediately implement special enhanced complaints handling procedures to resolve, in a fair and reasonable manner, all complaints in relation to the sale and distribution of structured products other than Lehman Brothers-related structured products;
engage an independent reviewer, to be approved by the SFC, to review its systems and processes relating to the sale of structured products and to report to the SFC, and to commit to the implementation of all recommendations by the independent reviewer; and
to engage a qualified third party, as approved by the SFC, to review and enhance its complaints handling procedures, and to commit to the implementation of all recommendations by such third party.

The SFC considers that this agreement resolves its concerns about CPYI’s sales practices in respect of Lehman Brothers-related structured products and is in the best interests of the investors. The repurchase or compensation scheme should ensure that eligible customers and eligible former customers who accept the repurchase or compensation offers will receive return of their capital.

This agreement is also forward looking and should ensure that CPYI remediates its systems and processes to meet the standards expected from a licensed corporation which distributes investment products and/or provides investment advice to its clients.

The SFC considers this to be an appropriate outcome in light of the nature and extent of the concerns with CPYI’s sales practices that SFC’s investigation raised.

The SFC acknowledges that CPYI has fully co-operated with SFC’s investigation and has acted responsibly in agreeing to compensate eligible customers and eligible former customers.

轉載：要求羅兵咸公開迷債抵押品收回價值是如何計算出來及尋找30.5億港元的下落

2011-05-08T18:50:00.000-07:00

轉載：
要求羅兵咸公開迷債抵押品收回價值是如何計算出來及尋找30.5億港元的下落

根據2009年迷債投資者簽回16家銀行同意接納集體和解書的1b(ii)回購條款聲名說(見註B) :
“於取回本人/吾等所投資系列的抵押品的變現所得的任何款额後30天內，進一步支付: (ii) 若有關系列的回收價值比率超逾該系列之本金金額70%，將支付超逾該70%的可歸屬於本人/吾等持有之迷你債劵的款額”在2011年3月28日羅兵咸的常見問題第10題(見註C)說抵押品的價值約15億美元(約117億港元)。償還投資者總款項(不計補償金)，為86.5億港元 (見註A)。

根據2011年4月21日立法會財經事務委員會特別會議所公佈的資料，迷債系列10至36的總投資金額為 105.65億港元。從以上資料得知，現在抵押品的價值117億港元已超越本金105.65億港元，理應全數本金100% 歸還投資者 (有些系列更可能超越100%)。現時只償還86.5億港元，即有30.5億港元(26%)不知被誰侵吞了。2009年所簽的接納表格沒有提及需要支付任何的費用。投資者只知道抵押品變現後所得的任何款額，如超逾本金金額70%，將支付該超逾70%的款額給回投資者。

2011年3月28日羅兵咸的常見問題(見註C)第10及11對於收費也自相矛盾，第10題說要從抵押品支付受託人的費用，但第11題又說受託人的費用不是由抵押品支付，而是由分銷銀行的「支出資助協議」中付出。

這個協議由銀行及證監一手泡製，完全沒有透明度，數目含糊不清，美其名稱為投資者的最佳方案。但如此方案，怎可接受 ?

現要求羅兵咸公開所有系列的收回價是如何計算出來及各項開支的金額，因迷債投資者才是最後收款人，理應有這個知情權，我們不要再在誤導的情况下而作出錯誤的決定。

雷曼苦主大聯盟啓
2011年5月3日

迷債系列10-12, 15-23及25-36抵押品

於2011年3月28日羅兵咸網站的常見問題:

問題10 抵押品價值為多少？現時抵押品的價值約為大約15億美元.....117.00億港元

總數償還款額給迷債苦主約.......................................................86.50億港元 (註A)

不知去向的款項.....................................................................30.50億港元

於2011年4月21日立法會財經事務委員會公佈資料：

系列10至36迷債持有人共34,592人及所涉金額為............105.65億港元(註A)

抵押品升值了.............................................................11.35億港元

於2009年7月22日所有銀行的接納表格回購條款1b項(見註B)列明：

“於取回本人/吾等所投資系列的抵押品變現所得的任何款額

後30天內，進一步如下支付..”

說明是變現所得的任何款額,
為何償還款額總數少了30.5億港元？

link: http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/E8A681E6B182E7BE85E585B5E592B8E585ACE9968BE8BFB7E582B5E68AB5E68ABCE59381E694B6E59B9EE583B9E580BCE698AFE5A682E4BD95E8A888E7AE97E587BAE4BE86E58F8AE5B08BE689BE30.5E58484E6B8AFE58583E79A84E4B88BE890BD12365.php

《李華華》香樹輝筆伐雷曼苦主幕後黑手

2011-04-29T19:52:00.000-07:00

1. 轉載自：蘋果日報 2011年4月28日(四) B版中環在線: 《李華華》香樹輝筆伐雷曼苦主幕後黑手

噚日，「一群中環金融從業員」喺香港 4份主要報章，落咗一個題為「唔該大家公道啲！」嘅廣告。洋洋千幾字講述呢兩年嚟，佢哋返工嗰陣，飽受雷曼苦主各式各樣示威造成嘅滋擾，情況有啲失控，甚至侵犯他人自由，喺忍無可忍下，決定不再沉默。

「一群中環金融從業員」份量非輕

廣告批評雷曼苦主嘅抗議模式，喺中上環好似癌細胞咁擴散，越嚟越激，除咗喺中環各大銀行、主要街道張貼有人身攻擊嘅旗海同橫額，又披麻戴孝將認為要為事件負責嘅人張相，整成靈堂相，搞到國際金融中心變成殯儀館集中地。

咁，呢則廣告究竟係邊個落嘅呢？ 華華八到，係由公關公司宙輝落嘅，至於宙輝老闆，就係城中名嘴之一「香帥」香樹輝。華華第一時間問香帥做乜咁激？到底邊一幫人咁有米，請佢哋登廣告，用錢筆伐雷曼苦主？香帥死都唔肯透露半點口風，仲話自己作為專業公關，唔可以爆客仔私隱，否則，點可以細水長流撈咗廿幾年。

至於邊個請得郁香帥出手？華華八到，「一群中環金融從業員」應該係一個重份量嘅人，至於邊個咁睇班苦主唔順眼？你話呢！

轉載自：蘋果日報 2011年4月28日(四) B版中環在線

2. 轉載一位名為“中間人”的評論，轉自 “誰人抹黑雷曼苦主？？” （http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/iam-marclee/article?mid=1991）。

足額贖回的迷債抵押品為甚麼不是全數返還投資者？

2011-04-14T08:26:00.000-07:00

(轉載) 足額贖回的迷債抵押品為甚麼不是全數返還投資者？

--無論是政府或迷債的分銷銀行都欠社會一個解釋

據迷債抵押品接管人羅兵咸永道會計師事務所在3月28日的公告，稱與有關各方達成迷債抵押品協議。按計算，協議所收回的迷債抵押品平均價值約是原投資款項的80.5%。但據羅兵咸在10年8月13日的通告：“在接管人受托處理的24項迷你債券系列中，18項迷你債券系列的相關抵押品已足額贖回，贖回所得款項現正由托管人BNYM保管，並再投資於美國國庫債券”。換句話說，18項足額贖回的抵押品平均19.5%的價值，以及沒有公佈的6項迷債系列抵押品的部份價值，加上投資於美國國庫債券的利息，被造成迷債爆煲的雷曼兄弟侵吞去了。

16家迷債的分銷銀行據此提出了迷債“最終處理方案”，稱加上分銷銀行提出的“特惠金”，所謂合資格的投資者其收回投資款項有85%至96.5%。

但我們不禁要問，造成今天迷債結局的是由於雷曼兄弟沒有履行協議(派息)，但雷曼卻要鯨吞屬於小投資者的利益！這樣的結局對小投資者公平嗎？

據羅兵咸稱，這是由於迷債產品結構中有一項“優先索償權變更條款”在英國法律與美國法律的差異，所以選擇與雷曼達成協議而不選擇訴訟，因為訴訟有可能比對投資者現在所得更為不利的結果。那麼我們更要問，口口聲聲聲稱已對迷債投資者盡責的分銷銀行，你們當初為什麼不按證券銷售的相關法例、守則對投資者解釋這款勞什子條款，還有甚麼英國法律與美國法律的差異？迷債的分銷銀行顯然在所有的公告中回避解釋這種對弱小投資者不公平的困局！他們提出的所謂“特惠金”無非是想掩蓋他們在道德上的虧欠，以及他們在銷售雷曼迷債時所犯下的過錯。

據媒體報導，財政司司長曾俊華接受訪問時表示，今次達成的和解方案，是各方的努力和誠意達到的成果，他鼓勵追討者接受新方案。另外，政府發言人表示，歡迎分銷銀行向大部分迷你債券持有人提供特惠補助金，又對銀行願意以相當好的價值收回迷你債券抵押品表示高興。很顯然，非常了解事件真相的政府選擇了站在犯錯者的一方，沒有向社會解釋清楚：為什麼違反協議的雷曼反而要侵吞投資者利益；為什麼違規銷售的銀行以小量的資金去補償過錯就可得到贊賞。

無論是政府或迷債的分銷銀行，都必須向社會解釋清楚，你們是憑甚麼法律或道德標準要雷曼苦主去接受這樣一個不公平、不透明的結果！政府也應該向全社會公佈抵押品的現時價值，以及現值與羅兵咸公佈返回投資者價值的差額是誰拿去？

證監會與金管局必須向社會解釋，為什麼當初批准銷售這種對小投資者極不公平的產品？

迷債的分銷銀行也欠雷曼苦主一個交代，為什麼要向小投資者違規銷售這種根本不應銷售的產品！

政府應該向社會公佈金管局及證監會對雷曼事件的調查報告。在真相未公開，責任未交待清楚的情況下，雷曼苦主要求百分之百賠償加利息，理所當然是合情合理合法，並符合社會公義與社會正義。

結果！讓人民來鑑定是非曲直，究竟雷曼苦主要求百分之百賠償是不是符合社會公義與社會正義！

烏輪、延時買賣、港交所 (轉載)

2011-04-12T00:27:00.000-07:00

轉載 David Chan 信博：財經2011年04月12日

烏輪、延時買賣、港交所

港交所（388）延長交易時間和高盛錯價認股證事件都已經是舊聞，何以現在才議論？

一來固然因為討論整體趨勢更重要；二來也因為此論題其實既能體現上周所論的範式轉移，兼且能為港交所的遠景作一些設想。其實，此二者以一貫之，就是港交所的經營理念轉變。

把港交所比喻為賭場的話，延長交易時間，則主要目的就是希望通過加長營業時間，以求把人流量（和生意量）最大化，以達到更大的利潤。不過，前提是有相當數量的賭客因為被迫做「灰姑娘」（或姑爺）平倉離枱，以及有相當數量的賭客只能望門興歎，結果都敗興而回；然後看見「隔離」賭場燈火通明，於是過檔去「再戰江湖」，此論據方能成立。

試想想，要是在一個平靜小鎮，寥寥數萬人，人人日入而息，則莫說「Nessun Dorma」（徹夜無眠），晚上開檔也是浪費力氣之舉；反過來說，在拉斯維加斯和澳門開檔者，縱使通宵會蝕本（或者大白天蝕本，彼乃不夜城也）也要做，正所謂「輸錢唔輸勢」也。

因此，貴為世界其中一個主要的金融中心，雖然延長交易時間迄今為止對流量幾近零增加，但港交所在其他各交易所的激烈競爭下，不得以起而應對之，經營上亦屬合理。

不過，經營之道多端，加長時間對應，戰略上只能稱之為「被動防禦」。

誠信勿毀掉

如果一間賭場只有老虎機和輪盤，其餘各種遊戲欠奉，環境烏煙瘴氣，令人不願長呆，荷官沒打賞時繃着臉孔，甚至公然索取小費，不然沒好氣對待，更甚者居然和賭客串通作弊，周圍也沒有食肆和購物區，甚至連紅燈區也欠奉；這樣的賭場，與一間有多種遊戲、賠率合理、不會輸打贏要、荷官服務專業、賭場有各種方式確保公平、沒有作弊，以及周邊尚有大量購物區和食宿玩樂，甚至老少咸宜設施的賭場相比，當然完全沒得比。

簡單地說，賭場的經營和其他生意一樣，在於誠信。如果某賭博遊戲賠率開錯了，要輸巨額現金予賭客，經營得法的賭場絕對寧可通賠，都不會「賴貓」。當然，事後對管理該賭枱的荷官追究和懲罰是另一回事。但是錢輸掉了，尚可贏回來，誠信毀掉了，就已經被踢出局。

高盛烏輪事件中，高盛這種賴皮的態度固然令人髮指, 但是港交所身為市場秩序的維持者，卻容許其會員作「賴貓」之事而不問，試問誠信何存？ 沒有誠信，又缺乏除股票和衍生工具外的產品，就算延長營業時間，又如何真的和外國交易所競爭？只懂採取「被動防禦」，而忘記了「根據地」（誠信）和「發展戰略要地」（產品服務多樣化），又如何成大事？

在如此經營下，除了依靠中央和欠缺創意的競爭方式外就一無所有。短期港交所尚可受惠於內地企業來港上市，但中長線卻無甚可觀之處，這應該是其股價硬是受牽絆的遠因之一。

dtwchan@yahoo.com

迷債風險，金融騙局

2011-03-28T23:45:00.000-07:00

許多媒體，政府監管機構的官員捫評論迷債，卻連迷債的真實風險究竟為何物都不敢明確地講清楚。只以複雜的“信貸掛鉤”來清淡地帶過。

請每一位評論迷債的人士在發表評論之前，先問問自己：於迷債的風險究竟為何？當初迷債的發行商和銷售銀行是如何介紹迷債的風險的？

事實是，銀行向顧客「力銷」的是“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鉤”的迷你債券，而迷你債券其實是由兩層「信貸違約掉期」產品組成，這大肆宣揚的“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鉤”的只是表面文章。這第二層「信貸違約掉期」是跟100多個公司信貸掛鉤。這第二層「信貸違約掉期」的風險和特徵，不僅顧客不知，連眾多的銀行職員捫也一直不知道。這才是迷債騙局的精華所在！！！

這也是為甚麼銀行閉口不談迷債的真實風險。
迷債騙局，在於迷債銷售商捫「力銷」產品的風險和特徵跟產品的真實風險和特徵是有著巨大區別的！
客觀事實是銀行行騙, 金管局失職, 港府卸責, 現在港府扮哂有為協助調解!

現在，不僅兼管機構，銀行，連媒體也不敢明確指出這迷債的騙局所在。只敢以信貸產品複雜，高回報要考慮高風險來為迷債發行者和銷售商辯護。迷債之複雜，在於設計者想用第一層的跟7個著名公司信貸掛鉤來欺騙客戶，以達到不告知客戶關於第二層的跟00多個信貸掛鉤的風險。
迷債設計者設計了這麼個複雜的結構，就是不想讓客戶捫了解到迷債的真實風險所在。不是太複雜而不能解釋，其實是不想解釋而做出這麼個雙層結構來欺騙普羅大眾。

”高風險“，關鍵在於何謂風險。顧客理解的迷債之‘高風險’在於公開大肆宣揚的“7個著名公司信貸”的高風險，顧客捫卻不知，還有這沒有告知的第二層的高風險存在。這第二層的高風險是跟100多個各類公司信貸掛鉤！！！這就是迷債騙局的根本所在，只講第一層的跟7個公司信貸掛鉤的‘高風險’，卻不講這第二層跟100多個公司信貸掛鉤的‘高風險’！！！

迷債辯護士捫可以用諸多藉口為不介紹第二層信貸掛鉤產品風險辯護，心裡卻都明白：不提第二層的風險，是因為不想客戶捫知道還有這第二層100多個公司信貸掛鉤的高風險！！！

迷債系列6真是以高息來吸引客戶，儘管利息比同期前後的迷債系列5或7,10 都為高，銷售量卻是最差的，只有4百多萬美金，因為講明迷債的高息要跟150個公司信貸掛鉤。

正因為由這第二層信貸掛鉤產品，這就是為甚麼要付錢請 PWC 來處理迷債，因為這第二層信貸掛鉤產品而引起的麻煩！！！

令香港市民利益受損，助成金融騙局令香港蒙辱的到底是誰？？？？？

這次是買入迷債的香港市民被騙，明天又是哪些香港市民？

李麗貞（香港銀行業僱員協會主席）在 “還銀行從業員一個公道”（文匯報 2011年3月24日）中就明確指出：
［試想一名藥房的售貨員，向顧客推銷一罐聲稱含有豐富維他命、適合兒童發展需要的最新奶粉後被發現原來這是一罐「毒奶粉」，嬰兒食用後更變為「大頭BB」。事件曝光後，政府即時檢控藥房售貨員，罪名是「對產品認識不足」及「向顧客披露不夠」。對於「毒奶粉」的來源及為何流入市場卻一概不管，相信各位讀者也會認為是荒天下之大謬，然而以上的鬧劇卻真真實實地發生在銀行前線員工身上。
。。。。。。
誠如文首的小故事，香港一旦有「毒奶粉」出現，政府只檢控藥房售貨員而拒絕嚴格監管奶粉的衛生安全，絕對是一個不公平及不負責任的做法。金管局及證監會絕不應只選擇性檢控銀行前線員工，但卻讓負責推出產品的銀行高層置身事外。整件雷曼事件的主因在於香港的金融監管機構監管不力，只懂亂批金融產品交由銀行銷售。一旦發現問題就第一時間「卸膊」，除了有損香港國際金融中心的聲譽，更令到一些向顧客推介產品的前線銷售人員蒙受不白之冤，更甚者因此前途盡毀，鋃鐺入獄。
。。。。。。
香港的金融監管機構更有責任做好把關的工作，不要被無良的投資產品設計者，以魚目混珠的包裝手法、混入不合理的槓桿投資手段，使平民百姓再墮「國際金融大騙局」，讓「金融毒奶粉」再次流入市場。但願金融海嘯不再來，讓金融業內的投資者及從業員都能在健全制度下，為香港能成為世界金融中心之首而努力！］

《李麗貞》還銀行從業員一個公道

2011-03-27T20:07:00.000-07:00

試想一名藥房的售貨員，向顧客推銷一罐聲稱含有豐富維他命、適合兒童發展需要的最新奶粉後被發現原來這是一罐「毒奶粉」，嬰兒食用後更變為「大頭BB」。事件曝光後，政府即時檢控藥房售貨員，罪名是「對產品認識不足」及「向顧客披露不夠」。對於「毒奶粉」的來源及為何流入市場卻一概不管，相信各位讀者也會認為是荒天下之大謬，然而以上的鬧劇卻真真實實地發生在銀行前線員工身上。
自雷曼事件發生後，多位銀行前線員工因涉嫌誤導投資者而被捕。前線銷售同事的鬱結一直無法申辯！今年2月18日香港法院就雷曼迷債案件，撤銷一名銀行銷售職員的所有控罪，香港銀行業僱員協會對此裁決感到欣慰，也認為是還銀行從業僱員的一個公道！

事實上，2008年爆發的雷曼事件觸發起金融海嘯，多年來一直困擾著香港金融業的發展，特別是銀行前線銷售人員，更為千夫所指，不斷受著「無講清楚風險、為指標哄騙客戶投資……」等等的無情指責！究其原因，金管局及證監會等金融業監管機構自雷曼事件發生後，一直將矛頭指向銀行前線職員，包括大規模傳召各銀行的銷售員工「審查」；新增及不斷更改銷售指引，規定銀行員工銷售債券產品時要進行錄音、將指引的所有文字讀出及客戶簽名確認等等。

銀行前線職員為代罪羔羊

以上的新措施不單讓公眾誤以為銀行前線員工是銷售雷曼債券的罪魁禍首，更直接在銀行業內製造「白色恐怖」。三年來前線銷售人員的職業生涯就如同驚弓之鳥、失去多年來與客戶建立的關係、日日更新的銷售程序及裡裡外外的種種指控，令他們無信心再在業內開展業務，更惶恐某一天會成為代罪羔羊！

誠如文首的小故事，香港一旦有「毒奶粉」出現，政府只檢控藥房售貨員而拒絕嚴格監管奶粉的衛生安全，絕對是一個不公平及不負責任的做法。金管局及證監會絕不應只選擇性檢控銀行前線員工，但卻讓負責推出產品的銀行高層置身事外。整件雷曼事件的主因在於香港的金融監管機構監管不力，只懂亂批金融產品交由銀行銷售。一旦發現問題就第一時間「卸膊」，除了有損香港國際金融中心的聲譽，更令到一些向顧客推介產品的前線銷售人員蒙受不白之冤，更甚者因此前途盡毀，鋃鐺入獄。

要保障香港銀行業僱員不再需要在「白色恐怖」下工作，銀行管理層實在有責任嚴檢投資產品的實質風險，設計適當的銷售管理程序，不宜只求盈利，把過多指標要求及工作量下壓至前線銷售人員！香港的金融監管機構更有責任做好把關的工作，不要被無良的投資產品設計者，以魚目混珠的包裝手法、混入不合理的槓桿投資手段，使平民百姓再墮「國際金融大騙局」，讓「金融毒奶粉」再次流入市場。但願金融海嘯不再來，讓金融業內的投資者及從業員都能在健全制度下，為香港能成為世界金融中心之首而努力！

李麗貞香港銀行業僱員協會主席

轉載自：文匯報 2011年3月24日(四) A21版民筆聊生

渣打14.8億回購雷曼ELN

2011-03-01T19:36:00.000-08:00

逾95%客戶受惠, 渣打14.8億回購雷曼ELN - 2011年3月2日

證監會、金管局和渣打銀行（2888）就雷曼兄弟發行的股票掛鈎票據（下稱雷曼ELN）達成協議，渣打在非承認責任的基礎上，同意向雷曼ELN的零售客戶提出回購建議，估計涉及14.8億元，涵蓋超過95%持有未到期的雷曼ELN渣打客戶。渣打是繼星展之後第二間就雷曼ELN達成協議的銀行。

證監會、金管局和渣打昨天公布渣打就雷曼ELN提出的回購建議，建議適用於持有未到期雷曼ELN的渣打零售客戶，以及其雷曼ELN投資額須佔交易當時的可投資資產值5%以上（就非保本雷曼ELN而言）或10%以上（就保本雷曼ELN而言）。合資格客戶當中，大部分持有非保本雷曼ELN，只有約3%持有保本雷曼ELN。

回購建議並不適用於法團（會根據個別情況評估是否適合被視作法團，而慈善團體及非牟利機構除外）、專業投資者、渣打私人銀行（渣打的私人銀行業務部）的客戶，以及並非經渣打購買雷曼ELN的人士。渣打亦會向符合資格但已和渣打達成和解協議的客戶補發款項，並享有同等待遇。

已和解客戶補發款項

根據協議，渣打將於10天內（由昨天起計）通知客戶是否合資格參與此計劃，並於發出通知函的五星期內向合資格客戶發出回購建議或補發款項建議。客戶可於60天內接納建議，渣打會接納建議後的30天內支付款項。

雷曼兄弟的破產程序仍在進行，未到期雷曼ELN的最終價值（如有）將取決於破產程序的結果，目前無法評估。渣打於2006年8月至2008年6月期間售出總值逾50億元的雷曼ELN，其中有21.9億元雷曼ELN仍未到期，總數達2515份，由2234名個人客戶持有。

證監會及金管局作出調查後，雙方均關注到渣打在評估雷曼ELN是否適合客戶時，並沒有充分考慮集中風險因素，即客戶的投資分布過度集中於涉及同類風險的資產，有可能令客戶承擔高於適當水平的投資風險。

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮表示，中介人就證券作出推介或提供意見時，有責任確保其推介或意見適合有關客戶；過程中必須評定有關客戶的投資風險集中程度是否處於適當水平。

證監不採取紀律行動

金管局副總裁阮國恒則指出，受規管人士在評估其推介或意見是否適合客戶時，必須採取適當的方法，審慎考慮客戶的投資風險集中程度及與該客戶有關的其他因素。

鑑於渣打提出上述回購計劃，證監會將不會就雷曼ELN的分銷事宜，對渣打的有關人士採取紀律行動。金管局亦已知會渣打，表示就已接納建議的客戶而言，該局不擬就渣打銷售雷曼ELN予該等客戶而向其有關人士採取執法行動。但雙方均表示，若涉嫌犯有刑事行為則屬例外。

【經濟法律】雷曼苦主可向國際證監會申訴 - 王岸然

2011-01-15T21:55:00.000-08:00

(轉自“我係王岸然”)

筆者在另一報刊的專欄曾經談及，若然香港的證監會拒絕依法執行〈證券及期貨條例〉中第107條，為欺詐或妄顧事實或作出失實陳述的行為作出刑事檢控，對苦主可考慮到國際證監會組織（IOSCO, International Organization of Securities Commissions）作出申訴，效果會令香港證監會及香港政府在國際上名譽掃地，從而產生強大的壓力，迫政府依法執法，還苦主一個公道。

文章刊出後有相當多人詢問筆者這是甚麼一回事，對國際證監是甚麼東西未有認識，筆者特在本欄再介紹。

國際證監不是聯合國下的組織，沒有官方身份，是民間組織，但其名譽及影響力極大，是極具權威的國際監管組織，是互助也是互利組織，亦方便了各國證監的人才可以自由流通。這組織成立於1983年，香港的證監會在成立後的第二年1993便已經加入成為正式會員。中國證監會於1995年亦加入該組織，成為正式會員。

據其網頁資料，國際證監現時共有196會員，正式會員114；聯擊會員11個，附屬會員有71個，是國際上獨一無二，並無類其他組織。組織有強大的司法互助功能，有多條正式協定，包括性的商業行為準則、審計標準、金融合併監管、會計標準、洗黑錢行為，而直接與雷曼苦主有關的，為〈跨國證券與期貨欺詐〉協定。在上述的範圍之內，各國的證監有責任互通資訊，互相合作，包括代別國的證監在本土進行調查工作。香港的〈證券及期貨條例〉在03年通過之時，便因而加入條款，授權香港證監在司法方面與國際合作。

為了履行對國際證監的責任，條例加入新的條文，為前〈證監會條例〉所沒有，其一是載明證監會須落實的監管目標，與雷曼苦主有關連的，是對公眾投資者有適當保障，儘量減少犯罪失當行為；要減少系統風險。這些目標香港證監做不到，是失禮於國際的。

從國際證監的網頁，大家亦可以得知國際的共同監管目標，是要保護投資者，要監管，監督和進行國際公認的一致的執法標準（Internationally recognized and consistent standard of regulation）。證監會在雷曼事件的前後有履行這些國際的監管指標嗎？答案明顯是否定的。

107條所針對的失實陳述及詐騙性行為，是普通法中固有，亦是各國的法律中大同小異地存在的犯罪行為。試問有哪一處國家的法律容許商人自由詐騙顧客？

證監與香港警方，面對雷曼事件之後數以萬計的投訴，到今天竟然只有準備或正在起訴兩件涉及107條的案件，筆者更懷疑只是選擇兩件證據不強的案件檢控作為交待，這與公然欺壓苦主，公然保護銀行何異？

雷曼苦主應告訴國際證監及各主要大國的證監，香港的證監只是一個聽命於特區政府的傀儡，完全沒有獨立性。 雖有高薪，國際上有良知的證監精英千萬別到香港工作，亦提醒國際社會，千萬不要僱用曾經在香港證監會工作過的人，這些人就算精英能幹，但欠缺的是對專業的忠誠與良心。

雷曼苦主大聯盟召集各銀行苦主大會

2011-01-12T07:43:00.001-08:00

!!雷曼事件「突破性發展」與「對銀行致命行動」!!

日期: 2011年1月15日(星期六) 時間: 晚上 7:00時–10:00時

地點: 香港小童群益會,香港灣仔駱克道 3號 101室
內容: 『突破性發展策略』 - 王岸然
『對銀行致命行動』 - 王岸然

邀請全港掛鈎票據 (ELN)苦主, 未獲百份百賠償的迷債及星债苦主,
被屈經驗投資者群組,精債苦主和購買其他雷曼產品未獲賠償的人士。

韋奕禮請辭揭監管危機 - 王岸然

2010-12-29T07:25:00.000-08:00

2010年12月29日

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮於本月9日突然請辭，此事反映政府在金融危機與雷曼事件爆發之後，並無認真正視危機及汲取教訓，進而要迫走韋奕禮這一類國際級的行政專才，令香港的金融監管變得更加虛假和人治。

一個人的去留，本來不應與一個制度的存廢掛鈎，但若然將這幾年間發生的重要財經事件與韋奕禮的突然離任串在一起，便看到香港的深層次危機再次顯現，政府已經為財團操控，獨立的監管制度已名存實亡。

人才離職庸才到位

香港只有一個證監會，證券監管工作予人與其他獨立非政府機關，如申訴專員或私隱專員屬同樣的東西，主管其事者不過是一名首長級人物而已，其位置可以隨便更換。不同的是，韋奕禮年薪900多萬，比特首高出幾倍，比負責監管他的財經事務局局長陳家強及財政司司長曾俊華高出更大比數；為何他值那樣的高薪？

韋奕禮不是那些一生在本地官僚系統內打滾的人物，而是國際證監集團人才的一員，有沒有工作一回事，身價與個人名譽是國際級別，毋庸置疑。證監是一門國際化的專業，國際證監會有一百八十多個會員，全世界的證券業九成以上受到同一類別的證監制度所監管（英、美、澳、加的證監為先進的代表模式）；世上比香港先進的監管制度其實不多，香港能夠付出比先進地區更為優厚的薪酬，卻不能留住人才，高薪位置由本地或是來自國內的人治庸才所佔據，這就是金融災難及失誤連番出現的原因。

苦主不忿抗爭至今

韋奕禮「劈炮」之後，政府透過自己的媒體放出消息，指韋是另有高就，會返回倫敦交易所任職云云。事實上，韋當年正是失意於倫敦交易所的人事鬥爭，已經回到鄉下準備搞點小生意終老，適逢香港證監會總裁有空缺，所以到來搵食。當然，此一時、彼一時，今天韋奕禮衣錦還鄉，有更高成就，是完全可能的事。不過，高級任命不可能不會多等三個月、到韋9月合約期滿為止；今天韋奕禮主動辭職，繼任無人，並不是好來好去的安排。

眾所周知，韋奕禮在雷曼事件的立場，一直是投資產品持牌者若有違規銷售的問題（mis-selling），會依國際證監的慣例，要銷售者負起全責，亦因而證監成功迫令包括新鴻基在內的三家雷曼產品分銷商要百分百賠償。這是去年初的事。

問題在於，經銀行監管出售同一類產品之時，監管之責與權全在銀行，而銀行的監管者任志剛卻站到銀行一邊，於是出現同一雷曼事件，卻出現不同賠償的六成方案；亦所以被迫接受六成賠償的苦主心存不忿，抗爭到今天，依然堅持事件尚未解決。

韋奕禮與任志剛的分別在哪裏？不是誰更有能力，而是一個是過江龍，以國際證監的監管標準為念；一個則是一生在香港的官僚與商界銀行之間打滾為生的地頭蟲。大家同樣面對特區政府可在適當時候另請高明的局面，韋堅持保護投資者為優先的國際證監專業，另一人則盤算要與業界打好關係，準備退休之時還可有再上層樓的空間。香港的官僚莫不如是。

自11月底，雷曼苦主不停向證監會施壓，要求證監依〈證券及期貨條例〉第一百零七條檢控銀行從業員；這一着擊中銀行的死穴，因為執行證券大法的權力還在證監之手，不須得到金管局的同意，因為不是業界監管而是刑事檢控。

問題是政府在最初就經由陳家強與曾俊華提議銀行先支付六成的所謂和解方案，作為政府不再追究的交換條件，而曾政府一直以官僚應付刁民的思維看問題，以為一人讓一步是最好的方案，只是這個六成和解方案本質是「不平等條約」，迷債苦主固然從不順氣，迷債以外的雷曼苦主只能私下與銀行和解，賠償有多有少，但亦無一人順氣，雷曼問題從無解決。

轉向國際提出申訴

過去兩個月的中環，雷曼苦主的示威威力比法輪功更強大，證監會不肯接受苦主報案的笑話，連外國金融報章亦已開始報道；這本是金融中心的天大笑話，只是香港人面對曾政府多樣的施政荒謬，已經麻木不覺。

這就是韋奕禮提早盡快離職的主要原因。去年政府拋出六成方案之時，是趁韋奕禮放假不在港，要證監會董事會通過決議接受；韋奕禮揹了黑鍋，卻受制於保密法例不能多言，今天面對苦主的天天示威，為保一己的清譽，只好提早離任。

可以預見，面對這樣一個官商橫行、不講法治的政府，證監會之內的國際人才專家會紛紛離去，國際的證監專才亦望而卻步，不肯來港，香港的監管制度名存實亡。

還有年半時間的曾蔭權不會拆彈，這是官僚習性，人人只會在任內自保。能藉第一百零七條迫銀行合理賠償的，只有政府及證監會，政府不動，苦主豈非無望？

筆者以為，苦主應將事件帶到國際層面，苦主可以直接向各國的證監會提交事件的報告，也可以直接向國際證監會組織（International Organization of Securities Commissions）提出申訴，給全球一百八十多個證監會評評道理，讓拒絕依法保護投資者的香港證監與香港政府在國際上名譽掃地。

檢控銀行職員雷曼事件新發展

2010-11-30T19:58:00.000-08:00

檢控銀行職員雷曼事件新發展 - 王岸然, 2010年12月1日

過去個多星期在中環上班而又有機會行經遮打大廈的中產一族，一定十分奇怪，為何遮打大廈似乎已經被示威者封鎖了，但新聞沒有報道是什麼事。幾個示威者到中聯辦請願，議題耳熟能詳，新聞報道不會缺少，但百多名雷曼苦主圍困了一座內有大量國際投資公司的大廈個多星期，沒有報道也沒有分析文章告訴大家發生了什麼事情。本文可能是大家疑惑的唯一解說資訊。

只知追逐慣性新聞的記者也許應該上雷曼苦主大聯盟的網頁參考一下那些Youtube，以決定事件是否符合新聞價值，但對一直有評論雷曼事件的筆者而言，這是一件涉及以百億計的金融大案，結果可能是有數以千計的銀行家（從業員）被刑事檢控，事件是從根基上動搖了香港的金融中心地位。這樣的大事沒有新聞價值乎？

似乎也不盡然，上星期地方法院開審了第一宗雷曼銷售過程的刑事檢控，依據的是《證券及期貨條例》第一○七條，被告的銀行經理涉嫌「以欺詐地或罔顧實情地誘使他人投資金錢」，經理被控九項控罪，涉及誘騙六名客戶近680萬元購買迷債產品。

雙重標準非法治

此案肯定只屬冰山一角，成千上萬的苦主有類似經歷，並曾經到證監、金管局及警方申訴，只是大多苦主及市民對事件屬刑事（詐騙投資者），還是民事（投資失誤，不良銷售手法）根本搞不清楚，普通市民還以為在所謂六成賠償方案之後，事件已經了結。殊不知整批雷曼產品以不同名目有問題的銷售手法，落入投資者手中涉及240億元，所謂六成和解的迷債項目，只涉數十億元，而和解只涉及民事，不涉及刑事的責任。

本欄早在本年3月31日已經清楚介紹什麼是一○七條，同時建議雷曼苦主應發動一次萬人報案大行動，不能讓事件不了了之。這不單是關係個別苦主的私人投資得失問題，而是關係我們的金融經濟體系之內，不能容許大量詐騙性的銷售行為，而我們的法治體系，亦不能容許雙重標準，對小販商戶欺詐一塊幾毛就嚴厲執法，但大商家大銀行就享有特權，中資銀行就更享有特權中的特權，大家反而不聞不問。

大家以為事件已經曲解，忽略了和解只屬迷債系列，在整個雷曼產品的銷售過程之中只佔五成多的比例，而和解只屬民事，沒有解決違法欺詐銷售的更嚴重問題，而所謂和解方案，只及六成，那是銀行必定能從雷曼遺下的抵押產品取回的金額，銀行不單沒有承認任何責任，更可以有掙！投資者是在沒有選擇的情況下接受了「不平等條約」，去年有社論級的評論讚賞和解方案，呼籲苦主接受，報刊更從此當完成了輿論監督的責任，社會的反智沉淪，豈是偶然？

事隔兩年零三個月，始有第一宗依據第一○七條的刑事檢控，這個延誤何等驚人，背後的政治含義如何且不論，法治原則是延誤就會破壞公平（delay defeats equity），兩年間已經有不少年紀大的苦主因病過身或成危疾，如果一年只檢控幾人，要多少年才能完成還苦主一個公道的責任？苦主要等政府先檢控，取得勝訴的結果，才能展開民事的訴訟，因為這才有取勝的把握。民事官司從來是燒金錢的遊戲，香港沒有集體訴訟（class action）的制度，對無財勢的小投資者如何公道？正義大狀議員當年高調干預，抽完政治油水就不聞不問，這是哪一門子的正義？

爭取權益要團結

上星期五在地院檢控的中銀經理張瑰瑰案，傳媒算是有詳細報道，案件的內容，大家若不善忘，兩年前就聽過不少類同的故事。銀行職員形容雷曼產品是「保本」，與七大企業掛鈎，與一般基金或是定息債券無異，這都是典型的失實陳述手法，從來都是法律所不容許，只是有財勢的銀行不承認責任，背後給予特區政府壓力，靠銀行家支持上位的任志剛終於下台之後，政府才肯進行第一單案件的檢控，這與「六四」時的中共領導人一天不死盡，「六四」不會平反一樣，這是人話，不是法治，香港在這方面日漸與大陸「統一」。

公權力不可靠，跟紅頂白的傳媒也不主持公道之時，雷曼苦主能依靠的，只有自身的力量，公民直接行動（Direct Action）爭取自身的權益，從來是最為有效。菜園村的村民只有一百幾十人，但行動堅定勇敢，就令到政府的收地行動一再延後。

雷曼苦主也不團結，也不是人人積極，坐待別人行動，坐待政府行動的大有人在，這與社會的大環境一樣，但還是有少數人努力不懈；遮打大廈是證監會所在，證監會本來有法定責任接受投案，但由於在枱底下與金管局達成協議，同意銀行的六成和解方案就是事件的了結，所以今天在沒有合理法律理由的情況下，拒絕雷曼苦主報案，造成過去個多星期遮打大廈外又棺材又打鼓的奇景。證監會的職責本來是要當小投資者的守護天使，但在官僚政治之下反而出賣了小投資者的利益，於心無愧嗎？

迷債，銀行銷售，風險披露，騙局，

2010-09-24T22:32:00.000-07:00

騙局，騙子，西裝革履的騙子，道貌岸然的銀行家, 這之間都有甚麼聯繫呢？

電影“Public Enemy”, 一貫以搶劫銀行為生的大盜對在銀行里的客戶說：“我們只搶劫銀行，我們不搶劫銀行客戶”。

電影“華爾街”的格言是：“貪婪是好” （"greedy is good"）。
從設計和銷售迷你債券，星債，和精明債券的銀行和銀行家身上，我們看到了 “greedy is good” 的精神。

現在“華爾街2：Money Never Sleeps" 要上映了。不知會有甚麼新的格言。

迷債發行章程的「本公司債券是甚麼？」一節，
有「誰應購買本公司債券？本公司債券是否適合所有人？」

本公司債券僅適合以下投資者：

 尋求美元或港元定息季度利息收入；

 有信心所述的七間該等相關主體在本公司債券發行日至到期日前第二個營業日不會受到信貸事件 (即「破產」、「未能償債」或「重組」，包括例如未能償還大額借貸、破產、進行不利的債券重組)影響等事件，且可以承擔當發生任何上述事件後可能損失投資的風險；

 願意接受本公司可選擇延長A組及/或B組債券的到期日；及

 就任何組別的本公司債券而言,願意接受本公司可選擇在二零零七年九月十五日或其後任何付息日提早償還本金額。

這四點具體要求大概是最容易讓零售客戶讀懂的，也是對潛在客戶的一個簡明要求。

大家可見，這只是提到7間著名公司，完全沒有提到CDO裏面信貸掛鉤的100多個公司。寫出這麼個簡要的“誰應購買本公司債券？本公司債券是否適合所有人？”，目的是甚麼呢？令投資者誤以爲迷債的風險只跟6－7個著名公司信貸掛鉤？

Court Filing (abstract)

2010-08-13T22:59:00.000-07:00

Case 1:10-cv-00017-WHP, Filed 08/09/10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
USDC SDNYDOCUMENTELECTRONICALLYFILED
DOC #:
DATE FILED:~$ ~(C)

KA KIN WONG, et al.,10 Civ. 0096 (WHP)Appeal from Bankruptcy
Plaintiffs/Appellants,Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)
-against-
HSBC USA, INC., et al.,Defendants/Appellees.

WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge:

Plaintiffs/Appellants Ka Kin Wong and six other noteholders appeal from twoorders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Peck,Bankr. J.)(the "Bankruptcy Court") dated November 23, 2009 and December 3, 2009 dismissingtheir Class Action Complaint (the "Complaint") with prejudice. While the events giving rise tothis adversary proceeding are complicated, two discrete issues are presented on appeal: (1)whether Plaintiffs have standing to sue, and (2) whether amendment of the Complaint would befutile.For the following reasons, this Court affirms in part, reverses in part, and vacates in part the Bankruptcy Court's orders.

BACKGROUND

1.Parties on Appeal

Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of purchasers of structured finance notes-alsoknown as "Minibonds"between June 16, 2003 and September 15, 2008. (Appellants'Designation of Contents of the Record Designation Number ("DN") 1: Complaint against HSBC,USA, et al. dated Mar. 12, 2009 ("Compl.") ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs brought claims against PacificInternational Finance Limited ("Pacific Finance" or the "Issuer"), the issuer of the Minibonds, aswell as several other entities and individuals. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-38.) The underlying transactionsand relationships among the various entities are opaque.

On appeal, Plaintiffs pursue their claims against only two entities: HSBC BankUSA, N.A. ("HSBC Bank" or the "Trustee"), and Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.("LBSF"). HSBC Bank is the trustee of collateral securing Pacific Finance's paymentobligations to the Minibonds holders and LBSF. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs mistakenly namedHSBC Bank's predecessor as trustee, (DN 6 Ex. 2: Affidavit of Song Qun Sworn, ProgrammeProspectus dated Mar. 12, 2007 at 7), and now appeal the Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave toamend the Complaint to name HSBC Bank. Defendant LSBF is a bankrupt Delawarecorporation and a debtor in the underlying bankruptcy proceedings, which involve severalLehman entities (the "Lehman Bankruptcy"). (Compl.IT38, 67.)

II.The Minibonds Program

Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief relating to $1.6 billion in Minibonds issued by Pacific Finance in separate, but virtually identical, series. (Compl. ¶ 45.) PacificFinance sold the Minibonds to retail investors located primarily in Hong Kong, and marketedthem as "credit-linked" to financially stable companies and backed by AAA-rated collateral.(Compl. ¶¶ 45, 47, 51.) As a consequence of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.'s ("LehmanBrothers") collapse, the Minibonds are now worthless. (Compl.T~67-69, 101-04.)

While the Minibonds were issued by Pacific Finance, Lehman Brothers and otherLehman entities designed the Minibonds program. (Compl. ¶¶ 46, 48, 50, 82.) The details ofLehman Brothers' involvement emerged during an inquiry conducted by Hong Kong regulatoryauthorities. In that proceeding, officers of HSBC Holdings Plc ("HSBC Holdings"), thecompany at the top of the HSBC pyramid, testified that Lehman Brothers appointed HSBC Bankas trustee of the Minibonds collateral.'(Compl. ¶ 82.) Lehman Brothers also compiled theprospectus for each Minibonds series. (Compl. ¶ 82.) Pacific Finance existed only "to issue the[Minibonds]. It [was for] all intents and purposes a creature of Lehman's design .... [PacificFinance was] not an active company ... and HSBC's role as a Director [was] not an active role.. . ." (Compl. 182.) Indeed, the Complaint alleges that Lehman Brothers and LBSF, not the Issuer, "selected the collateral" for the Minibonds. (Compl. ¶ 50.)

Pacific Finance secured its obligation to pay interest to the Minibonds holdersthrough two related transactions.'First, Pacific Finance purchased notes from Saphir FinancePublic Limited Company (the "Saphir Notes"). (DN 9 Ex.1, Ex. B: Tenth Supplemental Trust

1 The Hong Kong testimony in the Complaint does not distinguish among the various HSBC andLehman entities. At times, it is difficult to discern the specific entity referenced in the testimony.

Deed ("Tenth Deed") at 1.) The Saphir Notes were placed in trust with HSBC Bank as Trustee.(Tenth Deed at 1.) Pacific Finance also executed a credit default swap agreement with LBSF.(Tenth Deed at 1; Compl. 154.) Under the credit default swap, LBSF agreed to pay PacificFinance a sum equal to what Pacific Finance owed the Minibonds holders in exchange for theinterest earned by Pacific Finance on the Saphir Notes. (Tenth Deed at 15-16.) Because LehmanBrothers and LBSF exercised control over the Minibonds program, Plaintiffs assert that LBSF"negotiate[d] with itself over the essential terms of the swap agreements." (Compl. 150.)

The Saphir Notes are governed by a principal trust deed and a supplemental trustdeed issued for each series of Minibonds. (Compl.IT84-85.) These trust deeds and theprospectuses advertising the Minibonds sale set forth the "duties and obligations" of the Trusteeand the Issuer. (Compl.~T84-87.) The trust deeds contain,inter alia,provisions governing thepriority of payment in the event the Saphir Notes are liquidated. (Compl.IT84, 90.) The partiesdisagree about the operation of these provisions and who has priority to the Saphir Notes.Choice of law provisions in the trust deeds provide that they are to be construed under Englishlaw. (DN 9 Ex. 1: Principal Trust Deed ("Principal Trust Deed"), Sec. 17(a).) The prospectusesrepresented that "neither Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. nor any of its subsidiaries or affiliateshas any equity interest in, or any control over, us [Pacific Finance/HSBC]." (Compl. ¶¶ 84, 87.)

According to the Complaint, Pacific Finance is controlled by HSBC Bank(Cayman) Limited ("HSBC Cayman"). (Compl. 129.) In turn, HSBC Cayman is controlled byHSBC Holdings. (Compl. ¶ 31.) HSBC Holdings also controls the Trustee's predecessor,

2 Plaintiffs brought claims against other entities and individuals alleging rights to collateralpurchased as part of additional transactions. (Compl.118,32-37, 110, 118.) Because Plaintiffsdo not appeal the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of these claims, that collateral is not at issue.

HSBC Bank USA.3(Compl. 13 1.)
Another HSBC entity---HSBC Bank Plc-filed a claim for $234 million in theLehman Bankruptcy. (DN 30 Ex. 6: Amended Schedule of Assets and Liabilities for LehmanBrothers at 3.) In addition, a Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner's report published after the orderson appeal discloses that HSBC Holdings and Lehman Brothers cooperated extensively duringLehman's collapse to ensure that Lehman Brothers satisfied its obligations to HSBC Holdings.(Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, dated Mar. 11, 2010 at 1321-26.)

III.Procedural History

On October 3, 2008, LBSF filed for bankruptcy. (Counter-Designation of ItemsTo Be Included In Record On Appeal ("C-DN") 10: Supplement to Proof of Claim in Chapter 11Case of LBSF ¶ 10; Compl. ¶ 67.) Thereafter, LBSF's counsel informed HSBC Bank that anyattempt to liquidate the Saphir Notes may be subject to the automatic stay provisions of theUnited States Bankruptcy Code and demanded the Trustee cease all further action. (DN 30 Ex.5: Pls.' Opp'n to Def. [LBSF's] Mot. to Dismiss the Compl., Letter dated Nov. 25, 2008.)HSBC Bank complied.

On March 12, 2009, Plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding in the BankruptcyCourt. Count One of the Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the Minibonds collateral isthe property of the Minibonds holders, not the bankruptcy estate, based on breaches of contractand fiduciary duty by the Issuer and Trustee. (Compl. ¶¶ 97-108.) Count Two seeks to enjoin LBSF and the Trustee from impairing the Minibonds collateral and requests transfer of the

3 This Court presumes that an amended complaint would include the same allegation.

collateral to the Minibonds holders. (Compl.IT109-13.) Count Three seeks a resulting orconstructive trust on the Minibonds collateral for the benefit of the Minibonds purchasers.(Compl. ¶¶ 114-21.) Finally, the remaining counts of the Complaint-Counts Four throughThirteen-assert damages claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence,unjust enrichment, and aiding and abetting against the Trustee, the Issuer, and the Issuer'sdirectors and parent company. (Compl. ¶¶ 122-89.)

On May 27, 2009, LBSF and HSBC Bank USA each moved to dismiss theComplaint. (DN 5: Notice of HSBC USA, Inc.'s Mot. to Dismiss the [Complaint], Abstain orStay the Adversary Proceeding; DN 9: Notice of Mot. of [LBSF] for an Order Dismissing theAdversary Compl.)

In a ruling from the bench, Bankruptcy Judge Peck dismissed the Complaint. TheBankruptcy Court dismissed Counts One through Three for lack of standing on three principalgrounds. First, relying on the trust deeds and English law, the Bankruptcy Court held thatPlaintiffs lack standing to bring a direct claim against Defendants. The relevant provisions of thetrust deeds state that "[a] person who is not a party to [the deed] has no right under the Contracts(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 [("Contracts Act of 1999")] to enforce any term of [the deed]except and to the extent (if any) that [the deed] expressly provides for such Act to apply to any ofits terms." (Principal Trust Deed at 3; Tenth Deed at 3). The Bankruptcy Court held that"[t]hese provisions fit squarely within the tenets of governing English law," which "provides thatit is a trustee and not a beneficiary of a trust that is the appropriate party to bring an action onbehalf of the trust beneficiaries." (Tr. of Nov. 18, 2009 Hr'g (the "Bankr. Ct. Ruling") at 25.)

Second, the Bankruptcy Court held that it would be futile to allow Plaintiffs to amend the Complaint to bring a derivative claim on behalf of the Trustee. (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at26.) Construing English law, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that a trust beneficiary may stepinto the shoes of the Trustee and sue on its behalf only in special circumstances. (Bankr. Ct.Ruling at 26.) Applying this standard, the Bankruptcy Court reasoned that (i) the "mere fact thatthe trustee has not filed a lawsuit [seeking to enforce Plaintiffs' right to the Minibonds collateral]is not a sufficient `special circumstance;"' and (ii) the fact that an HSBC affiliate filed a proof ofclaim in the Lehman Bankruptcy does not establish that the Trustee is conflicted because "thereis no allegation of any actual conflict." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 26.)

Third, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that it would be futile to allowamendment of the Complaint to name the proper trustee-HSBC Bank-"for the reasons setforth in this ruling." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 22.) However, it is not apparent from the transcript ofthe ruling what those reasons were.

The Bankruptcy Court also dismissed Counts Four through Thirteen because theywere "not related to the debtors' proceedings." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 29.) The Bankruptcy Courtstated that an adversary proceeding is considered related to a bankruptcy case "if the outcomemight have a conceivable [e]ffect on the estate." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 28.) After noting thatCounts Four through Thirteen "involve tort, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary dutyclaims against various defendants, none of whom are debtors" in the Lehman Bankruptcy,(Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 27), the Bankruptcy Court held that "[i]nasmuch as Counts [Four] through[Thirteen] comprise actions governed by foreign law between two or more non-debtors, suchclaims, regardless of the outcome, will not affect the debtor's bankruptcy cases.... Resolutionof these claims will have no [e]ffect on the rights of debtors or creditors in the debtors' bankruptcy cases, nor will it have any [e]ffect on the debtors' estates." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 29.)DISCUSSION

1.Standard of Review

A district court reviews a bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear error and itslegal conclusionsde novo.Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013;In re Vouzianas,259 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir.2001);In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.,146 F.3d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1998). The dismissal of acomplaint is a legal conclusion which is subject tode novoreview.Selevan v. N.Y. ThruwayAuth.,584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) ("We reviewde novoa district court's dismissal of acomplaint for lack of standing.");see alsoRaine v. Lorimar Prods., Inc.,71 B.R. 450, 452(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (`Because this is an appeal from [a Bankruptcy Court's] decision on a motionto dismiss for failure to state a claim, purely legal considerations are involved, and thus thiscourt's review must bedenovo.").When reviewing such a dismissal, a court "accept[s] allfactual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor."ATSI Commcn's, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).

Generally, "[a] bankruptcy court's denial of a request to amend [the complaint] isreviewed for abuse of discretion."In re Calpine Corp.,406 B.R. 463, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)(citingIn re Enron Corp.,419 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). However, "[i]f that denial wasbased on an interpretation of law," such as the determination that an amendment would be futile,a court employsde novoreview. SeeDougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of ZoningAppeals,282 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2002);see alsoRicciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,941 F.2d119, 122-24 (2d Cir. 1991) (reviewingde novothe lower court's determination that amendment would be futile).

A court "should freely give leave [to amend the Complaint] when justice sorequires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Particularly where a court grants a motion to dismiss, "theusual practice is to grant leave to amend."Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau,180 F.3d 42, 53 (2d Cir.1999).A court may deny leave to amend as futile only "if the proposed claim could notwithstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)."Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Mach.Corp.,310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002). Indeed, futility means that it is "beyond doubt that theplaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his amended claims."Pangburn v. Culbertson,200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotations and citations omitted).

II.Claims Against LBSF: Counts One & Two

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their direct claims against LBSF and the denialof leave to replead those claims derivatively. This Court addresses Count Three of theComplaint separately for the reasons articulated in Section IV,infra.

a. Direct Claim Against LBSF

Plaintiffs appeal the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of their direct claims againstLBSF on two principal grounds: (1) Plaintiffs have standing under English law to sue LBSFdirectly because LBSF is a co-beneficiary under the trust; and (2) the Bankruptcy Court'sreliance on the provisions of the trust deeds prohibiting non-parties from enforcing the deeds'terms was misplaced. Because Plaintiffs lack standing under English law to bring a direct claimagainst LBSF, this Court need not address Plaintiffs' second contention.

Under English law, a trustee generally has "a duty to protect and preserve the trust estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries ...."Alsop Wilkinson v. Neary,[ 1996] 1 W.L.R.1220, 1224 (Ch.). As such, "[n]ormally [it is] the trustee who has a right of action [and] is theproper person to enforce [the trust]."Hayim v. Citibank NA,[1987] A.C. 730, 733 (P.C.); seealsoAlsop,1W.L.R. at 1224 ("Trustees have a duty to ... represent the trust in a third partydispute."). Plaintiffs seek to circumvent this general principle by invoking the so-called"beneficiaries dispute" theory.Under that theory, "where the dispute is between rival claimantsto a beneficial interest in the subject matter of the trust.... the duty of the trustee is to remainneutral and ... leav[e] it to the rivals to fight their battles."Alsop,1W.L.R. at 1225.

Plaintiffsargue this theory applies here because LBSF persuaded the Bankruptcy Court that it is abeneficiary rather than a third party under the trust.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs mischaracterize the Bankruptcy Court's ruling.The Bankruptcy Court did not describe LBSF as a trust beneficiary. Instead, relying onGregsonv. HAE Trs. Ltd.,[2008] EWHC 1006 (Ch.), the Bankruptcy Court found that the Trustee wasthe appropriate party to bring an action on behalf of the trust beneficiaries, InGregson,a trustbeneficiary brought suit against the director of a corporate trustee for impairment of trustproperty. The beneficiary argued that a corporate trustee's claims against its directors are heldfor the trust's beneficiaries, thereby empowering them to sue directly.Gregson,EWHC 1006 at119,22.TheGreszsoncourt rejected this notion and described the general rule that "a director ofa trustee company does not owe a fiduciary duty to the beneficiary of the trust," and absent thatduty, a trust beneficiary has no direct claim against the director.Gregson,EWHC 1006 atIT44,56, 69.

As the Gregsonanalysis illustrates, the core inquiry is whether the potentially liable third party owed a duty to the trust's beneficiaries. SeeGregson,EWHC 1006 at¶T44,46, 57-58 (stating that if a direct claim against the directors was valid, it would "circumvent theclear and established principle that no direct duty is owed by the directors to the beneficiaries");see alsoRoberts v. Gill & Co,[2010] UKSC 22, ¶¶ 46, 110 (S.C.) (beneficiary sought to amendto bring a derivative claim where it was "accepted that a claim that the [third parties] owed aduty of care to the beneficiaries would be difficult to sustain").While LBSF is a party to thetrust deeds, Plaintiffs do not allege the existence of any fiduciary relationship betweenthemselves and LBSF, Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court properly held that Plaintiffs lackstanding under English law to sue LBSF directly.

b.Derivative Claims Against LBSF

The Bankruptcy Court also concluded that re-pleading derivative claims againstLBSF would be futile because Plaintiffs cannot allege the existence of special circumstances. Inmaking this determination, the Bankruptcy Court considered Plaintiffs' allegations that theTrustee failed to bring suit against LBSF and that an HSBC entity filed a proof of claim in theLehman Bankruptcy.

Under English law, a trust beneficiary may bring a derivative suit against a thirdparty when "special circumstances" are present. The "special circumstances"rule, articulated inHayim v. Citibank NA,provides:

[A] beneficiary has no cause of action against a third party save inspecial circumstanceswhich embrace a failure, excusable orinexcusable, by the trustees to the beneficiary to protect the trustestate or to protect the interests of the beneficiary in the trustestate.Hayim,A.C. 730 at 748. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom recently addressed the "special circumstances" rule and summarized the relevant authorities as follows:
The special circumstances which were identified in the earliestauthorities as justifying a beneficiary's action were fraud on thepart of the trustee, or collusion between the trustee and the thirdparty, or the insolvency of the trustee, but it has always been clearthat these are merely examples of special circumstances, and thatthe underlying question is whether the circumstancesaresufficiently special to make it iust for the beneficiary to have theremedy.Roberts,UKSC 22 at746, 114 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of the United Kingdomnoted that a court has "wide latitude in evaluating ... special circumstances," taking into account"all [of] the relevant circumstances."Roberts,UKSC 22 at ¶¶ 76, 78, 114.

Through the prism of these English law principles, this Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs cannot allege special circumstances. Despite representations in the Minibonds prospectuses that neither Lehman Brothers nor any of itssubsidiaries exercised control over the Issuer, Lehman Brothers designed the Minibonds programand directed the Issuer's activities.As a party to the trust deeds, LSBF was substantiallyinvolved in that process. The Issuer then created a trust that, in certain circumstances, distributesits only collateral to aLehmanentity, rather than the trust'ssolebeneficiary. Juxtaposed againstthe promise that the Minibonds would be secured by highly-rated collateral, this is an odd result.SeeRoyal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v. Tan,[1995] 2 A.C. 378, 386-87 (P.C.) ("If, for his ownpurposes, a third party deliberately interferes in that relationship by assisting the trustee indepriving the beneficiary of the property held for him by the trustee, the beneficiary should beable to look for recompense to the third party as well as the trustee.");see alsoRoberts,UKSC22 at ¶¶ 46, 114 ("[T]he underlying question is whether the circumstances are sufficiently specialto make it just for the beneficiary to have the remedy.");In re Field,[ 1971 ] 1 W.L.R. 555, 561

Case 1:10-cv-00017-WHP
Document 14Filed 08/09/10
Page 13 of 18

(Ch.)(holding that special circumstances existed and "justice require[d] that the plaintiff, who isthe only other person interested [in the property], should be allowed to have [his claim] properlytried before a court"), Furthermore, the recently released Examiner's report reveals cooperationbetween HSBC and Lehman Brothers at the highest levels during Lehman Brothers' collapse.

Given the totality of these circumstances, this Court cannot find that it is "beyond doubt that theplaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] amended claims."Pangburn v.Culbertson,200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999).

On appeal, the parties advance arguments concerning the operation of the trustdeeds' payment priority provisions and potential class certification problems caused by asettlement arranged by Hong Kong regulatory authorities.While interesting, these arguments areextraneous to the issue of standing; they concern the merits of Plaintiffs' claims and are notbefore this Court on appeal. At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs should be permitted toreplead Counts One and Two as derivative claims against LBSF. The Bankruptcy Court's denialof leave to replead is reversed.

III.Claims Against the Trustee: Counts One & Two

Plaintiffs also contend that the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying leave to amendthe Complaint to name HSBC Bank as the Trustee. The Bankruptcy Court held that amendingthe Complaint would be futile for the reasons set forth in its ruling, but did not articulate thosereasons.

As an initial matter, the Bankruptcy Court's analysis of English case law ignoredthe differences between Plaintiffs' relationship with the Trustee and Plaintiffs' relationship with LBSF and the other dismissed entities. Under English law, "the basic right of a beneficiary is tohave the trust duly administered in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument ... andthe general law."Target Holdings Ltd. v. Redferns,[1996] 1 AC 421, 434 (H.L.).When atrustee unlawfully administers the trust, a trust beneficiary may sue the trustee directly. SeeHayim,A.C. at 735 ("The beneficiaries have a right to enforce the trust directly against the ...trustee.");Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co. Ltd.,[1980] 2 W.L.R. 430, 444, 452 (Ch.)(holding a trustee liable to the trust beneficiaries for willful "breach of trust");see alsoTargetHoldings,1AC at 437 ("A trustee who wrongly pays away trust money ... commits a breach oftrust and comes under an immediate duty to remedy such breach.").

The Bankruptcy Court heldthat the trustee is the proper party to bring suit on behalf of a trust beneficiary.While that mayexplain Plaintiffs' lack of standing to sue LBSF directly, it does not resolve the issue of whethera beneficiary has standing to sue his trustee. Indeed, Counts One and Two are premised onalleged breaches of contract and fiduciary duty by the Trustee for failing to distribute the SaphirNotes to Plaintiffs.

The standing provisions of the trust deeds provide that a non-party to the trust hasno right under the Contracts Act of 1999 to enforce any of the deeds' terms.While theBankruptcy Court held that these provisions fit squarely within English law, it merely quoted theprovisions without analyzing their language or the statute on which they rely. Notably, theContracts Act of 1999 allows a non-party to a contract to enforce the contract's terms if they"purport[] to confer a benefit on him," Contracts Act of 1999, c. 31, § 1 (U.K.), but expresslystates that it does not "affect any right or remedy of a third party that exists or is available apartfrom th[e] Act." Contracts Act of 1999, c. 31, § 7. Thus, while the trust deeds deprive Plaintiffs of rights derived from the Contracts Act of 1999, Plaintiffs may hold rights outside of the Act, anissue the Bankruptcy Court did not consider.

Finally, the Bankruptcy Court's rationale for dismissing Counts Four throughThirteen fails to render futile an amended complaint naming the correct trustee. The BankruptcyCourt reasoned that these counts involve questions of foreign law which will have no effect onthe rights of debtors or creditors in the underlying bankruptcy. The applicable rule is that "[a]proceeding is `related to' a [bankruptcy] case ... if the outcome might have a `conceivableeffect' on the estate."In re New 118th LLC,396 B.R. 885, 890 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citingIn re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.,980 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1992)). A conceivable effect is onewhich "could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positivelyor negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of thebankrupt estate."In re New 118th LLC,396 B.R. at 890 (citingIn re Pacor, Inc.,743 F.2d 984,994 (3d Cir. 1984),overruled on other grounds byThings Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,516U.S. 124, 134-35 (1995)). In this case, Plaintiffs seek to prevent the transfer of the SaphirNotes-worth $1.6 billion-to the bankruptcy estate. The effect of $1.6 billion on thebankruptcy estate is self-evident.Moreover, by instructing the Trustee to postpone distributionof the Saphir Notes, LBSF-not Plaintiffs-tethered the Saphir Notes to the LehmanBankruptcy. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave to replead Counts One andTwo against the Trustee is reversed.

IV.Constructive & Resulting Trust Claims: Count Three

In Count Three of the Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to impose a constructive or resulting trust on the Mimbonds collateral.While the Bankruptcy Court made a passingreference to these claims, it provided no analysis in its ruling. Understandably, the BankruptcyJudge was juggling a host of complex and urgent issues. Nonetheless, this Court cannot discernwhy the constructive and resulting trust claims were dismissed. SeeIn re Gucci,309 B.R. 679,685 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("This Court ... has no way of knowing whether and to what extent thedefense or elements thereof were rejected as a matter of law, [and] the reasons for any suchrejection ....").A constructive trust relies on equitable, as opposed to contractual and formaltrust, principles.See, e.g.,Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co„194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Aconstructive trust is an equitable remedy ... [whose] purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment.").Without some analysis of why standing principles derived from the trust deeds' and English lawapply to claims for a constructive or resulting trust, denial of leave to replead Count Threeagainst both the Trustee and LBSF was inappropriate. SeePanaburn,200 F.3d at 70 (denial ofleave to replead is warranted only when it is "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set offacts in support of [the] amended claims").Moreover, it is not evident whether these claims aregoverned by English law, an issue the Bankruptcy Court did not address. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Count Three is vacated and remanded for further consideration.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Counts One andTwo against LBSF is affirmed, and its denial of leave to replead those claims derivatively against LBSF is reversed. The Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave to replead Counts One and Twoagainst the Trustee is reversed. The Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Count Three is vacated.This action is remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with thisMemorandum and Order.

Dated: August 9, 2010
New York, New York

SO ORDERED:

WILLIAM H. PAULEY IIIU.S.D.J.

Counsel of Record:

Jason C. Davis, Esq.
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP100 Pine Street, Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94111

Counsel for Appellants

Howard Grant Sloane, Esq.Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP80 Pine Street
New York, NY 10005

Counsel for the HSBC Appellees

Richard W. Slack, Esq.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10153

Counsel for Appellee Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.

David S. Cohen, Esq.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP
1850 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Counsel for Intervenor Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lehman Brothers HoldingsInc. et al.

Lehman, HSBC May Be Sued by Hong Kong Investors in New York

2010-08-09T21:55:00.000-07:00

Aug. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and HSBC Holdings Plc may be sued over $1.6 billion in worthless securities sold to retail investors in Hong Kong, a judge in New York ruled yesterday.

U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley III reversed part of a decision by Lehman’s bankruptcy judge, who threw out a suit by seven holders of structured financial notes called minibonds. The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of investors in the notes from June 16, 2003, to Sept. 15, 2008, Pauley said in his decision.

An estimated $1.8 billion of minibonds were sold to about 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, according to local regulators. Lehman’s bankruptcy in 2008 wiped out the value of the investments, resulting in protests outside bank branches that have continued even after last year’s government-brokered settlement between sellers and buyers of minibonds.

“This shows that the courts around the world have investor protection at heart and investors should be protected against mis-selling by those that gain commissions from these types of investment products,” said Lewis Man, a partner at Hong Kong law firm Gall.

Hong Kong doesn’t have a mechanism for filing class action lawsuits.

David Hall, a Hong Kong-based spokesman for HSBC, didn’t immediately have a response to the ruling. Kimberly Macleod, a Lehman spokeswoman, didn’t return a voice-mail message left yesterday seeking comment.

Dismissal Reversed

In two orders, issued in November and December, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that any attempt to revise their complaint would be futile. Pauley yesterday reversed the dismissal of one count against HSBC and Lehman and permitted the plaintiffs to amend two dismissed counts.

Pacific International Finance Ltd. issued the minibonds and marketed them as linked to the credit of financially sound companies and backed by AAA-rated collateral, Pauley said. A Hong Kong regulatory investigation disclosed that Lehman designed the minibonds program, the judge said. HSBC Bank USA was selected as trustee of the collateral securing the notes, Pauley said, citing testimony in the Hong Kong proceeding.

Public outcry over the collapse of the minibonds led to street protests in Hong Kong and an investigation by regulators into how banks sold the products. The head of the city’s securities watchdog, Martin Wheatley, was called repeatedly to testify before Hong Kong’s legislature.

Two BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd. managers in June pleaded not guilty in the city’s District Court to charges of fraudulently selling minibonds. BOC Hong Kong was the biggest seller of the securities. The trial of the two employees starts in November.

Hong Kong banks offered to pay at least 60 cents on the dollar to investors in July last year as part of a buyback agreement brokered by the SFC. In an Aug. 6 press release, Hong Kong’s central bank said more than 13,000 cases were resolved by the repurchase agreement, and 179 Lehman-related complaints remain under investigation.

To contact the reporter on this story: Bob Van Voris in New York atrvanvoris@bloomberg.net; Debra Mao in Hong Kong atdmao5@bloomberg.net

2010年7月17日星債苦主記招新聞稿

2010-07-21T01:25:00.000-07:00

(转)2010年7月17日星債苦主記招新聞稿
2010年7月17日新聞會講稿

(關於7月14日) 証監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation 債券達成協議 (下稱協議)

是一份官商勾結, 互相卸責, 嫁禍於人的協議.

是一份不公開, 不公平, 不公正的三不公協議.

Constellation 債券受害苦主 (包括得到和解與得不到和解者)會繼續抗爭, 行動升級, 考慮對協議中某些條款進行司法覆核, 去信立法會. 請求第六次傳召星展作供. 并且追究星展銀行違反香港証監及期貨條例第107條, 欺詐地或罔顧實情地誘使他人投資金錢的罪行. 直至星展公開承認誤導, 退賠100%苦主, 100%本金.

1) 不公開

a) 協議稱: “星展香港在不承認任何責任下提出和解”, 有別於不承認任何錯失. 金管, 証監在調查過程中, 是否發現星展銀行”有錯”? 什麼錯? 必須公開.

b) 協議中, 証監會關注點的第1,2點, 可以理解為, 星展內部對星債評級有爭議, 一個評高, 一個評低. 現在看來, 評低的是錯, 評高的才對. 但錯在哪裡, 對在哪裡? 資料理據必須公開.

2) 不公平

a) 對被評為4級或5級風險類別客戶不公平

協議只說: “產品評為較高風險級別”. 但葉約德在証人陳述書14.10段寫明在2008年3月星展已將星債風險變為第5級高風險.第4級風險的客戶應該也不能買到第5級風險的產品，點解無得賠?

b) 即使被評為4或5級風險客戶，購買時見到產品風險是2而不是4或5, 難道他便不可以買低風險的產品嗎? 好像一個著名的賽車手，有一天他駕着一輛普通私家車時被其他車撞到，可否說他常常揸跑車，所以應該知駕車危險而不作賠償？當然不能，只要那宗交通意外不是他引致便有賠償。

c) 協議中証監會顧及：〝客戶若有較高的風險承受能力, 且具備衍生工具交易的經驗及知識，Constellation 債券可能本應是適合他們的投資產品”, 那麼有較高的風險承受能力, 但沒有衍生工具交易的經驗及知識的客戶便同是不適合購買星債，所以理應一樣獲得全賠。

d) 未見過有政府機構在嚴肅文件中, 採用”可能本應是”這種不定向的, 猜度的字眼, “可能是”, 亦可以”可能不是”, 50/50. 但協議則在這種靠估的前題下, 要執行一些真實的行動.太離譜.

3) 不公正

a) 單就產品風險一項而言, 星展在星債的申購表格, 白紙黑字標明: 產品風險程度2, 賣給客戶. 星展在交立法會迷你債券小經陳述書14.5段解釋原因時, 遺漏了星債掛勾公司”首先失責” (即一間死, 等於八間死晒) 為基準這一要項, 巳經違反証監及期貨條例298條, “披露虛假或具誤導性的資料以誘使進行交易的罪行. 葉約德在立法會答問, 回應債券掛勾多間公司, 說是分散風險, 也是遺漏星債”首先失責”條款. 協議又講 “星展香港另一部門曾將同一產品評為較高風險級別產品”. 是否顯示星展銀行高層自己都未明白產品結構和風險. 何況銷售員工? 不能做到”認識你的產品”, 星展巳屬違規, 如此明顯嚴重罪行, 不予揭露. 遣責, 處罰. 甚至起訴. 反而為星展開脫, 卸責, 并幫星展轉嫁損失, 轉嫁麻煩. 其實是証監知道星展有罪, 自己也難逃監管疏忽之責. 互相幫忙, 共同卸責. 對苦主太不公!

b) 星債產品風險定錯, 是銷售誤導. 理應通賠. 協議卻不賠予被星展香港列為較高風險級別客戶. (即4或5級), 要這些人經星展香港投訴處理程序逐一覆核, 真是豈有此理?! 這種先判你該死再要你自己舉証申訴方法, 不符合香港律法的”無罪推定”精神, 為此將考慮司法覆核.

c) 協議稱: 即使証監會成功對星展香港及/或其主管人員及僱員採取法律處分, 亦不能達到此協議取得結果. 講得冠冕堂皇, 其實是欺人之談. 只要金管, 証監判定星展 “失實陳述”. 根據香港法例284章, 苦主購買星債時所訂立的合約就有權撤銷. 撤銷合約, 苦主當然可以取回100%本金, 并可追討損害賠償. 百分之百苦主受惠.

d) 星展給客戶進行風險評級, 是以推銷產品為目的. 其中種種不良手法, 留待苦主向各位作証.

最後要說的是, 星展, 金管, 証監做出這樣協議, 非常不智.

(1) 時代不同了, 看一看美國政府告高盛, 高盛想和解. 除支付罰款, 還要認錯.

(2) 星展不賠給4或5級風險的客戶, 這些人會放過星展嗎? 星展有明顯的銷售誤導, 難道有人可以隻手遮天? 最後還是要賠. 不如就早點賠!

From: 2010年7月17日星債苦主記招新聞http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/2010E5B9B47E69C8817E697A5E6989FE582B5E88BA6E4B8BBE8A898E68B9BE696B0E8819EE7A8BF9236.php

證監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation債券達成協議

2010-07-21T01:19:00.000-07:00

2010年 7月 14日新聞稿
證監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation債券達成協議
(From: http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/TC/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=10PR80)

證券及期貨事務監察委員會（證監會）及香港金融管理局（金管局）今天公布，就星展銀行（香港）有限公司（星展香港）分銷與雷曼兄弟集團相關的Constellation債券（雷曼相關Constellation債券）的事宜，與星展香港達成協議（註1及2）。

繼證監會早前作出調查後，星展香港在不承認任何責任下，同意提出有關雷曼相關Constellation債券的和解計劃。根據有關和解協議：
星展香港將會向已購買雷曼相關Constellation債券的星展香港客戶，提出總額約6.51億元的付款建議，這些客戶必須是在購買該等債券時，獲星展香港按照其投資風險評估系統評為屬低至中級風險，即第1、2或3級風險類別的客戶（低風險客戶）（註3）；
星展香港將會向低風險客戶支付一筆款項（和解款項），金額相等於有關低風險客戶對雷曼相關Constellation債券的投資總額，加上這筆投資總額若在投資當日以定期存款形式存入星展香港，在投資當日直至今天日期為止，星展香港就該筆款項應付予有關客戶的利息，再減去迄今已支付予他們的票息後所得款項（註4）；
對於那些已經與星展香港達成和解協議的低風險客戶，星展香港將會向他們提出補發款項的建議，以達至這批客戶得以與其他低風險客戶享有相同待遇；
至於星展香港列入較高風險級別的客戶（即評定為第4或5級風險類別的客戶）所進行的雷曼相關Constellation債券的交易，星展香港將以加強的投訴處理程序逐一覆核有關這些交易的投訴（註5）；及
對於星展香港在今天日期前售出的雷曼相關Constellation債券以外的非上市結構性產品，星展香港將會採用加強的投訴處理程序，覆核有關這些產品分銷事宜的客戶投訴。

證監會在調查過程中提出以下關注：
星展香港將雷曼相關Constellation債券售予高風險級別及低風險級別這兩類客戶時，將雷曼相關Constellation債券評為低至中級風險產品（按照星展香港的風險評級制度，這些產品在1至5級的風險評級（低至高風險）中，獲評為2級風險）；
星展香港另一部門曾將同一產品評為較高風險級別的產品；
有關發行章程已述明，準投資者可能會損失全部或大部分對該等Constellation債券的投資；及
對於當時在客戶風險評級中，那些應選擇保守、穩健及均衡型投資的低至中級風險類別的客戶，雷曼相關Constellation債券未必適合他們。

這項協議的作用是，約2,160個帳戶的低風險客戶若接納上述和解計劃，便可以取回投資款項及利息並扣減作為債券持有人已收取的票息後的款項，而高風險客戶的投訴亦可獲星展香港根據加強的投訴處理程序，全面覆核有關個案。

證監會根據《證券及期貨條例》第201條達成此項協議，在考慮星展香港將提出的和解計劃時，已顧及到銷售雷曼相關Constellation債券與銷售雷曼兄弟迷你債券兩者之間多項不同之處，因此本個案的和解協議條款與迷你債券個案的不盡相同。證監會在考慮過程中顧及的重要因素包括：
有別於雷曼兄弟迷你債券，雷曼相關Constellation債券並沒有可分發予投資者的抵押品；
根據與16家銀行就迷你債券事宜達成的協議，分銷銀行同意交出從銷售迷你債券所得佣金，以成立追討基金，加快取回相關抵押品，但在本個案中，星展香港無需提供有關款項；及
有別於那些接納迷你債券協議所提出的回購建議的客戶，雷曼相關Constellation債券的持有人並無機會獲額外或補發款項或發還債款，換言之，星展香港的付款將會是低風險客戶唯一可獲付的款項。

證監會在考慮此協議的條款時，亦顧及到以下幾點：
客戶若有較高的風險承受能力，且具備衍生工具交易的經驗及知識，Constellation債券可能本應是適合他們投資的產品；
加強的投訴處理程序會處理涉及第4至5級風險類別客戶的每宗個案；對於獲星展香港投資風險評估系統評為風險承受能力較高的客戶，上述投訴處理程序應足以處理星展香港將雷曼相關Constellation債券分銷予這批客戶的過程中，可能出現的其他不規範情況；
星展香港承諾委聘獨立機構，檢討分銷制度及監控措施，確保星展香港日後以適當方式分銷非上市結構性產品；
此協議使本個案得到適當的解決，對星展香港及其客戶均有利；
即使證監會成功對星展香港及／或其主管人員及僱員採取紀律處分，亦不能達到此協議取得的結果；及
此協議取得的結果，可為雷曼相關Constellation債券的其他分銷商提供指引，從而解決已購買這些產品的客戶的投訴。

證監會及金管局認為，就它們向星展香港在監管方面提出的關注，星展香港提出的和解計劃屬合理及適當；協議亦符合公眾利益。

鑑於星展香港提出上述和解計劃，證監會將不會就雷曼相關Constellation債券的分銷事宜，對星展香港及其僱員採取進一步執法行動，但有關方面涉嫌犯有不誠實、欺詐、欺騙或屬刑事性質行為的情況除外。金管局已知會星展香港，對於那些接納星展香港和解建議的低風險客戶，金管局不打算就該等客戶的雷曼相關Constellation債券個案，對星展香港採取執法行動。

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮先生（Mr Martin Wheatley）表示："對於從星展香港購入雷曼相關Constellation債券的全部客戶而言，是次協議為他們取得成果；對於銷售這項產品的其他銀行及中介人，這項協議提供有用的指引，有助其解決較低風險客戶的相關投訴。"

他續說："中介人向客戶提供投資意見時，必須運用適當的專業知識和技能。證監會就雷曼相關的結構性產品個案進行的調查，清楚顯示證監會《操守準則》所訂的各項準則，是中介人行事的重要依據。認識產品、了解客戶的情況並向客戶提供清晰正確的資料，都是中介人必須履行的職責。這不但可以確保客戶的利益永遠居於首位，亦同時能夠保障銷售產品的中介人。"

韋奕禮先生指出："證監會一直竭力減低香港市場出現不當銷售的風險。今次這類和解計劃，使大家更清楚認識到，若我們將來未能妥善處理有關事宜，所有市場參與者將要為此付出高昂的代價。"

金管局副總裁阮國恒先生表示："金管局歡迎這項和解計劃。金管局相信，這項和解計劃既合適且合理，在考慮到各種情況下提供一個務實的解決方法，符合投資者的利益。"

完

備註：

1. 星展香港是根據《證券及期貨條例》獲發牌從事第1類（證券交易）、第4類（就證券提供意見）、第6類（就機構融資提供意見）及第9類（提供資產管理）受規管活動的註冊機構。

2. Constellation債券的發行商為Constellation Investment Ltd，安排人則為星展香港的有聯繫實體DBS Bank Ltd（星展銀行有限公司）。2004年至2007年間，星展香港向香港公眾分銷了以港元或美元計值的約77個系列的Constellation債券。

Constellation債券中，系列34至37、43至46、55至58、59至62、63至66、67至70、71至74及78至81債券屬信貸掛鉤票據，雷曼兄弟是上述系列的其中一家信貸參考機構（或稱"相關機構"）。星展香港向約3,400個客戶帳戶分銷雷曼相關Constellation債券，當中涉及約4,380宗交易，款額約13.16億元。

雷曼兄弟於2008年9月申請破產保護後，星展銀行有限公司宣布，受雷曼兄弟的信貸事件所影響，雷曼相關Constellation債券變得一文不值。

Constellation債券的其中一項主要特點是，投資者買入有關債券後，實際上要承擔的風險是，包括雷曼兄弟在內的信貸參考機構中，任何一家可能會出現破產等信貸事件。因應投資者承擔了這項風險，星展銀行有限公司在Constellation債券的投資期內，向投資者支付一項承擔風險款額。若債券到期時，信貸參考機構中並無信貸事件發生，投資者便可取回投資本金。然而，若發生信貸事件，投資者便可取回所謂"信貸事件贖回款額"，金額相等於雷曼兄弟的參考債項（或稱"相關債項"）的價值，但這些參考債項在雷曼兄弟申請破產後的買賣價已跌至接近零。雷曼兄弟在美國申請破產保護後，便出現上述的情況。

3. 星展香港分銷雷曼相關Constellation債券時，根據在星展香港投資風險評估問卷上所填寫的資料，將客戶列入五大級別，第1級為保守型，第2級為穩健型，第3級為均衡型，第4級為增長型，第5級為進取型。

另一方面，星展香港亦為其分銷的各項投資產品定下風險評級。產品風險評級分為五個級別，第1級為低風險，第2級為低至中風險，第3級為中風險，第4級為中至高風險，第5級為高風險。

若投資產品的風險評級低於或相等於有關客戶的投資風險評級，星展香港便會認為該產品適合該客戶投資。

4. 星展香港會以每名投資雷曼相關Constellation債券的低風險客戶的名義投資總值為基準，採用星展香港就不同到期日的定期存款所支付的最高利率，即向12個月定期存款戶所支付的利率，計算出由有關雷曼相關Constellation債券的發行日開始，直至今天日期這段期間的利息。根據星展香港計算，已付予每名低風險客戶的票息，與就有關投資的上述名義價值應支付的利息之間的差額，約為1,300萬元。

5. 加強的投訴處理程序由證監會制訂，旨在確保星展香港深入覆核高風險客戶的相關交易，確保星展香港以公平合理方式處理有關這些交易的投訴。有關程序與分銷銀行根據迷你債券協議所執行的投訴處理程序相同。

6. 請按此連結閱覽有關星展香港的建議和解計劃的問題解答。

腰斬迷債回購方案的司法覆核申請理何在？

2010-06-27T07:25:00.000-07:00

<转载>
腰斬迷債回購方案的司法覆核申請理何在？

迷債回購方案的司法覆核不被批准進行決非是香港司法史上的小漣漪，而是對司法獨立的衝擊。
讓我們看看迷債回購方案的司法覆核是如何被腰斬的。

首先，迷債苦主代表的法律援助不被批准，理由竟然是該代表包括迷債購入成本在內的資產稍微超過援助標準的上限(17萬元)。 其實，迷債的價值就是算到了今天仍然無法從法律上確實，世界公認的會計審慎原則都只能將其列為損失。法律援助署的官員自己也承認此不批准理由會有很大的爭議，但這那是甚麼法律觀點的爭議，將無法確定的將來資產也列為現有資產，這猶如依據你持有明天開彩的彩券而確定你今天就是百萬富翁一樣，完全是荒唐的政治決定。

第二，綜合各媒體的報導，在申請司法覆核許可的的聆訊上，“法官指此案牽連甚廣，除了十六家分銷銀行外，更有二萬四千八百八十八名已接受回購方案的雷曼事主可能受影響，因為一旦申請人獲判勝訴，證監會的調查要繼續，另一答辯人香港金融管理局也可向銀行採取執法行動，已取回六成或七成本金的事主可能因而被銀行要求退款，法官質疑申請人是否足以代表其他事主，而其他事主也可能不想再受噩夢糾纏”。

眾所周知，司法覆核是就政府的公共事務的政策、決策所進行，必然是牽連甚廣， 甚至牽連到司法體制所涵蓋的全社會。進行司法覆核是對政治尋求法律層面的裁決，而不是政治裁決。其實香港早前已有非常著明的與整個香港社會牽連甚廣案例，就是港人內地出生子女居港權的官司。終審法院並沒有就官司結果是否會對香港社會的經濟帶來嚴重影響的角度去裁決，而是從本身對基本法的理解去作出裁決，雖然事件最後由政府提請人大釋法而推翻原終審法院的裁決而結束，但終審法院的原裁決正是體現了當時參與的法官對司法獨立的堅守。如果法官也考慮社會政治因素，那麼所謂司法獨立就無存在的必要，社會的爭議就交由政治家來解決好了，要麼是通過議會決議，要麼是用革命手段推翻政府，但這決非社會之福，司法與政治應是凱撒的歸凱撒，上帝的歸上帝。

法官憂慮，“一旦申請人獲判勝訴，證監會的調查要繼續，另一答辯人香港金融管理局也可向銀行採取執法行動”。但是次司法覆核正是要求推翻證監會與金管局停止調查的政治決定，尋求社會公義。停止調查無非是放棄對銀行違規違法行為的追究，這難道是公正正義社會的應有之義嗎？

法官質疑其他事主也可能不想再受噩夢糾纏，當然是懷有高尚的、悲憫的人文情懷，但法官也應該關懷那些受騙而又被迫接受六至七成回購方案的苦主的噩夢糾纏。其實公認的法律之神是蒙上了雙眼，只從法律中尋找答案，而不是貢獻滔滔的憐憫淚水。以個人感情代替法律判斷，也不是司法的應有之義。

法官也質疑申請人是否足以代表其他事主，當然是合理的懷疑，但法官也沒有展開正式的聆訊，他又是如何推斷其他事主“噩夢糾纏”之說？沒有足夠充分的證據，司法程序是允許主觀臆測斷案嗎？

迷債的回購方案是由兩方面的內容組成，一是證監與金管局為監管一方，16家銀行為另一方的協議，協議的主要內容是16家銀行願意以六至七稱成本金回購迷債，監管方停止對16家銀行的迷債銷售調查；二是16家銀行向迷債持有者回購迷債的商業協議。如果司法覆核正如法官所言，最後由苦主方取勝，那麼法官的頒令也只能影響到證監與金管局的政治決策，而要取消銀行與迷債持有者的回購迷債協議，應須按協議雙方的自願行事，如苦主一方不願的話，我們認為也只能通過司法的程序。實在不明白法官“已取回六成或七成本金的事主可能因而被銀行要求退款”而使苦主“噩夢糾纏”之言，難道銀行會要脅或強搶？還是銀行要與二萬多苦主逐個進行司法訴訟？監管當局與銀行只要付出願意承擔過失的誠意，以新鴻基及凱基證券與證監的和解協議為藍本，重新提出公平的回購方案，那麼，二萬多苦主、政府、銀行本身、以至香港社會才不會再噩夢糾纏。

迷債回購方案的司法覆核在一波三折下還未開始就被腰斬，法官在拒絕批出司法覆核許可的判詞中大致重覆了他在聆訊上所表述的上述觀點，這只能讓人相信，法官在許可聆訊之前就已有定案，並且充分表露在他的聆訊發言中。法官並且認為苦主如仍不滿可再向監管機構投訴，法官大人確真是上帝派來的天使，充滿了爛漫的天真，只聽監管當局一面的美言，但卻不花一點時間了解一下監管當局因忌諱本身的監管過失，而在一年多來的所謂調查是如何袒護銀行、塞責敷衍。

法律援助署不批准我們的援助申請，使我們無財力上訴，法官的判詞也沒有使我們相信判決是合理的，而我們只能深信，迷債回購方案的司法覆核被腰斬是香港近年來大資本大財閥獨大的政治體制的結果，中低下階層的反抗雖愈趨激烈，但大多敗下陣來。是忍氣吞聲，還是愈挫愈戰，這是普羅大眾正面臨的選擇，也是雷曼苦主面臨的選擇。

Goldman Sachs Hudson CDO Said to Be Target of Second SEC Probe ，高盛面臨美證監第二項調查

2010-06-10T07:16:00.000-07:00

June 10 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc.’s $2 billion Hudson Mezzanine collateralized debt obligation, sold in 2006, is the target of a probe by the Securities and Exchange Commission, according to a person with knowledge of the matter.

The inquiry into the CDO may not lead to any additional actions against the New York-based securities firm, said the person, who declined to be identified because the investigation isn’t public. Michael DuVally, a spokesman for Goldman Sachs, declined to comment, as did SEC spokesman John Nester. The Financial Times reported the probe yesterday.

The U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, led by Levin, released e-mails in April related to Goldman Sachs’s mortgage-linked deals, including the Hudson Mezzanine transaction. In one October 2006 e-mail, a Goldman Sachs employee describes how the Hudson deal might be viewed by investors as “junk.”

Hudson Mezzanine

The Hudson Mezzanine 2006-1 CDO contained credit default swaps that referenced $2 billion in subprime, BBB-rated residential mortgage-backed securities, according to the documents released by Levin’s committee. While Goldman Sachs selected the assets in the deal, the firm was also the only investor buying credit protection on the entire transaction , the documents show.

Goldman Sachs created and sold the Hudson CDO in late 2006, near the time documents released by Levin show senior executives wanted to reduce the firm’s exposure to subprime mortgages.

“The CDO imploded within two years. Your clients lost; Goldman profited,” Levin said in an April 27 hearing during which he questioned Goldman Sachs Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein about the Hudson deal and other CDOs. “To go out and sell these securities to people and then bet against those same securities, it seems to me, is a fundamental conflict of interest and is -- raises a real ethical issue.”

(From Bloomberg: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aSNYXMe69Kh8&pos=3)

信報 2010年6月11日: 高盛面臨美證監第二項調查

面臨多項調查的高盛據報正面對美國證監第二項調查，調查目標是該行二○○六年出售的二十億美元「赫德森夾層」債務抵押債券（Hudson Mezzanine CDO）。

涉「赫德森夾層」ＣＤＯ

彭博社昨天引述知情人士報道，美國證券及交易委員會（ＳＥＣ）進行相關調查工作後，未必會向高盛採取進一步行動。

《金融時報》引述知情人士報道，ＳＥＣ最近數周正收集「赫德森夾層」ＣＤＯ交易的資料。

報道引述內部文件指出，高盛出售這些金融產品之際，亦同時沽空「赫德森夾層」ＣＤＯ，以保障這批ＣＤＯ的全部價值。

法律專家預期，「赫德森夾層」ＣＤＯ交易的調查將集中查明，高盛是否向投資者透露足夠的資料。高盛在推廣文件中表明，其利益與投資者利益相同，因為高盛購入這些ＣＤＯ。

這項調查是ＳＥＣ針對華爾街有關ＣＤＯ活動的更廣泛調查的一部分。《華爾街日報》昨天報道，ＳＥＣ同時調查摩根士丹利等主要大行的多宗按揭相關交易。

根據參議員萊文（Carl Levin）領導的參議院常設調查小組委員會的文件，高盛這批二○○六年一級「赫德森夾層」ＣＤＯ包含一批信貸違約掉期（ＣＤＳ），這些ＣＤＳ涉及合共二十億美元的BBB級次按抵押證券。

ＳＥＣ四月十六日提出起訴高盛在二○○七年出售名為Abacus的ＣＤＯ時涉嫌欺詐後，高盛股價已下跌百分之二十六。

遭澳洲對沖基金索償

在該訴訟中，ＳＥＣ表示，高盛及其一名職員沒有向投資者透露，對沖基金Paulson & Co.在設計該ＣＤＯ及對賭那些ＣＤＯ的角色。

另外，澳洲對沖基金Basis Capital周三入稟紐約曼哈頓聯邦法院，向高盛索償十億美元，指該公司購入高盛的次按證券後，被迫清盤。

Basis Capital的代表律師表示，高盛以明知錯誤的賣點推銷，強迫投資者把有毒證券的風險從賬目中撇除，是欺詐行為■

Moody's 'Gave Up Its Analytical Distinctiveness,' Ex-Employee Says

2010-06-02T23:29:00.000-07:00

Moody's 'Gave Up Its Analytical Distinctiveness,' Ex-Employee Says

BUSINESSJUNE 2, 2010, 9:33 A.M. ET

By AARON LUCCHETTI

A former Moody's Corp. lawyer who worked in the ratings firm's structured-finance group for a decade planned to tell a congressional panel that the company "gave up its analytical distinctiveness," partly by intimidating analysts who were too tough or angered influential investment bankers .

In written testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Mark Froeba accused Moody's managers of having "deliberately engineered a change to its culture intended to ensure that rating analysis never jeopardized market share and revenue."

Mr. Froeba is one of three former Moody's employees set to testify Wednesday at a hearing by the bipartisan commission into the credibility of credit ratings, the investment decisions based on those ratings and their role in the financial crisis.

The New York hearing also will include billionaire Warren Buffett, whose Berkshire Hathaway Inc. has long owned a stake in Moody's. Mr. Buffett, who provided no prepared testimony before the hearing, was subpoenaed by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission after declining an invitation to appear voluntarily.

The 10-member panel, led by former California Treasurer Phil Angelides, is required to submit a report on its findings by Dec. 15. Four previous hearings have zeroed in on investment banks, subprime mortgages and regulatory oversight of Wall Street, financial firms and government-sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Wednesday's hearing is set to begin at 8:30 a.m. ET. Mr. Buffett is expected to testify at about 11:30 a.m. with Moody's Chief Executive Raymond McDaniel, who has led the ratings firm since 2005.

Mr. McDaniel, in his written testimony, told the panel how the firm has improved its internal procedures. He also emphasized the limitations of credit ratings, which focus on the risk of default on debt payments.

Still, the CEO is likely to face tough questions about why the Moody's Investors Service unit of Moody's and its two biggest rivals, the Standard & Poor's unit of McGraw-Hill Cos. and Fimalac SA's Fitch Ratings, gave Triple-A marks to thousands of mortgage-related securities that later plummeted in value and suffered sharp downgrades. The three companies generated combined revenues of $3.6 billion on bond ratings last year.

Last month, Moody's disclosed it had received notice from the Securities and Exchange Commission that the ratings firm may face an enforcement action for allegedly misleading regulators in a 2007 license application. Moody's has said it fixed issues related to the SEC's concerns and has described the problem as isolated.

In his written testimony, Mr. Froeba cited as an example of undue efforts by Moody's to preserve the firm's market share a rating of European collateralized debt obligations that was one or two notches higher than justified. Mr. Froeba is particularly critical of former Moody's President Brian Clarkson, who carried out orders from Mr. McDaniel and the company's board to make the firm more friendly and responsive to bond issuers, according to the written testimony.

Under Mr. Clarkson, analysts were forced to explain even tiny slips in market share on deals, the former Moody's lawyer told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in his written testimony. Such pressure was a repudiation of the independence long cherished by the firm, Mr. Froeba wrote in his prepared remarks for the panel.

"I reject any suggestion … that Moody's sacrificed ratings quality in an effort to grow market share," Mr. Clarkson said in his prepared remarks submitted to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Mr. Clarkson left Moody's in 2008 and is set to make his first public comments about the financial crisis when he testifies Wednesday afternoon.

In his prepared remarks, Mr. Clarkson told the congressional panel that he was "disappointed" in the performance of Moody's ratings. But the firm's assumptions and methodologies "were overwhelmed by the magnitude and velocity of the unprecedented economic deterioration."

Mr. Clarkson said rating firms and investors need better disclosure from issuers about structured-finance bonds, suggesting that regulators look into stronger rules for mortgage brokers and underwriters.

Ratings firms face the likelihood of toughened oversight under financial-overhaul legislation being debated this month by a conference committee of the House and Senate. The proposals include measures to make rating firms more transparent and effective, while removing some of their market clout and stripping bankers of the ability to shop around for the firm that will give the highest rating.

At Wednesday's hearing, former Moody's rating executive Gary Witt is expected to describe how he removed a legal analyst from collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, created byGoldman Sachs Group Inc. after the securities firm asked that the analyst "not be assigned to further Goldman Sachs CDOs for the next year," according to Mr. Witt's written testimony.

Mr. Witt told the panel that he worried Goldman would complain to his superiors if he failed to do what the firm wanted, potentially costing the analyst his job. After discussing the matter with the Moody's analyst, "we both agreed that the best course of action was to comply with Goldman's request," according to Mr. Witt's testimony.

—Erik Holm in New York contributed to this article.
Write to Aaron Lucchetti at aaron.lucchetti@wsj.com

Related stories:

S & P: "We’d Do a Deal Structured by Cows" And Other Rating Agency Dirty Linen

Employees at Moody’s Investors Service told executives that issuing dubious creditworthy ratings to mortgage-backed securities made it appear they were incompetent or “sold our soul to the devil for revenue,” according to e-mails obtained by U.S. House investigators.

“The story of the credit rating agencies is a story of colossal failure,” Committee Chairman Henry Waxman, a California Democrat, said at the hearing. “The result is that our entire financial system is now at risk.”…

Former executives from S&P and Moody’s told lawmakers today that credit raters relied on outdated models in a “race to the bottom” to maximize profits.

Bank probes expanding with new investigation

2010-05-13T06:19:00.000-07:00

2010-05-13

Bank probes expanding with new investigation

(Reuters) - U.S. authorities are expanding their probes of past mortgage securities deals, with New York's attorney general opening an investigation into whether eight banks misled rating agencies, a source familiar with the matter said.

New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo's office on Wednesday served subpoenas on four U.S. banks and four European lenders, the source said.

Cuomo is targeting Citigroup, Credit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs Group Inc, Morgan Stanley, UBS and Merrill Lynch, now owned by Bank of America, the source said.

The investigation comes as Wall Street and major banks around the world are attracting scrutiny from regulators stemming from transactions that occurred in the run-up to the subprime mortgage meltdown and financial crisis.

The Wall Street Journal on Wednesday reported that U.S. federal prosecutors, working with securities regulators, were conducting a preliminary criminal probe into whether four banks misled investors about their roles in mortgage bond deals.

The banks under early-stage criminal scrutiny are JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and UBS, the newspaper reported on its website, citing a person familiar with the matter.

The banks have also received civil subpoenas from the U.S. Securities and Exchanges Commission as part of a sweeping investigation of banks' selling and trading of mortgage-related deals, the report said.

A spokesman for JPMorgan told the Journal the bank had not been contacted by federal prosecutors and was not aware of any criminal investigation. The other banks either declined comment or were not immediately available.

美檢察機關對華爾街數家投行展開刑事調查

《紐約時報》引述消息人士稱，紐約司法部門正調查8間銀行，是否向評級機構，提供誤導資料，提升次按產品評級。

消息人士稱，紐約檢察總長安德魯已向8間華爾街大行，發出傳票，進行調查，涉及銀行包括高盛、摩根士丹利、花旗、瑞信、德銀、美林、瑞銀及東方匯理等。

美國證券交易委員會已民事起訴高盛，涉嫌隱瞞資料，誤導客戶。而紐約今次的調查則擴大至8間銀行，不單只涉及銀行與客戶的交易，而是涉及銀行與評級機構的關係。

當局將集中調查銀行在樓市大跌前，如何向評級機構提供資料，影響他們的按揭產品評級。市場一直批評評級機構，未能正確評價有關次按產品，令投資者受損。涉及的標級機構包括標普、穆迪及惠譽國際。

'Out of thin air': Synthetic CDOs, inflated the credit bubble

2010-05-13T02:37:00.000-07:00

From Marketwatch:
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/out-of-thin-air-synthetic-cdos-pumped-bubble-2010-04-26,

SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWatch) -- The securities at the crux of the Securities and Exchange Commission's case against Goldman Sachs Group Inc. inflated the credit bubble, leaving even more losses when it popped, structured-finance experts and investors said in the wake of the recent civil-fraud charge against the investment bank.

"Derivatives and synthetic securities have been used to create imaginary value out of thin air," George Soros, chairman of $27 billion hedge-fund firm Soros Fund Management, wrote in a column posted on his Web site last week.

"More triple-A CDOs were created than there were underlying triple-A assets. This was done on a large scale in spite of the fact that all of the parties involved were sophisticated investors," he added. "The process went on for years, and culminated in a crash that caused wealth destruction amounting to trillions of dollars. It cannot be allowed to continue."

"Synthetic CDOs should be abolished," Janet Tavakoli, a structured-finance specialist who wrote a book about CDOs in 2003, said in a recent interview. "They're too complex and provide no real benefit. They only existed to game the system or hide losses."

The SEC alleged that Goldman Sachs (GS 147.20, +5.23, +3.68%) didn't tell investors in a synthetic CDO called Abacus 2007-AC1 that hedge-fund firm Paulson & Co. helped structure the deal, and also was betting against it. Goldman and Paulson have denied wrongdoing.

Because they weren't based on real assets, such investments were tricky to value. When the housing market collapsed, the existence of such hard-to-value securities in the financial system caused havoc as counterparties struggled to find out who had lost money.

Fabrice Tourre, the Goldman banker named in the SEC's case, described such problems in a January 2007 email, just as the subprime-mortgage meltdown was gaining steam.

"I'm trading a product which a month ago was worth $100 and which today is worth $93 and which on average is losing 25 cents a day," Tourre wrote, according to recent Goldman disclosures.

"When I think that I had some input into the creation of this product (which by the way is a product of pure intellectual masturbation, the type of thing which you invent telling yourself: 'Well, what if we created a 'thing', which has no purpose, which is absolutely conceptual and highly theoretical and which nobody knows how to price?') it sickens the heart to see it shot down in mid-flight," Tourre added in the email.

Packaging

Synthetic CDOs sat at the end of a long chain of boom-time transactions that began with the origination of mortgages and other loans. These assets were packaged up by investment banks and sold as asset-based securities, including residential mortgage-backed securities, or RMBS.

CDOs were created by taking pieces of RMBS and other securities, packaging them up again and reselling them.

Demand for such investments was so strong during the credit boom that there weren't enough underlying assets to build new ones. So Wall Street came up with a way of creating CDOs that didn't need actual assets.

The result was synthetic CDOs. These are formed by writing credit-default swaps on bits of RMBS and other asset-backed securities. (These swaps pay out in the event of default.) Once enough of these derivatives contracts were written, investment banks bundled them up into new CDOs and sold them.

More than $110 billion worth of synthetic CDOs were sold in 2006 and 2007, according to Thomson Reuters data.

Raynes, who used to work at Moody's Investors Service (MCO 22.29, +0.53, +2.44%) and co-authored a book on structured finance, said the rating agency put AAA ratings on many parts of CDOs, giving investors the confidence they needed to buy the products.

"You needed a third party to analyze the structures," he added. "That's what provided the value for these deals."

(信報轉載) 高院否決雷曼苦主司法覆核

2010-05-02T19:34:00.000-07:00

高院否決雷曼苦主司法覆核 - 2010年5月1日

高等法院昨天拒絕接納之前有雷曼苦主提出的司法覆核申請，證監會對此表示欣慰，而雷曼苦主大聯盟則未決定下一步行動。

證監感欣慰

證監會發言人回應本報查詢時表示，對昨天高院的判決感到欣慰，但目前沒有進一步評論。

雷曼苦主大聯盟召集人陳光譽表示，暫定於下周二與其他雷曼苦主會面，討論下一步的行動，惟現在沒有任何決定。

證監會和金管局去年七月就雷曼迷債事件公布回購方案，以賠償最小百分之六十本金予苦主，換取終止調查迷債事件；同時，金管局不會再向銀行採取任何行動。其中一名拒絕接受回購方案的苦主石麗珊指出，證監會拒絕承擔責任，於三月二十二日要求高等法院批准其司法覆核申請。

至於立法會的雷曼研訊，昨天完成傳召首家銀行的工作。星展銀行（香港）行政總裁葉約德昨天回應議員提問時，否認銷售手法有欺詐成分，強調銷售產品時有經過產品介紹及風險說明。

有議員希望了解金管局去年十一月採取紀律處分星展前僱員的個案，但葉約德表示，該行處理的相關投訴超過二千七百宗，令她忘記個別個案的情況。

立會下周傳召洪丕正

星展香港的三次公開研訊已經結束，立法會研究雷曼兄弟相關迷你債券及結構性金融產品所引起的事宜小組委員會主席何鍾泰說，稍後將傳召葉約德出席閉門研訊，了解該行未能提交部分資料的原因。

下周五的研究將傳召第二家銀行，渣打集團（香港）行政總裁洪丕正和另一名銀行代表將出席。

根據金管局的公布，截至四月三十日，二萬一千六百零二宗雷曼兄弟相關投訴個案中，二千七百八十三宗個案完成詳細調查並正進行紀律程序，另外有一百九十八宗個案仍在調查中■

Goldman Abacus, DBS Constellation Notes & Lehman Minibond, 高盛ABACUS, 雷曼迷債/ 星展星債

2010-04-18T19:37:00.000-07:00

From the news:

“The product was new and complex but the deception and conflicts are old and simple,”
SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami said in the statement.

The SEC alleged that Goldman did not tell investors "vital information" about the CDO , called ABACUS. This included that a major hedge fund, Paulson & Co, was involved in choosing which securities would be part of the portfolio, and had taken a short position against the CDO in a bet its value would fall.

美國證監指控，高盛未向投資者披露大型對沖基金保爾森公司對該產品沽空的「關鍵信息」。

高盛自辯：
［ it provided “extensive disclosure” to IKB and ACA about the risk of the underlying mortgage securities. ］

高盛的客戶是機構投資者，是真正的經驗投資者了！高盛給這些大客戶們提供了跟 CDO 相關的詳細披露。唯一沒有給這些機構投資者提供的信息是產品的對家以及銷售該產品的真正原由。

類似的合成CDO 產品賣給機構投資者的時候， DBS / 雷曼的做法也是跟高盛一樣，給機構投資者們提供跟 CDO 相關的詳細披露 “extensive disclosure” 的。可是，當DBS ／雷曼把合成CDO 產品打包成面向零售銀行客戶們的信贷挂钩产品的時候，DBS ／雷曼給客戶們提供了些甚麼披露呢？

DBS Constellation / 雷曼迷債的投資者都是零售銀行的客戶。關於 Constellation Notes / 迷債 underlying securities “合成CDO”得到些甚麼披露呢？ 是否需要得到 (如其它機構投資者們一樣）同等程度的 “extensive disclosure” ?

DBS Constellation Notes 章程 / 雷曼迷債章程對於其 underlying securities 可是甚麼具體披露都沒有啊！

雷曼迷債章程提到迷債抵押品為 3A 評級，提到了“合成CDO”這個名詞而毫无任何解释，尽管迷债章程有关于债券的解释。看来雷曼迷债章程制作人认为迷债章程读者有必要了解何为债券，却无必要了解新产品“合成CDO”的特征。對於迷債 underlying securities （所謂的迷債抵押品 “合成CDO”）可是甚麼解释和具体披露都沒有啊！更不要提“extensive disclosure” 了！此处暫且不論跟迷債的“合成CDO”的起因（終極買賣對手）有關的信息。暫且不論披露 Underlying Securities 的起因（終極對手）有關的信息.

DBS Constellation Notes 章程提到抵押品為 3A 評級，卻根本不提這抵押品究竟為何類產品，連“合成CDO”都欠奉。以 3A 評級來帶過這抵押品實為另一層信貸掛鈎產品的實質。3A 評級是 DBS Constellation Notes 投資者們得到的關於抵押品的披露。

“3A 評級 ” 是跟 “合成CDO”相關的唯一「關鍵信息」嗎？ “3A 評級 ” 是客戶們應該得到的關於星展星債的唯一「關鍵信息」嗎？ 為甚麼 Constellation Notes 投資者們沒有（如其它非機構投資者們一樣）得到通常應該得到的關於“合成CDO”的「關鍵信息」？？

DBS 可是 Constellation Notes 的策劃／設計者，安排者和銷售銀行。還有誰可以比DBS更清楚Constellation Notes 的 underlying securities 的本質和相關風險了呢？

「為何風險最高的貸款產品會賣給最不在行的借款人？答案就在問題中──最不在行的借款人是最容易被哄騙買入這些產品的。」
（"金融改革的終局" - Paul Krugman）

衍生工具複雜且深藏危險，迷債 / 星債之設計者和銀行分銷商都是金融界的專業人員，更是深明此理。
如果發行產品的投行和銷售商們給客戶們介紹了產品的真實面目，這樣買入者就不會有悔。当然，众多的客户们很可能在可以理解产品的真实特征和风险之前，就已经决定不买这么复杂，听不懂的产品了。

迷債.星債的問題在於用漂亮的騙局幌子來跟銀行的客戶們介紹和銷售迷債，投行和銀行分銷商根本不想讓客戶瞭解迷債的真實特徵和風險，如果可以大講跟7個公司信貸掛鈎，為甚麼卻不可以明確提醒客戶：”迷債還要跟100多個各種評級的公司信貸掛鈎“？？？

看看在雷曼事件上，香港證監會和金管局是如何做的？
香港證監會和金管局只是竭盡其所能，替行騙者們開罪。

DBS Constellation Notes 可不是只發行了一個系列的產品，Constellation Notes 是以類似的結構，從2003至2007年間發行了的諸多個系列的產品！Constellation Notes 章程對於其underlying securities 一貫是甚麼具體披露都沒有！是太複雜而無法披露，還是太嚇人而不想披露给投资者知道？

星展自稱有指引，認為對職員的培訓和銷售上無系統失誤。請星展：
－把它給銀行職員的相關產品的培訓指引（產品的主要風險特徵等）公佈於眾，
－把它給銀行職員的相關產品的銷售指引公佈於眾，

對於迷債這麼個複雜的產品，香港證監會不但不敢指出迷債章程的誤導欺騙性，證監會調查報告第一強調的就是迷債章程寫了“本產品不保本”！！ 完全不敢指出章程裡完全沒有披露的迷債的合成CDO 的相關信息！完全不敢指出迷債的合成CDO是關乎迷債風險和價值的「關鍵信息」。證監會卻為迷債章程辯護：指出迷債合成 CDO有了3A 評級的信息就足以。

迷債可不是只發行了一個系列的產品，迷債是以類似的結構，從2003至2008年間發行了的36個系列的產品！迷債章程對於其underlying securities （所謂的迷債抵押品 “合成CDO”）是甚麼disclosure都沒有！

相关文章：

雷曼夢魘將醒乎? 雷曼事件之真相研究報告－1 ；
解構迷你債券結構－比較三種結構式產品的披露水平: 雷曼事件之真相研究報告－4 , & 雷曼事件之真相研究報告－5；
披露為本: 雷曼事件之真相研究報告－6；

雷曼骗局之根源 Root Cause of Lehman Minibond Fraud；監管機構身兼金融騙局共謀者

Related readings:
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (1);
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (3);
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (5): II. Dissecting the ‘Piggybacked Structure’;
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (8);
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (9);
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (10);
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (11): III. Disclosure-based Regulation;

Bloomberg: Abacus Let Goldman Shuffle Mortgage Risk Like Beads

2010-04-18T00:02:00.000-07:00

April 17 (Bloomberg)

-- From July 2004 through April 2007, as credit markets boomed, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. created 23 financial transactions called Abacus, the word for a relatively crude counting tool involving the shuffling of beads.

Yesterday, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued the bank for securities fraud in what would be the penultimate offering in the series, according to Bloomberg data.

The bank used the deals to off-load the risk of mostly subprime home loans and commercial mortgages to investors, either as hedges for similar positions or to bet against securities itself. While the data show New York-based Goldman Sachs issued at least $7.8 billion of Abacus notes, the risk passed to investors was multiples higher.

The Abacus transactions are so-called synthetic collateralized debt obligations, which marry two financial innovations that contributed to the worst collapse in financial markets since the Great Depression.

“Investors needed to ask some questions about synthetics they didn’t need to ask with other CDOs,” Joseph Mason, a finance professor at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, said in a telephone interview.

The financial tools, often called technologies, are credit- default swaps, used to transfer the risk of losses on debt, and securitization, used to slice the risk in a pool of assets into various new securities.

Abacus deals were filled with default swaps that offered payouts to Goldman Sachs if certain mortgage bonds didn’t pay as promised, in return for regular premiums from the bank.

Upfront Cash
Some of the cash needed for the potential payouts to Goldman Sachs would be raised upfront, and essentially placed in escrow, from sales of Abacus CDO notes with varying ratings. The grades were tied to how many of the underlying securities needed to default before the CDO classes would.

Such securitization enabled debt with the lowest investment-grade ratings to be transformed, in part, into AAA securities that turned out to not be as safe as that ranking suggested. At least $5 billion of Abacus slices now carry junk ratings, below BBB-, from Standard & Poor’s, or have defaulted, Bloomberg data show.

The SEC said that Goldman Sachs created and sold Abacus 2007-AC1 without disclosing that hedge fund Paulson & Co. helped pick the underlying securities and also bet the CDO would default. Paulson was proved correct, and his hedge fund eventually turned a $1 billion profit and CDO investors lost a similar amount, according to the SEC.

ACA Management

The deal was different from most Abacus CDOs in that Goldman Sachs said that a third-party, ACA Management LLC, was choosing the underlying debt instead of the bank itself, according to prospectuses.

At least $192 million of the debt was granted top grades by credit-rating companies, and an additional $1.1 billion was supposedly even safer, according to Bloomberg data. The latter, super-senior portions were derivatives and not securities.

“This would never have been possible if the ratings had been correct,” said Gene Phillips, director of PF2 Securities Evaluations, a New York-based advisory firm. “For these trades to come out so well for Paulson, the ratings agencies would not have been able to identify as well as Paulson did that these were crappy assets.”
Synthetic CDOs

An explosion in synthetic CDOs began in December 1997, with the first of the so-called BISTRO deals created by a predecessor to JPMorgan Chase & Co.. The transaction involved the bank laying off some of $9.7 billion of its risk tied to financing for 307 companies, according to “Fool’s Gold,” a book by Gillian Tett (Free Press, 2009).

Shortly after that, JPMorgan helped Bayerische Landesbank of Germany unload the risk of $14 billion of U.S. mortgages and then completed one more mortgage-linked BISTRO transaction, before stepping out of the market for home-loan deals because it couldn’t get comfortable assessing the risk it needed to retain amid a lack of historical data on how the debt would perform, according to the book.

UBS AG, in a series called North Street from at least 2000 through at least 2005, and Deutsche Bank AG, through its Start program in at least 2005 and 2006, also issued synthetic CDOs tied to mortgages, according to Bloomberg data. Doug Morris, a spokesman for Zurich-based UBS, and Renee Calabro, a spokeswoman for Frankfurt-based Deutsche Bank, declined to comment.

Goldman’s Role

In 2006 and 2007, the distinction between synthetic mortgage-bond CDOs and “cash” ones, or those made only of actual debt, broke down as “hybrid” deals, filled with both securities and credit swaps, began to dominate the market, meaning that almost every major bank was underwriting CDOs filled in part with their own bets against homeowners.

Investors “came to Goldman Sachs and other financial intermediaries to establish long and short exposures to the residential housing market,” and the bank’s protection against home-loan bond defaults represented a way to offset risk it took on by selling the opposite position to clients, Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein said in the company’s annual report.

In 2006 and 2007, when the residential and commercial mortgages with the highest default rates now were made, the bank created more than $4 billion of Abacus notes, Bloomberg data show.

That figure doesn’t reflect the fact that banks such as Goldman Sachs often would retain some of the slices they created. The bank said in a statement yesterday that it lost $90 million on the transaction the SEC sued it over. The $7.7 billion in Abacus CDOs doesn’t include most of the so-called super-senior tranches that were supposedly safer even than AAA debt. Super-senior transactions were often private.

Super-Seniors

For instance, with Abacus 2005-3, initially 68 percent linked to subprime-mortgage securities, Goldman planned to create a $1 billion super-senior class along with $825 million of notes, according to a May 10, 2005, preliminary term sheet. Super-senior classes, or those in which the cash that would be potentially paid out to Goldman Sachs wasn’t collected upfront, often made up larger portions of the deals.

American International Group Inc., the insurer whose mortgage losses led to its need for a U.S. bailout, took on the super-senior risk on the 2005-3 deal, along with six others, according to an internal memo posted on CBS News’s Web site.
That included the last Abacus deal, which priced April 17, 2007, and focuses on commercial-mortgage securities, Bloomberg data show. Its most-senior class below the super-senior one is now rated CCC by Fitch Ratings, its third-lowest level.
$6 Billion

AIG guaranteed $6 billion through Abacus deals, a person with knowledge of the matter said this month. That figure shrank to $4.3 billion by November 2008 as some of the mortgages linked to the derivatives were repaid or refinanced, the person said.
The insurer last year terminated about $3 billion of the swaps with Goldman Sachs that made up the super-seniors, resulting in $1.5 billion to $2 billion of realized losses, said the person, who declined to be identified because the specific transactions weren’t disclosed. AIG, based in New York, has about $1.3 billion in remaining swaps tied to the CDOs, the person said.
The swaps weren’t included in AIG’s 2008 government rescue because they insured pools of derivative bets, rather than actual securities. AIG and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York retired $62.1 billion in swaps by fully reimbursing bank counterparties in exchange for obtaining the securities, which are held in a taxpayer-funded vehicle called Maiden Lane III.
Other CDOs

Still, some Abacus classes are in Maiden Lane III, because they’re held by other CDOs. One is Davis Square III, a CDO underwritten by Goldman Sachs in 2004 and managed by TCW Group Inc. that bought $24 million of Abacus slices, including some created after Davis Square III was, according to Moody’s Investor Service reports.
Erin Freeman, a spokeswoman for TCW, a unit of Paris-based Societe Generale, said none of the CDOs managed by TCW purchased the Abacus deal at the center of the SEC suit.

The holdings of CDOs by other CDOs mean that some bond buyers and insurers may not know they’re exposed to Abacus deals. Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, the bank now controlled by the U.K. government, was the bigger loser in the deal in which the SEC alleges Paulson & Co. was involved, paying out $840.9 million to Goldman Sachs in 2008, most of which it then passed to Paulson’s hedge fund, according to the SEC complaint.

Even as subprime defaults soared in 2007, more than $1.1 trillion of CDOs were created, about the same as in 2006, according to JPMorgan data. The figures, which also include CDOs backed by assets such as buyout loans and bank capital securities, include unfunded super-senior classes. Funded issuance totaled about $1.05 trillion during those two years.
New Investments

Some of Goldman’s Abacus CDOs were “static,” meaning the portfolio of securities they referenced didn’t change over time, while others allowed for reinvestment into different investments as initial holdings paid down, with Goldman choosing the new securities.

That’s partly because investors including Dusseldorf, Germany-based IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, a buyer of part the CDO the SEC is suing over, asked for the reinvestment because they would be given higher yields, a person familiar with the matter said earlier this year.

‘Inferior Quality’

A dispute over replacement collateral involving UBS landed in New York Supreme Court in 2008. Hamburg-based HSH Nordbank AG, the world’s biggest shipping financier, said in a complaint that UBS had been “deliberately selecting inferior quality” assets for a synthetic CDO called North Street 2002-4.

Goldman Sachs may have lost money on Abacus 2007-AC1 because in at least some Abacus deals, the bank used the cash raised from note sales, which would be owed to either the owners or itself, to buy securities including AAA-rated mortgage bonds and CDOs, according to Fitch and Moody’s Investors Service.

It then guaranteed that, in most cases, it would buy the escrow account securities at face value if needed to pay the owners of the Abacus notes, unless those escrow holdings defaulted, according to the rating firms’ reports. Declines in the value of the purchased securities could limit how much Goldman Sachs could pay itself.

Bloomberg: Abacus Let Goldman Shuffle Mortgage Risk Like Beads

How the Synthetic CDO "Abacus" was set up

2010-04-16T21:08:00.000-07:00

The Abacus transactions are so-called synthetic CDO.

Abacus deals were filled with default swaps that offered payouts to Goldman Sachs if certain mortgage bonds didn’t pay as promised, in return for regular premiums from the bank.

Such securitization enabled debt with the lowest investment-grade ratings to be transformed, in part, into AAA securities that turned out to not be as safe as that ranking suggested. At least $5 billion of Abacus slices now carry junk ratings, below BBB-, from Standard & Poor’s, or have defaulted, Bloomberg data show.

The SEC said that Goldman Sachs created and sold Abacus 2007-AC1 without disclosing that hedge fund Paulson & Co. helped pick the underlying securities and also bet the CDO would default. Paulson was proved correct, and his hedge fund eventually turned a $1 billion profit and CDO investors lost a similar amount, according to the SEC

From Bloomberg http://mobile.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2065100&sid=aMVnYAF6bYCw

“The SEC’s charges are completely unfounded in law and fact and we will vigorously contest them and defend the firm and its reputation,” Goldman Sachs said in a statement today.

The firm put together the Abacus deal in 2007, a year in which Goldman Sachs earned a then-record $11.6 billion, a figure it surpassed in 2009, when it earned $13.4 billion. Goldman Sachs paid Blankfein $68.5 million for 2007 -- $600,000 in salary, plus a $67.9 million bonus.

According to the SEC’s complaint, Tourre, now 31, sent an e-mail to a friend in January 2007 saying, “The whole building is about to collapse” in reference to CDOs tied to subprime mortgages.

‘Fabulous Fab’

“Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab standing in the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all of the implications of those monstrousities!!!” Tourre wrote in the e- mail, according to the SEC. The agency didn’t identify the recipient of the note.

Reached at his London office today, Tourre declined to comment. “I need to jump, thank you, goodbye,” he told Bloomberg News before hanging up. A call to Pamela Chepiga , a lawyer for Tourre at Allen & Overy LLP, wasn’t returned. Tourre, a graduate of Ecole Centrale Paris, one of France’s top engineering schools, and Stanford University, joined Goldman Sachs in July 2001, according to his LinkedIn profile.

Goldman Sachs and Tourre knew it would be difficult, if not impossible, to sell the CDO if they disclosed to investors that Paulson played a significant role in selecting the collateral and was also betting against it, the SEC said.

‘Surreal’ ACA Meeting

The bank also knew that at least one potential investor, Dusseldorf, Germany-based IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG , wasn’t likely to invest in a CDO that didn’t have a collateral manager to analyze and select the portfolio, according to the complaint.

In January 2007, Goldman Sachs approached ACA Management LLC , a firm that analyzes credit risk, to select the portfolio for a CDO transaction sponsored by Paulson. In an internal memo on March 12, 2007, Goldman said it would “leverage ACA’s credibility and franchise” to help distribute the transaction, the SEC said.

Paulson, Tourre and a representative from ACA met in February 2007 to discuss assets that would be included in the residential-mortgage backed security, the SEC said. While Paulson and Tourre knew Paulson intended to short the security, ACA wasn’t in the loop.

“I am at this ACA meeting,” Tourre wrote in an e-mail to an unidentified Goldman Sachs employee during the meeting. “This is surreal.”

Goldman’s ‘Extensive Disclosure’

Goldman Sachs also said that it lost more than $90 million because it had an investment in the deal, overwhelming the $15 million it made in fees. The firm said it provided “extensive disclosure” to IKB and ACA about the risk of the underlying mortgage securities. Goldman Sachs never told ACA that Paulson was going to be a “long” investor in Abacus, and ACA selected the underlying securities, the firm said.

《博客主的建议》

建议高盛邀请香港金管局和证监会为他们辩护.

香港金管局和證監會會說：
合成 CDO "Abacus" 有 AAA的評級，不需要多講其它，風險披露也講了“本產品不保本”，這就是足夠的風險披露了, 就是［“vital information" about the CDO］了，不需要披露其它甚麼［“vital information" about the CDO］，況且買家（投資者）是專業機構投資者。
看看我们香港的银行散户是什么水平。银行，雷曼亚洲以及有关的人员和机构都是只要跟散户讲雷曼迷债／星展Constellation Notes /大摩精明债券是 ’跟几个著名公司信贷挂钩，本产品不保本。抵押品是 AAA的評級‘ 就足够了！根本不需要解释产品的抵押品的实质，特征以及具体详情呢！抵押品实为跟100多个公司信贷挂钩以及挂钩公司的信息都是多余，是不需要的信息！

什么是 “vital information" about 雷曼迷债／星展Constellation Notes /大摩精明债券？ ‘ ’跟几个著名公司信贷挂钩，本产品不保本。’就是 “vital information" ！

我们香港的银行散户就都会完全明白这雷曼迷债／星展Constellation Notes /大摩精明债券的真实特征和重大风险了。

Related reading:
SEC Sues Goldman Sachs, Alleging Fraud in CDO Tied to Subprime

SEC Sues Goldman Sachs, Alleging Fraud in CDO Tied to Subprime

2010-04-16T08:11:00.001-07:00

1. SEC Sues Goldman Sachs, Alleging Fraud in CDO Tied to Subprime
By Gregory Mott

April 16 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc. was sued by U.S. regulators for fraud tied to collateralized debt obligations that contributed to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The firm’s shares tumbled as much as 16 percent and financial stocks slumped.

Goldman Sachs misstated and omitted key facts about a financial product tied to subprime mortgages as the U.S. housing market was starting to falter, the Securities and Exchange Commission said in a statement today. The SEC also sued Fabrice Tourre, a Goldman Sachs vice president.

“The product was new and complex but the deception and conflicts are old and simple,” SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami said in the statement. “Goldman wrongly permitted a client that was betting against the mortgage market to heavily influence which mortgage securities to include in an investment portfolio, while telling other investors that the securities were selected by an independent, objective third party.”

The SEC alleged that Goldman Sachs, led by Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein, 55, structured and marketed CDOs that hinged on the performance of subprime mortgage-backed securities. The New York-based firm failed to disclose to investors that hedge fund Paulson & Co. was betting against the CDO, known as Abacus, and influenced the selection of securities for the portfolio, the SEC said. Paulson wasn’t accused of wrongdoing.

Financial Stocks Slump

A gauge of banks and brokerages in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index sank 3.9 percent for the top loss among 24 groups after the SEC announced its action. Bank of America Corp. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. lost at least 3.5 percent as all 27 companies in the S&P 500 Diversified Financial Index declined.

“This gave the politicians everything they need to push for stronger financial reform and it’s going to further shake investor confidence in Wall Street,” said Matthew McCormick, a banking-industry analyst and portfolio manager at Bahl & Gaynor Inc. in Cincinnati, which oversees $2.8 billion.

2. Goldman Sachs charged with fraud by SEC
NEW YORK, Fri Apr 16, 2010 11:05am EDT

(Reuters) - Goldman Sachs Group Inc was charged with fraud on Friday by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in the structuring and marketing of a debt product tied to subprime mortgages.

The SEC alleged that Goldman structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt obligation that hinged on the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities, and which cost investors more than $1 billion.

It alleged that Goldman did not tell investors "vital information" about the CDO, called ABACUS. This included that a major hedge fund, Paulson & Co, was involved in choosing which securities would be part of the portfolio, and had taken a short position against the CDO in a bet its value would fall.

According to the SEC complaint, Paulson & Co paid Goldman $15 million to structure the CDO, which closed on April 26, 2007. Little more than nine months later, 99 percent of the portfolio had been downgraded, the SEC said.

The SEC said Goldman Vice President Fabrice Tourre was principally responsible for creating ABACUS. It also charged him with fraud.

3. 美證監控高盛欺詐累投資者損失10億美元

美國證券交易委員會向高盛集團提出民事訴訟，指控高盛在設計及銷售與次按相關的債務抵押債券(CDO)時，涉嫌欺詐，令投資者損失超過10億美元。高盛發表聲明，否認欺詐，形容指控毫無根據。

美國證監指控，高盛未向投資者披露大型對沖基金保爾森公司對該產品沽空的「關鍵信息」。

證交會稱，保爾森公司07年向高盛支付約1500萬美元的設計和行銷費用，安排交易。購入CDO的為2間歐洲銀行，當中荷蘭銀行（ABN Amro）損失了8.41億美元，另1間德國銀行IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG則損失1.5億美元。
遭到起訴的還有高盛副總裁陶爾（Fabrice Tourre），他涉嫌在美國樓市開始下跌時，透過不實陳述及隱瞞與次按相關事宜，欺騙投資者，應對事件負主要責任。

美國證監法規執行部董事Robert Khuzami認為，有關產品是創新及複雜的，但是其原理卻很簡單；高盛則誤導客戶相信有關產品涉及的次按證券是由獨立第三者ACA所揀選，事實上有關證券是一名對沖基金巨擘所選擇。

My Comments:

(a) The Lehman Minibond sold in Hong Kong, was arranged by Lehman Brothers Asia, the CDO & Structured Credit Group headed by Leon Hindle.

Why did Mr. Leon Hindle lie about the purpose of the CDS which was actually the underlying securities for a Minibond Series ?

雷曼亚洲安排了迷债及迷债最为隐藏之部分：合成CDO。雷曼亚洲让迷债发行商Pacific International Finance (汇丰所属）买入雷曼自己安排的合成CDO("Septermber 25, 2006 Derivatives Week")。雷曼亚洲之结构产品部门主管 Leon Hindle 却在新闻发布上讲：此产品是“通过直接销售和第三者分销商卖给各类投资者”。

Leon Hindle 掩盖了此产品其实是作为迷债抵押品， 100％全數直接卖给Pacific International Finance的事实。掩盖了此产品是为迷债抵押品而设计的事实, 掩盖了此产品跟雷曼迷你债券的关系。掩盖了雷曼一手操纵此产品之买卖双方之事实。

A deception ?

(b) When banks in Hong Kong selling Minibond to their retail clients,

- did banks / banks staff tell clients ''vital information" about the so-called Minibond collateral (or: Minibond underlying securities) which is essentially another layer of credit-linked products?

- did banks tell banks staff ''vital information" about the so-called Minibond collateral (or: Minibond underlying securities) which is essentially another layer of credit-linked products, during banks training session /or banks guidance on the related products?

Citi Offers To Buy Back Lehman Notes Sold To Spanish Clients

2010-04-09T02:20:00.000-07:00

8 Apr 2010

MADRID -(Dow Jones)- Citigroup Inc. said Thursday it has agreed to buy back structured notes created by Lehman Brothers and sold to clients in Spain that later became nearly worthless when Lehman went bankrupt.

The New York bank's Spanish unit, Citibank Espana SA, is offering 55% of the nominal value of the EUR78 million it sold in Lehman notes, according to a press release.
Hundreds of clients that purchased the securities from Citi sued the bank in Spanish courts on charges that it sold a high-risk product aggressively to retail investors without adequately explaining the risks.

"It was sold as an alternative to long-term deposits, as a secure financial product," said Jordi Ruiz de Villa, a partner at Barcelona law firm Jausas, who together with Madrid law firm Zunzunegui advised 122 clients in the case against Citibank.

Ruiz de Villa said the Lehman products have a market value of somewhere between 20% and 30% of their nominal value.

Citi isn't the only bank in Spain that sold these products. Last month, Bankinter SA (BKT.MC) was ordered by a Spanish court to compensate some of the clients that bought Lehman Brothers products through the bank. Bankinter has said it will appeal.
According to Jausas' Ruiz de Villa, Deutsche Bank AG (DBK.XE) and Credit Suisse Group (CS) are also facing lawsuits for the sale of similar products to Spanish clients.

-By Christopher Bjork, Dow Jones Newswires ; 34 91 395 8123;
christopher.bjork@dowjones.com

Source:
"News Citi Offers To Buy Back Lehman Notes Sold To Spanish Clients"from Morningstar
http://news.morningstar.com/newsnet/ViewNews.aspx?article=/DJ/201004080702DOWJONESDJONLINE000431_univ.xml

（转载）遲來的正義 -- 作者: 老馬

2010-04-06T07:10:00.000-07:00

遲來的正義

據報警方商業罪案調查科採取行動，拘捕兩名中國銀行的前線女職員，她們涉嫌用欺詐手段誘使他人投資雷曼迷債產品。
警方在有數千人報案後的一年多才有所行動，可以說是太遲了。但遲了，總比完全不執法進步。無論政府如何想掩蓋事實真相，但真相被完全揭發只是時間的遲早；『證券及期貨條例』早已立法，雷曼苦主對法例的覺悟也只是時間的遲早。警方的動作究竟是對此有所警醒，還是政府的政治算計，都不重要，因為正義總會到來。

社會上恐怕也有同情該前線職員，事實上銀行的前線職員是處於整個劇毒的雷曼結構性產品利益鏈條的最末端：吞噬了大部份暴利的是雷曼的職業經理們，疑是同謀的經銷機構、銀行高層也吃下了豐厚的報酬，前線的職員只收繩頭小利。但雖如此，作為有專業資格的從業員，應嚴格規守專業的操守、道德規範，而不是僅僅為了繩頭小利，為了迎合上司的不合理指示而損害顧客的利益。雖然，我們都相信絕大多數的前線職員都不會故意做出欺詐的行為，但沒有主觀的意圖，不等於不會造成客觀的傷害。這猶如一個肇事的汽車駕駛者，他主觀上可能沒有傷人意圖，但如果客觀上造成人命財產的傷害，他還是要負上刑事責任。每一個汽車駕駛者都應該明白，一旦拿起方向盤，他就要承擔起道德和法律的責任。每一個證券專業的從業員也應該明白，他們是提供資產管理服務的專業人士，他們也要為自己的行為負上法律及道德上的責任。從各方面的調查都表明，百分之七十多的購置雷曼相關結構性產品者都不是合適的投資者，或者說，這些不合適的投資者損失了這些資產，就再也無能力找回來，對那些用作養老金的人來說，更是嚴重的傷害。

『證券及期貨條例』第107條正是針對那些罔顧自己職責及道德責任的專業從業員，並非只是故意的欺詐才負上刑責，罔顧職責，罔顧實情的失實陳述也屬犯罪。雷曼事件對香港的警示也正在於此：在過去數年，銀行業大規模擴充證券業務，但無論從監管當局，到銀行高層，到前線員工，都罔顧現行的法律，罔顧道德規範，大規模地違反專業操守，造成的大規模的傷害。但非常令人憤慨的是，香港政府為了掩蓋少數人的失職，僅將事件定性為商業糾紛，而沒有真正吸取事件的教訓，採取措施糾正錯誤，平復社會創傷。

政府應該改弦更張，與利益各方商討平復社會創傷的方案，使受害者與銀行在公平的基礎上達到合理的和解，而不是單方面具強迫性的6至7成之迷債方案，才是一個人民的政府，而不是少數財閥寡頭的代理，才不會被歷史所唾棄。

老馬
31/03/2010

雷曼苦主申請覆核團體發動簽名支持

2010-04-06T07:04:00.000-07:00

1. 雷曼苦主申請覆核團體發動簽名支持 04 Apr 2010 [大公報]

一名買入雷曼產品的女子上月向高院申請司法覆核，指兩大監管機構當日的決定不合法。庭上法官表示擔心，一旦申請人獲判勝訴，已取回六至七成本金的事主，可能因而被銀行要求退款。法官質疑申請人是否足以代表其他事主，將案件押後裁決。雷曼苦主大聯盟昨日發動簽名行動，數百名苦主聯署簽名，表示甘願放棄回購以尋找真相，支持高院繼續司法覆核。

雷曼苦主大聯盟昨日開會，聚集超過六百苦主。大聯盟召集人陳光譽引述庭上法官說，案件牽連甚廣，除了十六家分銷銀行，更有近二萬五千名已接受回購方案的雷曼事主可能受影響，擔心申請人訴求不能代表其他苦主意願。

陳光譽在會上向苦主表示，司法覆核不會損害第三者的利益，同時事關「查找真相」，呼籲苦主簽名支持，表達甘願放棄回購來尋找真相，給法官了解苦主心聲。他的呼籲得到在場過百人支持，苦主留下姓名、聯絡電話和金管局投訴編號，並簽名支持行動，當中包括不少已接受回購方案的人士。陳光譽表示，會將收集到的簽名整理後交給法官。他還稱，大聯盟經費嚴重不足，希望苦主支援。

雷曼迷債回購方案提出後，證監會和金管局在去年七月與十六家分銷銀行達成和解協議，並即時停止調查。上月底該名女子入稟法院，要求司法覆核。庭上更爆出證監會已完成中銀的調查。

2. 雷曼苦主興訟籌得90萬 04 Apr 2010 [星島日報]

雷曼苦主早前申請司法覆核，期望推翻監管機構跟銀行就迷債回購方案的決定，法院將於本月19日決定是否接納申請。雷曼苦主大聯盟暫籌得90萬元作打官司之用，仍未達預計的150萬元。

大聯盟前召集人陳光譽不滿政府當事件已完結，懶理涉款達100億元、逾萬名非雷曼迷債苦主個案仍未解決，他們會繼續與銀行及政府周旋。

望籌得150萬元

雷曼苦主大聯盟不滿證監會和金管局跟16家銀行，去年達成迷債回購方案，九成人只獲七成賠償的決定，其中一名女苦主已就此申請司法覆核。為打這場官司，大聯盟希望籌得100萬至150萬元。

大聯盟昨舉行簡報會，約有500名苦主出席，陳光譽指由去年10月至今約籌得90萬元，如司法覆核獲得接納，先前已接受和解、只獲部份賠償的苦主，就有機會再爭取十足賠償，亦有利仍未取得分毫賠償的信貸相聯債券、精明債券及掛票據等苦主，繼續抗爭。

對涉嫌誤導投資者的兩名前中銀職員被捕，陳光譽表示警方至今未有向他查詢，大聯盟暫未接觸到涉案苦主。

大聯盟召集人陳浩偉希望捐款越多越好，因一旦打官司，時間越長所需費用越多。不少出席簡報會的苦主昨日也踴躍簽名支持司法覆核，購買了50萬元渣打掛票據的苦主陳小姐說，現時要求已不高，能取回四成已足夠。

另一苦主李先生雖已獲永亨銀行賠償八成本金，但仍到場聽取最新進展及捐款，「一定支持，佢（政府及銀行）個方案唔賠足係唔。」

[星島日報] 雷曼苦主申司法覆核法庭未決定是否受理

2010-03-28T02:46:00.000-07:00

雷曼迷債回購方案提出後，證監會和金管局在去年7月與16家分銷銀行達成和解協議，並即時停止調查。但一名以4萬元買入雷曼產品的女子，指兩大監管機構當日的決定不合法，昨向高院申請司法覆核許可，而一直未有公布調查下文的證監會，於庭上爆出已完成中銀的調查。法官押後裁決。

昨有近80名雷曼事主到庭旁聽，雷曼苦主大聯盟主席陳光譽以有利益人士身份發言，矛頭指向證監會及金管局，聲言：「找出迷債真相、社會公義，是今日之目的」，語畢即全場拍掌以示支持。

答辯人證券及期貨事務監察委員會一方，由資深大律師馮華健代表，對申請人石麗珊(譯音)一方指證監會按《證券及期貨條例》，要全面徹底調查後才可以停止，馮於庭上指條文並不要求證監會與銀行和解前要做到百分百完成調查，更披露證監會的調查已經「大體上(substantially)」完成，而就申請人購買迷債的分銷銀行中銀而言，調查更已「全面(fully)」完成」，馮指申請人的事實基礎已出錯，認為法庭不應頒下司法覆核許可。

庭上爆「中銀調查已完成」

法官認為證監會去年7月22日公布回購方案時，未有交代部分調查已完成，准許證監會3日內作出解釋及存檔有關證據。不過，證監會這個說法卻惹來一眾雷曼事主不滿。陳光譽於庭上說：「如果不到法庭，永遠不知中銀調查已完成」，形容監管機構的態度是「無透明度」。

法官又指此案牽連甚廣，除了16家分銷銀行，更有24,888名已接受回購方案的雷曼事主可能受影響，一旦申請人獲判勝訴，證監會的調查要繼續，另一答辯人香港金融管理局也可向銀行採取執法行動，已取回60%或70%本金的事主，可能因而被銀行要求退款，法官質疑申請人是否足以代表其他事主，而其他事主也可能不想再受惡夢糾纏。法官要求申請人三思及限制其訴求範圍。

申請人最後同意加入聲明訴求，指達成和解而終止調查銀行的安排屬不合法，代表的資深大律師戴啟思表示，單純的聲明不會影響第三者利益，法官亦有酌情權為今次案件「度身訂造」判決。而陳光譽也於庭上說：「有時銀紙好重要，但找出真相、找出公義都重要」，明言可以發起簽名行動，讓事主表達甘願放棄回購來尋找真相的意願。

4萬購迷債婦拒回購方案

49歲婦人石麗珊於申請書指出，她2008年1月在中銀職員失實陳述下，以4萬元購入雷曼迷債35B系列，雷曼爆煲後，去年8月7日中銀向她提出60%回購和解方案，條件是永久終止任何投訴及法律程序，她拒絕接受，認為《證券及期貨條例》第201條並不賦予證監會停止調查的權力，真正解釋是證監會全面徹底調查後才可以停止。

申請人認為證監會的調查不全面，分銷銀行也沒有承認任何責任，故證監會及金管局停止調查的決定不合法、不合理及有違申請人對證監會及金管局的合理期望。

據雷曼苦主大聯盟資料顯示，申請人的法援申請遭否決，聯盟就其官司費用展開募捐，截至今年1月籌得捐款約88萬元。

【案件編號：HCAL115/09】

整合自：2010年3月23日(二) 星島日報 A19版

獨立機構保障消費者（选自 "金融改革的終局"）

2010-03-01T22:24:00.000-08:00

"金融改革的終局" - Paul Krugman 2010年3月2日

(...)

消費者需要更佳的保障是毫無疑問的。

曾積極要求前聯儲局主席格林斯平（Alan Greenspan）對付有害貸款的已故聯儲局理事格拉姆利赫（Edward Gramlich），在2007年完美地簡述了相關理據：
「為何風險最高的貸款產品會賣給最不在行的借款人？答案就在問題中──最不在行的借款人是最容易被哄騙買入這些產品的。」

獨立機構保障消費者

這種保障由一家獨立機構來提供很重要嗎？一定是的，否則說客不會那麼努力地反對成立這個機構。

原因不難理解。有人認為保障消費者的工作可以、並應該由聯儲局來做，或是如一個目前看來不太可能實現的妥協方案中所提到的──或財政部屬下一個單位處理。但要記得，不久之前，格林斯平是聯儲局主席，而斯諾（John Snow）是財長。理據再明顯不過了。在未來可能出現的反監管管治下──相信我，金融說客的影響力如此大，將來是會有這種政府的──消費者唯一得到保護的方法是由一個只是為了監管銀行操守而存在的機構。

博客主看法：

衍生工具複雜且深藏危險，迷債之設計者和銀行分銷商都是金融界的專業人員，更是深明此理。
如果發行產品的投行和銷售商們給客戶們介紹了產品的真實面目，這樣買入者就不會有悔。当然，众多的客户们很可能在可以理解产品的真实特征和风险之前，就已经决定不买这么复杂，听不懂的产品了。迷債的問題在於用漂亮的騙局幌子來跟銀行的客戶們介紹和銷售迷債，投行和銀行分銷商根本不想讓客戶瞭解迷債的真實特徵和風險，如果可以大講跟7個公司信貸掛鈎，為甚麼卻不可以明確提醒客戶：”迷債還要跟100多個各種評級的公司信貸掛鈎“？？？
證監會對於“全面披露“的要求可是”清晰，準確，無誤導“！

發行產品的投行和銷售商們發現如果把產品的實質講一點出來的話（如：迷債利息跟150個公司的信貸掛鈎－系列6），買迷債的人就會大為減少。而加了個漂亮的騙局“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎”，買的人就會放心這7個著名公司。

迷债系列6寫明保本跟150 個公司信貸掛鈎，利息為 5％。這個高息跟150 個公司信貸掛鈎：6 個或以上信貸事件：利息為 0。

2003年9月銷售的系列6 之之銷售結果是最差的，僅為 4百75 萬美金。
於同年6月發行的系列 5 之銷售總額是過了 1千萬美金。
於同年11 月發行的系列 7 的銷售總額則是多達 4千 6百多萬美金。
於次年2004年5月發行的系列10 的銷售總額也是多達是 4千4百多萬美金。

系列6 之年息卻是最高的，利息為 5％。兩年期，2005年9月到期。
而系列5 的利息僅是 3。8％，
系列 7 的利息只是 4。2％，
系列 10 的美元系列利息也是： 4。25％，
系列 5 ， 7 和 10 的利息均低於系列 6 這麼個保本迷債，鎖定年期也不比系列6 短。

為甚麼銀行客戶們會捨系列6 之高息誘惑而選擇其它低息的迷債系列呢？參見“從迷債系列 6 看雷曼迷你債券騙局手段之完美完善過程”
.

同樣由雷曼亞洲一手安排的在澳洲銷售的信貸掛鈎票據 Mahogany Notes 就清晰地介紹了
- 該信貸掛鈎票據之本金跟50個公司信貸掛鈎（7個破產就會失去100％本金），
- 該票據之利息跟150個公司信貸掛鈎（破產事件跟票據利息之關係）
- 該票據所有信貸掛鈎主體之評級（AA 到 BBB- 及低於 BBB- 之公司數目，等）和公司之業界類別等信息。
- 該票據明確指出其資金不是投入於任何信貸掛鈎主體（公司）。

Mahogany Notes 票據買的人明確瞭解它們買入的產品是甚麼，所以雷曼暴煲之後，Mahogany Notes 票據持有者們沒有高呼上當，沒有投訴銷售結構。因為他們知道他們買的是甚麼。

From Lehman Minibond To Oracle Capital Limited

2010-02-25T22:44:00.000-08:00

The Lehman Minibonds were single handedly created and arranged by Lehman Brothers Asia Pacific. The main contributor was the CDO & Structured Credit Group headed by Leon Hindle.

Oracle Capital Limited was described in the "The other side of structured credit of The Asset October 2009 by Chito Santiago (http://www.theasset.com/article/17587.html)" as follows:

[
When the saga of Lehman Brothers started to unravel and eventually led to its spectacular demise in September last year, two of its senior bankers, Leon Hindle and Fredric Teng, were already contemplating lives outside of the firm – and outside of investment banking for that matter. After all, the sellside was gone as the investor base was shattered at that point in time. Perhaps it was opportune to move to the other side of the fence – into the buyside.

Hindle used to be managing director and head of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and structured credit trading group for the Asia-Pacific region at Lehman Brothers. He was also a member of Lehman’s Asia-Pacific fixed income management committee and the global credit products management team.

(...)

Together, they formed Oracle Capital Limited, the Hong Kong-based sub-investment advisor of Oracle Investment Fund SPC focussing on structured credit asset class . Their motivation came at a time when investment banking was changing significantly. In every asset class, it looks as though there is a huge opportunity to move to the buyside. Teng says they have already obtained an asset management licence from the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, and are currently applying for an advisory licence and expect the process to be concluded soon.

In setting up Oracle, Hindle and Teng followed the footsteps of fellow investment bankers who have decided to leave the industry and strike it on their own so as to take advantage of the market dislocation. For instance, Jeremy Amias, a 23-year veteran at Citi who left the US firm as head of fixed income, currencies and commodities for Asia-Pacific, has joined hands with another former Citi banker Charlie Berman to set up Amias Berman and Company, a fixed income advisory, origination and brokerage firm.

(...)

While markets in other asset classes have witnessed rallies, this seems to be less the case for structured credit and according to Hindle, this situation may last for another four to five years. Structured credit is pretty much the whole gamut of products, ranging from single name credit linked notes to balance sheet collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and synthetic CDOs. “These assets are not straight-forward,” notes Teng. “There is a lot of work to be done before you can understand what is going on. And the barrier to entry is high, you need a team of credit derivatives specialists and also a lot of investment in technology. We think we are the only outfit wholly dedicated to this asset class in Asia. We see a lot of opportunities.”

Hindle adds: “Asian investors are really in a difficult position, if you like, to make decisions about how to manage these things going forward given the overall environment now. It is probably less the case for the European or US investors because they do have a greater sense of the underlying risks in these products. That is why I think the opportunity in Asia is present for us. There are people who are running similar funds in the US and Europe, but there is not really anyone on the ground in this region with the same focus.”

(...)

Unlike CLOs, which have rallied and boast a deeper liquidity now, synthetic CDOs did not have a chance to rally to the same extent, because there are not that many pure-end buyers and because, in some cases, the risks of the transactions are tied up to the riskiest names in the former investment grade universe such as the monolines. “The kind of valuation for certain deals at this point in time, if they are managed right, should be able to generate a pretty healthy return despite the lack of liquidity in that area,” Hindle points out.

(...)

]

According to its website, Oracle Captial Limited is located on the 20th Floor, Central Tower of Central, and its Chief Investment Officer is Leon Hindle.

Leon Hindle and his CDO & Structured Credit Group surely have done an excellent jobs for boosting Lehman Brothers revenue and his own bonus in selling synthetic CDO/CDS at the cost of Hong Kong retail banks' clients with the innovation product "Lehman Minibond".

Lehman Brothers sold CDO to their clients by taking advantages of the CDO boom. Lehman Brothers also sold synthetic CDO / CDS to the clients to provide insurance for the event of CDOs bust. However, Lehman Brothers did not want to be the insurance-provider on the related CDOs.

What did Lehman Brothers do? One of the solution is the Lehman Minibond.

Lehman Brothers Asia-Pacific region created the Lehman Minibond which was essentially providing credit default insurances for a basket of reference entities. According to "Derivatives Week" (Dec.8,2008), Leon Hindle oversaw Lehman's origination and distribution of all structured credit in the Asia-Pacific, including the strucuring of CDOS linked to its controversial minibond series.
In 2003, from the poor sales results of Minibond Series 6, the Minibond creator realized that Hong Kong retail banks' clients are not keen in a product that is credit linked to 150 reference entities. The Minibond creator quickly switched to a smoother strategy. They added a facade to the Minibond and prominently promoted the Minibond as "Credite Linked with 7 well-known Companies". While Hong Kong retail banks' clients thought that they bought into a Lehman Minibond which was credited linked to 7 well-known companies, they did not realize that they have actually become the ultimate synthetic CDO /CDS insurance provider, to provide insurance on the default event of a basket of undisclosed 125-194 reference entities. It's the insurance premium for the undisclosed 125-194 reference entities (Synthetic CDO) that pays the Minibond interest.

With all the experience and in-depth knowledge on CDO / Synthetic CDO / CDS, knowing how little that people understand and can be fooled by financial experts on such innovation products, Leon Hindle and his company Oracle Capital Limited surely would provide excellent service to their clients.

Related blogs on Leon Hindle: " Why did Lehman Asia head of structure division Leon Hindle Lie "
(http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/06/lehman-asia-head-of-structure-division.html)

Watch out, if you are considering to buy a product from the experts of CDO / CLO / Synthetic CDO. The product may have a conservative branding name and a beautiful facade, but the true features & risks of the product probably can be anything that is totally different from the branding name & the prominent facade.

The former Lehman Asia Pacific CDO & Structured Credit Team

2010-02-24T00:35:00.001-08:00

Who was the creator of the Minibond ?
The product was created by the CDO & Structured Credit Asia Pacific of Lehman Brothers.

Who is Leon Hindle ?
Loen Hindle was Managing Director and Head of CDO & Structured Credit, Asia Pacific, Lehman Brothers.
According to "Derivatives Week" (Dec.8,2008), Leon Hindle oversaw Lehman's origination and distribution of all structured credit in the Asia-Pacific, including the strucuring of CDOS linked to its controversial minibond series.

Related blogs on Leon Hindle: "Why did Lehman Asia head of structure division Leon Hindle Lie"
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/06/lehman-asia-head-of-structure-division.html

Other Senior members in the Lehman Brothers Asia Pacific for CDO & Structured Credit products related may include:

George Sun: is Managing Director and Head of Global Credit Products Sales for Lehman Brothers in Asia ex-Japan. Mr. Sun heads up a team that is responsible for the distribution of all credit products including money markets, high grade credit, high yield credit, loans, private placements, structured credit, CDOs, and emerging market assets.

Ian Croft: is a senior vice president and is responsible for corporate credit securitisation opportunities in Asia ex-Japan, as well marketing and distribution of structured credit products in Singapore and South East Asia.

Patrick Kaye is a Senior Vice President, responsible for Lehman Brothers’ Principal and Structured Finance practice in non-Japan Asia. He and the group arrange securitization financings on behalf of clients as well as asset-based principal investments on behalf of the Firm.

Tay Teck How is a Vice President, in the CDO & Structured Credit, Asia Pacific, Lehman Brothers.

Steve Baker is a Senior Vice President in the CLO Banking group at Lehman Brothers US. Steve is focused on origination, structuring and placement of corporate credit securitizations, CLOs and related products.

銀行＝金融老千？

2010-02-17T20:05:00.000-08:00

虎年来临，回首上年之签：

"君不須防人不肖,
眼前鬼卒皆為妖，“

銀行伙同投行以骗术来包装和推銷雷曼迷你債券、大摩精明债券，星展星债（Constellation）， ELN、。。。等等。

政府为了quick-qin，则不惜杀鸡取蛋，全力支持銀行和投行们面向市民们的金融骗局和骗术。

一不小心，信任银行的市民们都會被骗入到经过金融精英们精心包装过的金融骗局之中，而市民们的身邊的儲蓄都會最终随着骗局的破灭而化為烏有，

骗局暴露之后，政府为了保护銀行和投资银行，全力为银行和投资银行们的金融骗局和骗术辩护，混淆视听。
我們的政府／議員／法律機構等, 對於倫敦金或祈福黨／跌錢黨等欺騙市民的集團，是否會施以同樣的寬容，並以現在為銀行辯解的理由來為這些集團之欺騙行為辯護？

” 秦王徒把長城築,
禍去禍來因自招"

金融老千真係無處不在，今次银行在政府的护航之下得以安全地全身而退，他們會因此而變得重視誠信，對客戶盡責麼？或者是變得更加有恃無恐？
市民們：小心銀行和投資銀行錶面的道貌岸然和花言巧語，小心再次被銀行和投資銀行欺騙啊!

千古奇冤，香港迷債，
銀行行騙，市民蒙冤。
銀行抵賴，市民無奈。
銀行欺詐，無須受罰。
！！！！！！！！！！！！！

（轉載）雷曼苦主若肯堅持可追回餘下四成損失《新報》

2010-02-12T00:59:00.000-08:00

by 王岸然
11 Feb 2010

早於一年多前，筆者在本欄多次提議應以調解制度解決雷曼事件，當時對事件的認識，不如今天的深入；今天可以斷言，新的調解制度不適用於雷曼的苦主，事實上部份苦主於無奈接受六成和解的方案，等同迫苦主完全承擔迷債的苦果，而銀行不須負上責任，亦不須負擔任何補償費用，這是無以言公平的。筆者認為苦主有權追究到底，就算已經接受了六成賠償的苦主，亦不等於無權再追究下去。正好相反，在前證監的「陶淵明」高秉忠先生作供之後，事實證明了事件是人禍，不是天災，苦主只要肯團結，可以合情合理合法地追回餘下四成損失，問題只是由銀行或證監會負責，還是兩者共同分擔。
人才難敵港府人治作風

上星期四文章結尾之時，提及筆者曾經查問高秉忠，有否願意將一己的寶貴證監經驗，貢獻給中國的證監機構，他的反應是哈哈大笑，有朋友問筆者，「哈哈大笑，盡在不言之中」是甚麼意思？上星期由於篇幅所限，沒有解釋，其實也不難明白，在一個人治的社會，要獨立專業地依法律的授權，不受干擾地履行職責，研究審批投資產品，談何容易？香港受英國人管治一百五十年，自由法治的觀念深入腦海，但回歸之後，內地人治的一套日漸入侵，高秉忠的證供，足以證明一切，高先生若只圖高薪職位，在證監已過二百萬年薪，尚且因為難忍證監內的人治作風要請辭，中國證監份屬行家，知己知彼，人治作風只會比香港的嚴重，不會比香港的輕

香港證監會職員的人工，特別是高薪一族，是比國外的行家高出兩三倍之多。論證監經驗的先進，美國、加拿大、澳洲及英國都比香港先進，香港有條件請一流的人才，但人才當奴才用，上述四處地方的銀行都沒有將迷債放在櫃出售，就是最佳證明。

銀行主事職員應被起訴

新加坡的證監專家不及香港多，「中招」猶有可說，香港的證監專家來自外國先進經驗，並不是欠缺能力，而是難敵港府的人治作風，有原則的人早就離去。

筆者有責任提醒各方面有權者必須注意的，是無論如何也不能讓事件不了了之。作為一個負責任的政府，不能任由社會上幾萬無辜市民，在自己沒有錯誤的情況下，蒙受不明不白的損失，而讓事件不了了之。事情已經很明白，銀行被查明有違規銷售的個案，按法律有刑事責任（不誠實的詐騙），主持其事的銀行職員應被刑事起訴，世上並無因為要打工搵食而隨便犯法的道理，只要苦主肯堅持，事件終可解決。

時事評論員

wongonyin@yahoo.com

（轉載）致立法會雷曼小組主席何鍾泰議員的公開信

2010-02-04T01:26:00.000-08:00

致立法會雷曼小組主席何鍾泰議員:

我們一眾雷曼苦主對閣下處理證監會前職員高秉忠先生在立法會雷曼小組中作供一事, 實不理解。

作為雷曼小組主席, 閣下特別地在會議上不斷及主動引導各議員, 除非高秉忠先生提交證據及文件, 以支持他對證監會言論及指摘, 否則可不考慮其供詞內容. 而閣下在接受電台訪問中, 亦重覆地重申相同腔調。

我們在此不揣測閣下作出此等動作的意圖, 但這些特別的動作, 閣下實無可否認地限制了高先生抖出證監會在處理審批雷曼事件中失職的真相。

我們翻看年內閣下主持雷曼小組會議, 在傳召證人方面, 包括金管局任志剛, 蔡耀君; 證監會韋奕禮, 何賢通; 財經事務及庫務局陳家強等人士, 均沒有特別主動提醒各小組議員要上述證人提交文件及證據, 以支持他們的供詞, 我們請閣下詳細解釋為何在處理證人供詞上出現如此雙重標準。

雷曼小組在往後傳召其他證人時, 包括銀行負責人, 閣下會否同樣地主動提醒各議員, 除非銀行代表提供文件及證據, 否則應不理會其供詞及答辯。

我們覺得高秉忠先生是為彰顯公義而來, 各議員亦應本著社會公義去聆聽作供的內容, 為真相窮追猛打, 主持公道, 才不辜負全港市民的期望。可是我們卻在電視上看到某些議員在聆訊中保持沈默, 似乎在擔心提問會對證監會不利, 暴露他們處事不當, 更甚者, 我們在電視竟看到某些議員在議會上呼呼大睡, 這成何體統 !

我們全港5萬名雷曼苦主, 每天注意著事態的發展, 所有單位及人士的表現, 也都一一存檔, 並銘記於心, 尤其是議員處理雷曼事件上的公正問題。希望何鍾泰議員與全港苦主互勉之 !

祝政安!

雷曼苦主大聯盟
二零一零年二月二日

转载自： “致立法會雷曼小組主席何鍾泰議員的公開信”
http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/E887B4E7AB8BE6B395E69C83E99BB7E69BBCE5B08FE7B584E4B8BBE5B8ADE4BD95E98DBEE6B3B0E8ADB0E593A1E79A84E585ACE9968BE4BFA1--E99BB7E69BBCE88BA6E4B8BBE5A4A7E881AFE79B9F6887.php

(信報轉載) 誰要為雷曼事件負責- 王岸然

2010-02-02T18:33:00.000-08:00

信報－ 2010年2月3日

經過高秉忠兩天的公開聆訊，相信一直有研究、留意雷曼迷債事件的人，不難明白事件的來龍去脈。簡單地說，這是前朝弄出來的禍，是人禍而不是天災，就算不是有百年一遇的金融海嘯，這件事情同樣會出現，只是遲早的問題。

由於事件的遠因比筆者原先估計的為早，現在的曾蔭權政府財經班子完全未上位，二○○一年時陳家強還在大學教書，曾俊華在海關工作，負責打擊翻版碟，而曾蔭權當時失勢，行行企企之餘就只是負責城市清潔的工作。作為行政會議成員，他理應知情，但談不上要負責，除非有證據顯示他二○○五年掌權之後，有人提議他要正視證監會一會兩管可能出現的問題，而他不理，這就另當別論。

在兩天的聆訊中，泛民議員最有興趣追問，是高秉忠證供之中提及在二○○一年時，當時的證監主席一反證監會十多年的工作常規，直接與前線的監管者開會，要求提供一些快贏方法（Quick Wins），以期盡快搞活經濟。這位沈聯濤主席的做法絕對可笑，這類超級施壓的結果，無異是希望負責審批投資產品的專家放寬他們一貫的標準，以便更多的新投資產品可以推出市場，而類似雷曼迷債這類新的衍生工具投資產品，正是在當時開始出現。

聆訊中泛民議員一再追問，無非想由高秉忠的口中，得知事件的真正負責人，是「董建華」三個字。這是不合理的，因為以高秉忠的位置，就算知道，也只是從沈聯濤或其他高層口中得知，在法律上只屬傳聞證據（Hearsay），不足以證明事實的存在，但作為線索，作為引申的依據，則是十分充足。

「快贏」方法

雷曼特權小組下一步應做的，是以高秉忠的作證為依據，傳召相關人物作供，而這四人，明顯要為雷曼迷債事件的出現，負上終極的責任。這四人分別是證監會前主席沈聯濤、前金融專員任志剛、前財政司梁錦松，自然還有前特首董建華。當然，如果可以的話，應傳訊數個證監會前副總監，特別是「公司財務部」的主管，只是這些外國人早已離任，是否願意到港協助調查，頓成疑問。（順帶一提，議員其實可以親身到外國找這些前證監高層詢問，媒介也可以這樣做，要找尋事件的真相，非不能，是不為也。）

二○○一年港府推行高官問責制，梁錦松上任財政司，若大家還記得，他希望香港的經濟曼克頓化，他是沈聯濤的直屬上司，他曾經對沈聯濤給予指示，是極有可能的，而這就成為沈聯濤逼下屬提供「快贏」方法去搞活經濟的最大原因。

為何又關任志剛事？筆者似乎一直在本欄「追殺」任專員，但事實上整件事件與他有脫不開的關係。沈聯濤在出任證監主席之前，是金融管理局的副總裁，是任志剛的得力助手，二人關係密切，沈聯濤被調去主管證監，是任專員當時勢力擴張的結果，而當時銀行界取消統一存款利息後，需要增加其他類別的業務，任專員本來就是以保護銀行家的利益為己任，他聯同梁錦松，要求沈聯濤主持下的證監會拆牆鬆縛，結果弄出後來的災難，是正常不過的推論，是否如此，若不是，「快贏」之說從何而來？有待特權小組的調查了。

人為悲劇

還有是在二○○五、○六年，本來證監會之內已經花了一年的時間，準備了一套監管中介人不良銷售手法（Mis-Selling）的守則，準備供銀行業使用，但不知為何沒有了下文。證監本來就有守則（經發牌制度）規管證券業界，這是為何證監去年可以逼「新鴻基」及另一證券行百分之一百賠償給雷曼苦主，但銀行的監管完全是金管局的責任，任志剛曾否背後施加影響力，阻攔新守則的通過，不是他又是誰人，正是特權小組的調查要點所在。

無論如何，在高秉忠作證之後，雷曼迷債事件之所以會在香港發生的謎底，基本上已被解開。證監會沒有在適當的時間，做好適當的預防措施，是悲劇的所以發生原因，而悲劇原本是完全可以避免，背後阻礙證監會工作的原因，是當時的政府金融高官自私地考慮個人利益，要求任內有「快贏」的政績的結果。一想到兩位前朝人物梁錦松與任志剛今天還有為祖國的金融業貢獻經驗，只能祝祖國的投資者好運。

無論對苦主、對社會大眾而言，一句悲劇與不幸，並不是結果。有兩點法律上及制度上可以解決事件的責任及令到事件有較令人滿意的結果。 大概香港市民不以為要用納稅人的金錢補償雷曼苦主是合理，但證監會在二○○四年起設立了一個「投資者賠償基金」，在弄清責任之後，這基金足以賠償給苦主。另外，只要證明銀行確有詐騙的行為，當局可以刑事起訴銀行的高層，有這一權力，逼銀行出資負擔部分的賠償自然可能。

就這兩點，筆者會另外專文討論，筆者一直認定雷曼苦主有理由亦應有權得到百分百賠償，並非是一個意見咁簡單。

[信報] 加拿大銀行業的Good and Boring - Paul Krugman

2010-02-01T18:50:00.000-08:00

2010年2月2日 Paul Krugman

在危機時期，好新聞不是新聞。冰島財政危機成為頭條；加拿大銀行業極其穩健則沒什麼人報道。

然而，隨着全球焦點從拯救金融業轉到改革金融業，那些低調的成功故事至少應該如大型倒閉個案般得到那麼多注視。我們需要從那些顯然是做對了的國家學習，而領頭的是美國的北部鄰居。加拿大現在是個非常重要的榜樣。

是的，我知道，加拿大應該是枯燥無味的。《新共和國雜誌》（The New Republic）曾揚言「有價值的加拿大推廣計劃」（Worthwhile Canadian Initiative）是世上最沉悶的標題（譯注：這是已故美國記者Flora Lewis上世紀八十年代在《紐約時報》一個專欄的名字）。但我一直認為加拿大很有吸引力，主要因為它與美國有很多地方很相似，但又不完全一樣；當加拿大和美國走着不同方向時，很多時候都是因為政策的不同，而不是因為文化或經濟架構不一樣。

無論如何，當談到銀行業時，沉悶是件好事。

首先來一些背景資料。過去十年，美國和加拿大面對同樣的全球環境：兩者都面對大量廉價產品和廉價資金流入；兩國的經濟分析員興奮地宣告，不斷出現嚴重衰退的年代已經過去。

楓葉國的成功經驗

但當問題出現時，加拿大和美國面對的後果很不相同。在美國，按揭拖債大升，一些大金融機構倒閉，其他可以存活的主要是靠政府救助。在加拿大，這一切都沒有發生。加拿大人到底做了什麼不一樣的事？

這與利率政策無關。很多評論員指摘聯儲局是金融危機的罪魁禍首，指它把利率維持在極低水平一段長時間，製造了一個災難性的泡沫。但加拿大利率緊隨美國利率，因此低利率似乎不足以成為造成金融危機的唯一原因。

令人敬畏的前聯儲局主席伏爾克（Paul Volcker）曾大力主張，美國的危機主要來自金融機構規模太大及業務範圍太廣──即「大得不能倒閉」（too big to fail）的銀行的存在。但加拿大的經驗也反駁了這個看法，因為在加拿大，幾乎所有銀行都是「大得不能倒閉」的：佔據加拿大金融業的只有五個銀行集團。

另一方面，加拿大的經驗似乎也支持了美國部分人的看法，其中包括國會負責監管銀行拯救行動的小組主席瓦倫（Elizabeth Warren）。

他們認為，之所以發生金融危機是因為美國未能保護消費者免受誤導性的信貸所害。加拿大有一個獨立的金融消費者機構（Financial Consumer Agency），而且對類似次按的貸款有非常嚴格的限制。

最重要的是，加拿大的經驗似乎支持了那些主張讓銀行業保持沉悶的人的看法，也就是限制銀行的風險承擔活動。美國銀行業本來是沉悶的，但列根時代的撤銷管制措施令銀行業變得有趣但危險。相比之下，加拿大銀行業一直處於愜意的沉悶狀態中。

更具體地說，加拿大對銀行信貸的限制一直比美國嚴格得多，令銀行可以倚靠借來的資金。加拿大對證券化過程也有限制。證券化是把銀行貸款包裝再出售的過程，原意是協助銀行降低風險，但最後令銀行利用其他人的資金來進行更大的賭博。

美金融改革陷兩難

這些限制在近年無疑是限制了加拿大銀行家推出創新主意的機會，如果加拿大仿效美國撤銷管制，這種機會會多很多。但最後證明這個限制是好事。

那麼，美國從加拿大的成功中吸取經驗的機會有多大？

事實上，美國眾議院去年11月通過的金融改革方案將大大地把美國金融系統加拿大化。根據有關方案，美國將成立一個獨立的消費者金融保護機構，對信貸實施限制，並要求銀行繼續持有部分貸款，作為對證券化的限制。

但類似的方案要在參議院得到通過所需的六十票機會不大。共和黨人表明反對任何重大的金融改革──沒有任何一個共和黨人投票支持眾議院的方案──部分民主黨人也猶豫不決。

因此，在防止金融危機再發生的問題上，美國有很大機會什麼都不做，或做的不多，但這將不是因為美國不知道要做什麼：美國毗鄰就有一個好例子告訴我們如何維持銀行業安全。

Original: "Good and Boring"
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/opinion/01krugman.html

-----------------------------

博客主评论：

在如何防范对消费者的金融骗局方面，香港可以做的是否就是：
（1）坚持为标有“此产品不保本”的所谓“风险披露”辩护，
（2）為欺騙和誤導消費者們（以及銀行的普通員工們）的銀行和銀行家們辯護。
？？？

[明報 ] 部門欠溝通埋下迷債禍根

2010-01-30T01:47:00.000-08:00

轉載自：明報 2010年1月30日(六) B2版

證監會前僱員高秉忠在陳述書指出，證監會交由投資產品部及企業融資部審批投資產品，但兩部門欠缺溝通，以致審批尺度不一，變相埋下迷債事件禍根。他昨日補充，兩部門其實早在2001年曾嘗試「破冰」，但因當時的企業融資部董事歐達禮不合作，以致兩部門往後斷絕溝通，直至歐達禮離任為止。
稱歐達禮惡評審批報告

高秉忠表示，投資產品部對應用《公司條例》審批產品有經驗，但歐達禮在01年新上場，對應用該條例審批產品不熟悉，是以投資產品部曾寫了若干報告，解釋審批程序及如何應用法例，並將之交予企業融資部。然而，歐達禮並不欣賞，更用「粗鄙」字眼批改投資產品部的報告，自此企業融資部及投資產品部便不作溝通。高秉忠在第一次作供時曾明言，歐達禮的態度，令兩部門從來難以交流。

高秉忠這兩次應訊提供的資料，觸及不少港府及證監會前要員，包括沈聯濤、張灼華、梁錦松及馬時亨等，有立法會雷曼事件調查小組的委員指出，將繼續向高秉忠取證，希望確立到更明確的立論，方便稍後傳召沈聯濤、馬時亨等前財金要員。

立法會雷曼事件調查小組主席何鍾泰在閉門會議後表示，3月會再次傳召高秉忠，下月9日則傳召證監會行政總裁韋奕禮。他認為高秉忠的作供，有太多是個人評論及感受，這對小組搜集證據撰寫報告無幫助，希望下次高秉忠應訊，會有更具體的資料提供

[經濟日報] 證監2部門被指審批迷債過鬆

2010-01-30T01:38:00.000-08:00

轉載自：經濟日報 2010年1月30日(六) A12版

證監會前僱員高秉忠繼續發揮「深喉」本色，昨日出席立法會雷曼迷債小組聆訊時，大爆主管證監會兩大執行部門的執董於2001年起交惡，雙方數年間不相交往，凸顯證監會執行部門之間各據山頭、缺乏協調的情況。

前僱員︰融資與投資產品部交惡

高秉忠在聆訊中指出， 2001年11月時，首批結構性票據產品出現，由於不熟悉公司法下審批產品可運用的權力，負責審批的企業融資部有感根據《公司條例》下的審批有關產品，不及當時的《投資者保障條例》（其後合併為《證券及期貨條例》）般具彈性。

他續稱，投資產品部當時與法律部討論後，結論是審批投資產品時，如發行人要求就某些公司法下的規定給予豁免，則執行部門有權要求附加條件，但卻惹來企業融資部激烈反彈。

「我們收到的回覆被『劃花晒』，企業融資部主管的評論，我在此亦不便讀出來，當中有些用語比較粗鄙。」高秉忠直言，自此之後，企業融資部與投資產品部之間再沒有就政策交換意見，雙方職員只有工作層面接觸，截至04年企業融資部執董離職後，才再現轉機。

指2部門欠協調未附保障要求

歐達禮（Ashley Alder）於2001年7月獲委任證監會企業融資部執董，及至2004年離任後，由何賢通接掌該部門，而張灼華則自2001年2月起，一直主管投資產品部（當時包括中介團體部）至今。

兩大負責產品審批的部門，未能就審批方式作協調，高秉忠認為是導致企業融資部未有在審批包括迷債的結構產品時，仿效投資產品部的做法，按公司法要求附加保障投資者結構要求的原因。

至於證監會被指在雷曼爆煲後全面停頓產品審批，高秉忠則證實情況確實如此，批評有關做法失當，更是促使他在雷曼爆煲後十日首次請辭的導火。另被問及對在港設立超級監管機構的看法時，他則表示贊成，原因是他近年觀察監管機構的工作文化，往往有「向下看」的情況，即其他負責銀行、保險監管機構的投資者保障做得較證監會差時，便避免採取行動，以免招徠業界人士抨擊。

兩次出席聆訊後，議員對高秉忠爆料意猶未盡，擬於稍後另定會期再傳召出席小組聆訊。

［信报］ “ 高秉忠: 證監會政治化高層急推投資產品 ”

2010-01-28T21:09:00.000-08:00

2010年1月30日

高秉忠轟證監越權爭表現

證監會投資產品科前高級經理高秉忠【左圖】昨天第二次出席立法會有關雷曼迷債事件的聆訊，繼續批評證監會前主席沈聯濤【右圖】為了爭取表現而作出不符合該會職能的決定，並指出證監會旗下二個審批產品部門的不和，可能是導致出現雷曼迷債事件的原因之一。

出席雷曼聆訊矛頭直指沈聯濤

高秉忠供詞的矛頭直指沈聯濤，後者昨天首次為此回應。沈聯濤通過電郵回覆傳媒查詢時表示，自一九九八年擔任證監會主席以來，花了七年時間，希望把證監會發展成世界級的監管機構。他強調，證監會的董事會非常獨立，同時證監會也有獨立的程序複檢委員會監察。

沈聯濤於一九九八年十月至二○○五年九月期間，連續擔任三屆證監會主席，他現職為中國證監會首席顧問、清華大學和馬來西亞大學兼職教授。

指部門不和缺溝通

高秉忠表示，二○○一年是關鍵的一年，原因是當時特區政府正式成立高官問責制後，對證監會的干預愈多愈大；沈聯濤為了急於爭取成績，期間作出的部分決定根本不符合證監會的職能，對執行人員構成壓力。他甚至指出，沈聯濤曾主動接觸基金經理，邀請他們設計新產品。

與此同時，高秉忠表示，證監會旗下的企業融資部和政策、中國事務及投資產品部長期不和，導致部門之間溝通不足，在產品審批方面曾出現混淆不清的程序，加上雷曼迷債在當時屬於新的投資產品，故可能促使迷債事件出現；至二○○四年其中一個部門主管，即證監會前執行董事歐達禮（Ashley Alder）退休，二個部門的關係才見改善。

他指出，證監會於披露風險和監管有不足之處責無旁貸，在外國，與雷曼產品相類近的產品，不會銷售予零售投資者，加上發行商向證監會提交的產品廣告，不足以令投資者了解產品的結構，實在有改善的地方。

何鍾泰：供詞多涉個人感受

證監會表示不評論前職員高秉忠的言論。委員會主席何鍾泰重申，高秉忠的作供涉及很多個人感受，這並非小組所期望；不過，委員會希望能夠於其個人感受中取得有力證據。

何鍾泰又表示，希望於三月中再傳召高秉忠出席聆訊，而委員會亦希望於二月九日再傳召證監會行政總裁韋奕禮。高秉忠於去年九月正式離開證監會後主動聯絡委員會，本周初首次被傳召作供，力陳證監會的不是。

另外，金管局昨天公布，截至本月二十八日，共有一萬六千二百八十六宗雷曼兄弟相關投資產品投訴個案處理完畢■

證監前高層作供直言迷債監管不足 (新報訊)

2010-01-28T20:57:00.000-08:00

2010-01-28

【新報訊】證監會投資產品科前高級經理高秉忠，昨日在立法會調查雷曼事件小組委員會上表示，部份雷曼迷債產品只有擔保人，並無基金經理，如只用披露方式審核並不足夠。他說，不相信證監會的高層不理解有投資產品誤導的情況嚴重。他又指，在2005至2006年期間，有3宗涉嚴重違規的個案，數百名投資者受影響，但未有對外公布。

披露式審批不足夠
立法會調查雷曼事件小組委員會繼續研訊，出席作供的高秉忠表示，離職前的工作主要負責批核投資產品能否推出市場，如產品結構上有問題，會要求更改，更改後符合要求可獲批核，否則會被拒絕認可。他又說，若只用披露方式審批雷曼迷債產品，並不足夠。
他指出，有其他國家或地區在審核迷債產品時，除了以披露為本外，還有結構性的審批準則，證監會去年發出的加強保障投資者諮詢文件，要求結構性投資產品的發行人及擔保人需符合一定條件，便屬結構性的要求，但是當局仍然堅持以披露為本。

2月再傳召韋奕禮
民主黨甘乃威質疑為何投資產品送交證監會審批時，可分別交到投資產品科及公司融資部兩個部門，但不由一個部門統一處理。高秉忠回應指，投資產品由於包裝不同，會歸納到不同部門處理，而兩個部門批核的標準同類產品亦會有不同，但他指出，產品銷售章程複雜，難作比較。

立法會雷曼迷債小組主席何鍾泰表示，高秉忠提供的資料，當中有涉及個人意見及感受，委員會會清楚界定，最後再決定如何採納他的證供。
何鍾泰稱，小組的整個調查工作已經完成一半，有待4月傳召6間銀行的員工，本周五會再次傳召高秉忠出席研訊，2月則再傳召證監會行政總裁韋奕禮。

迷債爆煲曾蔭權幫兇. 着重短期回報不監不管 (東方日報)

2010-01-28T20:53:00.000-08:00

2010-01-28

迷債爆煲曾蔭權幫兇

證券及期貨事務監察委員會前任非上市投資產品高級經理高秉忠，昨日在立法會（權力及特權）條例保護下大爆證監會「不監不管」的七宗罪，歸根究底，是在曾蔭權及梁錦松先後擔任財政司司長的年代，港府開放金融市場過急，而當時證監會主席沈聯濤為配合政策，亦不顧證監會的監管角色，竟直接指示下屬提供即時見效方案，為開放金融市場開綠燈，才鑄成「雷曼大錯」。
高秉忠昨日首次出席立法會研究雷曼事宜小組委員會公開聆訊。民主黨議員劉慧卿表示，證監會前主席沈聯濤於○一年曾要求高秉忠提供「quick wins（速贏）」方案配合港府開放金融市場的政策，以便與港府開會。到○一年尾，沈又與時任財政司司長的梁錦松商討，質疑是否「董建華想喺施政報告擺啲料落去咁」。
高秉忠形容，當年沈聯濤以前所未見的方式，繞過高的多名上司，要求他與其同事提供「quick wins」、「即食麵」方案配合開放政策。據他理解，當時港府希望開放金融市場，但這令證監會工作方針偏離軌道，甚至「有少少不務正業」，坦言證監會工作理應是監管，而非發展市場。

證監會大換班致命傷

堅稱自己不是無的放矢的高秉忠，在陳述書中又指出，證監會四名富經驗執董於○一年同時離任，而接任人無一具監管金融產品銷售經驗亦是大錯成因之一。尤其是具豐富監管經驗又敢於向政府據理力爭的現任行政會議成員查史美倫，高形容她的離開對證監會造成特別嚴重的損失。
高秉忠又踢爆證監會在○一年多番與政府就開放金融市場作出互相交流，而當時的財政司司長是曾蔭權，其後由梁錦松接手處理。梁錦松在○二年發表的財政預算案中，提及政府與多個金融監管機構包括證監會，致力簡化金融產品的發行手續，而董建華在翌年的施政報告亦說明要讓金融新產品特別是衍生產品可以較方便開發，將香港發展成內地主要金融中心。

着重短期回報不監不管

陳述書中又提及到，證監會的獨立性多年來不斷減退。尤其○三年港府推行問責制後，問責官員只着重短期回報， 令由港府委任並屬短期合約的證監會執行董事，未能履行好專業監管者的角色。

此外，高秉忠揭穿違規銷售問題在證監會內部早已不是秘密。證監會先後於○五及○七年做過審查，均發現問題但沒有改善。他曾於○五年向上級自動請纓，要求更新及完善審批結構性產品的指引，經七、八個月完成及向業界解釋過後，當局遲遲沒有採納。直至○七年五月，證監會才發出內容相近但效力成疑的「常見問題」。

高秉忠續指，雷曼迷債及精明債券等，都由企業融資部審批，不過企業融資部只側重產品披露是否足夠，沒有就結構性問題，例如擔保人財政穩健性作出要求，坦言若迷債由他任職過的投資產品科審批，「出得街唔係咁嘅樣」。

獨立議員葉劉淑儀反問，證監會行政總裁韋奕禮多次在聆訊上推說，現行制度是以披露為本，到底證監會角色為何。高秉忠暗批，去年底證監會推出的諮詢文件，亦表明披露以外，應留意產品發行人責任等，若有人堅持這是披露為本，是「偷換概念、玩文字」。

急功近利谷金融不監不管埋禍根 (太陽報 )

2010-01-28T20:51:00.000-08:00

2010-01-28

經過多月來的聆訊，立法會研究雷曼事宜小組委員會揭出愈來愈多內幕。證監會前任非上市投資產品高級經理高秉忠日前出席聆訊時主動爆料，力數證監會「不監不管」的七宗罪，令人側目。
高秉忠指出，雷曼迷債為禍香江，絕非無可尋。早於○一年，證監會前主席沈聯濤為了配合港府開放金融市場的政策，乃破格繞過高秉忠的多名上司，要求他與其他同事提供「quick win（速贏）」方案。同年，證監會四名富經驗的執董離任，而接任人無一具金融產品銷售的監管經驗。
後來，港府又以「發展金融中心」為由，大力簡化金融產品的發行程序，令證監會的監管角色及獨立性不斷減退，尤其是在○三年推行問責制後，問責官員只重短期回報，忽略長遠後果，更令金融監管的漏洞日益擴大。
正正因為財金高官急功近利，金融監管網開一面，雷曼迷債得以乘虛而入，一種在外國只准賣給專業投資者的高風險投資產品，竟被包裝成低風險的債券，向包括長者、傷殘人士在內的普羅大眾大銷特銷。事實上，證監會曾先後於○五年及○七年進行審查，發現業內存在違規銷售問題。但遺憾的是，當局竟對問題見而不理，即使高秉忠於○五年向上級自動請纓，要求完善結構性產品的審批指引，也都不得要領，結果錯失了一次亡羊補牢的機會。
在高秉忠交代的整個過程中，人們可以看到，當局不斷以放寬監管換取金融發展的所謂「效率」，乃至縱容業界違規銷售金融產品，可謂愚不可及。可以毫不過分地說，早在放寬金融產品審批的一刻起，當局已為雷曼迷債埋下計時炸彈，在證監會「不監不管」下，迷債爆煲只是遲早的事。
金融業是本港經濟一大命脈，港府積極推動金融發展，本是無可厚非。問題是，欲速則不達，急功近利，好大喜功，那叫做揠苗助長，而不是推動金融發展。真正的國際金融中心，必須建基於嚴謹審批、嚴密監管的基礎上，港府自毀監管長城，只能適得其反，不但無助金融發展，反而引發一場禍及數萬人的迷債風暴，自損金融根基。
必須指出的是，衍生金融產品之所以出現這種無王管的荒唐現象，當局利令智昏、執迷不悟，應該負上最大的責任。正如高秉忠所批評，證監會高層拒絕溝通的態度，令下屬向上級提出的建議不了了之。
雷曼迷債爆煲後，社會各界曾就證監會及金管局的角色問題展開一場討論，當局甚至提出增設財經事務申訴專員，以加強金融監管。其實，人的因素第一，當局的官僚作風不改，即使設立再多監管機構，也是徒勞之舉。
雷曼事件還在聆訊，最後會得出甚麼結論仍是未知之數，不過，如果當局不能吸取教訓，這種聆訊也就顯得毫無意義。如今，上海正全力打造國際金融中心，深圳亦計劃在前海地區發展金融，香港要在芸芸勁敵之中脫穎而出，必須以質取勝，加強金融監管，完善市場機制，刻不容緩。

證監都夠無恥

2010-01-26T03:01:00.000-08:00

證監都夠無恥，原來犯了這樣多種過錯，現在被逐一翻出來。看文章，不如請你們自已親自聽聽，立法會各議員1月8日向韋奕禮質詢的經過。相信你們聽過之後一定覺得又氣憤，又好像吐了一口烏氣。但不要太早高興，這個政府還要死撑下去，我們要不斷出新招同佢抗爭到底！
請點擊以下超連結欣賞。你可以下載之後聽亦可，無需下載用4share網頁上的Player來聽亦可。
01余若薇 http://www.4shared.com/file/201211676/36df23bc/01_online.html
1.明明銀行做錯為何只賠6成或7成？唔係10足？
如果苦主事前見到你的報告可能唔接受6成！
立法會要寫22封信才迫到政監出這份報告。

02葉劉淑儀 http://www.4shared.com/file/201216358/784d966b/02_online.html
2.你的報告出後，政府高官反應如何？
財政司話係你批准這些產品？
你會點處理三間不願和解的銀行？

03涂謹申 http://www.4shared.com/file/201218037/5c31e516/03_online.html
3.有無向犯規最多的銀行先下手呢個辦法來加速調查？
有無的銀行犯得最多過錯呢？
有無曾經想過要求這些銀行賠多過6,7成呢？

04劉慧卿 http://www.4shared.com/file/201219708/5a50daa4/04l.html
4.又問財政司的指控有何基礎？
如果這份報告早些公開一定會更震撼。
政府這個做法是否構成詐騙或不誠實？
要求交出銀行的資料。

05甘乃威 http://www.4shared.com/file/201222737/71636927/05_online.html
5.講出報告內容！
點解唔願意在提出回購方案前披露這個報告內容？
是否應該讓苦主知到這個報告後讓他們自已決定？
這個報告內容是否包括其他產品在內？

06石禮謙 http://www.4shared.com/file/201225501/2d7e7306/06_online.html
6.同意政監是世界一流標準。
報告數目籠統。市民蒙受損失。花旗，荷銀等銀行不願見苦主。
可否指出銀行的名？
政監，銀行的行為才是非法！
不能用公眾利益作為值口！

07梁國雄 http://www.4shared.com/file/201228060/f882fe20/07_online.html
7.要求政監交出結構性產品發行人申請人03年至08年其間報告。
結構性產品06年已知有漏洞！
政監是否已違反職能？
用公司條例怎樣調查雷曼資產？怎樣披露風險？

08何鍾泰 http://www.4shared.com/file/201229414/f1b6347/08_online.html
8.政監局怎樣知到銀行得到足夠的監管？

09余若薇 http://www.4shared.com/file/201230809/21c3b1e5/09_online.html
9.是那些銀行？大逼供
跟據何守則有些賠多有些賠少？

10甘乃威 http://www.4shared.com/file/201231795/4a5766df/10_online.html
10.加強版。
非迷債產品是否有回購安排？
同一個職員又賣迷債，又賣非迷債是否犯同一錯誤？

《转载报道》高秉忠指堅持披露迷債審批是侮辱

2010-01-26T02:55:00.000-08:00

1。《頭條日報》 2010.1.26 (11:24)
立法會調查雷曼事件小組委員會繼續研訊，出席作供的前證監會投資產品科高級經理高秉忠表示，離職前的工作主要負責批核投資產品能否推出市場，如產品結構上有問題，會要求更改，更改後符合要求可獲批核，否則會被拒絕認可。

高秉忠指出，證監去年發出加強保障投資者諮詢文件，要求結構性投資產品的發行人及擔保人需符合一定條件，是結構性的審批準則，已脫離披露要求，但當局仍堅持披露為本，是轉移視線，對審批投資產品人員是侮辱。

他表示，部分雷曼迷債只有擔保人，但沒有基金經理，若只用披露方式審批雷曼迷債產品，是不足夠的。

民主黨的甘乃威質疑為何投資產品送交證監會審批時，分別交到投資產品科及公司融資部兩個部門，但不由一個部門統一處理。高秉忠回應時表示，由於投資產品由於包裝不同，會歸納到不同部門處理，而兩個部門批核的標準同類產品亦會有不同，但他指出，產品銷售章程複雜，很難作出比較。

2.《RTHK 劉家慧報道》

http://www.rthk.org.hk/rthk/news/expressnews/20100126/news_20100126_55_643143.htm

高秉忠：部分雷曼迷債產品只用披露方式審核　並不足夠

證監會投資產品科前高級經理高秉忠，在立法會調查雷曼事件小組委員會上表示 ，部份雷曼迷債產品，只有擔保人，並無基金經理，如只用披露方式審核並不足夠。

他指出，有其他國家或地區在審核迷債產品時，除了以披露為本外，還有結構性的審批準則，證監會去年發出的加強保障投資者諮詢文件，要求結構性投資產品的發行人及擔保人需符合一定條件，便屬結構性的要求，但當局仍堅持披露為本。

高秉忠說，不相信證監會的高層不理解有投資產品誤導的情況嚴重，他又指， 05 及 06 年期間，有 3 宗涉嚴重違規的個案沒有公布。

《新報》雷曼苦主應獲百分百賠償 By 王岸然

2010-01-26T02:41:00.000-08:00

2010-01-26

雷曼迷債事件已經發生了一年零四個月，似乎已經被新聞界所淡忘，公眾亦失去興趣。去年十月，各有關銀行在政府的壓力下提議六成和解方案作為了結，公眾大多數認定合理，苦主若不肯接受，似乎是貪心及不合情理，須知相當部份普通投資者（包括筆者）在金融海嘯之中失去數成資產者比比皆是，何獨雷曼苦主為然？凡投資者皆有風險，損失是正常的。

賣假藥者豈可六折退款

這認知其實有極大謬誤在內。投資者若然對投資是了解的、清楚的，損失自然是自己承擔，但若然投資者產品被虛假陳述，或者產品根本就不應在市面出售，則購買者當然是無辜及應該得回百分百賠償。雷曼苦主的怨氣極重，表現出來就是被騙去金錢的苦主。君曾否聽過賣假藥的人被查出是賣假藥之後，警方叫被告人六折回款算數？又也許，禁藥被發現錯誤出售，需要回收，消費者只可六折退款？
現時的情況，是負責驗藥的政府及負責賣藥的藥房明明白白應負上責任，而要消費者的病人食死貓， 容許這種情況出現，然後不了了之，這就不是一個公平公正的政府，就不是一個講法治的社會。
明白這點，搞清楚雷曼迷債的發行過程中出了甚麼問題，不但是為了苦主，而是為我們的社會，為我們的金融中心地位，為了令投資者恢復信心，是含糊不得的

雷曼迷債為何會出現在銀行的謎團快可以解開，證監會投資產品部的前高級經理高秉忠先生星期二（二十六日）將應立法會雷曼特權專責小組傳召，出席公開聆訊。據報道指，他已經在上星期的閉門聆訊中提供了重要材料，指證監會原來有兩套審批投資者的標準，雷曼迷債若依一套嚴謹的標準，是不可能被批准出售之時，為何可以經一套只要求以「披露為本」的寬鬆標準被批准在銀行櫃，經由一些欠缺有關產品認識的小職員售賣？

議員應追查是否有別情

筆者當然希望所有謎團都能一次過被解開，不然的話，立法會的議員就有責任利用特權，依照高秉忠所提供的線索，傳召證監之內負責審批者作供。追查審批的過程，是否另有內情，例如可能曾經有政府高層施加壓力，要證監會用寬鬆的標準審批有關的雷曼產品，因而弄出禍來。
筆者只從法律角度眼。若然在正常的情況下，雷曼迷債本來就不能出售給小投資者，甚而是因結構安全不足的理由不被批准出售，但過程中因政府的不適當干預引致現時的結果，那麼雷曼所有苦主都有權獲得百分百的賠償，而非只限六成。現時的六成根本就不是賠償，而是絕大多數迷債因為經濟改善而可以得回超過六成價值，政府與銀行根本就沒有承認任何責任。

在真相公開之後，法律學者、財務學者及議員，應該仔細研究事件，為苦主追尋公道十億元，也是必須的，這些錢總不會比高鐵的六百六十九億元花得更冤枉吧！之餘，亦是維持社會的公義及保證香港的投資環境是有高度的商業道德與負責任的制度。就算納稅人要因而多付出數十億元，也是必須的，這些錢總不會比高鐵的六百六十九億元花得更冤枉吧！

王岸然時事評論員wongonyin@yahoo.com

(信报) 雷曼的苦難不是上帝意旨 - 王岸然

2010-01-19T17:45:00.000-08:00

2010年1月20日

普通法的原則，是不會令到一個人無緣無故承受了損失，而不會得到應有的補償。損失的出現，必然有其理由，亦必然有人承擔責任；法律上無法找出任何人承擔責任的事故，例如是由於不可預測的天災禍害，苦主被視為不幸的人，於是無人需要負責，法律上這是被形容為上帝的旨意（Act of God）。

雷曼迷債的苦主所承受的災難，是上帝的旨意嗎？如果不是，我們的政治與法律制度，我們的新聞監察制度，為何不能為苦主弄清楚事件的責任誰屬？明明可以知道而因為人為的因素令事件的真相不能大白於天下，這就不單不是天災，不是上帝的旨意，而是人禍！

聆訊必須完全公開

證監會的前投資產品部高級經理高秉忠先生，提早了六年結束他在證監會的工作，放棄了一千三百多萬的薪金，選擇提早退休，目的就只是希望到立法會的雷曼特權小組公開作供，清楚對公眾解釋為何會有雷曼事件的出現，協助苦主及公眾了解一切謎團，但雷曼小組選擇了閉門會議，不肯讓苦主及公眾了解究竟發生了什麼事情。

雷曼特權小組原本安排了兩節會議讓高秉忠到小組作供。小組選擇在星期二早上先作閉門會議，先聆聽高秉忠解釋事件，再決定星期五早上的第二節會議是否公開進行。高秉忠的不二選擇，是聆訊必須完全公開，讓公眾及苦主清楚事件的真相。高先生與筆者有一共通之處，就是不相信政客，包括民主派的。

若然小組決定高先生的資料「無料到」，小組可以決定取消再聆訊，任由高先生自己決定是否公開事件。若然認為高先生的證供有爆炸性的內容，足以改變整個雷曼的六成賠償計劃，則沒有理由不讓高先生在星期五早上作公開的聆訊作供。

筆者執筆的一刻，收到的消息令我大為吃驚，小組之內有近半數的議員是直選產生，他們在為誰人服務，為公眾或是政府，或是銀行家？（曾經捐錢給政客嗎？）還是為關係友好的金融強人任志剛？消息說，雷曼特權小組對高先生的不公開聆訊所提供的資料大感驚訝（shock），但在商議之後，決定竟然是取消了星期五的第二次會議，但沒有決定是否再傳召高秉忠作公開聆訊！

涉及明顯人為錯誤

相信新聞界有必要追逐一眾泛民議員，了解清楚發生了什麼事情。若然筆者的分析沒有錯誤，證監會及政府在迷債的出現過程之中犯上了不可原諒的錯誤，由於這些錯誤極為明顯，法律上或是道德上，政府有責任百分之一百賠償給所有曾經購買雷曼產品的投資者，一切只待真相的公開，讓學者及法律專家可以有公正的研究及評論（請參考筆者在本報去年十二月二日的文章，及過去一年有關的文章）。

筆者這裏只想指出一個極大而又為公眾所忽略的誤導形容。證監一直聲稱審批投資產品（包括雷曼迷債）是所謂以披露為本（Disclosure Principle），而雷曼的審批過程之中，雷曼作為發行商，準備了以寸厚計的文件交給認購者，將所有資料披露詳盡，所以這已經盡了責任，而證監在審批這些資料的過程之中，亦肯定這些資料的性質正確（不管小投資者看得明白與否），所以亦是已經盡了以披露為本的責任。

筆者必需指出，這不是事實，這是完全的誤導。大家只需拿〈證券及期貨條例〉看看，證監會的監管責任之中，並無什麼「披露為本」的標準，這恐怕只是證監高層及政府在出事之後編造出來誤導公眾的說法。詳盡披露只是證監審批投資產品的其中一項準則，從來就不是全部的責任。

「披露為本」胡說八道

法例之內證監會的「法定規管目標」（Regulatory Objectives）有六大類：

一、維持和促進證券期貨業的公平性、效率、競爭力、透明度及秩序。

二、促使公眾更能了解證券期貨投資運作及成能。

三、向投資於金融產品的公眾提供保障。

四、盡量減少在證券期貨業內的犯罪行為及失當行為。

五、減少證券期貨業內的系統風險。

六、採取與證券期貨有關的適當步驟，以協助財政司維持香港金融市場的穩定性。

請特別留意上述第三項及第五項，這是國際證監會組織（ＩＯＳＣＯ）之間的共同協議。只要就這一點略作研究，就知道所謂「披露為本」的說法，根本是胡說八道。【註】

就筆者所認識，這也不是秘密，證券業人人皆知，證監會審批任何投資產品的要求，皆遠超什麼披露為本的原則。再簡單說，雷曼審批的過程之中是否涉及港府極高層包括特首及前特首的干預，干預的理由並非專業的考慮及判斷，是事件真正謎團所在。泛民議員為何不協助公眾打開這個黑盒！

註：《香港證券及期貨條例解讀》第二十一頁，羅祥國、黃覺岸合著

THE VALUE OF MINIBOND ? 85%-99% ?

2010-01-10T20:14:00.000-08:00

ARE HKMA and SFC trying to hide the true value of Minibond from Hong Kong retail investors?

ARE BANKS in Hong Kong trying to rip off their clients again from the minibond buyback plan?

On 14 December 2009, the value of Australia Mahogany Notes (a minibond alike product, arranged by Lehman Aaia) ,was announced in the ASX announcement:
Minibond-like Credit-Linked Notes sold in Australia (Mahogany Notes I & II by Lehman Asia) are worth $99 and $85. The notes/series that would mature at a later stage (2016) is worth $85. The notes/series that would mature much earlier in 2010 hence it is worth $99, is worth $99.

WHEN will Hong Kong retail investors get any updates on the value of the Minibond?

The banks buyback was only 60-70% of the issued value.

Who is losing more money?
Who is making profit from the Minibond sales & Minibond buyback?
The bank or the small investor?

In the ASX announcement as of 14 December 2009, it stated that for
"Mahogany Capital Limited – A$75 million Notes Series I and A$50 million Notes Series II ", the "Structured Credit Research has estimated a value for:
AUD 75MM ANZ Floating Rate Note maturing 10 Dec 2011 (XS0208078732) of $99 as of 30 November 2009 (the ultimate Collateral for Mahogany Notes Series I),
and a value for:
AUD 50MM RBS Floating Rate Note maturing 17 Mar 2016 (XS0247983058) of $85 as of 30 November 2009 (the ultimate Collateral for Mahogany Notes Series II). (...) These valuations represent the highest valuations received since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008."

[ full text of the ASX announcement on the value of Australia Mahogany Notes:
https://www.macquarie.com.au/edge/static/eclipse/Hidden/Company%20Announcements/ISSUED%20CAPITAL/2009-12/010222460.pdf ]

Australia Mahogany Notes (by Lehman Brother Asia) related information::

1. Summary Information:
It is credit-linked to 100-150 reference entities which are explained in the 2-page product summary. The interest rate (of the notes) and the principal loss are affected by the number of default events which are clearly outlined in the 2-page product summary.
同樣由雷曼亞洲一手安排的在澳洲銷售的信貸掛鈎票據 Mahogany Notes 清晰地介紹了
- 該信貸掛鈎票據之本金跟100個公司信貸掛鈎，（7個破產就會失去100％本金），
- 該票據之利息跟150個公司信貸掛鈎（破產事件跟票據利息之關係）
- 該票據所有信貸掛鈎主體之評級（AA 到 BBB- 及低於 BBB- 之公司數目，等）和公司之業界類別等信息。
該票據明確指出其資金不是投入於任何信貸掛鈎主體（公司）。

2-page summary from the issuer: "Mahogany Notes II - a CDO defence",
http://www.mahoganycapital.com.au/mahogany/PageAttachmentServlet?PageID=4764

2. Prospectus
All the reference entities related information, the impact of default event(s) to the interest rate, the impact of default event(s) to the principal loss are clearly outlined in the prospectus.

http://www.mahoganycapital.com.au/mahogany/PageAttachmentServlet?PageID=4762

3. Related Analysis:
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/01/austalia-mahogany-notes-prospectus.html
and
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/01/how-was-mahogany-notes-ii-being-briefed.html

(信报转载）2010年要汲取的五大教訓 by Joseph E. Stiglitz

2010-01-03T07:50:00.000-08:00

- 2010年1月1日 Joseph E. Stiglitz

如果要為2009年說幾句好話，我們頂多能說，情況本來會更糟，2008年下半年我們彷彿在懸崖邊徘徊，後來總算沒掉下去，而在2010年，世界上大多數國家的情況八成會有所改善。全世界也已得到了一些寶貴的教訓，儘管現在和未來經濟為此付出了巨大代價─這代價原本未必這麼大，如果我們早點懂得那些道理的話。

第一個教訓是，市場不會自動糾正錯誤。事實上，如果規管不充分，市場傾向於走極端。2009年，我們又一次看清楚，為什麼亞當．史密斯所謂「看不見的手」常常真的看不見：它根本不存在。銀行家對自身利益的追求（貪婪）並未導致社會福利的增進，甚至沒有增進其股東和債權人的利益，更別說那些失去房產的業主、丟掉工作的勞動者、眼看養老金泡湯的退休者，以及為幾千億美元銀行救助方案埋單的納稅人的利益了。

死抓舊教條墮入深淵

社會保障網的初衷是幫助不幸者度過難關，如今卻慷慨地擴大了覆蓋面：先是救助商業銀行，然後又救助投資銀行、保險公司、汽車生產商乃至汽車貸款公司─據說這都是因為，整個金融體系面臨崩潰風險。這麼多錢從多數人手裏轉移到少數人手裏，這是破天荒第一次。

我們習慣地認為，政府主導下的再分配是把富人的錢轉給窮人；但如今是，窮人和中等階層的錢在轉給富人。納稅人已經不堪重負了，居然還要看他們的錢被拿去支付銀行家的天價獎金和紅利─據說這是為了確保銀行能繼續放貸，以促進經濟復蘇。我們一直以為紅利是利潤的分成，如今它卻是政府「大禮包」的分成！

有人說，無論措施多麼不完善，救助銀行是必要的，因為這可以令信貸市場解凍。可實際上，信貸市場沒有解凍。現在所發生的一切，其實是把普通納稅人的錢輸送給那些多年以來一直在盤剝他們的金融機構─盤剝手段包括掠奪性的貸款、跟高利貸沒啥兩樣的信用卡罰息，以及缺乏透明度的收費專案。

銀行救助行動，暴露了美國社會無處不在的虛偽。有些人一說到那些扶助窮人的小小福利專案，就開始念「財政約束」的緊箍咒，如今卻在鼓吹世界上最大規模的「福利」項目。有些人曾經那麼熱情地歌頌自由市場的美德─「透明度」，最終卻搞出這麼不透明的一套金融體系，銀行連自己的資產負債表是怎麼樣都說不清。

而政府呢？它出台的救助措施愈來愈缺乏透明度，因為它不得不掩蓋自己在救助過程中的大手大腳。那些曾經高調呼籲「負責任的政府」和「有擔當的政府」的傢伙，現正兜售為金融部門免除債務的政治膏藥。

第二個教訓是，我們理解了市場為什麼經常失靈。市場失靈的原因多種多樣。這一回是，扭曲的激勵鼓勵一些「大到不能倒」的金融機構冒險賭博：如果它們僥倖賭贏了，大把利潤就落入它們囊中；如果賭輸了，還可以等納稅人來擦屁股。此外，資訊不充分也會導致市場失靈，而在金融市場上，資訊不充分是一個核心問題。一家銀行倒閉，其他銀行跟遭殃；金融體系崩潰，納稅人和全世界勞動者就得跟付出代價。

金融創新剝削老百姓

第三個教訓是，凱恩斯主義政策的確有效。有一些國家出台了規模大、水準高的刺激計劃，從危機中恢復得比較早，比如澳洲。其他國家被一些財政巫師蠱惑，死抓那些舊教條，才會落到如斯田地。

每當一個經濟體陷入蕭條，稅收下滑必然快於支出削減，因此自然會出現財政赤字。舊教條認為，必須削減赤字─提高稅收或削減開支─以「恢復信心」。但那樣的政策幾乎每次都會削弱總需求，把經濟推入更深的深淵，進一步又會瓦解信心─二十世紀九十年代國際貨幣基金組織給一些東亞國家就是開了這種藥方，你看後來怎麼樣？

第四個教訓是，貨幣政策不僅僅是對抗通貨膨脹。過度關注通脹，致使某些國家的中央銀行忽略了該國金融市場的問題。央行放任資產泡沫無限膨脹，會令經濟付出高昂代價，相比之下，溫和通脹的成本真是不足掛齒。

第五個教訓是，並不是所有的創新都會提高經濟效率和生產力，更別說帶來社會效益了。對私營企業施加什麼樣的激勵是很關鍵的，如果這種激勵違背社會利益，其結果將是過度冒險、過度短視和創新怪胎。比方說，近幾年搞出來的許多金融工程創新，它們到底有沒有帶來好處都是個問題，更別說帶來多少好處了，而它們造成的經濟和社會損失明明白白就在眼前，還大得很呢。

事實證明，金融工程創造出來的那些產品，幫不了普通老百姓管理貸款買房這麼簡單的風險，結果搞得幾百萬人丟了房子，還會有幾百萬人步其後塵。

金融創新的真實效果是，發明了更好的手段去剝削那些教育程度不太高的老百姓，去繞開規管和會計準則這些旨在保護市場效率和穩定的規範。結果，本該管理風險、有效配置資本的金融市場，反而成為了大規模風險製造者和資本配置的扭曲者。

這次危機讓我們記住這些教訓了嗎？會否比從前歷次危機之後記得牢一點呢？我們很快就能看到。很遺憾，如果2010年美國和其他發達國家在金融改革方面沒什麼太大長進的話，我們很快又有機會重溫這些教訓了。

哥倫比亞大學教授、2001年諾貝爾經濟學獎得主。他的新著Freefall將於2010年1月出版。

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Link to 信报: http://www.hkej.com/template/forum/php/forum_details.php?blog_posts_id=42694

Link to original article "Harsh lessons we may need to learn again" (by Joseph E. Stiglitz):
http://downwithtyranny.blogspot.com/2009/12/economnics-2009-10-joseph-e-stiglitzs.html

證監前高層自願於雷曼調查做供，被拒絕

2009-11-21T17:49:00.000-08:00

1. 《蘋果日報》11月21日報導
證券及期貨事務監察委員會前任非上市投資產品高級經理高秉忠，主動要求出席立法會調查雷曼事件小組作供「爆料」觸礁。

雷曼苦主大聯盟召集人陳光譽昨日會見傳媒透露，幾日前在香港人權監察總幹事羅沃啟陪同下與高秉忠見面。陳光譽引述高秉忠說，任職證監會期內，曾負責非上市投資產品（包括雷曼相關產品）審批工作，主動要求出席立法會雷曼專責小組作供，是出於良知驅使。希望指證證監會在雷曼事件錯在何處，指出如何防止同樣錯誤再發生，並願意「爆料」提供一些內幕資料。不過，小組要求他要冒違反《證券及期貨條例》保密條款約束，先行向小組提交資料及性質，供與已作
證的證監會證人資料比對有何不同。

立法會調查雷曼事件小組主席何鍾泰說，大家不想在沒有基本資料情況下，隨便傳召某些人作供，小組成員期待高秉忠的回覆。證監會發言人昨日證實，高秉忠是今年8月離職的僱員。

2.《東方日報》11月21日報導: ”陳光譽促傳召證監一高層“

雷曼苦主大聯盟主席陳光譽昨日召開記者會，要求立法會調查雷曼小組傳召前證監會外務科一名姓高的高級經理作供。高在證監會工作近二十年，主要從事非上市投資產品的規管工作，審批雷曼產品亦屬其工作範圍，陳認為高在調查雷曼事件上是一個很關鍵的證人。

陳光譽指出，由於當事人擔心書面陳述會觸犯保密條款，所以強烈要求該會主席何鍾泰傳召高到立法會作證，相信有助雷曼事件找出真相。

參與審批雷曼產品
一名早前離職、有份參與審批雷曼產品的證監會高級經理，主動聯絡立法會調查雷曼小組委員會作供，但基於他受「證券及期貨條例」保密條款約束，所以要求在立法會權力及特權法的傳召下才作供，但小組委員會反要求他在不違反保密條款下作書面陳述。雷曼苦主大聯盟主席陳光譽認為，雷曼小組的要求並不合理，並促請該會在特權法下，傳召該名前高級經理以專家身份作證。

3. 信報 2009年11月23日: 證監前高層被拒向雷曼小組作供

4. 高秉忠先生與立法會雷曼小組致函及覆函撮要

高秉忠先生致函立法會雷曼小組 – 28/10/09
1) 我的名字叫Harold Ko｡直到今年8月份, 有近20年, 我一直服務於證監會, 並且主要從事非上市投資產品的規管(見附件)｡我相信我可以協助「雷曼小組」研究有關雷曼事宜｡但是, 作為證監會前僱員, 我受到「證劵及期貨條例」保密條款的約束｡若果「雷曼小組」要我協助, 我願意在立法會「特權法」第9節的傳召下, 到小組前作證｡

立法會雷曼小組覆函 – 05/11/09

2) 28/10 來函已呈交「雷曼小組」正副主席及小組成員｡依小組主席指示, 你如能提供資料的範疇及議題, 希望你能再來函申明, 並解釋為何你能協助小組的研訊｡

致函 – 08/11/09
3) 作為證監會非上市投資產品的規管, 最長服務期的僱員, 我自信可以從監管角度, 就雷曼事件錯在何處, 以至如何防止同樣錯誤的發生, 提供一些深刻的認識(insights)｡

覆函 – 11/11/09
4) 在並無違反「證劵及期貨條例」(法例571章) (SFO), 請你向小組提供下述資料:
a) 你在證監會的不同職務及責任, 特別是 12/3/2002 (SFO成立) 到 15/9/2008 (雷曼破產)
b) 證監會已有證人到小組作證, 你所能提供資料的種類及性質將會有何不同
c) 若可以, 請提供你的資料大綱

以上為函件翻譯及撮要, 一切以英文原件為准｡

http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/E9AB98E7A789E5BFA0E58588E7949FE88887E7AB8BE6B395E69C83E99BB7E69BBCE5B08FE7B584E887B4E587BD-E58F8AE8A686E587BD6108.php

Goldman CEO Apologizes for Role in Financial Crisis

2009-11-17T17:36:00.000-08:00

NEW YORK (Reuters) - Goldman Sachs Group Inc chief executive Lloyd Blankfein said his firm "participated in things that were clearly wrong" in the lead-up to the financial crisis, Bloomberg News reported on Tuesday.

Lloyd Blankfein, told a corporate conference in New York that the bank regretted taking part in the cheap credit boom that had fuelled the pre-crisis bubble. “We participated in things that were clearly wrong and have reason to regret,” said Mr Blankfein. “We apologise.”

Mr Blankfein also told the conference he wished he had not told the UK’s Sunday Times newspaper that Goldman did “God’s work” – a remark that was seized upon by the bank’s critics – and said it had been meant as a joke.

As a result of the crisis, Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS - news) and competitors received billions of dollars in bailouts from taxpayers.

Related Links:
1. http://seekingalpha.com/news/market_currents/post/36688
2. http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/goldman-ceo-apologizes-for-role-in-crisis-report-reuters_molt-059f53cecd70.html?x=0
3. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/782afd66-d3bd-11de-8caf-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1

「披露為本」: 哪些重大風險是需要得到清晰，準確，無誤導的披露的？

2009-11-09T00:00:00.000-08:00

「披露為本」是个好听的万金油和遮羞布。因为不需要定义和解释哪些風險是重大風險, 不需要定义和解释哪些重大風險是需要得到披露的，更无须定义和解释何谓清晰，準確，無誤導的风险披露。一切可以是读者之想像力.

1。以迷你債卷為例，「披露為本」该披露哪些重大风险呢？
- 風險到底是跟7個著名公司挂鉤，還是跟132個各類評級公司挂鉤？
- 迷債的錢是投入於實質資產還是沒有投入於任何實質資產而隻是賣保險等，
如何清晰准確均衡無誤導地，真真實實地把真實特征和風險給客戶介紹，這才是問題的關鍵。

不追究清楚何種“風險”为重大風險，何種重大风险需要“披露”的話，「披露為本」又能披露多少真實相關風險呢？

如果「披露為本」簡化為兩句話：
第一：本產品不保本。
第二：本產品是高風險。
可否會作出世界第一流的高水準的風險披露呢？
至于具体有些什么风险呢，是那些具体因素可能会造成“高风险”或“失去本金”呢，就是读者“清者自清”，运用你自己的想像吧。

2。迷債之最大問題在於“”一大堆銷售文件“卻無披露重大風險，極盡欺騙和誤導之術，

迷債 “一大堆銷售文件”幾十頁紙，介紹了一大堆7个著名公司信貸掛鈎及相關信息，卻不提重大風險之一：合成CDO 的風險，

洋洋洒洒的几十页的文件，卻不肯清楚地告訴讀者：合成CDO 實為信貸掛鈎產品，而非傳統債券，可能跟幾十或上百個公司的信貸掛鈎。既然抵押品和迷債的實質均為信貸掛鈎，為甚麼跟100多家公司信貸掛鈎的抵押品之特徵和風險無須給客戶介紹, 跟7個公司信貸掛鈎的特徵和風險卻要用諸多篇幅去介紹? 這是清晰，準確，無誤導的風險披露嗎？

至今為止，沒有一個政府機構敢於以迷債為例，給出一個“披露為本”之風險披露簡要。甚至在講到“披露為本”的時候，連“清晰，準確，無誤導地披露風險”之要求都不敢再次提起。

政府和監管機構究竟是在保護誰的利益？

銀行主动停止銷售雷曼迷你債券之決定：揭示了銀行對於迷債真實風險之理解

2009-10-24T20:10:00.000-07:00

2003-2008: 銀行一直以跟 7個著名公司信貸掛鈎作為銷售迷債的風險介紹。銀行眾多職員們對於迷債的重大風險的瞭解似乎僅限於跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎之風險.此處暫且不談銀行職員對於”如果出現一個破產事件“之後的迷債價值的理解和介紹。

從2007年下半年起，諸多雷曼迷你債券的長期忠實的經驗分銷銀行開始陸續停止銷售迷債。為甚麼? 發生了甚麼變故？是甚麼令銀行改變主意，開始對雷曼迷債說‘不’？相同期間，星展 DBS 和大摩也不再繼續發行 Constellation 和精明債券系列了。

信貸破產掉期 CDS 等信貸掛鈎產品的目的之一是為銀行界服務. 有著理解並且買賣 CDO / 合成 CDO / CDS / 信貸掛鈎票據的專業知識和多年豐富投資經驗的銀行界, 是 出于对于系列 34/35/36 的 7 個著名掛鈎主體有可能出現破產事件之担心，还是其它不可公开的因数和忧虑而使银行決定停止銷售迷債的呢？銀行掌握了些甚麼信息？ 银行之决定是否揭示了銀行從未告知客戶的關於雷曼迷債之真實特征和相關風險？！

- 系列 34　信貸掛鈎主體：　中國，匯豐，太古，新地，和黃，星展，置地；
- 系列 35　信貸掛鈎主體：　中國，匯豐，太古,　新地，和黃，港鐵，渣打；
- 系列 36　信貸掛鈎主體：　中電, 匯豐，中海油，星展，和黃，港鐵，渣打。　
系列 34/35/36 抵押品: 3A 評級實質為信貸掛鈎產品之合成 CDO,合成 CDO之主要风险是一篮子挂钩主体之信贷事件风险;

（a) 永亨銀行 ,
永亨銀行是最早參與迷債銷售的銀行之一。從2003年的迷債系列 5 開始，一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售，直至2007年中的系列33。
自2007年10月起，是甚麼發生了變化？是甚麼原因促使永亨銀行決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 34／35／36 ？銀行是出于甚麼考慮而決定停止銷售“中風險”評級的迷債？（注：永亨銀行對於迷債的風險評級一直是“中風險”）。

(b) 富邦銀行 。
從 2005 的系列21 開始銷售迷債。在銷售了迷債2年之後，
自2007年10月起，是甚麼原因促使富邦銀行不再參與銷售迷債系列 34／35／36 ？

(c) 上海商業銀行，工商銀行亞洲.
二者都是最早參與迷債銷售的銀行之一。從2003年的迷債系列5 開始，一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售，直至2007年底的系列34。
自2007年12月起，是甚麼原因促使上海商業銀行和工商銀行亞洲決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 35／36 ？

(d) 中信嘉華銀行 。
從2004年8月起的迷債系列12 開始，一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售，直至2007年底的系列34。
自 2007年12月起，是甚麼原因促使中信嘉華決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 35／36？

(e) 中國銀行 .
中銀作為迷債銷售量最大的分銷商，叢2004年2月的迷債系列 8 開始，一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售，直至2008年1月的系列35。
自2008年3月起, 是甚麼發生了變化？是甚麼原因促使中銀決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 36 ？

(f) 集友銀行，南洋商業銀行 .
二者一直是迷債的長期忠實分銷商。
自2008年3月起，是甚麼原因促使二者決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 36 ？

(g) 荷蘭銀行 ，
自2008年3月起，是甚麼原因促使荷蘭銀行決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 36 ？

对信贷挂钩产品有丰富经验的银行，陸續停止銷售佣金慷慨的迷債，是否揭示了銀行對於迷債真相之真實理解程度? 等於把銀行從未告知公眾的真話公佈與世？

1. 銀行是根據甚麼因數和考慮而决定对迷債说”不” ？是甚麼发生了變化而使銀行改變了對於銷售迷債的態度？

2. 銀行是否出於擔心迷債抵押品出現爆煲而決定停止銷售？
對CDS/CDO/信貸挂鉤產品有著豐富知識和經驗的銀行應該完全明白抵押品為信貸掛鈎產品而非傳統債券，應該完全明白抵押品的挂鉤主體數目很可能是跟100多個主體信貸掛鈎。換言之，盡管給客戶的風險介紹和銷售章程均是大肆介紹７個著名掛鈎主體信貸風險，只字不講抵押品有著跟１００多個主體信貸挂鉤之特徵和風險。銀行心知抵押品內的信貸掛鈎主體出事的可能性是遠遠高於那大肆宣揚的 7 個掛鈎主體的。

至今，銀行以及金管局公開堅持聲稱沒有必要對客戶介紹迷債的抵押品.
- 聲稱因為抵押品是 3A 評級，可卻從不解釋：既然抵押品和迷債的實質均為信貸掛鈎，為甚麼以跟一籃子主體信貸掛鈎為主要特徵的抵押品之信貸掛鈎風險無須給客戶任何介紹和解釋, 跟7個公司信貸掛鈎的特徵和風險卻要用諸多篇幅去介紹?

- 同時又聲稱：由於每一個系列的迷債的抵押品在銷售期間之間還沒有買入，在每一迷債系列的銷售期間銀行也不知道該系列抵押品的詳情。可卻從不敢公開說明：銀行方面是否認為(實為信貸掛鈎票據之)抵押品的相關信息是 '信貸掛鈎票據:雷曼迷你債券'的相關重大風險和重大信息?

- 中國銀行給迷債的風險評級是“高風險”, 給與客戶的解釋是：所有信貸掛鈎產品評級都是高風險。依此類推，實為信貸掛鈎產品之抵押品應該是當仁不讓地也同屬於“高風險“類別了！
可中國銀行卻從不敢公開說明：同屬於信貸掛鈎產品，“高風險”類別的抵押品之重大風險和信息是否屬於迷債相關的重大風險和信息? 為甚麼無須給客戶介紹和解釋？

3. 儘管銀行聲稱在銷售迷債的時候不瞭解該迷債系列抵押品之詳情，銀行的產品相關部門和銀行主要相關管理層看來對於抵押品實為信貸掛鈎之主要特徵和相關風險是一直有所瞭解而且一直關注相關的市場變化。這就解釋了為甚麼諸多迷債的長期經驗分銷銀行從2007年下半年開始陸續停止銷售迷債。因為他們知道迷債抵押品實為（第二層）隱藏的信貸掛鈎產品，而表面的7個著名公司只是招牌。真正帶來利息（收入）和重大風險的都是藏於實為信貸掛鈎產品的抵押品（合成CDO）之中。一旦市場變差，抵押品中的質素參差不齊的100多家公司破產爆煲的機會就會快速大大增加，迷債的真實風險被原形畢露的機會大大增加，迷債的謊言被戳穿的機會也大大增加。

4. 以迷債系列 34 為例，銷售系列 34 的時候，銀行或許不知道系列 34 的抵押品之詳情。但是，銀行的產品相關部門和銀行主要相關管理層對於比系列34 早的那些系列 5 － 33 的抵押品之主要特徵和相關風險等看來卻是有相當程度的瞭解的，因而對於系列 34 抵押品很可能又是“跟100-150多個公司信貸掛鈎”之相關重大風險和特徵也是有著清晰的理解的。這就解釋了隨著市場變差，銀行開始逐漸停止銷售迷債。因為銀行擔心從未跟客戶解釋的迷債抵押品之謎會容易原形畢露。

　［附註－１］：　迷債系列銷售商
• 系列 33：一共 16 個分銷商。銷售期間：2007年 7月；
• 系列 34：一共 14 個分銷商。銷售期間：2007年11月；
• 系列 35：一共 11 個分銷商。銷售期間：2008年 1月；
• 系列 36：一共 7 個分銷商。銷售期間：2008年 4 月；

［附註－２］：無獨有偶，2007年底，當諸多雷曼迷你債券的長期忠實的經驗分銷銀行們開始逐漸對銷售雷曼迷債說“不”的時候，

• 星展DBS 於 2007年8月發行了　Constellation　系列82－86，隨后就徹底停止發行Constellation，　而且並沒有再推出跟Constellation類似的跟幾個著名公司信貸挂鉤票據了。　
• 而大摩於2007年9月發行了的精明債券系列21－22 之後，　隨后就徹底停止發行精明債券，　而且並沒有再推出跟精明債券類似的跟幾個著名公司信貸挂鉤票據了。　

2007年底, 是甚麼原因促使星展和大摩決定停止發行 Constellation 和精明債券？

(i) 是由於經濟環境變差,而不易找到 7－8著名公司來掛鈎了呢？
(ii) 還是由於經濟環境變差，擔心包藏於抵押品內的真實風險容易暴煲，有著漂亮外表的騙局極有可能被原形畢露？

相關文章：從迷債系列 6 看迷債騙局手段之完美完善過程
.......

轉載 : 司法覆核不能少了你 - 筆者: 老馬

2009-10-20T05:35:00.000-07:00

如果你對雷曼苦主大聯盟準備協助就迷債的回購方案進行司法覆核有不明白，那麼就請你看看以下所言：
銀行欺騙或誤導你購買結構性的衍生產品，使你遭受損失，或重大的損失，甚至損失畢生的積蓄；使你鬱抑、氣憤，甚至使你的生活受到影響；
銀行對你的投訴以扭曲事實的回覆來應付你，使你憤慨、懊怒、不知所措，氣結難平，遭受再次的打擊；
證監及金管主導的迷債回購方案分明是損害迷債投資者利益，損害公平、公正的社會核心價值，但你卻無可奈何地接受；
你是非迷債的苦主，到今天仍在苦海中掙扎，不知何時何處是岸。

所有的這一切一切，使你冤難訴，氣難消，因為司法門檻高，官府門戶深。你渴望可以將那些誤導你、騙你的銀行被帶上法庭的被告席，你渴望可以將犯有過失的銀行輕輕地帶過的監管當局帶上法庭的被告席，但你卻沒有金錢和能力做得到，那麼，司法覆核就是這樣一個去實施你的渴望的機會！

雖然不能說銀行就一定會真實地站到司法覆核的被告席上，但就迷債的回購方案進行司法覆核將無可避免地將銀行所犯過錯的事實、將監管當局偏袒銀行的瀆職事實，放在法律的天秤上來審判，放在公眾的放大鏡下仔仔細細地拷問；

雖然我們不能確定官司的勝負，但能夠將雷曼事件帶上法庭，就是平民對權勢的勝利！

雖然司法覆核不能直接補償你所遭受的損失，但能為你一舒心中的鬱悶，能一洗被那些流言蜚語所蒙上的不白之冤也是非常值得的。

因此，司法覆核不能少了你的參與，有錢出錢，有力出力，無論出多少的錢，無論出多大的力，只要參與了，努力過，就是對得起自己。

筆者: 老馬

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『司法覆核』是變相的集體訴訟！

雷曼事件壹周年過去了，對整個運動發揮關鍵性作用有兩個里程碑：一個是去年11月中旬立法會通過引用“權力及特權法”調查雷曼事件，另一則是今年3月份在美國紐約州法院成功入稟，為所有迷債苦主進行集體訴訟。這兩個事件仍在發展，仍然對整個抗爭行動帶來深遠而廣泛的影響。

當前的一個成果就是，22/7證監、金管和16家銀行的迷債回購方案。但是這個方案只是政府與銀行私下協議，大前提是保障銀行，漠視苦主訴求，不顧社會整體利益，不折不扣是一個掩耳盜鈴的方案。

面對這個不合理的情況，並且惦記着毫無着落的非迷債苦主，包括ELN、星債、精債、袖珍及其他雷曼票據的苦主。我們別無選擇，只好訴諸法律途徑，對這個方案進行司法覆核。

官商勾結，小市民無可奈何。可是，當前出現了個難得的機會，並且是我們發動總反擊的一個機會。我們要在21/10之前在法院立案，申請覆核。這不僅為了迷債苦主，不僅是為了“經驗投資者”受屈苦主，更重要是為了非迷債苦主，為後者繼續抗爭製造有利條件，簡而言之，這是一個變相的集體訴訟。

天若有眼，這會是雷曼事件的第三個里程碑。

發動總攻擊，要等候機會，當前就是這個機會，這個機會不會重現，我們不要失之交臂！

時乎，時不再來！

*********************************************************************************************************

! !"司法覆核" 請踴躍捐助 ! !
捐款方法如下：請按: 雷曼苦主大聯盟 (http://www.lbv.org.hk/)

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"警方搜查安永拘一人"相關新聞和評論

2009-09-30T07:41:00.000-07:00

彭博新聞報道，安永會計師事務所正協助警方商業罪案調查科，調查一宗涉及雅佳控股清盤的案件，又指警方星期二到過安永的辦公室調查，懷疑涉及一宗偽造文件案，並拘捕一名四十一歲姓鄧的男子，懷疑涉案。
家用電器公司雅佳控股二千年清盤，清盤前由安永做核數，雅佳的清盤人2004年以疏忽的名義，向安永追討賠償。到本月23日，雙方在高等法院達成和解，消息指，安永同意賠償超過十億元。安永是本港四大會計師事務所之一。
(安永同意向雅佳清算人支付巨款：http://www.ftchinese.com/story.php?storyid=001028907).

讀者評論
和解了,只是代表赔偿与苦主.但刑责还在,走着瞧.

誰說投資失利皆因貪財起，怪不了人？
誰不貪財？投資，銀行放款當然是風險自負，
但對家存心欺騙，告之，錢追不了，也要討個公道，把騙子繩之於法， 以正公義，以警效猶。
就如捉殺人犯，捉了，死者也不會番生，唔通咁就唔捉

【明報】證監難拒交報告顯示銀行有系統性失誤

2009-09-19T19:58:00.000-07:00

【明報專訊】2009-9-16.

立法會調查雷曼迷債事件的專責委員會，曾不止一次要求證監會交出銀行銷售迷債的調查報告，遭證監會以妨礙調查為由拒絕。據本報了解，在銀行與大部分事主達成和解協議後，證監會內部研判，繼續拒交報告的法理依據已變得相當薄弱，報告羅列的證據，足以證明大多數銀行銷售迷債確實存在系統性失誤。

　銀行或多或少犯下四大錯誤

　據悉，證監會的調查報告載有銀行系統性違規銷售的證據，專責委員會看完報告後，可能毋須花太多時間傳召銀行界人士作供也能得出清楚的結論。消息人士解釋，所謂系統性違規銷售，不一定是事主和媒體常說的誤導性銷售，如強調迷債是安全的債券或等同長期定期存款，也包括：

　（1）沒有對產品作獨立的盡職審查，研判產品的風險特性；

　（2）沒有針對產品的風險特性制訂適切的培訓教材和安排前線銷售人員接受專業的培訓；

　（3）沒有制訂專業的測試辦法，準確地評估客戶對結構投資產品的風險承受能力；

　（4）沒有針對特別脆弱客戶群，如高齡、低教育程度、殘障、全副身家投入等類別客戶，制訂額外的程序，確保客戶理解和接受產品的風險。

　消息指出，銷售迷債的銀行大部分犯了以上一項或多項的錯誤，不管個別銷售個案中有沒有誤導性言論，都已經構成違規銷售。這種違規銷售是系統性的，因為誤導性陳述可能是個別前線人員違規，但培訓材料若未能準確講出產品核心風險，前線銷售人員便不可能解釋清楚給客戶知道，便會令每一宗銷售都出問題，所以是系統性的失誤，深植於銀行內部制度。銀行願意接受證監會提出的六至七成回購建議，或多或少是看到，若被檢控定罪的機會很大。

　現公開報告不涉妨礙司法

　消息指出，證監會拒絕向立法會專責委員會交出雷曼調查報告，法理依據是調查尚未結束，若銀行拒絕接受證監會為保障投資者提出的和解建議，調查所得將用於檢控銀行違規，向立法會披露調查所得可能會妨礙檢控和審訊，導致議會和媒體公審，有違司法公平原則。不過，現時絕大部分涉及雷曼有關產品投訴的銀行已經向客戶作出和解建議，證監會不會提出檢控，調查工作已經告一段落，原來拒絕交出報告的依據已經不存在。

　消息稱，雖然證監會與被調查銀行達成和解協議載有保密條款，不得對外披露調查的內容，但立法會專責委員會若行使法定權力要求閱覽報告，《立法會（權力及特權）條例》的法律約束力將凌駕於證監會與銀行之間的協議，證監會為履行法例所定責任交出調查報告，不算違反保密協議。

　至於尚有3間沒銷售迷債但涉及雷曼信用掛鹇票據的銀行，尚未與客戶和解，會否影響證監會交出報告，消息指調查報告可以隱去與這些銀行有關的資料，對和解談判應該沒有實質影響。

從迷債系列 6 看雷曼迷你債券騙局手段之完美完善過程

2009-09-13T22:11:00.001-07:00

2003年9月銷售的迷債系列 6 的銷售額是迷債系列中最低的，連 5 百萬美金都未達到。而其5％之年息卻比同期前後幾個系列都高。為甚麼系列6 會這麼不受銀行客戶們的青眯呢？

比較迷你債券系列6及其前後系列，可以看到迷債產品表面結構的“進化”和產品宣傳的“神話”過程，看到產品披露的“精化” 和 “簡化”過程，
可以看到金融精英們是如何在政府監管部門的縱容和庇護下逐步地把迷債債券精心包裝成安全形象的產品，以達到大量向銀行客戶們銷售的目的。

1。2003年9月銷售的系列6 之銷售結果是最差的。

系列 6 的總銷售額僅為 4百75 萬美金。
於同年6月發行的系列 5 之銷售總額是過了 1千萬美金。
於同年11 月發行的系列 7 的銷售總額則是多達 4千 6百多萬美金。
於次年2004年5月發行的系列10 的銷售總額也是多達是 4千4百多萬美金。

2。系列6 之年息卻是最高的。
系列 6 之利息為 5％。兩年期，2005年9月到期。
到期時，發行商有權把期限延長至2009年3月，延期後的利息預定為 8％。發行商行使了這個延期權，
而系列5 的利息僅是 3。8％，
系列 7 的利息只是 4。2％，
系列 10 的美元系列利息也是： 4。25％，
系列 5 ， 7 和 10 的利息均低於系列 6 這麼個保本迷債，鎖定年期也不比系列6 短。

為甚麼銀行客戶們會捨系列6 之高息誘惑而選擇其它低息的迷債系列呢？

3。系列 6 寫明跟150 個公司信貸掛鈎。

根據銷售章程，系列 6 聲稱是保本的（條件之一是：如果抵押品不出現完全損失的情形的話）。可是，這個高息卻是有條件的。
於2003年9月－2005年9月間, 這150 個公司信貸掛鈎中如果出現：
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
0 個信貸事件：利息為 4。2％；
1 個信貸事件：利息為 4。15％；。。。。。。
5 個信貸事件：利息為 0。8％；
6 個或以上信貸事件：利息為 0；
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－

於2005年9月－2009年3月間, 這150 個公司信貸掛鈎中如果出現：
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
0 個信貸事件：利息為 8％；
1 個信貸事件：利息為 6。65％；。。。。。。
5 個信貸事件：利息為 1。3％；
6 個或以上信貸事件：利息為 0；
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－

看來可以鎖定2－6年的喜歡穩定高息的銀行客戶們多數並不喜歡這個跟150公司信貸事件掛鈎的條件？

4。迷債表面之信貸掛鈎主體.

系列 6 寫明跟 150 個公司信貸掛鈎。銷售章程列出了這 150 家公司的名稱和信貸評級。
系列 5 寫明跟 1個參考主體信貸掛鈎，銷售章程列出了這 1 家公司的名稱和信貸評級 (Hutchison Whampoa )。
系列 7 寫明跟 6 個公司信貸掛鈎。銷售章程列出了這 6 家公司的名稱和信貸評級 (Citigroup, DBS, HSBC, Hutchison Whampoa, Standard Chartered Bank, Wing Hang bank; )。
系列 10 寫明跟 7 個公司信貸掛鈎，銷售章程列出了這 7 家公司的名稱和信貸評級 (Coca-Cola, IBM, McDonald, BMW, Hutchison Whampoa, SBC, MTR; )。

從表面上看，跟150 個公司信貸掛鈎之系列 6 令銀行客戶們缺乏安全感，儘管高息，依然令眾人卻步。
而跟1 ／6 ／7 個公司信貸掛鈎之其它系列，儘管利息比系列6 的低，卻給人以“穩陣”的感覺。
而選為表面掛鈎主體的公司“質素”也愈來愈高，尤其是後期系列之表面信貸掛鈎主體均選用著名企業，迷債最為大肆宣揚的賣點就是跟幾家著名企業掛鈎，更與人以“安全”的錯覺。

5。迷債抵押品之實質均為信貸掛鈎產品。
所有的迷債系列均未有提供抵押品的具體內容和詳情。儘管系列 6 / 5 / 7 / 10 的抵押品其實都是投入於信貸掛鈎票據。
系列 5 / 6 / 7 之抵押品是由雷曼發行的跟多達150 個主體掛鈎的信貸掛鈎票據。
而系列10 之抵押品則是由雷曼 SPV 發行的跟125 個主體信貸掛鈎的信貸掛鈎票據（合成 CDO）。

由此可見，儘管表面之信貸掛鈎公司數目不盡相同，迷債系列 5 ／ 6 ／ 7 ／ 10 之抵押品實質其實是大同小異，均為跟多至125－150個主體信貸掛鈎產品。 換言之，
系列6 實質是跟［ 150 （表面）＋多達 150 個（抵押品）］信貸掛鈎的產品；
系列 5 實質是跟［ 1 （表面）＋多達 150 個（抵押品）］信貸掛鈎的產品；
系列 7 實質是跟［ 6 （表面）＋多達 150 個（抵押品）］信貸掛鈎的產品；
系列 10 實質是跟［ 7 （表面）＋多達 150 個（抵押品）］信貸掛鈎的產品；

但是銀行客戶們並不知道這些抵押品的實質，銀行客戶們並不知道隱藏於抵押品之中的第二層跟多至125－150個主體信貸掛鈎之重大信息和對於迷債的重大風險。銀行客戶們只看見和聽見了表面的幾個掛鈎公司之介紹。

6。銷售章程實質內容之簡化
迷債系列 6 只有一本銷售章程， "Prospectus".
而由迷債系列 9 （2004年3月）開始，發行商提供兩本章程： Program Prospectus 和 Issue Prospectus .

那麼系列 10 的兩本章程是否提供多一些關於迷債之重大內容和重大相關風險所介紹的內容呢？
系列 6 銷售章程：
(i) 明確要求分銷商給客戶介紹包括抵押品文件在內的所有相關文件，
(ii) 明確指出會提供包括抵押品在內的一些通常文件於分銷商處。
(iii) 明確指出會於迷債發行日起，抵押品相關文件可供於分銷商處查看。

系列10 以及之后的所有迷债系列的洋洋洒洒之两大本Program Prospectus 和 Issue Prospectus :
再也没有明确写出以上之3点。只是用”可以到雷曼公司去查阅所有文件“一语带过， Issue Prospectus 发行章程详细地提供了许多页的关于表面6－7个信贷挂钩公司之相关评级和信息，并大谈“如果你相信这7个挂钩公司不会有破产事件的话。。。”，发行章程还提供了关于“债券”等诸多产品之定义和解释，却没有解释何谓合成CDO 及其主要特征。

系列6 之分銷商們：
按照系列 6 之銷售章程，分銷商們都應該於發行日起收到迷債抵押品之詳細文件。分銷商們應該是看過並清楚地瞭解迷債抵押品之詳情。至於分銷商們有沒有跟客戶介紹迷債抵押品文件並讓客戶查看迷債抵押品之詳細文件就是另當別論了。

7。包裝迷債騙局的手段之進一步升華和完善

經過系列 6 失敗銷售一役，以及之後的系列 7－10 之成功銷售，金融精英們明白了以下真諦, 進一步完善了包裝迷債騙局的手段：：
要提高銷售額，必須打造出有漂亮表面的迷債產品。告知客戶的掛鈎產品是越少越好，告知客戶的掛鈎主體是越少越好，告知客戶的掛鈎主體之信貸評級是越高越好，抵押品之內容則萬萬不可以告知客戶，那會嚇跑客戶的。

於是，表面掛鈎的公司的數量只是6－7個，而選用的掛鈎主體的質素則越來越高，
“如果你相信 China Mobile （等7個）不會破產的話。。”。讓人覺得出現破產事件的機會是零的假象，讓人產生迷債是個非常“安全”的產品之錯覺，

把真實的重大風險和真正可以帶來收入的信貸掛鈎內容全部隱藏到抵押品之中，對於抵押品的內容和風險從不明確解釋，至於抵押品之實質為信貸掛鈎產品之事實更是隱晦不談。

讀者若非具有 CDS/CDO 之專業知識，就萬萬想不到這抵押品其實是第二層信貸掛鈎產品，

銀行客戶們萬萬想不到的是：迷債除了有著跟表面6－7個公司信貸掛鈎之風險，迷債還同樣承受著跟這從未披露的 100－190多個主體信貸掛鈎之重大風險, 而且抵押品出現信貸事件的概率是遠高於那表面幾個掛鈎公司的，因為抵押品內是跟包括了低於投資評級（BB / B / CCC）在內的 100-190多個一籃子主體信貸掛鈎的。換言之，把評級差一些的的信貸掛鈎主體全部藏入抵押品的信貸掛鈎條款。以7個著名公司的表面假象來吸引銀行客戶。。。

而星債，精明債券等各類假債券，也紛紛以漂亮的表面掛鈎公司做招牌來推銷，而把產品實質和風險深藏於避而不談的抵押品之中。

8。迷債騙局之辯護士們:

在這［ 7 個掛鈎公司之風險］＋［ 100-190 個公司部分破產之風險］的 2 個風險中，
最最不可能發生的破產事件應該是那7個掛鈎公司。

金融精英們和政府监管机构的精英们在為無須披露抵押品內容而辯護的時候，可否請解釋一下：
如果廣告和章程可以大肆張揚解釋這發生可能性最小的風險，為甚麼不明確解釋另外發生可能性更高一些的風險呢（即: ［ 100-194 個公司部分破產之風險］）？这是什么样的有选择性的风险披露呢？

或者拿出專業機構投資者們買入類似產品，而始終從未收到過合成CDO（信貸掛鈎產品）之詳細文件之例子？

参考1： "Lehman Minibond Series 6 解读迷债系列6"
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/lehman-minibond-series-6.html

参考2： Lehman Minibond Series 6 Prospectus::
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/lehman-minibond-series-6.html

轉載:證監難拒交報告顯示銀行有系統性失誤

2009-09-11T06:53:00.000-07:00

調查雷曼迷債事件的專責委員會，曾不止一次要求證監會交出銀行銷售迷債的調查報告，遭證監會以妨礙調查為由拒絕。據本報了解，在銀行與大部分事主達成和解協議後，證監會內部研判，繼續拒交報告的法理依據已變得相當薄弱，報告羅列的證據，足以證明大多數銀行銷售迷債確實存在系統性失誤。
銀行或多或少犯下四大錯誤

據悉，證監會的調查報告載有銀行系統性違規銷售的證據，專責委員會看完報告後，可能毋須花太多時間傳召銀行界人士作供也能得出清楚的結論。消息人士解釋，所謂系統性違規銷售，不一定是事主和媒體常說的誤導性銷售，如強調迷債是安全的債券或等同長期定期存款，也包括：

（1）沒有對產品作獨立的盡職審查，研判產品的風險特性；

（2）沒有針對產品的風險特性制訂適切的培訓教材和安排前線銷售人員接受專業的培訓；

（3）沒有制訂專業的測試辦法，準確地評估客戶對結構投資產品的風險承受能力；

（4）沒有針對特別脆弱客戶群，如高齡、低教育程度、殘障、全副身家投入等類別客戶，制訂額外的程序，確保客戶理解和接受產品的風險。

消息指出，銷售迷債的銀行大部分犯了以上一項或多項的錯誤，不管個別銷售個案中有沒有誤導性言論，都已經構成違規銷售。這種違規銷售是系統性的，因為誤導性陳述可能是個別前線人員違規，但培訓材料若未能準確講出產品核心風險，前線銷售人員便不可能解釋清楚給客戶知道，便會令每一宗銷售都出問題，所以是系統性的失誤，深植於銀行內部制度。銀行願意接受證監會提出的六至七成回購建議，或多或少是看到，若被檢控定罪的機會很大。

現公開報告不涉妨礙司法

消息指出，證監會拒絕向立法會專責委員會交出雷曼調查報告，法理依據是調查尚未結束，若銀行拒絕接受證監會為保障投資者提出的和解建議，調查所得將用於檢控銀行違規，向立法會披露調查所得可能會妨礙檢控和審訊，導致議會和媒體公審，有違司法公平原則。不過，現時絕大部分涉及雷曼有關產品投訴的銀行已經向客戶作出和解建議，證監會不會提出檢控，調查工作已經告一段落，原來拒絕交出報告的依據已經不存在。

消息稱，雖然證監會與被調查銀行達成和解協議載有保密條款，不得對外披露調查的內容，但立法會專責委員會若行使法定權力要求閱覽報告，《立法會（權力及特權）條例》的法律約束力將凌駕於證監會與銀行之間的協議，證監會為履行法例所定責任交出調查報告，不算違反保密協議。

至於尚有3間沒銷售迷債但涉及雷曼信用掛鈎票據的銀行，尚未與客戶和解，會否影響證監會交出報告，消息指調查報告可以隱去與這些銀行有關的資料，對和解談判應該沒有實質影響。

轉載自：明報 2009年9月11日(五) A版

Bloomberg: London Suicide Connects Lehman Lesson Missed by Hong Kong Woman

2009-09-10T20:28:00.000-07:00

Sept. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Yu Lia Chun, a retired hospital orderly in Hong Kong, never heard of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. before she got a call last September from her banker.

“He said, ‘Did you hear the news? Something has happened to Lehman,’” Yu, 66, recalled in an interview in June. “I didn’t get it.”

Yu, who has a sixth-grade education, said she thought her money was in a savings account. She didn’t know she had lent it to a bankrupt American securities firm. Eventually, she found out that her HK$1.2 million ($155,000) nest egg was gone. Her children lost another HK$3.8 million because Yu had persuaded them to make similar investments.

“There is no way a person like me could understand any of this,” Yu said, dabbing her eyes with a tissue in a coffee shop in Hong Kong’s financial district. “Sometimes I feel like jumping off a building.”

What hit Yu and her family was a tidal wave triggered halfway around the world by the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history. The Sept. 15, 2008, collapse of Lehman, with $613 billion in liabilities, had unforeseen and far-flung consequences that devastated those, like Yu, who didn’t know their fates were tied to the New York-based investment bank.

‘Quicker This Time’

The chief operating officer of a private-equity firm in London jumped in front of a commuter train because he blamed himself for leaving the company’s money in a Lehman account, according to a coroner’s report. The Israeli managers of a hotel construction project on the island of West Caicos, northeast of Cuba, were taken hostage by Chinese workers when an anticipated Lehman loan didn’t materialize and wages weren’t paid. In Hong Kong, Yu and thousands of others who had invested in Lehman products camped out in the rain, thumping drums and chanting, “Give us our money back.”

The realization that a U.S. securities firm so woven into the financial system couldn’t pay its debts radiated out from New York, panicking investors around the world. It was a doomsday scenario that former International Monetary Fund chief economist Simon H. Johnson likened to Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s 1963 novel “Cat’s Cradle,” in which a single crystal of the fictitious substance ice-nine hardens all of the planet’s water.

What differentiated Lehman from previous financial crises was how fast the panic spread, said Richard Sylla, an economic and financial historian at New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business in New York.

“Communications made things happen faster,” Sylla said, describing how it took six months for the 1931 failure of Austria’s Creditanstalt bank to put stress on the British financial system. “The news of everything got spread around much quicker this time.”

Goldman Sachs Debt

The freezing of global credit markets following Lehman’s demise began with professionals who traded commercial paper in New York. They were the first to feel the chill when the Reserve Primary Fund, the oldest money market fund, was inundated with requests for redemptions and seized up hours after the bankruptcy filing. The $785 million that Reserve had lent to Lehman was deemed worthless by 4 p.m. the next day.

Fear that more banks and financial firms might fail meant most investors stopped lending to anyone other than the government. Even New York-based Goldman Sachs Group Inc., which earned $11.6 billion in 2007, more than any U.S. securities firm in history, wasn’t immune. The average annual cost of insuring $10 million of Goldman Sachs debt for five years soared to a record $545,000 from $182,557 in the three days after Lehman failed, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Plummeting Prices

Lehman’s demise triggered a panic. Money fund managers were forced to raise cash to pay off investors. They tried selling what securities they held and couldn’t. The market was flooded, and prices were plummeting -- if prices could be obtained at all. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index suffered its worst decline in six years. Mistrust leaked into the corporate bond market.

The most widely traded 30-year bond of General Electric Capital Corp., the world’s biggest issuer of commercial paper, dropped by as much as 30 cents on the dollar to 62 cents by Sept. 18 because of doubts that GE would be able to persuade money funds to renew its short-term notes.

At that price, the three-day loss for owners of the issue was more than $1.9 billion, according to prices provided by Trace, the bond-trade reporting system of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.

The U.S. responded within a week to guarantee money markets and bank-to-bank lending. Within a month, Congress agreed to spend $700 billion to prop up banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. guaranteed new bank debt, and Federal Reserve lending to financial institutions ballooned by $1 trillion.

Lehman Minibonds

Those programs, which succeeded in stemming the panic, remain in place today. What they didn’t do was save Yu and thousands of other investors in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and elsewhere who had bought equity-linked notes or so-called minibonds connected to Lehman.

Equity-linked notes combine attributes of both bonds and stock by investing part of the proceeds in share options and the remainder in fixed income. Minibonds are custom-made securities linked to the creditworthiness of companies, backed by collateralized-debt obligations and sold in denominations of $5,000. They functioned like credit-default swaps in reverse, where the investor stands to lose his principal when the firm named in the note can’t pay its debts.

‘Information Asymmetry’

Yu, a mother of six who emigrated from mainland China in 1962, didn’t have a chance, according to Joseph Stiglitz, a Columbia University economics professor who won a Nobel Prize for his work on the effect of unequal access to information on buyers and sellers in financial markets.

“As securities got more complex, the opportunities for gaming, to the disadvantage of ordinary people, increased,” Stiglitz said. “Complexity opened up new venues for information asymmetry, which banks exploited.”

Asia became Lehman’s highest growth region in 2007, taking in more than $3.1 billion in revenue, or 16 percent of the firm’s business. Revenue was up more than 41 percent from 2005 in Asia, while it climbed 3 percent in the U.S. in the same period, according to Bloomberg data.

Yu said she went to an export trade show in Hong Kong two years ago and met Chow Chi Chung, a salesman for Amsterdam-based ABN Amro Holding NV. He offered her a better return on her savings if she switched banks, she said. So she did.

Two-thirds of Yu’s money, about $100,000, came from a settlement with her employer after an elevator fell half a floor, injuring her pelvis, according to Yu, who still drags her right leg when she walks.

Didn’t Read Prospectus

A month after their meeting, Yu said Chow called her to say he had a new product that could return as much as 20 percent a year because it was linked to the stock performance of three large Chinese companies -- China Communications Construction Co.,China Merchants Bank Co. and Ping An Insurance Co.

Yu said she didn’t read the fine print, trusting Chow when he told her she couldn’t lose her principal. Had she looked at the prospectus and understood it she would have discovered that she had essentially bought three call options -- contracts that would capture gains if the shares of the three companies rose by a certain amount -- coupled with the equivalent of a Lehman corporate bond. If Lehman defaulted, her money would be gone.

Cash Bonus

ABN Amro, now part of Edinburgh-based Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, also recruited Yu to sell the same product to her family, giving her a cash bonus of about $155 for each person who signed up, she said.

Yuk Min Hui, a Hong Kong-based spokeswoman for RBS, declined to comment about Yu’s case. She said in an e-mail that if the bank determined that “sales processes and guidelines were not properly followed,” it would offer “appropriate remedies.” Only a small number of investors fall in this category, she said.

Chow couldn’t be located.

There are 873 issues of such Lehman equity-linked structured notes outstanding with a combined face value of about $8.7 billion, all now in default, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Bonds were denominated in pounds, Swiss francs and Hungarian forint, as well as Australian and Hong Kong dollars.

Banks also sold $1.8 billion of Lehman minibonds to an estimated 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, where the notes were first marketed in 2003, according to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. The biggest seller was BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd., a unit of Beijing-based Bank of China Ltd.

Financial Dumplings

The minibonds were all issued by a Cayman Islands-based entity called Pacific International Finance Ltd., set up by Lehman with trustees from London-based HSBC Holdings Plc. The notes were financial dumplings -- derivatives contracts tied to the creditworthiness of major companies wrapped inside Lehman corporate bonds. Series 19 notes, for instance, were linked to securities dealers including Citigroup Inc. and Goldman Sachs. If any of those businesses or Lehman defaulted, the investor wouldn’t get paid.

In effect, investors in Series 19 notes bought the losing end of credit-default swaps, or insurance policies pegged to the survival of financial institutions. If any of those companies failed, the noteholders were the ones responsible for paying off the principal on the derivative.

Lehman took payments from investors in exchange for a guaranteed yield, then placed the cash in a Lehman-managed money market fund and issued commercial paper to borrow more money. Those funds were in turn used to invest in CDOs sold by Lehman off-balance-sheet entities in places such as Ireland and the Cayman Islands.

‘Blood and Sweat’

Sun Kwan, a 58-year-old retired parks worker, was among those who bought Lehman minibonds. He stood outside the I.M. Pei-designed Hong Kong headquarters of the Bank of China on June 15, along with Yu and 51 other protesters, banging a chipped red drum with a stick every two seconds. Raindrops beaded on the brim of his blue cap. A sign around his neck, hand-lettered in Chinese characters, read: “The Bank of China is a hooker. Give me back my money earned with blood and sweat.”

Sun, who has a high school education, invested about $285,000 in Lehman Minibond Series 12 notes, sold to him by BOC Hong Kong, which paid about 4 percent interest a year.

He said he thought he was putting his money into a certificate of deposit. Instead, as the prospectus explained, the notes were a bet against the default of the Chinese government and five companies, including Hutchison Whampoa Ltd., which operates ports and telecommunications services, Chinese state-owned oil producer CNOOC Ltd. and Lehman.

As an incentive, he was given $26 in supermarket coupons.

Rhinos, Whales

Sun also purchased $40,000 worth of Octave Series 10 notes, a similarly structured product created by Morgan Stanley, in which the investor would lose all of his money if Lehman or any of six other companies defaulted. He said he never heard of Lehman and thought the notes were backed by the People’s Republic of China because most of the businesses were state- owned.

Nick Footitt, a spokesman for Morgan Stanley in Hong Kong, declined to comment.

Each minibond series was custom-made, so their characteristics differed. Packagers skipped using some numbers, including 4, which is considered unlucky in Chinese culture and would make the bond difficult to market. Investors got prizes, including video cameras and flat-screen televisions, according to newspaper advertisements and fliers handed out at banks. The ads, in both Chinese and English, featured rhinoceroses, whales and other symbols of potency, luck or profit.

‘Rotten Deal’

“It’s all gone,” Sun said in an interview conducted through a Chinese translator at the demonstration. “I almost wanted to kill myself. I’ve been crying for months, even though I am a man.”

He said he hadn’t yet told his 25-year-old son, Sun Chi Yan, what had happened to his nest egg, most of which came from a settlement when the government bought his family’s land.

Sun and Yu were among investors who staged protests almost every business day for nine months, sparking a Hong Kong legislative investigation and calls for more protection for retail customers. The raucous demonstrations in the city’s financial district, including a tent encampment and bullhorns connected to an iPod that blared the looped chant “Rotten Deal -- Money Back,” became an embarrassment to the banks.

In a city of 7 million, where only 30 percent of workers had pensions before 2001, the Lehman protesters struck a chord, according to Audrey Eu, one of 60 members of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council.

Bank Offer

“A lot of them lost their life savings,” Eu said in an interview in June. “They’re all crying. They work as cleaners, and $50,000 is a lot of money to them.”

Angel Yip, a spokeswoman for BOC Hong Kong, said in an e- mail that “we understand and sympathize with customers” who lost money as a result of the Lehman collapse. She said advertisements and prospectuses distributed by the bank “contained a detailed description of the structure and risks” of the investments.

In July, 16 retail banks, including BOC Hong Kong, offered to repay minibond investors at least 60 cents on the dollar, a deal brokered by the city’s securities regulator that would amount to $813 million. About two-thirds of eligible noteholders accepted the offer, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority said in a statement on Sept. 4. Sun said he hadn’t yet made up his mind.

“The compensation offer is totally unfair and based on groundless calculations,” Sun said. “If we have to accept it eventually, it’ll be because we’ve exhausted all other means.”

‘Grotesquely Wrong’

While investors in Hong Kong have the right to sue banks, there are no class-action laws or contingency fees, making it difficult to find lawyers willing to take cases.

Patrick Daniels, a lawyer with Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP in San Diego, has filed a class-action suit against Lehman in federal court in New York on behalf of minibond holders like Sun in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore seeking $1.6 billion from Bank of New York Mellon Corp. The money, mostly shares in Lehman’s Institutional Money Market Fund, is being held by the bank as collateral to secure the minibonds, Daniels said. Other Lehman creditors are trying to get the same funds from the Bank of New York Mellon, which isn’t accused of wrongdoing. The case is pending.

“Something is grotesquely wrong here,” Daniels said in an interview in July. “These people were just flat-out lied to and stolen from.”

Neither the lawsuit nor the settlement applies to Yu or other holders of equity-linked notes from Houston to Singapore.

London Suicide

Hong Kong retirees weren’t the only victims. Even professional investors were stuck with Lehman losses.

The stocks and bonds of Lehman’s London brokerage customers, used as collateral to borrow more money, were frozen on Sept. 15. About 3,500 clients, including 700 hedge funds, couldn’t get access to an estimated $65 billion of assets. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Lehman’s U.K. bankruptcy administrator, is still sorting out who should get paid and how much. Some firms have closed, and others may have to wait as long as a decade to get their assets back, Tony Lomas, the PwC partner in charge of the U.K. administration, said in August.

It took only 10 days for the ice-nine to get to Kirk Stephenson, chief operating officer of Olivant Ltd., a London private-equity firm run by former UBS AG Chairman Luqman Arnold. On Sept. 25, Stephenson, 47, jumped in front of a train going 125 mph at a station in Taplow, 28 miles (45 kilometers) west of London.

The coroner’s office for the county of Buckinghamshire ruled the death a suicide. Stephenson, a native of New Zealand, was despondent about the financial crisis and talked about killing himself one week after Lehman’s demise, according to a statement from his wife read at the coroner’s inquest.

U.K. Lock-Up

Lehman Brothers International (Europe) was Olivant’s prime broker. It held the firm’s 2.78 percent stake in UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank by assets, according to a statement from Olivant on Oct. 1. The shares were worth 1.6 billion francs ($1.44 billion) at the time.

The hedge fund lock-up led the U.K. to reconsider its procedures when firms fail. While Lehman’s broker-dealer in the U.S. stayed out of bankruptcy long enough to process many of its trades, the business seized up in the U.K.

“In the U.S., everything was wrapped in cotton wool for four days,” said PwC’s Lomas. In the U.K., “everything failed come 7:56 a.m. that Monday morning.”

‘Black Hole’

The U.K. had an advantage in attracting hedge fund assets before the Lehman bankruptcy. While U.S. prime brokers face limits on how much they can loan hedge funds, those rules could be circumvented with overseas units like Lehman’s in London. Some U.S. clients didn’t know they were customers of Lehman Brothers International (Europe).

“If you didn’t pay attention to what you were signing, you would have missed it,” said Michael Romanek, principal at Rise Partners Ltd., which arranges financing for funds from London. “It was called enhanced prime brokerage, where they could be more accommodating with more leverage or loans. It just took signing some extra papers in New York. Most people didn’t realize it.”

Some fund managers with frozen assets say they’ve gone from extreme anger to resignation that they’ll have to wait a long time to see any return.

“I still don’t know if I’ll ever get any money back,” said Edward Chin, whose Hong Kong-based Pride Revelation Fund used Lehman as its sole prime broker. “We’re in a black hole.”

$30 Billion Gap

The ice-nine also halted construction projects from Wall Street to the Turks and Caicos Islands.

Lehman borrowed against property investments that couldn’t easily be sold, such as construction loans. So when the property market turned sour and creditors demanded more collateral for the loans or their money back, the investment bank was stuck.

The property portfolio doomed Lehman when a rescue still seemed possible. On Saturday, Sept. 13, 2008, Timothy Geithner, then president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and now U.S. Treasury secretary, asked a team of the world’s top bankers to evaluate Lehman’s real estate holdings as part of an effort to facilitate a sale of the investment bank to London-based Barclays Plc.

The team, including representatives from Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse Group AG, determined that Lehman had overvalued its real estate investments by $20 billion to $30 billion, according to people who attended meetings at the New York Fed last September.

Watergate Hotel

When Barclays pulled out of an agreement to buy the firm, Lehman was forced to file for bankruptcy. Only then did Barclays buy Lehman’s U.S. securities business, including its headquarters in Manhattan’s Times Square.

The bankruptcy deprived the international real estate market of a major source of financing. The bank was known for doing deals nobody else would touch, according to a former Lehman executive.

The Watergate Hotel, made famous by the 1972 break-in that led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon, was sold at auction in August for $25 million after its owner, Washington- based Monument Realty LLC, defaulted on its mortgage. Monument was financed by Lehman.

A condo conversion at 25 Broad St. in Manhattan, two blocks from Goldman Sachs’s headquarters, was suspended by developers. It too was financed by Lehman.

SunCal, Depfa

Irvine, California-based SunCal Cos., a closely held developer, said it had $1.6 billion in financing from Lehman. Since the bank’s failure, 19 projects, all in California, have filed for bankruptcy, SunCal said. Work has stopped on all of them, including the 248-acre Marblehead Coastal community in San Clemente, which was supposed to feature 69 single-family homes, 244 other residences, a movie theater, parks and hiking trails.

Munich-based Hypo Real Estate Holding AG received 102 billion euros ($143 billion) in debt guarantees and credit lines from the German government after its Depfa unit was stuck without short-term funding following Lehman’s bankruptcy. Like Lehman, Hypo funded long-term real estate assets with short-term loans such as commercial paper.

German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck defended the bailout of the lender because the global financial system was just “millimeters from the abyss.”

Molasses Reef

On West Caicos, an otherwise uninhabited island 250 miles northeast of Cuba, work stopped on the Molasses Reef Ritz- Carlton Hotel and Residences, slated to include a cluster of $6.5 million cottages. About 400 Chinese employees of Tel Aviv- based construction firm Ashtrom Properties Ltd. didn’t get paid when Lehman funding dried up, according to Jonathan Siegel, New York-based managing director of Logwood Hotel Development Co.

About 60 electrical workers rebelled, taking a dozen managers hostage and refusing to let them leave the island.

“We had 400 to 500 unhappy men, and we were concerned violence would erupt,” Siegel said. “The Turks and Caicos government was very unhappy with the situation. There was a limited supply of food and water.”

Ashtrom ended the standoff after a week by paying what it considered “a ransom,” Siegel said. The project, about 70 percent completed, is still on hold, said Verona Carter, Ritz- Carlton Hotel Co.’s director of public relations for the Caribbean area.

Financial Leadership

The vulnerability of the global financial system revealed by Lehman’s bankruptcy -- from ordinary investors like Sun and Yu to London hedge funds and German lenders -- makes it all the harder to regulate.

“The difficulty you have in getting control is that you need a global alliance,” said former World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn in an e-mail. “You need all the finance ministers to come together, because if a transaction can’t be done here, it can be done in Lichtenstein or France or the Far East.”

Lehman’s bankruptcy also poses a challenge to America’s financial leadership.

Wall Street profited by arranging financing that allowed other countries to tap global capital markets to build offices, factories, resorts and housing. What’s broken now is the trust the rest of the world had in U.S. banks, said Phillip Yin, a native of Seattle who is managing director of Asia Investors Partners Ltd., a Hong Kong-based research firm.

“All that has happened since -- the job losses, the slump, everything -- is tied to one thing and one event,” Yin said. “And that’s Lehman.”

(Lehman’s Lessons: Next, Too Big to Fail)

To contact the reporters on this story: Mark Pittman in New York at mpittman@bloomberg.net; Bob Ivry in New York at bivry@bloomberg.net.

from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aNFuVRL73wJc

《信報》證監在雷曼事件應負的責任

2009-09-06T06:59:00.000-07:00

在2002年三月《證券及期貨條例》二讀時,財經事務局局長葉澍堃就政府的立塲作了如下的重要陳述;“我們清楚明白加强證監會的問責性及透明度极為重要,所以條例草案保留了所有現行的問責安排,並且引入多項額外的制衡措施”,“例如在條例草案加入證監會的規管目標,讓市民及業界可以以這些目標作基準,衡量證監會的工作表現”.
在立法會立法通過賦予證監會更大的權力以保障投資者的目標後,出現了涉及數萬宗的史無前例投訴,市民及業界對這樣的監管成效,有何感想呢?雖然大部分的投訴是針對銀行,但證監會是不可能將責任全數推給金管局及投資者的,理由是根據《證券及期貨條例》,證監會是有「監管、監察及規管」銀行銷售證券產品的權力及責任,雖然條例亦指出,證監會可以根據不同情况而行使酌情權,以决定部分或全部依賴金管局代他們執行對銀行的前線監管.但他們亦可運用酌情權,不完全依賴金管局,並要求直接抽查懷疑違規的銀行,法例是完全允許的.
再者,證監會亦可與金管局商討修改他們雙方訂立但沒有法律效力的《備忘錄》,以讓證監曾可直接監管銀行對這些結構性金融產品的銷售,這種安排亦是有法可依的.但證監會並未有積極考慮這些做法.面對可能出現的金融危機,仍然是默守成規地按章工作.
知悉問題不作堵塞
除上述的權責外,證監會對結構性產品進入市場,是有守門員的責任.披露為本的監管政策主要體現在審批、監察及規管章程、廣告及持續披露,讓投資者能評估產品的投資價值及風險.對披露不足的文件不作登記,產品便不能向公眾發售.根據證監會的執行董事日前在立法會上作供時表示,證監會招股章程組是按《公司條例》附表三的條款,審批結構性產品的章程,他承認該條款對監管這此包含了CDS(信貸違約掉期)產品的章程是過時,且承認該小組並沒有審批這些複雜的保險及衍生產品的財務及精算人才.
其實證監會對這個漏洞巳知悉多年,但一直只停留於諮詢而不作堵塞.早於二00三年,證監會已就修改招股章程展開了三個階段的諮詢,在二00五年最後一次諮詢文件中清楚指出,《公司條例》附表三是為監察具有實體業務的公司發債及招股而設的,不適合規管經營衍生產品的公司發債.
證監會於二00六年九月就該諮詢發表總結報告,提出可考慮將含有CDS及CDO(債務抵押債券)一類的結構性產品剔出債券的定義範圍,使其章程及廣告受《證券及期貨條例》,而非不合適的《公司條例》所規管.若證監會當時加速立法並嚴格執行,便沒有今天的雷曼事件.

調查組披露執法漏洞
在聆聽證監會两位高層人員的作供後,可看到四個重要的事實.
第一.證監會於二00五年巳確認《公司條例》對監管結構性產品的章程及廣告是過時的;
第二.招股章程組對審批具有保險特性的債券章程並無相關的尃業人才;
第三.《公司條例》雖然有很多漏洞,但其中多項條款仍可發揮作用,讓證監會可要求發債人披露更具體的風險及可能的利益冲突,但章程組並沒有積極運用該等條款,以要求發債人披露更重要的資料,讓投資者作出有依據的决定.
第四.證監是可以引用《證券及期貨條例》第105(1)條,對申請審批的廣告加上任何附加限制,以保障投資者不受廣告的誤導,但章程組對廣告的審批採取過分寬鬆的標準.
結構性金融產品引致龐大數量的投訴,究竟與證監會這種被動式的執法有多大關連?他們應該負上多大的責任?市民應可用當年葉澍堃在立法會上所提的立法目標作基準,以“衡量證監會的工作表現”並回答上述的問題.
《信報》2009年8月4日曾廣海、尹靖廷

CNBC news: M. Stanley, Moody's, S&P Must Defend Fraud Claims

2009-09-03T07:05:00.000-07:00

Source of CNBC news: http://www.cnbc.com/id/32667231.

Published: Wednesday, 2 Sep 2009

A U.S. federal judge ruled that Morgan Stanley and two credit rating agencies must defend fraud charges in a class-action lawsuit accusing them of masking the risks of an investment linked to subprime mortgages, and which eventually collapsed.

U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin on Wednesday rejected efforts by Morgan Stanley [MS 27.09 -0.36 (-1.31%) ] , Moody's [MCO 26.10 -0.32 (-1.21%) ] Moody's Investors Service and McGraw-Hill's [MHP 32.31 -0.95 (-2.86%) ] Standard & Poor's to dismiss fraud claims brought by the plaintiffs, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and King County in Washington state.

She dismissed the plaintiffs' remaining claims, and all claims against a fourth defendant, Bank of New York Mellon [BK 27.95 -0.15 (-0.53%) ] , while granting permission for the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.

Scheindlin's ruling could affect other lawsuits brought by pension funds and other investors, seeking to hold banks and credit raters responsible for hyping the value of complex debt to win fees and causing investor losses as the debt collapsed.

The case concerned the Cheyne Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV), which went bankrupt in August 2007 after the quality of its assets plummeted. Many investors in Cheyne-related notes lost much or all of their investments.

SIVs are complex packages of loans and debt, including collateralized debt obligations, that once held some $350 billion of assets before falling out of favor.

The California Public Employees' Retirement System, the nation's largest public pension fund, in July sued Moody's, S&P and Fitch Ratings over losses on Cheyne and other SIVs.

In the New York case, the plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley wrongly marketed Cheyne as a high-quality investment, and that the rating agencies assigned improperly high ratings.

The complaint also accused Bank of New York Mellon, acting as a depositary and processing agent, of improperly valuing Cheyne's assets and delivering reports to the rating agencies.

In a 68-page ruling, Scheindlin said the plaintiffs pleaded enough facts to let the fraud claims case go forward.

"Where both the rating agencies and Morgan Stanley knew that the ratings process was flawed, knew that the portfolio was not a safe, stable investment, and knew that the rating agencies could not issue an objective rating because of the effect it would have on their compensation, it may be plausibly inferred that Morgan Stanley and the rating agencies knew they were disseminating false and misleading ratings," she wrote.

Scheindlin set an Oct. 1 status conference in the case.

McGraw-Hill spokesman Frank Briamonte said the company was pleased that Scheindlin dismissed all but one of 11 claims it faced, and said it was "confident" it would prevail on the remaining claim.

Bank of New York Mellon spokesman Kevin Heine had no immediate comment. The rest of the parties did not immediately return calls or e-mails seeking comment.

The case is Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan), No. 08-7508.

銀行迫迷債事主啃6成方案，情何以堪！

2009-09-02T02:59:00.000-07:00

（(轉載自經濟日報 9月2日)
在現代社會，公關手法經常有助扭轉事件發展。上星期日新疆發生特大騷亂，舉世震驚。中央政府在星期一立即安排國內外媒體採訪騷亂現場，爭取輿論主動。可見在信息年代，連一向以威權見稱的中央政府也明白公關造勢的重要性。

銀行公關造勢迫證監低頭

遠在海角一隅的香港，近日為了證監會應否同意16家零售銀行用雷曼迷債60%的價值（下稱「6成方案」）來全面性解決雷曼事件，也掀起一場公關造勢戰。本星期三有公關同行在他報的專欄把有份協助雙方的公關專才名字點了出來，甚至說證監會韋奕禮以公帑來聘請一些資深公關人是為了締造人民英雄形象。又說「銀行自動求和」，明眼人一看便知道是為銀行造勢，企圖令證監會低頭，接受銀行6成方案建議。但這個結果是對雷曼苦主不利的。為了苦主的利益，筆者要把自己知道的情況說出來，以正視聽。

筆者先申報利益，我自己雖屬公關界，但我本人和我所屬公司都沒有接任何涉及雷曼一方的生意。筆者只是以個人身份義務地幫雷曼苦主。筆者身為民主黨核心黨員，也是公開資訊；筆者評論雷曼事件時從來沒有藏頭露尾，在不申報利益情況下，借助自己的專欄去為商業利益服務。

銀行一毛不拔損失全歸事主

雷曼苦主大聯盟主席陳光譽先生在6月底時已指出，銀行（當時主要指中銀）若真的以6成方案來解決雷曼事件，其實是把抵押品的價值照價還給苦主而已。銀行可謂分毫不出、一毛不拔。對於中銀這種錙銖必算的行徑，我兩周前已在本欄內指出中銀這樣做，有違其企業社會責任，更加有負國家刻意在香港締造和諧的苦心。沒有國家數年前把以千億計金錢注入中銀以充實其資本，中銀集團根本不可能在香港上市。現在國家為了在香港締造和諧，絞盡腦汁、扭盡六壬。中銀集團卻袖手旁觀，捂着荷包不肯多賠一點予雷曼苦主。用內地的話講，這是不懂政治，不顧全大局的宗派思想。左派陣營經常扣民主派破壞安定團結的帽子；但中銀集團明知雷曼苦主們失去了自己畢生積蓄卻依然只肯賠6成，客觀上是迫雷曼苦主走向極端，甚至走向絕路（辛瑞英女士的不幸，令人神傷）。其對香港安定團結的破壞，莫此為甚。

用內地的話來說：「錢是人民的」，不是你中銀集團袞袞諸公個人所有的。倘若中銀集團有份直接或間接聘用專業公關來為其6成方案造勢，迫證監會及雷曼苦主硬啃這個骨頭。那更是用人民的錢來破壞香港人民的和諧，迫同屬中國公民的雷曼苦主接受城下之盟。真的是情何以堪﹗中聯辦理應介入，訓斥中銀集團高層只見樹木不見森林，和中央政府的和諧政策對着幹！

公關文過飾非愧讀聖賢書

至於說證監會堅持要100%賠償才接受令事件膠着，令雷曼苦主繼續受折磨。實情是雷曼苦主大聯盟早已明確要求銀行百分百賠償。今次證監會恰巧是站在人民的一面，和人民對着幹的反而是零售銀行及其公關們。雷曼苦主目睹證監會成功迫使新鴻基及凱基兩家證券行同意百分百賠償，一眾苦主拍手稱快都來不及，又怎會在乎多等一會。證監會若在輿論下低頭，6成方案一旦執行，損失的是雷曼苦主，埋下的是未來社會不穩定的因素，得益的是有錯不認還要賺到盡的零售銀行。

金融海嘯下，我明白一眾同業的生意壓力，但置公義於不顧來為有錯不認的零售銀行造勢，令我想起了文天祥的四句詩：「讀聖賢書所學何事而今而後庶幾無愧」。

謹以此與各同行共勉！
撰文:馮煒光中產動力主席

Lehman Minibond Series 6 解读迷债系列6

2009-08-29T03:07:00.000-07:00

解读迷债系列6，
因为系列6是2003－2004两年间提供最高利息的迷债系列（跟系列5 或系列7－10相比），却是销售量最低的系列（低于5百万美金），其表面挂钩公司也跟其它系列不同：跟多达150个公司信贷挂钩。

Series 6 was issued in Sep.2003, and matured in Sep.2005, but was extended (by issuer) to Mar.2009.

Why Series 6?

It would be interesting to learn how the early Minibond Series was introduced. For Series 6, there was only a "PROSPECTUS". For Series 10 and later, Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus are offered.

Because Series 6 showed us how Minibond's upfront facade / marketing selling point had been evolved over years, It also showed us how the disclosure level of Underlying Securities related information had gone from LESS to the LEAST, while the prospectus was expanded into Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus . Similar reduction in disclosure is also observed in the DBS Constellation Notes, if one compares the much polished prospectus for Constellation Series 59 versus the Constellation Series 34-37. The Prospectus for Minibond Series 6 also showed us what banks knew at the early stage about the true features and material risks of Minibond.

Summary of Minibond Series 6.
1. Maturity Term.
Series 6 was issued in Sep.2003, with initial Maturity date in Sep.2005.
Upon maturity, the issuer has the right to extend the maturity date to Mar.2009.

2. It is credit-linked to 150 reference companies ("referecne portfolio") .
The Prospectus listed the 150 reference companies name, and their rating.

3. Prospectus listed the impact to the interest-rate with the number of default event of the 150 reference entities.
- For Sep.2003 - Sep.2005:
0 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 5%:
1 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 4.15%: ........
5 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 0.80%:
6 or more default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 0:

- For extended Sep.2005 - Mar.2009:
0 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 8 %:
1 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 6.65%: ........
5 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 1.30%:
6 or more default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 0:

4. Where did the Minibond Money go?
According to Prospectus, it would be used on purchasing "Underlying Securities" with maturity date at Mar.2009.
The Underlying Securities in fact was another structured products.
My Comments:
Prospectus did not use the term 'collateral', the document used 'Underlying Securities'.

5. It claimed to be principal protected. but it also said that if something happened to the Underlying Securities, the principal will be at loss (or total loss).

6. Procedures and Information related to the 'underlying securities' in the Prospectus.

(a) page 53: "APPLICATION PROCEDURES"
(...)
Relevant Dealers will inform prospective investors that copies of the documents listed under paragraph 10 in the section headed "General Information" are available for inspection at the office of the Arranger specified herein ."

(b) in Page 95, "General Information" ,
"10. (...) copies of the following documents will be available .....and the Initial Dealers " (i.e. the distributing banks).

(c) page 96: "(xii): Information Memorandum and all other relevant programme documentation relating to the Underlying Securities Issuer's US $18,000,000,000 EUR Medium-Term Notes Program guaranteed (...)"

(d) page 96: "(xiii) Pricing Supplement relating to the Underlying Securities which supplements the master terms and conditions of the Underlying Securrities set out in the Information Memorandum referered to in (xii) above to form the terms and conditiosn of the Underlying Securities"

My comment:
- The "(xiii)" , i.e. (d) above, refers to the crucial Underlying Securities information document.
- The Underlying Securities Information Documents were available at selling agent (distributor banks) office.
- The "APPLICATION PROCEDDURE" and "General Information" were in fact requiring selling-agent /distributors
(i) to inform clients/potential minibond-buyers all the document information including Underlying Securities Information Document,
(ii) to let clients/potential minibond-buyers inspect all the document information including Underlying Securities Information Document, at selling-agent's office (i.e. at banks if the distributor is a bank). => Both Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus for later Minibond Series never invited clients to inspect such information/documents at selling agents / distributors office any more.
- Similar requirements for inviting clients to inspect the Underlying Securities Information Documents were also found in the prospectus of Constellation Series 34-37 (in the name of "Charged Asset Information" ), but NOT in the prospectus of Constellation Series 59.

- Did selling agents/distributors inform and give clients Underlying Securities Information Document?
- Did selling agents/distributors read through Underlying Securities Information Document which were available at their site?
* What did they learn about the Underlying Securities' true feature and risks?
* How did the Underlying Securities Information affect Banks' understanding on the Minibond's true features and risks?
* How did the Underlying Securities Information affect Banks' understanding on the Minibond's material risk and material information?
- Is there a connection between such information with the Questions regarding to disclaimers in Wing Hang Bank's Minibond Purchaser Confirmation Form?
Questions: in http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/question-regarding-wing-hang-banks.html

(e) page 96: "Copies of the (...) refered to in (...) (xii), (xiii) and (xiv), will be avialable for inspection as aforesaid with effect from the Issue Date. (...)"

My Comment:
- The Prospectus disclosed that some information (e.g. Underlying Securities Information Document) will be available from the Issue Date, i.e. not available before the Sale-offer closed.
- Similar information on the availability of "Charged Asset Information" (i.e. Underlying Securities equivalent) was also found in the Constellation Series 34-37, but was not found in the prospectus for later Constellation Series (e.g. Constellation Series 59).
- Similar information (disclosure) was dropped forever in the Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus for Minibond series 10 and later. The Program Prospectus and Issue Prospects never mentioned about the availability of Underlying Securities Information Document.
In the later series (of Minibond and Constellation notes), not only there was no mentioning of the availability of Underlying Securities (collateral) Information document, the well polished Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus never invited clients to inspect such information/documents at selling-agents/distributors office any more.
WHY?
Because such information did not carry material information and was not relevant material information for understanding the true features and risks of Minibond / Constellation notes ?

7. Distributors of Minibond Series 6:
Dah Sing Bank,
ICBC (Asia),
Mervas Bank,
Shanghai Commercial Bank,
Sun Hung Kai Investment Services Limited,
Wing Hang Bank,
WIng Lung Bank;

8. Sales of Early Minibond Series (based on data from HSBC USA Trustee).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 5: $10.6 million USD; Reference Entities: 1 ; Interest Rate at 3.8%; Jun.2003- Jul.2010;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 6: $4.75 million USD; Reference Entities: 150 ; Interest Rate at 5% for year 1-2, 8% from 3rd year-maturity, pending on number of default event; Sep.2003 - Mar.2009;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 7A: $15.2 million USD; Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 4.2%: Nov.2003 - Dec.2008;
Series 7B: $32 million USD ($250 million HKD); Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 4.2%:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 9A: $22 million USD; Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 3.7% year 1-3, 4.3% year 4-maturity: Mar.2004 - Sep.2009;
Series 9B: $353 million USD; Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 3.5% year 1-3, 4.1% year 4-maturity:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 10: $44.6 million USD; Reference Entities: 7 + Additional 125 undisclosed reference entities hidden in CDO Collateral ; USD Interest Rate at 4.25% year 1-3, 4.75% year 4-maturity: May 2004 - Nov.2009;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 11: $42 million USD; Reference Entities: 1 + Additional 125 undisclosed reference entities hidden in CDO Collateral ; fixed + Libor linked float Interest Rate: Jun.2004 - Jun.2010;
------------------------------------------------------------

My Comment:
- Series 6 was offering a higher interest rate comparing to other series because Series 6 has 150 reference entities at up front.
- Series 6 Sales was the lowest amongst all the Minibond Series.
- Comparing the Interest Rate (and sales results) offered for Series 6 versus Series 10:
Both are credit linked to over 100 reference entities. But Series 6 listed 150 reference entities at up front, Series 10 listed 1 reference entities at up front and addded another 125 reference entities in the never disclosed CDO.

参考1: Series 6 Prospectus:
http://www.sfc.hk/sfcCOPro/EN/displayFileServlet?refno=0550&fname=Minibond%20Series%206_Prospectus_ENG2.pdf

参考2: 從迷債系列 6 看雷曼迷你債券騙局手段之完美完善過程
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/09/6_4956.html
.
.

美國聯邦法官拒絕在證券委和美銀和解書上簽字－起時

2009-08-25T20:58:00.000-07:00

轉載“起時”博客：(link: http://blog.wenxuecity.com/blogview.php?date=200908&postID=31745)

金融危機發生近一年，雖然金融系統幾乎崩潰，經濟遭巨大創傷，失業率高昇，人心惶惶，政府用納稅人的錢救助了那些“太大”的金融機構。奧巴馬，布什及所有華盛頓的官員都在譴責華爾街的“貪婪”，但迄今為止，沒有一個人，無論是華爾街，或華盛頓公開站出來，為他們的行為向納稅人道歉。迄今為止，沒有一個主要負責人人因此受到司法的追究。華爾街的銀行盈利照舊，金融衍生品照賣，華盛頓的“國會代表”們只會在無任何法律效力的聽證會上，裝模作樣痛斥華爾街的執行長，企圖換取選民的支持。但金融危機到底如何造成的，誰造成的，為甚麼會造成那麼大的損失，難道只是簡單的“貪婪”？和“投機”？這裡邊隱藏的巨大欺騙，和黑幕，不知那天才能暴露於天下。

今天的一個新聞讓我分外注意，就是證券委(SEC) 再次試圖和美銀( Bank of America)和解，美銀同意支付三千三百萬的罰款，為去年美林（Merrill Lynch）的年終分紅接受罰款，與證券委和解，並要求聯邦法官傑德· 瑞考夫（Jed S. Rakoff）在和解書上簽字。美銀去年9月在保森和美林前執行長約翰·贊 (John Thain) 的“欺騙”下，先與美林“訂婚”，12月又在保森和博南克的“槍口下”，被迫“完婚”。而美林隱瞞第四季高達140億的損失，在公佈季報之前，悄悄發了近四十億的奬金。

這是證券委和美銀第二次的企圖了。上次就被瑞考夫駁回，要求提供更多的證據，解釋為甚麼要和解。今天，瑞考夫再次質問證券委和解的原因，如果美銀的管理層撒了謊，證券委為甚麼不起訴，而只要求和解。

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125123100930658077.html

證券委申訴了理由，但被法官駁回。 法官瑞考夫認為證券委的解釋是“不符常理“。

法官瑞考夫強調有義務使“和解”公平和符合公眾的利益。

我在另一篇博文中講到，美國的司法近乎癱瘓，尤其是“白領犯罪”，無法可循，無理可證，用諾貝爾得奬克魯格曼的話說“華爾街的所有手法都是合法”。奧巴馬政府天天嚷著要金融改革，但卻不做改革，不追究危機發生的責任，這樣做，只會掩蓋事實，反而使下次危機發生的可能性更高。而財長蓋特納也在多次場合表示，是錯誤（mistake）造成了危機的發生。這麼大的錯誤，可能只有“華盛頓”和“華爾街”能犯吧？

這個案子，就是另一例奧巴馬政府企圖用“和解”掩蓋欺騙，掩蓋犯罪，試圖用納稅人的人為犯罪買單。別忘了，我們納稅人已經為美銀投資了450億了。這三千三百萬的罰款是納稅人的錢，我不知道證券委會拿多少分成，納稅人養著他們，而他們卻連一個麥道夫都抓不到。

但願瑞考夫法官能主持正義，讓納稅人給回一點對司法的信心。請繼續關注。

王子犯法：無罪？有罪的是抗議王子犯法的庶民們?

2009-08-22T21:25:00.000-07:00

（據8月23日太陽報）“警方證實，由今年一月至本月二十日，中區警區共接獲十九宗與雷曼事主示威活動有關的報案，當中涉及傷人、恐嚇及於公眾地方行為不檢等。現時共有十六人被捕，當中八人因證據不足獲釋，其餘八人保釋候查。
法律界人士梁永鏗指出，任何人在示威過程中作出過激行為，例如刑事毀壞及傷人等，社會絕不會接受，但如果苦主只是透過帶有激烈性字眼的口號，藉以宣洩不滿情緒，梁則認為是情有可原。另一方面，他促請證監會及金管局做好自己的角色，搜集足夠證據，向涉嫌違規的銀行作出處分。”

現實是：
－在近日已經有兩個苦主突然被警察就未有確實的證據、而且非常輕微的事故帶返警局調查。
－ 2008年9月至今以來，由受害人個人（不是有錢勢的金融機構或財團）給警方提出的數千宗對金融機構及其職員之金融欺騙的相關報案，警方對於相關金融機構和職員做出過甚麼相關調查呢？

警方連續對2至3個月前在某一大銀行示威的苦主採取行動，但卻對銀行銷售產品過程中偽造罪行的報案置之不理，明顯是有強烈的政治意圖。難道說：當金融機構行騙的時候，司法機關就可以一拖再拖（以冠冕堂皇的理由）而最終不了了之了？

當金融機構對一些參與抗議的苦主們有投訴的時候，警方就會迅速採取相應的行動。對無權勢無商業巨頭機構做背景的普通百姓極盡威嚇恐赫之能。參見“關於警察濫用職權，給警察局的一封公開信”。這簡直是黑色恐怖!

深受金融詐騙的苦主們的相關投訴呢？警方一定是在“認真”處理的過程之中吧？這麼複雜的產品，警方大概是看不明白的? 銀行大概也是被雷曼欺騙了，銀行可能是只理解傭金而不理解產品的真實特徵和風險，而蒙查查地做了幾年的產品銷售。誠如一個藥品銷售商給學生們賣了幾年毒品，可是毒品並不是該藥品銷售商製造的呀。要抓，也要抓毒品製造商和買毒品的學生們呀。怎麼可以怪到藥品銷售商的頭上來了呢？

金管局象保護心愛王子一樣地庇護銀行。證監會,也只有在回購談判的最後關頭跟銀行家們叩頭投降，最後的回購建議不僅僅連究竟誰錯，證監會對於銀行有甚麼錯／或有甚麼關注等根本不提，乾脆連“錯”和“關注”都不敢寫入。監管機構和政府的態度這讓警方怎麼能夠因為有幾千名苦主報案就因此去調查銀行了呢？警察要向政府／特首負責。而特首的主要責任之一是對銀行和銀行家負責，對吧？特首是來自警察之家，當然理解警察向政府／特首負責的心態和制度。還是束之高閣慢慢地調查調查吧，“一萬年不久”。過了今生還有來世... 特首不是來自雷曼苦主之家，自然不能理解苦主們信任“銀行理財”的後果是：過去的存定期時的“悠閒生活” 變成了現在的“遊行生活”。。。

與此同期間，關於金融欺騙，紐約的檢察官和 FBI 們做了些甚麼呢？請按此連接：

http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/while-hk-police-have-busy-with.html

Open Letter to Commissioner of Police Regarding to Police Abuse of Powers

2009-08-20T03:32:00.000-07:00

（轉載）
An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of Police Abuse of Powers

Mr. TANG King Shing

Commissioner of Police , Police Headquarters,

Sirs,

I write on behalf of Ms. Tracy Ho as well as the Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims in Hong Kong to complain against your officers who authorise the ‘dawn raid’ against Ms. Ho for reason that she is suspected of having committed an act of common assault.
The alleged assault takes place at about 1625 hours on 21st May 2009 outside the Bank of China Building, which is situate at no. 1 Garden Road, Central. In addition to the gross disproportion between police action and the nature of the allegation, there are numerous dubious acts on the part of your officers during the process that could only be explained as intending to maximize the harassment and distress inflicted on Ms. Ho and her family.

The Dawn Raid

2. At about 07:30 hours on 19th August 2009 five detectives (three male and two female) in plain clothes claiming to be attached to the Central Police District or Division knocked on the door of Ms. Ho’s Residence in Choi Hung. The visit is a total surprise and when Ms. Ho answered the door your officers insisted that they wanted to enter the premises before they would reveal the purpose of their visit.

3. With utmost reluctance and distress of her family, Ms. allowed the officers into her home. One of the officers then produced a photograph to Ms. Ho and asked if she is the person in it. Although the photograph does not show her face, Ms. Ho recalled the scene which is the protest outside the Bank of China Building mentioned above.

4. When Ms. Ho was about to admit that she is the lady on the photograph, one of the officer threatened her to immediately produce the clothes and shoes she worn that day or else they would search for the items themselves. Perplexed by the sudden police interest in the event that happened months ago and pressured by the threatening language, Ms. Ho complied with the demand and produced the items accordingly. She was then asked to follow the officers to the police station for further enquiries but before leaving the premises she was asked to sign on the notebook of one of the officers that it was not an arrest and she was not therefore handcuffed.

A Trivial Offence

5. Ms. Ho arrived at the Central Police Station at Arsenal Street at about 0930 hours after having been taken to and asked to wait at the Ngau Tau Kok Police Station for some time during which your officers were presumably completing some formalities to record their action in another police area.

6. In the Central Police Station, Ms. Ho was shown a video footage lasting for about 10 to 15 seconds in which her right foot seemed to have a momentary contact with the buttock of a bank staff. Apparently the footage was shot in a commotion where attempt was made by the bank staff to forcibly remove the protesters. It is understandable that in such circumstances people were jostling against each another and what Ms. Ho was doing then is crucial in establishing the plausibility of the allegation against her.

7. Ms. Ho has a flair for electronic video and audio devices and she has been responsible for filming the public activities of the Alliance almost since the creation of it. When the assault was allegedly taken place, Ms. Ho was actually holding her video device filming the forcible removal of the protesters by the bank staff. Her attention was on the action in front of her and the display screen of her video. It is, to say the least, very unlikely that a person would in the circumstances feel like joining the fray.

8. There is another factor that discounts the truthfulness of the allegation. Ms. Ho is a small, slim young lady whose weight would not be much more than 90 lbs. Could a person with that physique be inclined to provoke a fight? And could a lady like Ms. Ho who has taken part in so many protests relating to the fraud of Lehman Brothers and has always behaved properly, suddenly and without any provocation whatsoever, acted contrary to her personality and disposition? The allegation is so preposterous that no person in his right mind would seriously entertain it. Yet your officers have concluded that the offence is so grave that it justifies a deployment of five officers to carry out a dawn raid for an allegation of common assault where the supposed victim does not seem to have suffered any visible or detectable injury and does not complain for months after the event.

Assault on Law by Abuses of Powers

9. How should the public comprehend a dawn raid by five detectives against a young lady suspected of common assault? Does it not indicate the new low of the state of policing in this city under your watch?
But that is not all in so far as the outrageous police conduct is concerned. For almost one year now Ms. Ho has been the contact person between the police and the Alliance on many occasions especially in respect of application for approval to assemble and conduct procession. Your officers at the Police Community Relations Office in Central District know Ms. Ho well and it would take only a phone call to get Ms. Ho to the Central Police Station to view the video footage and to assist police investigation into the allegation. The differences between asking Ms. Ho to the police station and the dawn raid are that only the latter could inflict the distress, sudden sense of fear, and helplessness on Ms. Ho and her family.

10. The connection between the decision to harass Ms. Ho and another assault complaint against the bank staff at the scene of protest is clear. As mentioned above, the moment when Ms. Ho was accused of committing assault on the anonymous bank staff, she was filming an assault in progress by the bank staff against a protester.
It is hardly surprising that the protester would sustain injury given the way she was man-handled by the bank staff. As it was, she was taken to hospital, and stayed there for days for medical treatment. We also learn that a complaint of assault was lodged with the police by her or subsequently with the medical findings of the injury she sustained. Despite the evidence, no action has been taken against the bank or the assailant by the police, just like other crimes related to the Lehman Brothers fraud.

11. In the circumstances, it is an irresistible inference that the police harassment against Ms. Ho is motivated by the desire to please certain influential individuals affiliated with the bank.

12. The allegation against Ms. Ho is so trivial that she is granted a police bail of HKD100. Against an allegation of common assault that could, technically speaking, be committed by everyone in this crowded community, the police deployed five detectives to conduct a dawn raid on the basis of the flimsiest evidence which comes into being in a commotion caused largely by the bank itself. The commotion would not have happened had the police had the courage and sense of decency to enforce the law. Against the banks for fraud that is proven by documentary evidence that no government official would dare to dispute, not a single officer of yours has the courage to follow your own orders to classify the complaints after almost one year of their lodgments with the Commercial Crime Bureau. Insofar as the Lehman Brothers fraud is concerned, the victims have been deprived of any legal rights and remedies. Would any of the government officials to whom this complaint is addressed care to respond to this latest episode of police abuse of powers?

c.c.
Mr. TANG Ying Yen, Henry, Chief Secretary for Administration
Mr. Wong Yan Lung, Secretary for Justice
Mr. Ian Grenville Cross, Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Ian McWalters, Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Lee Ka Chiu, Director of Crime & Security, HKP

======================================================
From: An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of police abuse of powers

Is HK now a Heaven for Banking Crooks ?

2009-08-19T03:17:00.000-07:00

What have HK Police / Justice department done regarding all the financial fraud related complaints by Minibond / Constellation / Octave victims /other-products, since 15 sept. 2008?
(a) act upon banks' request & demand: Arrested and raided some minibond / constellation victims who participated in protesting banks' over 5 years' fraudulent act;
(b) Taking photos of those who participated in the demonstrations ...
(c) What ELSE ????????

While HK Police have been busy with responding to banks' request & demand: searching & raiding Minibond/Constellation victims because of their involvement in protest against Banks' cheating behavior on Minibond / Constellation / Octave,
What have the financial center New York's legal system done so far?

In the recent news:

1. "New York Attorney General sues Charles Schwab over securities sales" (Aug.17)
NEW YORK - New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo filed a lawsuit Monday against the brokerage unit of Charles Schwab Corp., claiming the firm misled customers about the safety of auction-rate securities.
Cuomo's office has been at the forefront of pushing brokers and underwriters of auction-rate securities to repurchase them from investors who were left with steep losses after the market for the investments collapsed in early 2008.
The suit against Schwab is aimed at forcing the retail brokerage firm to repurchase the securities at face value from investors.
...
Last month, Cuomo's office notified San Francisco-based Charles Schwab that it was planning to file the suit against the retail brokerage firm for claiming the securities were safe investments while selling them to customers.
In a statement Monday, Cuomo said: "Charles Schwab owed its customers a duty to properly understand and make accurate representations concerning auction-rate securities. Today we commenced a lawsuit to remedy Schwab's repeated breach of that duty."
...
related link: http://www.cnbc.com/id/32447041

2. "Credit Suisse broker convicted of fraud" (Aug.17)
A former Credit Suisse broker was on Monday convicted by a jury of fraudulently selling risky auction-rate securities in one of the first criminal prosecutions to emerge from the two-year-long credit crisis.

The guilty verdict against Eric Butler, 36, comes after a three-week trial in which prosecutors accused him and his former colleague, Julian Tzolov, of scheming to generate higher sales commissions by lying to clients about what kind of securities they were being sold.

“The defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations saddled investors with unknown risks they did not bargain for,” said Benton Campbell, US attorney for the eastern district of New York.

“This case shows that those who engage in such schemes will be held to account for their criminal activity.”
related links:
- http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE57G4HK20090817?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticNews (reuters)
- http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/nyfo081709a.htm (FBI press release)

3. 2008-News:
US Regulators alleged that brokerages misled investors into believing that auction rate securities were safe, cash-equivalent products, when in fact they faced increasing liquidity risk. Major financial companies Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia Corp.,and others that sold auction-rate securities have reached 100% buy-back settlements.

Questions Regarding Wing Hang Bank's Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form

2009-08-10T08:35:00.000-07:00

In the Wing Hang Bank's Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form, for Minibond Series 30 (January 2007),
the "Declaration " has Clause 11 as the following：
"11. I/We understand that I/we can read copies of the display documents as listed in the Programme Prospectus at the offices of the arranger as set out in the Programme Prospectus;"

However, the 'Clause 11' does not detail what the ‘display documents’ are.
By contrast, the same provision about ‘display documents’ is not available in the Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form for Series 27 (August 2006).

The Question is:
What are the 'display documents' referring to in the 'Clause 11' ?

Wing Hang Bank has been an experienced Minibond distributor since 2003. Why can't Wing Hang Bank clarify this?

關於永亨銀行迷債“購買者確認及指示表格”之疑問

永亨銀行於2007年1月銷售的迷債系列30之“購買者確認及指示表格” 的 “聲明" 之第11條有如下內容:
“11。我／我們明白我／我們可親臨安排人於計劃章程所述的辦事處，查閱計劃章程內列為可供查閱的文件；”

可是，這第11條並沒有指出這些“可供查閱的文件”究竟具體是指哪些文件。
－永亨銀行為甚麼不明確指出這些“可供查閱的文件”究竟具體是指哪些文件呢？給銀行的詢問也沒有回答。
－另一令人疑惑之處是，在2006年銷售的迷債（如8月銷售的系列27）之“購買者確認及指示表格“，並無此第11條的內容。
為甚麼2007年開始有這第11條，而2006年的就沒有呢？

永亨銀行自從2003年開始就銷售迷債了（包括系列2003年9月的迷債系列6以及更為早期的迷債系列），直至2007年7月的系列33。儘管並沒有參與系列34－36的銷售。永亨銀行也可算是迷債的經驗分銷商了。為甚麼永亨銀行不可以回答關於銀行自身的“購買者確認及指示表格”的問題呢？
？？？？？？
？？？？？？

香港的銀行，金融監管機構和政府還有信用可言麼？

2009-08-09T07:38:00.000-07:00

對於銀行家而言：
客戶不可貴，誠信價更低，若為傭金故，一切皆可拋。

對於金管局和政府而言：
市民不可貴，公眾價更低，若為銀行故，一切皆可拋。

香港到底是金融中心呢？還是縱容金融騙局的金融詐騙中心呢？

銀行行騙和庶民行騙不同罪？
我們的政府／議員／法律機構等, 對於倫敦金或祈福黨／跌錢黨等欺騙市民的集團，
是否會施以同樣的寬容，並以現在為銀行辯解的理由來為這些集團之欺騙行為辯護？

當受監管的金融機構銀行欺騙市民們的時候，就不是欺騙了？
就可以對銀行網開一面，不受懲罰，而要求受騙人來承擔責任？

Cheat me once, Shame on You.
Cheat me twice, Shame on me.

看了迷你債券之銷售和現在銀行+監管+政府之態度，香港的市民會有甚麼體會呢？
大概都意識到了銀行跟老千的關係，意識到政府跟銀行家的關係，
明白自己是萬萬不可以再信任銀行的了！

香港的銀行和銀行家們對普通市民而言還有信用嗎？
香港的監管機構（金管局和證監會）對普通市民而言還有信用嗎？
香港政府對普通市民而言還有信用嗎？

請聽一位苦主的肺腑之言：
［ ...... 然而銀行/金管/証監/特首/議員真的不知答案嗎?
只是他們都認同了香港是一個不需要講道理的地方! 是講權勢,是講錢財.........
我真的無語問蒼天, ... 因為銀行同政府的信用對我來說是全無價值!
.....只見滿目是不義的事,只見遍地是無望的眼神,怎也是無法接受,
但轉眼間郤見自己的影子在其中
］

《转载》有感於銀行家之霸道

2009-08-07T00:43:00.000-07:00

十月奔走討商奸
官商勾結暗往還
六折換得假公義
半生積蓄血淚斑

轉載自：作者 "adam100w", http://www29.discuss.com.hk/viewthread.php?tid=10193929&extra=&page=14

SCMP:Watchdog accused over Lehman probe decision

2009-08-04T19:36:00.000-07:00

4 August 2009

Lawmakers criticised the financial regulator for suspending an investigation over the selling of non-minibond products after banks agreed a HK$6.3 billion deal to repay Lehman Brothers minibonds buyers.

Securities and Futures Commission chief executive Martin Wheatley said the commission had not only ended its top-down inquiry into minibonds, but also suspended investigation of other products from the 16 banks under the agreement.

He was speaking at a hearing of the subcommittee on the debacle surrounding the sale of Lehman Brothers financial products.

Democrat James To Kun-sun told the five-hour meeting: "It's about the minibonds agreement with the banks, but you {hellip} voluntarily suspended your statutory duty to investigate the systematic failure [over the selling] of non-minibonds products."

Another democrat, Kam Nai-wai, asked Mr Wheatley if he thought the interests of other buyers who bought Constellation Notes, a derivative similar to minibonds also issued by Lehman Brothers, or equity-linked notes had been sacrificed.

Lehman Brothers minibonds holders will receive letters before Monday from the banks who will repay them at least 60 per cent of the value of their initial investment.

Mr Wheatley said the investigation into non-minibonds products, involving about 500 cases, had been suspended because the latest deal required the banks to immediately implement improved complaints-handling procedures to resolve all complaints they received.

He said the investigation of three other banks, which were not included in the payout deal because they sold Lehman-related products apart from minibonds, continued. Investors should first turn to banks if they had complaints, and then the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.

Subcommittee chairman Raymond Ho Chung-tai said it would ask the commission to submit an original copy of the agreement, investigation findings of the 16 minibond-selling banks, as well as e-mail exchanges the commission had with the Monetary Authority and financial officials before it reached the deal.

Minibonds are not corporate bonds, but consist of high-risk credit-linked derivatives, and are marketed as a proxy investment in well-known companies. Hong Kong investors lost billions of dollars on minibonds guaranteed by Lehman Brothers when the US investment bank went bankrupt last September

From SCMP:Watchdog accused over Lehman probe decision