2010年9月24日 星期五

迷債,銀行銷售,風險披露,騙局,

騙局,騙子, 西裝革履的騙子,道貌岸然的銀行家, 這之間都有甚麼聯繫呢?

電影“Public Enemy”, 一貫以搶劫銀行為生的大盜對在銀行里的客戶說:“我們只搶劫銀行,我們不搶劫銀行客戶”。

電影“華爾街”的格言是:“貪婪是好” ("greedy is good")。
從設計和銷售迷你債券,星債,和精明債券的銀行和銀行家身上,我們看到了 “greedy is good” 的精神。

現在“華爾街2:Money Never Sleeps" 要上映了。不知會有甚麼新的格言。


迷債發行章程的「本公司債券是甚麼?」一節,
有「誰應購買本公司債券?本公司債券是否適合所有人?


本公司債券僅適合以下投資者:

 尋求美元或港元定息季度利息收入;

有信心所述的七間該等相關主體在本公司債券發行日至到期日前第二個營業日不會受到信貸事件 (即「破產」、「未能償債」或「重組」,包括例如未能償還大額借貸、破產、進行不利的債券重組)影響等事件,且可以承擔當發生任何上述事件後可能損失投資的風險;

 願意接受本公司可選擇延長A組及/或B組債券的到期日;及

 就任何組別的本公司債券而言,願意接受本公司可選擇在二零零七年九月十五日或其後任何付息日提早償還本金額。



這四點具體要求大概是最容易讓零售客戶讀懂的,也是對潛在客戶的一個簡明要求。

大家可見,這只是提到7間著名公司,完全沒有提到CDO裏面信貸掛鉤的100多個公司。寫出這麼個簡要的“誰應購買本公司債券?本公司債券是否適合所有人?”,目的是甚麼呢? 令投資者誤以爲迷債的風險只跟6-7個著名公司信貸掛鉤 ?

2010年8月13日 星期五

Court Filing (abstract)

Case 1:10-cv-00017-WHP, Filed 08/09/10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
USDC SDNYDOCUMENTELECTRONICALLYFILED
DOC #:
DATE FILED:~$ ~(C)

KA KIN WONG, et al.,10 Civ. 0096 (WHP)Appeal from Bankruptcy
Plaintiffs/Appellants,Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)
-against-
HSBC USA, INC., et al.,Defendants/Appellees.

WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge:

Plaintiffs/Appellants Ka Kin Wong and six other noteholders appeal from twoorders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Peck,Bankr. J.)(the "Bankruptcy Court") dated November 23, 2009 and December 3, 2009 dismissingtheir Class Action Complaint (the "Complaint") with prejudice. While the events giving rise tothis adversary proceeding are complicated, two discrete issues are presented on appeal: (1)whether Plaintiffs have standing to sue, and (2) whether amendment of the Complaint would befutile.For the following reasons, this Court affirms in part, reverses in part, and vacates in part the Bankruptcy Court's orders.

BACKGROUND

1.Parties on Appeal

Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of purchasers of structured finance notes-alsoknown as "Minibonds"between June 16, 2003 and September 15, 2008. (Appellants'Designation of Contents of the Record Designation Number ("DN") 1: Complaint against HSBC,USA, et al. dated Mar. 12, 2009 ("Compl.") ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs brought claims against PacificInternational Finance Limited ("Pacific Finance" or the "Issuer"), the issuer of the Minibonds, aswell as several other entities and individuals. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-38.) The underlying transactionsand relationships among the various entities are opaque.

On appeal, Plaintiffs pursue their claims against only two entities: HSBC BankUSA, N.A. ("HSBC Bank" or the "Trustee"), and Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.("LBSF"). HSBC Bank is the trustee of collateral securing Pacific Finance's paymentobligations to the Minibonds holders and LBSF. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs mistakenly namedHSBC Bank's predecessor as trustee, (DN 6 Ex. 2: Affidavit of Song Qun Sworn, ProgrammeProspectus dated Mar. 12, 2007 at 7), and now appeal the Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave toamend the Complaint to name HSBC Bank. Defendant LSBF is a bankrupt Delawarecorporation and a debtor in the underlying bankruptcy proceedings, which involve severalLehman entities (the "Lehman Bankruptcy"). (Compl.IT38, 67.)


II.The Minibonds Program

Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief relating to $1.6 billion in Minibonds issued by Pacific Finance in separate, but virtually identical, series. (Compl. ¶ 45.) PacificFinance sold the Minibonds to retail investors located primarily in Hong Kong, and marketedthem as "credit-linked" to financially stable companies and backed by AAA-rated collateral.(Compl. ¶¶ 45, 47, 51.) As a consequence of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.'s ("LehmanBrothers") collapse, the Minibonds are now worthless. (Compl.T~67-69, 101-04.)

While the Minibonds were issued by Pacific Finance, Lehman Brothers and otherLehman entities designed the Minibonds program. (Compl. ¶¶ 46, 48, 50, 82.) The details ofLehman Brothers' involvement emerged during an inquiry conducted by Hong Kong regulatoryauthorities. In that proceeding, officers of HSBC Holdings Plc ("HSBC Holdings"), thecompany at the top of the HSBC pyramid, testified that Lehman Brothers appointed HSBC Bankas trustee of the Minibonds collateral.'(Compl. ¶ 82.) Lehman Brothers also compiled theprospectus for each Minibonds series. (Compl. ¶ 82.) Pacific Finance existed only "to issue the[Minibonds]. It [was for] all intents and purposes a creature of Lehman's design .... [PacificFinance was] not an active company ... and HSBC's role as a Director [was] not an active role.. . ." (Compl. 182.) Indeed, the Complaint alleges that Lehman Brothers and LBSF, not the Issuer, "selected the collateral" for the Minibonds. (Compl. ¶ 50.)

Pacific Finance secured its obligation to pay interest to the Minibonds holdersthrough two related transactions.'First, Pacific Finance purchased notes from Saphir FinancePublic Limited Company (the "Saphir Notes"). (DN 9 Ex.1, Ex. B: Tenth Supplemental Trust

1 The Hong Kong testimony in the Complaint does not distinguish among the various HSBC andLehman entities. At times, it is difficult to discern the specific entity referenced in the testimony.

Deed ("Tenth Deed") at 1.) The Saphir Notes were placed in trust with HSBC Bank as Trustee.(Tenth Deed at 1.) Pacific Finance also executed a credit default swap agreement with LBSF.(Tenth Deed at 1; Compl. 154.) Under the credit default swap, LBSF agreed to pay PacificFinance a sum equal to what Pacific Finance owed the Minibonds holders in exchange for theinterest earned by Pacific Finance on the Saphir Notes. (Tenth Deed at 15-16.) Because LehmanBrothers and LBSF exercised control over the Minibonds program, Plaintiffs assert that LBSF"negotiate[d] with itself over the essential terms of the swap agreements." (Compl. 150.)

The Saphir Notes are governed by a principal trust deed and a supplemental trustdeed issued for each series of Minibonds. (Compl.IT84-85.) These trust deeds and theprospectuses advertising the Minibonds sale set forth the "duties and obligations" of the Trusteeand the Issuer. (Compl.~T84-87.) The trust deeds contain,inter alia,provisions governing thepriority of payment in the event the Saphir Notes are liquidated. (Compl.IT84, 90.) The partiesdisagree about the operation of these provisions and who has priority to the Saphir Notes.Choice of law provisions in the trust deeds provide that they are to be construed under Englishlaw. (DN 9 Ex. 1: Principal Trust Deed ("Principal Trust Deed"), Sec. 17(a).) The prospectusesrepresented that "neither Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. nor any of its subsidiaries or affiliateshas any equity interest in, or any control over, us [Pacific Finance/HSBC]." (Compl. ¶¶ 84, 87.)

According to the Complaint, Pacific Finance is controlled by HSBC Bank(Cayman) Limited ("HSBC Cayman"). (Compl. 129.) In turn, HSBC Cayman is controlled byHSBC Holdings. (Compl. ¶ 31.) HSBC Holdings also controls the Trustee's predecessor,

2 Plaintiffs brought claims against other entities and individuals alleging rights to collateralpurchased as part of additional transactions. (Compl.118,32-37, 110, 118.) Because Plaintiffsdo not appeal the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of these claims, that collateral is not at issue.

HSBC Bank USA.3(Compl. 13 1.)
Another HSBC entity---HSBC Bank Plc-filed a claim for $234 million in theLehman Bankruptcy. (DN 30 Ex. 6: Amended Schedule of Assets and Liabilities for LehmanBrothers at 3.) In addition, a Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner's report published after the orderson appeal discloses that HSBC Holdings and Lehman Brothers cooperated extensively duringLehman's collapse to ensure that Lehman Brothers satisfied its obligations to HSBC Holdings.(Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, dated Mar. 11, 2010 at 1321-26.)

III.Procedural History

On October 3, 2008, LBSF filed for bankruptcy. (Counter-Designation of ItemsTo Be Included In Record On Appeal ("C-DN") 10: Supplement to Proof of Claim in Chapter 11Case of LBSF ¶ 10; Compl. ¶ 67.) Thereafter, LBSF's counsel informed HSBC Bank that anyattempt to liquidate the Saphir Notes may be subject to the automatic stay provisions of theUnited States Bankruptcy Code and demanded the Trustee cease all further action. (DN 30 Ex.5: Pls.' Opp'n to Def. [LBSF's] Mot. to Dismiss the Compl., Letter dated Nov. 25, 2008.)HSBC Bank complied.

On March 12, 2009, Plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding in the BankruptcyCourt. Count One of the Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the Minibonds collateral isthe property of the Minibonds holders, not the bankruptcy estate, based on breaches of contractand fiduciary duty by the Issuer and Trustee. (Compl. ¶¶ 97-108.) Count Two seeks to enjoin LBSF and the Trustee from impairing the Minibonds collateral and requests transfer of the

3 This Court presumes that an amended complaint would include the same allegation.

collateral to the Minibonds holders. (Compl.IT109-13.) Count Three seeks a resulting orconstructive trust on the Minibonds collateral for the benefit of the Minibonds purchasers.(Compl. ¶¶ 114-21.) Finally, the remaining counts of the Complaint-Counts Four throughThirteen-assert damages claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence,unjust enrichment, and aiding and abetting against the Trustee, the Issuer, and the Issuer'sdirectors and parent company. (Compl. ¶¶ 122-89.)

On May 27, 2009, LBSF and HSBC Bank USA each moved to dismiss theComplaint. (DN 5: Notice of HSBC USA, Inc.'s Mot. to Dismiss the [Complaint], Abstain orStay the Adversary Proceeding; DN 9: Notice of Mot. of [LBSF] for an Order Dismissing theAdversary Compl.)

In a ruling from the bench, Bankruptcy Judge Peck dismissed the Complaint. TheBankruptcy Court dismissed Counts One through Three for lack of standing on three principalgrounds. First, relying on the trust deeds and English law, the Bankruptcy Court held thatPlaintiffs lack standing to bring a direct claim against Defendants. The relevant provisions of thetrust deeds state that "[a] person who is not a party to [the deed] has no right under the Contracts(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 [("Contracts Act of 1999")] to enforce any term of [the deed]except and to the extent (if any) that [the deed] expressly provides for such Act to apply to any ofits terms." (Principal Trust Deed at 3; Tenth Deed at 3). The Bankruptcy Court held that"[t]hese provisions fit squarely within the tenets of governing English law," which "provides thatit is a trustee and not a beneficiary of a trust that is the appropriate party to bring an action onbehalf of the trust beneficiaries." (Tr. of Nov. 18, 2009 Hr'g (the "Bankr. Ct. Ruling") at 25.)

Second, the Bankruptcy Court held that it would be futile to allow Plaintiffs to amend the Complaint to bring a derivative claim on behalf of the Trustee. (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at26.) Construing English law, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that a trust beneficiary may stepinto the shoes of the Trustee and sue on its behalf only in special circumstances. (Bankr. Ct.Ruling at 26.) Applying this standard, the Bankruptcy Court reasoned that (i) the "mere fact thatthe trustee has not filed a lawsuit [seeking to enforce Plaintiffs' right to the Minibonds collateral]is not a sufficient `special circumstance;"' and (ii) the fact that an HSBC affiliate filed a proof ofclaim in the Lehman Bankruptcy does not establish that the Trustee is conflicted because "thereis no allegation of any actual conflict." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 26.)

Third, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that it would be futile to allowamendment of the Complaint to name the proper trustee-HSBC Bank-"for the reasons setforth in this ruling." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 22.) However, it is not apparent from the transcript ofthe ruling what those reasons were.

The Bankruptcy Court also dismissed Counts Four through Thirteen because theywere "not related to the debtors' proceedings." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 29.) The Bankruptcy Courtstated that an adversary proceeding is considered related to a bankruptcy case "if the outcomemight have a conceivable [e]ffect on the estate." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 28.) After noting thatCounts Four through Thirteen "involve tort, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary dutyclaims against various defendants, none of whom are debtors" in the Lehman Bankruptcy,(Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 27), the Bankruptcy Court held that "[i]nasmuch as Counts [Four] through[Thirteen] comprise actions governed by foreign law between two or more non-debtors, suchclaims, regardless of the outcome, will not affect the debtor's bankruptcy cases.... Resolutionof these claims will have no [e]ffect on the rights of debtors or creditors in the debtors' bankruptcy cases, nor will it have any [e]ffect on the debtors' estates." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 29.)DISCUSSION

1.Standard of Review

A district court reviews a bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear error and itslegal conclusionsde novo.Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013;In re Vouzianas,259 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir.2001);In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.,146 F.3d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1998). The dismissal of acomplaint is a legal conclusion which is subject tode novoreview.Selevan v. N.Y. ThruwayAuth.,584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) ("We reviewde novoa district court's dismissal of acomplaint for lack of standing.");see alsoRaine v. Lorimar Prods., Inc.,71 B.R. 450, 452(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (`Because this is an appeal from [a Bankruptcy Court's] decision on a motionto dismiss for failure to state a claim, purely legal considerations are involved, and thus thiscourt's review must bedenovo.").When reviewing such a dismissal, a court "accept[s] allfactual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor."ATSI Commcn's, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).

Generally, "[a] bankruptcy court's denial of a request to amend [the complaint] isreviewed for abuse of discretion."In re Calpine Corp.,406 B.R. 463, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)(citingIn re Enron Corp.,419 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). However, "[i]f that denial wasbased on an interpretation of law," such as the determination that an amendment would be futile,a court employsde novoreview. SeeDougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of ZoningAppeals,282 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2002);see alsoRicciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,941 F.2d119, 122-24 (2d Cir. 1991) (reviewingde novothe lower court's determination that amendment would be futile).

A court "should freely give leave [to amend the Complaint] when justice sorequires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Particularly where a court grants a motion to dismiss, "theusual practice is to grant leave to amend."Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau,180 F.3d 42, 53 (2d Cir.1999).A court may deny leave to amend as futile only "if the proposed claim could notwithstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)."Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Mach.Corp.,310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002). Indeed, futility means that it is "beyond doubt that theplaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his amended claims."Pangburn v. Culbertson,200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotations and citations omitted).

II.Claims Against LBSF: Counts One & Two

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their direct claims against LBSF and the denialof leave to replead those claims derivatively. This Court addresses Count Three of theComplaint separately for the reasons articulated in Section IV,infra.

a. Direct Claim Against LBSF

Plaintiffs appeal the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of their direct claims againstLBSF on two principal grounds: (1) Plaintiffs have standing under English law to sue LBSFdirectly because LBSF is a co-beneficiary under the trust; and (2) the Bankruptcy Court'sreliance on the provisions of the trust deeds prohibiting non-parties from enforcing the deeds'terms was misplaced. Because Plaintiffs lack standing under English law to bring a direct claimagainst LBSF, this Court need not address Plaintiffs' second contention.

Under English law, a trustee generally has "a duty to protect and preserve the trust estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries ...."Alsop Wilkinson v. Neary,[ 1996] 1 W.L.R.1220, 1224 (Ch.). As such, "[n]ormally [it is] the trustee who has a right of action [and] is theproper person to enforce [the trust]."Hayim v. Citibank NA,[1987] A.C. 730, 733 (P.C.); seealsoAlsop,1W.L.R. at 1224 ("Trustees have a duty to ... represent the trust in a third partydispute."). Plaintiffs seek to circumvent this general principle by invoking the so-called"beneficiaries dispute" theory.Under that theory, "where the dispute is between rival claimantsto a beneficial interest in the subject matter of the trust.... the duty of the trustee is to remainneutral and ... leav[e] it to the rivals to fight their battles."Alsop,1W.L.R. at 1225.

Plaintiffsargue this theory applies here because LBSF persuaded the Bankruptcy Court that it is abeneficiary rather than a third party under the trust.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs mischaracterize the Bankruptcy Court's ruling.The Bankruptcy Court did not describe LBSF as a trust beneficiary. Instead, relying onGregsonv. HAE Trs. Ltd.,[2008] EWHC 1006 (Ch.), the Bankruptcy Court found that the Trustee wasthe appropriate party to bring an action on behalf of the trust beneficiaries, InGregson,a trustbeneficiary brought suit against the director of a corporate trustee for impairment of trustproperty. The beneficiary argued that a corporate trustee's claims against its directors are heldfor the trust's beneficiaries, thereby empowering them to sue directly.Gregson,EWHC 1006 at119,22.TheGreszsoncourt rejected this notion and described the general rule that "a director ofa trustee company does not owe a fiduciary duty to the beneficiary of the trust," and absent thatduty, a trust beneficiary has no direct claim against the director.Gregson,EWHC 1006 atIT44,56, 69.

As the Gregsonanalysis illustrates, the core inquiry is whether the potentially liable third party owed a duty to the trust's beneficiaries. SeeGregson,EWHC 1006 at¶T44,46, 57-58 (stating that if a direct claim against the directors was valid, it would "circumvent theclear and established principle that no direct duty is owed by the directors to the beneficiaries");see alsoRoberts v. Gill & Co,[2010] UKSC 22, ¶¶ 46, 110 (S.C.) (beneficiary sought to amendto bring a derivative claim where it was "accepted that a claim that the [third parties] owed aduty of care to the beneficiaries would be difficult to sustain").While LBSF is a party to thetrust deeds, Plaintiffs do not allege the existence of any fiduciary relationship betweenthemselves and LBSF, Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court properly held that Plaintiffs lackstanding under English law to sue LBSF directly.

b.Derivative Claims Against LBSF

The Bankruptcy Court also concluded that re-pleading derivative claims againstLBSF would be futile because Plaintiffs cannot allege the existence of special circumstances. Inmaking this determination, the Bankruptcy Court considered Plaintiffs' allegations that theTrustee failed to bring suit against LBSF and that an HSBC entity filed a proof of claim in theLehman Bankruptcy.

Under English law, a trust beneficiary may bring a derivative suit against a thirdparty when "special circumstances" are present. The "special circumstances"rule, articulated inHayim v. Citibank NA,provides:

[A] beneficiary has no cause of action against a third party save inspecial circumstanceswhich embrace a failure, excusable orinexcusable, by the trustees to the beneficiary to protect the trustestate or to protect the interests of the beneficiary in the trustestate.Hayim,A.C. 730 at 748. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom recently addressed the "special circumstances" rule and summarized the relevant authorities as follows:
The special circumstances which were identified in the earliestauthorities as justifying a beneficiary's action were fraud on thepart of the trustee, or collusion between the trustee and the thirdparty, or the insolvency of the trustee, but it has always been clearthat these are merely examples of special circumstances, and thatthe underlying question is whether the circumstancesaresufficiently special to make it iust for the beneficiary to have theremedy.Roberts,UKSC 22 at746, 114 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of the United Kingdomnoted that a court has "wide latitude in evaluating ... special circumstances," taking into account"all [of] the relevant circumstances."Roberts,UKSC 22 at ¶¶ 76, 78, 114.

Through the prism of these English law principles, this Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs cannot allege special circumstances. Despite representations in the Minibonds prospectuses that neither Lehman Brothers nor any of itssubsidiaries exercised control over the Issuer, Lehman Brothers designed the Minibonds programand directed the Issuer's activities.As a party to the trust deeds, LSBF was substantiallyinvolved in that process. The Issuer then created a trust that, in certain circumstances, distributesits only collateral to aLehmanentity, rather than the trust'ssolebeneficiary. Juxtaposed againstthe promise that the Minibonds would be secured by highly-rated collateral, this is an odd result.SeeRoyal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v. Tan,[1995] 2 A.C. 378, 386-87 (P.C.) ("If, for his ownpurposes, a third party deliberately interferes in that relationship by assisting the trustee indepriving the beneficiary of the property held for him by the trustee, the beneficiary should beable to look for recompense to the third party as well as the trustee.");see alsoRoberts,UKSC22 at ¶¶ 46, 114 ("[T]he underlying question is whether the circumstances are sufficiently specialto make it just for the beneficiary to have the remedy.");In re Field,[ 1971 ] 1 W.L.R. 555, 561

Case 1:10-cv-00017-WHP
Document 14Filed 08/09/10
Page 13 of 18

(Ch.)(holding that special circumstances existed and "justice require[d] that the plaintiff, who isthe only other person interested [in the property], should be allowed to have [his claim] properlytried before a court"), Furthermore, the recently released Examiner's report reveals cooperationbetween HSBC and Lehman Brothers at the highest levels during Lehman Brothers' collapse.

Given the totality of these circumstances, this Court cannot find that it is "beyond doubt that theplaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] amended claims."Pangburn v.Culbertson,200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999).

On appeal, the parties advance arguments concerning the operation of the trustdeeds' payment priority provisions and potential class certification problems caused by asettlement arranged by Hong Kong regulatory authorities.While interesting, these arguments areextraneous to the issue of standing; they concern the merits of Plaintiffs' claims and are notbefore this Court on appeal. At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs should be permitted toreplead Counts One and Two as derivative claims against LBSF. The Bankruptcy Court's denialof leave to replead is reversed.

III.Claims Against the Trustee: Counts One & Two

Plaintiffs also contend that the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying leave to amendthe Complaint to name HSBC Bank as the Trustee. The Bankruptcy Court held that amendingthe Complaint would be futile for the reasons set forth in its ruling, but did not articulate thosereasons.

As an initial matter, the Bankruptcy Court's analysis of English case law ignoredthe differences between Plaintiffs' relationship with the Trustee and Plaintiffs' relationship with LBSF and the other dismissed entities. Under English law, "the basic right of a beneficiary is tohave the trust duly administered in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument ... andthe general law."Target Holdings Ltd. v. Redferns,[1996] 1 AC 421, 434 (H.L.).When atrustee unlawfully administers the trust, a trust beneficiary may sue the trustee directly. SeeHayim,A.C. at 735 ("The beneficiaries have a right to enforce the trust directly against the ...trustee.");Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co. Ltd.,[1980] 2 W.L.R. 430, 444, 452 (Ch.)(holding a trustee liable to the trust beneficiaries for willful "breach of trust");see alsoTargetHoldings,1AC at 437 ("A trustee who wrongly pays away trust money ... commits a breach oftrust and comes under an immediate duty to remedy such breach.").

The Bankruptcy Court heldthat the trustee is the proper party to bring suit on behalf of a trust beneficiary.While that mayexplain Plaintiffs' lack of standing to sue LBSF directly, it does not resolve the issue of whethera beneficiary has standing to sue his trustee. Indeed, Counts One and Two are premised onalleged breaches of contract and fiduciary duty by the Trustee for failing to distribute the SaphirNotes to Plaintiffs.

The standing provisions of the trust deeds provide that a non-party to the trust hasno right under the Contracts Act of 1999 to enforce any of the deeds' terms.While theBankruptcy Court held that these provisions fit squarely within English law, it merely quoted theprovisions without analyzing their language or the statute on which they rely. Notably, theContracts Act of 1999 allows a non-party to a contract to enforce the contract's terms if they"purport[] to confer a benefit on him," Contracts Act of 1999, c. 31, § 1 (U.K.), but expresslystates that it does not "affect any right or remedy of a third party that exists or is available apartfrom th[e] Act." Contracts Act of 1999, c. 31, § 7. Thus, while the trust deeds deprive Plaintiffs of rights derived from the Contracts Act of 1999, Plaintiffs may hold rights outside of the Act, anissue the Bankruptcy Court did not consider.

Finally, the Bankruptcy Court's rationale for dismissing Counts Four throughThirteen fails to render futile an amended complaint naming the correct trustee. The BankruptcyCourt reasoned that these counts involve questions of foreign law which will have no effect onthe rights of debtors or creditors in the underlying bankruptcy. The applicable rule is that "[a]proceeding is `related to' a [bankruptcy] case ... if the outcome might have a `conceivableeffect' on the estate."In re New 118th LLC,396 B.R. 885, 890 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citingIn re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.,980 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1992)). A conceivable effect is onewhich "could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positivelyor negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of thebankrupt estate."In re New 118th LLC,396 B.R. at 890 (citingIn re Pacor, Inc.,743 F.2d 984,994 (3d Cir. 1984),overruled on other grounds byThings Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,516U.S. 124, 134-35 (1995)). In this case, Plaintiffs seek to prevent the transfer of the SaphirNotes-worth $1.6 billion-to the bankruptcy estate. The effect of $1.6 billion on thebankruptcy estate is self-evident.Moreover, by instructing the Trustee to postpone distributionof the Saphir Notes, LBSF-not Plaintiffs-tethered the Saphir Notes to the LehmanBankruptcy. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave to replead Counts One andTwo against the Trustee is reversed.

IV.Constructive & Resulting Trust Claims: Count Three

In Count Three of the Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to impose a constructive or resulting trust on the Mimbonds collateral.While the Bankruptcy Court made a passingreference to these claims, it provided no analysis in its ruling. Understandably, the BankruptcyJudge was juggling a host of complex and urgent issues. Nonetheless, this Court cannot discernwhy the constructive and resulting trust claims were dismissed. SeeIn re Gucci,309 B.R. 679,685 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("This Court ... has no way of knowing whether and to what extent thedefense or elements thereof were rejected as a matter of law, [and] the reasons for any suchrejection ....").A constructive trust relies on equitable, as opposed to contractual and formaltrust, principles.See, e.g.,Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co„194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Aconstructive trust is an equitable remedy ... [whose] purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment.").Without some analysis of why standing principles derived from the trust deeds' and English lawapply to claims for a constructive or resulting trust, denial of leave to replead Count Threeagainst both the Trustee and LBSF was inappropriate. SeePanaburn,200 F.3d at 70 (denial ofleave to replead is warranted only when it is "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set offacts in support of [the] amended claims").Moreover, it is not evident whether these claims aregoverned by English law, an issue the Bankruptcy Court did not address. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Count Three is vacated and remanded for further consideration.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Counts One andTwo against LBSF is affirmed, and its denial of leave to replead those claims derivatively against LBSF is reversed. The Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave to replead Counts One and Twoagainst the Trustee is reversed. The Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Count Three is vacated.This action is remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with thisMemorandum and Order.

Dated: August 9, 2010
New York, New York

SO ORDERED:

WILLIAM H. PAULEY IIIU.S.D.J.

Counsel of Record:

Jason C. Davis, Esq.
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP100 Pine Street, Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94111

Counsel for Appellants

Howard Grant Sloane, Esq.Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP80 Pine Street
New York, NY 10005

Counsel for the HSBC Appellees

Richard W. Slack, Esq.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10153

Counsel for Appellee Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.

David S. Cohen, Esq.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP
1850 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Counsel for Intervenor Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lehman Brothers HoldingsInc. et al.

2010年8月9日 星期一

Lehman, HSBC May Be Sued by Hong Kong Investors in New York

Aug. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and HSBC Holdings Plc may be sued over $1.6 billion in worthless securities sold to retail investors in Hong Kong, a judge in New York ruled yesterday.

U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley III reversed part of a decision by Lehman’s bankruptcy judge, who threw out a suit by seven holders of structured financial notes called minibonds. The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of investors in the notes from June 16, 2003, to Sept. 15, 2008, Pauley said in his decision.

An estimated $1.8 billion of minibonds were sold to about 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, according to local regulators. Lehman’s bankruptcy in 2008 wiped out the value of the investments, resulting in protests outside bank branches that have continued even after last year’s government-brokered settlement between sellers and buyers of minibonds.

This shows that the courts around the world have investor protection at heart and investors should be protected against mis-selling by those that gain commissions from these types of investment products,” said Lewis Man, a partner at Hong Kong law firm Gall.

Hong Kong doesn’t have a mechanism for filing class action lawsuits.

David Hall, a Hong Kong-based spokesman for HSBC, didn’t immediately have a response to the ruling. Kimberly Macleod, a Lehman spokeswoman, didn’t return a voice-mail message left yesterday seeking comment.

Dismissal Reversed

In two orders, issued in November and December, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that any attempt to revise their complaint would be futile. Pauley yesterday reversed the dismissal of one count against HSBC and Lehman and permitted the plaintiffs to amend two dismissed counts.

Pacific International Finance Ltd. issued the minibonds and marketed them as linked to the credit of financially sound companies and backed by AAA-rated collateral, Pauley said. A Hong Kong regulatory investigation disclosed that Lehman designed the minibonds program, the judge said. HSBC Bank USA was selected as trustee of the collateral securing the notes, Pauley said, citing testimony in the Hong Kong proceeding.

Public outcry over the collapse of the minibonds led to street protests in Hong Kong and an investigation by regulators into how banks sold the products. The head of the city’s securities watchdog, Martin Wheatley, was called repeatedly to testify before Hong Kong’s legislature.

Two BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd. managers in June pleaded not guilty in the city’s District Court to charges of fraudulently selling minibonds. BOC Hong Kong was the biggest seller of the securities. The trial of the two employees starts in November.

Hong Kong banks offered to pay at least 60 cents on the dollar to investors in July last year as part of a buyback agreement brokered by the SFC. In an Aug. 6 press release, Hong Kong’s central bank said more than 13,000 cases were resolved by the repurchase agreement, and 179 Lehman-related complaints remain under investigation.

To contact the reporter on this story: Bob Van Voris in New York atrvanvoris@bloomberg.net; Debra Mao in Hong Kong atdmao5@bloomberg.net

2010年7月21日 星期三

2010年7月17日星債苦主記招新聞稿

(转)2010年7月17日星債苦主記招新聞稿
2010年7月17日新聞會講稿

(關於7月14日) 証監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation 債券達成協議 (下稱協議)

是一份官商勾結, 互相卸責, 嫁禍於人的協議.

是一份不公開, 不公平, 不公正的三不公協議.



Constellation 債券受害苦主 (包括得到和解與得不到和解者)會繼續抗爭, 行動升級, 考慮對協議中某些條款進行司法覆核, 去信立法會. 請求第六次傳召星展作供. 并且追究星展銀行違反香港証監及期貨條例第107條, 欺詐地或罔顧實情地誘使他人投資金錢的罪行. 直至星展公開承認誤導, 退賠100%苦主, 100%本金.


1) 不公開

a) 協議稱: “星展香港在不承認任何責任下提出和解”, 有別於不承認任何錯失. 金管, 証監在調查過程中, 是否發現星展銀行”有錯”? 什麼錯? 必須公開.

b) 協議中, 証監會關注點的第1,2點, 可以理解為, 星展內部對星債評級有爭議, 一個評高, 一個評低. 現在看來, 評低的是錯, 評高的才對. 但錯在哪裡, 對在哪裡? 資料理據必須公開.

2) 不公平

a) 對被評為4級或5級風險類別客戶不公平

協議只說: “產品評為較高風險級別”. 但葉約德在証人陳述書14.10段寫明在2008年3月星展已將星債風險變為第5級高風險.第4級風險的客戶應該也不能買到第5級風險的產品,點解無得賠?

b) 即使被評為4或5級風險客戶,購買時見到產品風險是2而不是4或5, 難道他便不可以買低風險的產品嗎? 好像一個著名的賽車手,有一天他駕着一輛普通私家車時被其他車撞到,可否說他常常揸跑車,所以應該知駕車危險而不作賠償?當然不能,只要那宗交通意外不是他引致便有賠償。

c) 協議中証監會顧及:〝客戶若有較高的風險承受能力, 且具備衍生工具交易的經驗及知識,Constellation 債券可能本應是適合他們的投資產品”, 那麼有較高的風險承受能力, 但沒有衍生工具交易的經驗及知識的客戶便同是不適合購買星債,所以理應一樣獲得全賠。


d) 未見過有政府機構在嚴肅文件中, 採用”可能本應是”這種不定向的, 猜度的字眼, “可能是”, 亦可以”可能不是”, 50/50. 但協議則在這種靠估的前題下, 要執行一些真實的行動.太離譜.

3) 不公正


a) 單就產品風險一項而言, 星展在星債的申購表格, 白紙黑字標明: 產品風險程度2, 賣給客戶. 星展在交立法會迷你債券小經陳述書14.5段解釋原因時, 遺漏了星債掛勾公司”首先失責” (即一間死, 等於八間死晒) 為基準這一要項, 巳經違反証監及期貨條例298條, “披露虛假或具誤導性的資料以誘使進行交易的罪行. 葉約德在立法會答問, 回應債券掛勾多間公司, 說是分散風險, 也是遺漏星債”首先失責”條款. 協議又講 “星展香港另一部門曾將同一產品評為較高風險級別產品”. 是否顯示星展銀行高層自己都未明白產品結構和風險. 何況銷售員工? 不能做到”認識你的產品”, 星展巳屬違規, 如此明顯嚴重罪行, 不予揭露. 遣責, 處罰. 甚至起訴. 反而為星展開脫, 卸責, 并幫星展轉嫁損失, 轉嫁麻煩. 其實是証監知道星展有罪, 自己也難逃監管疏忽之責. 互相幫忙, 共同卸責. 對苦主太不公!


b) 星債產品風險定錯, 是銷售誤導. 理應通賠. 協議卻不賠予被星展香港列為較高風險級別客戶. (即4或5級), 要這些人經星展香港投訴處理程序逐一覆核, 真是豈有此理?! 這種先判你該死再要你自己舉証申訴方法, 不符合香港律法的”無罪推定”精神, 為此將考慮司法覆核.


c) 協議稱: 即使証監會成功對星展香港及/或其主管人員及僱員採取法律處分, 亦不能達到此協議取得結果. 講得冠冕堂皇, 其實是欺人之談. 只要金管, 証監判定星展 “失實陳述”. 根據香港法例284章, 苦主購買星債時所訂立的合約就有權撤銷. 撤銷合約, 苦主當然可以取回100%本金, 并可追討損害賠償. 百分之百苦主受惠.


d) 星展給客戶進行風險評級, 是以推銷產品為目的. 其中種種不良手法, 留待苦主向各位作証.

最後要說的是, 星展, 金管, 証監做出這樣協議, 非常不智.

(1) 時代不同了, 看一看美國政府告高盛, 高盛想和解. 除支付罰款, 還要認錯.

(2) 星展不賠給4或5級風險的客戶, 這些人會放過星展嗎? 星展有明顯的銷售誤導, 難道有人可以隻手遮天? 最後還是要賠. 不如就早點賠!


From: 2010年7月17日星債苦主記招新聞http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/2010E5B9B47E69C8817E697A5E6989FE582B5E88BA6E4B8BBE8A898E68B9BE696B0E8819EE7A8BF9236.php

證監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation債券達成協議

2010年 7月 14日 新聞稿
證監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation債券達成協議
(From: http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/TC/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=10PR80)


證券及期貨事務監察委員會(證監會)及香港金融管理局(金管局)今天公布,就星展銀行(香港)有限公司(星展香港)分銷與雷曼兄弟集團相關的Constellation債券(雷曼相關Constellation債券)的事宜,與星展香港達成協議(註1及2)。

繼證監會早前作出調查後,星展香港在不承認任何責任下,同意提出有關雷曼相關Constellation債券的和解計劃。根據有關和解協議:
星展香港將會向已購買雷曼相關Constellation債券的星展香港客戶,提出總額約6.51億元的付款建議,這些客戶必須是在購買該等債券時,獲星展香港按照其投資風險評估系統評為屬低至中級風險,即第1、2或3級風險類別的客戶(低風險客戶)(註3);
星展香港將會向低風險客戶支付一筆款項(和解款項),金額相等於有關低風險客戶對雷曼相關Constellation債券的投資總額,加上這筆投資總額若在投資當日以定期存款形式存入星展香港,在投資當日直至今天日期為止,星展香港就該筆款項應付予有關客戶的利息,再減去迄今已支付予他們的票息後所得款項(註4);
對於那些已經與星展香港達成和解協議的低風險客戶,星展香港將會向他們提出補發款項的建議,以達至這批客戶得以與其他低風險客戶享有相同待遇;
至於星展香港列入較高風險級別的客戶(即評定為第4或5級風險類別的客戶)所進行的雷曼相關Constellation債券的交易,星展香港將以加強的投訴處理程序逐一覆核有關這些交易的投訴(註5);及
對於星展香港在今天日期前售出的雷曼相關Constellation債券以外的非上市結構性產品,星展香港將會採用加強的投訴處理程序,覆核有關這些產品分銷事宜的客戶投訴。

證監會在調查過程中提出以下關注:
星展香港將雷曼相關Constellation債券售予高風險級別及低風險級別這兩類客戶時,將雷曼相關Constellation債券評為低至中級風險產品(按照星展香港的風險評級制度,這些產品在1至5級的風險評級(低至高風險)中,獲評為2級風險);
星展香港另一部門曾將同一產品評為較高風險級別的產品;

有關發行章程已述明,準投資者可能會損失全部或大部分對該等Constellation債券的投資;及
對於當時在客戶風險評級中,那些應選擇保守、穩健及均衡型投資的低至中級風險類別的客戶,雷曼相關Constellation債券未必適合他們。

這項協議的作用是,約2,160個帳戶的低風險客戶若接納上述和解計劃,便可以取回投資款項及利息並扣減作為債券持有人已收取的票息後的款項,而高風險客戶的投訴亦可獲星展香港根據加強的投訴處理程序,全面覆核有關個案。

證監會根據《證券及期貨條例》第201條達成此項協議,在考慮星展香港將提出的和解計劃時,已顧及到銷售雷曼相關Constellation債券與銷售雷曼兄弟迷你債券兩者之間多項不同之處,因此本個案的和解協議條款與迷你債券個案的不盡相同。證監會在考慮過程中顧及的重要因素包括:
有別於雷曼兄弟迷你債券,雷曼相關Constellation債券並沒有可分發予投資者的抵押品;
根據與16家銀行就迷你債券事宜達成的協議,分銷銀行同意交出從銷售迷你債券所得佣金,以成立追討基金,加快取回相關抵押品,但在本個案中,星展香港無需提供有關款項;及
有別於那些接納迷你債券協議所提出的回購建議的客戶,雷曼相關Constellation債券的持有人並無機會獲額外或補發款項或發還債款,換言之,星展香港的付款將會是低風險客戶唯一可獲付的款項。

證監會在考慮此協議的條款時,亦顧及到以下幾點:
客戶若有較高的風險承受能力,且具備衍生工具交易的經驗及知識,Constellation債券可能本應是適合他們投資的產品;
加強的投訴處理程序會處理涉及第4至5級風險類別客戶的每宗個案;對於獲星展香港投資風險評估系統評為風險承受能力較高的客戶,上述投訴處理程序應足以處理星展香港將雷曼相關Constellation債券分銷予這批客戶的過程中,可能出現的其他不規範情況;
星展香港承諾委聘獨立機構,檢討分銷制度及監控措施,確保星展香港日後以適當方式分銷非上市結構性產品;
此協議使本個案得到適當的解決,對星展香港及其客戶均有利;
即使證監會成功對星展香港及/或其主管人員及僱員採取紀律處分,亦不能達到此協議取得的結果;及
此協議取得的結果,可為雷曼相關Constellation債券的其他分銷商提供指引,從而解決已購買這些產品的客戶的投訴。

證監會及金管局認為,就它們向星展香港在監管方面提出的關注,星展香港提出的和解計劃屬合理及適當;協議亦符合公眾利益。

鑑於星展香港提出上述和解計劃,證監會將不會就雷曼相關Constellation債券的分銷事宜,對星展香港及其僱員採取進一步執法行動,但有關方面涉嫌犯有不誠實、欺詐、欺騙或屬刑事性質行為的情況除外。金管局已知會星展香港,對於那些接納星展香港和解建議的低風險客戶,金管局不打算就該等客戶的雷曼相關Constellation債券個案,對星展香港採取執法行動。

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮先生(Mr Martin Wheatley)表示:"對於從星展香港購入雷曼相關Constellation債券的全部客戶而言,是次協議為他們取得成果;對於銷售這項產品的其他銀行及中介人,這項協議提供有用的指引,有助其解決較低風險客戶的相關投訴。"

他續說:"中介人向客戶提供投資意見時,必須運用適當的專業知識和技能。證監會就雷曼相關的結構性產品個案進行的調查,清楚顯示證監會《操守準則》所訂的各項準則,是中介人行事的重要依據。認識產品、了解客戶的情況並向客戶提供清晰正確的資料,都是中介人必須履行的職責。這不但可以確保客戶的利益永遠居於首位,亦同時能夠保障銷售產品的中介人。"

韋奕禮先生指出:"證監會一直竭力減低香港市場出現不當銷售的風險。今次這類和解計劃,使大家更清楚認識到,若我們將來未能妥善處理有關事宜,所有市場參與者將要為此付出高昂的代價。"

金管局副總裁阮國恒先生表示:"金管局歡迎這項和解計劃。金管局相信,這項和解計劃既合適且合理,在考慮到各種情況下提供一個務實的解決方法,符合投資者的利益。"



備註:

1. 星展香港是根據《證券及期貨條例》獲發牌從事第1類(證券交易)、第4類(就證券提供意見)、第6類(就機構融資提供意見)及第9類(提供資產管理)受規管活動的註冊機構。

2. Constellation債券的發行商為Constellation Investment Ltd,安排人則為星展香港的有聯繫實體DBS Bank Ltd(星展銀行有限公司)。2004年至2007年間,星展香港向香港公眾分銷了以港元或美元計值的約77個系列的Constellation債券。

Constellation債券中,系列34至37、43至46、55至58、59至62、63至66、67至70、71至74及78至81債券屬信貸掛鉤票據,雷曼兄弟是上述系列的其中一家信貸參考機構(或稱"相關機構")。星展香港向約3,400個客戶帳戶分銷雷曼相關Constellation債券,當中涉及約4,380宗交易,款額約13.16億元。

雷曼兄弟於2008年9月申請破產保護後,星展銀行有限公司宣布,受雷曼兄弟的信貸事件所影響,雷曼相關Constellation債券變得一文不值。

Constellation債券的其中一項主要特點是,投資者買入有關債券後,實際上要承擔的風險是,包括雷曼兄弟在內的信貸參考機構中,任何一家可能會出現破產等信貸事件。因應投資者承擔了這項風險,星展銀行有限公司在Constellation債券的投資期內,向投資者支付一項承擔風險款額。若債券到期時,信貸參考機構中並無信貸事件發生,投資者便可取回投資本金。然而,若發生信貸事件,投資者便可取回所謂"信貸事件贖回款額",金額相等於雷曼兄弟的參考債項(或稱"相關債項")的價值,但這些參考債項在雷曼兄弟申請破產後的買賣價已跌至接近零。雷曼兄弟在美國申請破產保護後,便出現上述的情況。

3. 星展香港分銷雷曼相關Constellation債券時,根據在星展香港投資風險評估問卷上所填寫的資料,將客戶列入五大級別,第1級為保守型,第2級為穩健型,第3級為均衡型,第4級為增長型,第5級為進取型。

另一方面,星展香港亦為其分銷的各項投資產品定下風險評級。產品風險評級分為五個級別,第1級為低風險,第2級為低至中風險,第3級為中風險,第4級為中至高風險,第5級為高風險。

若投資產品的風險評級低於或相等於有關客戶的投資風險評級,星展香港便會認為該產品適合該客戶投資。

4. 星展香港會以每名投資雷曼相關Constellation債券的低風險客戶的名義投資總值為基準,採用星展香港就不同到期日的定期存款所支付的最高利率,即向12個月定期存款戶所支付的利率,計算出由有關雷曼相關Constellation債券的發行日開始,直至今天日期這段期間的利息。根據星展香港計算,已付予每名低風險客戶的票息,與就有關投資的上述名義價值應支付的利息之間的差額,約為1,300萬元。

5. 加強的投訴處理程序由證監會制訂,旨在確保星展香港深入覆核高風險客戶的相關交易,確保星展香港以公平合理方式處理有關這些交易的投訴。有關程序與分銷銀行根據迷你債券協議所執行的投訴處理程序相同。

6. 請按此連結閱覽有關星展香港的建議和解計劃的問題解答。

2010年6月27日 星期日

腰斬迷債回購方案的司法覆核申請理何在?

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腰斬迷債回購方案的司法覆核申請理何在?

迷債回購方案的司法覆核不被批准進行決非是香港司法史上的小漣漪,而是對司法獨立的衝擊。
讓我們看看迷債回購方案的司法覆核是如何被腰斬的。

首先,迷債苦主代表的法律援助不被批准,理由竟然是該代表包括迷債購入成本在內的資產稍微超過援助標準的上限(17萬元)。 其實,迷債的價值就是算到了今天仍然無法從法律上確實,世界公認的會計審慎原則都只能將其列為損失。法律援助署的官員自己也承認此不批准理由會有很大的爭議,但這那是甚麼法律觀點的爭議,將無法確定的將來資產也列為現有資產,這猶如依據你持有明天開彩的彩券而確定你今天就是百萬富翁一樣,完全是荒唐的政治決定。

第二,綜合各媒體的報導,在申請司法覆核許可的的聆訊上,“法官指此案牽連甚廣,除了十六家分銷銀行外,更有二萬四千八百八十八名已接受回購方案的雷曼事主可能受影響,因為一旦申請人獲判勝訴,證監會的調查要繼續,另一答辯人香港金融管理局也可向銀行採取執法行動,已取回六成或七成本金的事主可能因而被銀行要求退款,法官質疑申請人是否足以代表其他事主,而其他事主也可能不想再受噩夢糾纏”。

眾所周知,司法覆核是就政府的公共事務的政策、決策所進行,必然是牽連甚廣, 甚至牽連到司法體制所涵蓋的全社會。進行司法覆核是對政治尋求法律層面的裁決,而不是政治裁決。其實香港早前已有非常著明的與整個香港社會牽連甚廣案例,就是港人內地出生子女居港權的官司。終審法院並沒有就官司結果是否會對香港社會的經濟帶來嚴重影響的角度去裁決,而是從本身對基本法的理解去作出裁決,雖然事件最後由政府提請人大釋法而推翻原終審法院的裁決而結束,但終審法院的原裁決正是體現了當時參與的法官對司法獨立的堅守。如果法官也考慮社會政治因素,那麼所謂司法獨立就無存在的必要,社會的爭議就交由政治家來解決好了,要麼是通過議會決議,要麼是用革命手段推翻政府,但這決非社會之福,司法與政治應是凱撒的歸凱撒,上帝的歸上帝。

法官憂慮,“一旦申請人獲判勝訴,證監會的調查要繼續,另一答辯人香港金融管理局也可向銀行採取執法行動”。但是次司法覆核正是要求推翻證監會與金管局停止調查的政治決定,尋求社會公義。停止調查無非是放棄對銀行違規違法行為的追究,這難道是公正正義社會的應有之義嗎?

法官質疑其他事主也可能不想再受噩夢糾纏,當然是懷有高尚的、悲憫的人文情懷,但法官也應該關懷那些受騙而又被迫接受六至七成回購方案的苦主的噩夢糾纏。其實公認的法律之神是蒙上了雙眼,只從法律中尋找答案,而不是貢獻滔滔的憐憫淚水。以個人感情代替法律判斷,也不是司法的應有之義。

法官也質疑申請人是否足以代表其他事主,當然是合理的懷疑,但法官也沒有展開正式的聆訊,他又是如何推斷其他事主“噩夢糾纏”之說?沒有足夠充分的證據,司法程序是允許主觀臆測斷案嗎?

迷債的回購方案是由兩方面的內容組成,一是證監與金管局為監管一方,16家銀行為另一方的協議,協議的主要內容是16家銀行願意以六至七稱成本金回購迷債,監管方停止對16家銀行的迷債銷售調查;二是16家銀行向迷債持有者回購迷債的商業協議。如果司法覆核正如法官所言,最後由苦主方取勝,那麼法官的頒令也只能影響到證監與金管局的政治決策,而要取消銀行與迷債持有者的回購迷債協議,應須按協議雙方的自願行事,如苦主一方不願的話,我們認為也只能通過司法的程序。實在不明白法官“已取回六成或七成本金的事主可能因而被銀行要求退款”而使苦主“噩夢糾纏”之言,難道銀行會要脅或強搶?還是銀行要與二萬多苦主逐個進行司法訴訟?監管當局與銀行只要付出願意承擔過失的誠意,以新鴻基及凱基證券與證監的和解協議為藍本,重新提出公平的回購方案,那麼,二萬多苦主、政府、銀行本身、以至香港社會才不會再噩夢糾纏。

迷債回購方案的司法覆核在一波三折下還未開始就被腰斬,法官在拒絕批出司法覆核許可的判詞中大致重覆了他在聆訊上所表述的上述觀點,這只能讓人相信,法官在許可聆訊之前就已有定案, 並且充分表露在他的聆訊發言中。法官並且認為苦主如仍不滿可再向監管機構投訴,法官大人確真是上帝派來的天使,充滿了爛漫的天真,只聽監管當局一面的美言,但卻不花一點時間了解一下監管當局因忌諱本身的監管過失,而在一年多來的所謂調查是如何袒護銀行、塞責敷衍。

法律援助署不批准我們的援助申請,使我們無財力上訴,法官的判詞也沒有使我們相信判決是合理的,而我們只能深信,迷債回購方案的司法覆核被腰斬是香港近年來大資本大財閥獨大的政治體制的結果,中低下階層的反抗雖愈趨激烈,但大多敗下陣來。是忍氣吞聲,還是愈挫愈戰,這是普羅大眾正面臨的選擇,也是雷曼苦主面臨的選擇。

2010年6月10日 星期四

Goldman Sachs Hudson CDO Said to Be Target of Second SEC Probe , 高盛面臨美證監第二項調查

June 10 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc.’s $2 billion Hudson Mezzanine collateralized debt obligation, sold in 2006, is the target of a probe by the Securities and Exchange Commission, according to a person with knowledge of the matter.

The inquiry into the CDO may not lead to any additional actions against the New York-based securities firm, said the person, who declined to be identified because the investigation isn’t public. Michael DuVally, a spokesman for Goldman Sachs, declined to comment, as did SEC spokesman John Nester. The Financial Times reported the probe yesterday.

The U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, led by Levin, released e-mails in April related to Goldman Sachs’s mortgage-linked deals, including the Hudson Mezzanine transaction. In one October 2006 e-mail, a Goldman Sachs employee describes how the Hudson deal might be viewed by investors as “junk.”

Hudson Mezzanine

The Hudson Mezzanine 2006-1 CDO contained credit default swaps that referenced $2 billion in subprime, BBB-rated residential mortgage-backed securities, according to the documents released by Levin’s committee. While Goldman Sachs selected the assets in the deal, the firm was also the only investor buying credit protection on the entire transaction , the documents show.

Goldman Sachs created and sold the Hudson CDO in late 2006, near the time documents released by Levin show senior executives wanted to reduce the firm’s exposure to subprime mortgages.

“The CDO imploded within two years. Your clients lost; Goldman profited,” Levin said in an April 27 hearing during which he questioned Goldman Sachs Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein about the Hudson deal and other CDOs. “To go out and sell these securities to people and then bet against those same securities, it seems to me, is a fundamental conflict of interest and is -- raises a real ethical issue.”

(From Bloomberg: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aSNYXMe69Kh8&pos=3)

信報 2010年6月11日: 高盛面臨美證監第二項調查

面臨多項調查的高盛據報正面對美國證監第二項調查,調查目標是該行二○○六年出售的二十億美元「赫德森夾層」債務抵押債券(Hudson Mezzanine CDO)。

涉「赫德森夾層」CDO

彭博社昨天引述知情人士報道,美國證券及交易委員會(SEC)進行相關調查工作後,未必會向高盛採取進一步行動。

《金融時報》引述知情人士報道,SEC最近數周正收集「赫德森夾層」CDO交易的資料。

報道引述內部文件指出,高盛出售這些金融產品之際,亦同時沽空「赫德森夾層」CDO,以保障這批CDO的全部價值。

法律專家預期,「赫德森夾層」CDO交易的調查將集中查明,高盛是否向投資者透露足夠的資料。高盛在推廣文件中表明,其利益與投資者利益相同,因為高盛購入這些CDO。

這項調查是SEC針對華爾街有關CDO活動的更廣泛調查的一部分。《華爾街日報》昨天報道,SEC同時調查摩根士丹利等主要大行的多宗按揭相關交易。

根據參議員萊文(Carl Levin)領導的參議院常設調查小組委員會的文件,高盛這批二○○六年一級「赫德森夾層」CDO包含一批信貸違約掉期(CDS),這些CDS涉及合共二十億美元的BBB級次按抵押證券。

SEC四月十六日提出起訴高盛在二○○七年出售名為Abacus的CDO時涉嫌欺詐後,高盛股價已下跌百分之二十六。

遭澳洲對沖基金索償

在該訴訟中,SEC表示,高盛及其一名職員沒有向投資者透露,對沖基金Paulson & Co.在設計該CDO及對賭那些CDO的角色。

另外,澳洲對沖基金Basis Capital周三入稟紐約曼哈頓聯邦法院,向高盛索償十億美元,指該公司購入高盛的次按證券後,被迫清盤。

Basis Capital的代表律師表示,高盛以明知錯誤的賣點推銷,強迫投資者把有毒證券的風險從賬目中撇除,是欺詐行為■