顯示具有 Hong Kong 標籤的文章。 顯示所有文章
顯示具有 Hong Kong 標籤的文章。 顯示所有文章

2010年8月9日 星期一

Lehman, HSBC May Be Sued by Hong Kong Investors in New York

Aug. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and HSBC Holdings Plc may be sued over $1.6 billion in worthless securities sold to retail investors in Hong Kong, a judge in New York ruled yesterday.

U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley III reversed part of a decision by Lehman’s bankruptcy judge, who threw out a suit by seven holders of structured financial notes called minibonds. The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of investors in the notes from June 16, 2003, to Sept. 15, 2008, Pauley said in his decision.

An estimated $1.8 billion of minibonds were sold to about 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, according to local regulators. Lehman’s bankruptcy in 2008 wiped out the value of the investments, resulting in protests outside bank branches that have continued even after last year’s government-brokered settlement between sellers and buyers of minibonds.

This shows that the courts around the world have investor protection at heart and investors should be protected against mis-selling by those that gain commissions from these types of investment products,” said Lewis Man, a partner at Hong Kong law firm Gall.

Hong Kong doesn’t have a mechanism for filing class action lawsuits.

David Hall, a Hong Kong-based spokesman for HSBC, didn’t immediately have a response to the ruling. Kimberly Macleod, a Lehman spokeswoman, didn’t return a voice-mail message left yesterday seeking comment.

Dismissal Reversed

In two orders, issued in November and December, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that any attempt to revise their complaint would be futile. Pauley yesterday reversed the dismissal of one count against HSBC and Lehman and permitted the plaintiffs to amend two dismissed counts.

Pacific International Finance Ltd. issued the minibonds and marketed them as linked to the credit of financially sound companies and backed by AAA-rated collateral, Pauley said. A Hong Kong regulatory investigation disclosed that Lehman designed the minibonds program, the judge said. HSBC Bank USA was selected as trustee of the collateral securing the notes, Pauley said, citing testimony in the Hong Kong proceeding.

Public outcry over the collapse of the minibonds led to street protests in Hong Kong and an investigation by regulators into how banks sold the products. The head of the city’s securities watchdog, Martin Wheatley, was called repeatedly to testify before Hong Kong’s legislature.

Two BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd. managers in June pleaded not guilty in the city’s District Court to charges of fraudulently selling minibonds. BOC Hong Kong was the biggest seller of the securities. The trial of the two employees starts in November.

Hong Kong banks offered to pay at least 60 cents on the dollar to investors in July last year as part of a buyback agreement brokered by the SFC. In an Aug. 6 press release, Hong Kong’s central bank said more than 13,000 cases were resolved by the repurchase agreement, and 179 Lehman-related complaints remain under investigation.

To contact the reporter on this story: Bob Van Voris in New York atrvanvoris@bloomberg.net; Debra Mao in Hong Kong atdmao5@bloomberg.net

2009年9月10日 星期四

Bloomberg: London Suicide Connects Lehman Lesson Missed by Hong Kong Woman

Sept. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Yu Lia Chun, a retired hospital orderly in Hong Kong, never heard of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. before she got a call last September from her banker.

“He said, ‘Did you hear the news? Something has happened to Lehman,’” Yu, 66, recalled in an interview in June. “I didn’t get it.”

Yu, who has a sixth-grade education, said she thought her money was in a savings account. She didn’t know she had lent it to a bankrupt American securities firm. Eventually, she found out that her HK$1.2 million ($155,000) nest egg was gone. Her children lost another HK$3.8 million because Yu had persuaded them to make similar investments.

“There is no way a person like me could understand any of this,” Yu said, dabbing her eyes with a tissue in a coffee shop in Hong Kong’s financial district. “Sometimes I feel like jumping off a building.”

What hit Yu and her family was a tidal wave triggered halfway around the world by the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history. The Sept. 15, 2008, collapse of Lehman, with $613 billion in liabilities, had unforeseen and far-flung consequences that devastated those, like Yu, who didn’t know their fates were tied to the New York-based investment bank.

‘Quicker This Time’

The chief operating officer of a private-equity firm in London jumped in front of a commuter train because he blamed himself for leaving the company’s money in a Lehman account, according to a coroner’s report. The Israeli managers of a hotel construction project on the island of West Caicos, northeast of Cuba, were taken hostage by Chinese workers when an anticipated Lehman loan didn’t materialize and wages weren’t paid. In Hong Kong, Yu and thousands of others who had invested in Lehman products camped out in the rain, thumping drums and chanting, “Give us our money back.”

The realization that a U.S. securities firm so woven into the financial system couldn’t pay its debts radiated out from New York, panicking investors around the world. It was a doomsday scenario that former International Monetary Fund chief economist Simon H. Johnson likened to Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s 1963 novel “Cat’s Cradle,” in which a single crystal of the fictitious substance ice-nine hardens all of the planet’s water.

What differentiated Lehman from previous financial crises was how fast the panic spread, said Richard Sylla, an economic and financial historian at New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business in New York.

“Communications made things happen faster,” Sylla said, describing how it took six months for the 1931 failure of Austria’s Creditanstalt bank to put stress on the British financial system. “The news of everything got spread around much quicker this time.”

Goldman Sachs Debt

The freezing of global credit markets following Lehman’s demise began with professionals who traded commercial paper in New York. They were the first to feel the chill when the Reserve Primary Fund, the oldest money market fund, was inundated with requests for redemptions and seized up hours after the bankruptcy filing. The $785 million that Reserve had lent to Lehman was deemed worthless by 4 p.m. the next day.

Fear that more banks and financial firms might fail meant most investors stopped lending to anyone other than the government. Even New York-based Goldman Sachs Group Inc., which earned $11.6 billion in 2007, more than any U.S. securities firm in history, wasn’t immune. The average annual cost of insuring $10 million of Goldman Sachs debt for five years soared to a record $545,000 from $182,557 in the three days after Lehman failed, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Plummeting Prices

Lehman’s demise triggered a panic. Money fund managers were forced to raise cash to pay off investors. They tried selling what securities they held and couldn’t. The market was flooded, and prices were plummeting -- if prices could be obtained at all. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index suffered its worst decline in six years. Mistrust leaked into the corporate bond market.

The most widely traded 30-year bond of General Electric Capital Corp., the world’s biggest issuer of commercial paper, dropped by as much as 30 cents on the dollar to 62 cents by Sept. 18 because of doubts that GE would be able to persuade money funds to renew its short-term notes.

At that price, the three-day loss for owners of the issue was more than $1.9 billion, according to prices provided by Trace, the bond-trade reporting system of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.

The U.S. responded within a week to guarantee money markets and bank-to-bank lending. Within a month, Congress agreed to spend $700 billion to prop up banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. guaranteed new bank debt, and Federal Reserve lending to financial institutions ballooned by $1 trillion.

Lehman Minibonds

Those programs, which succeeded in stemming the panic, remain in place today. What they didn’t do was save Yu and thousands of other investors in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and elsewhere who had bought equity-linked notes or so-called minibonds connected to Lehman.

Equity-linked notes combine attributes of both bonds and stock by investing part of the proceeds in share options and the remainder in fixed income. Minibonds are custom-made securities linked to the creditworthiness of companies, backed by collateralized-debt obligations and sold in denominations of $5,000. They functioned like credit-default swaps in reverse, where the investor stands to lose his principal when the firm named in the note can’t pay its debts.

‘Information Asymmetry’

Yu, a mother of six who emigrated from mainland China in 1962, didn’t have a chance, according to Joseph Stiglitz, a Columbia University economics professor who won a Nobel Prize for his work on the effect of unequal access to information on buyers and sellers in financial markets.

“As securities got more complex, the opportunities for gaming, to the disadvantage of ordinary people, increased,” Stiglitz said. “Complexity opened up new venues for information asymmetry, which banks exploited.”

Asia became Lehman’s highest growth region in 2007, taking in more than $3.1 billion in revenue, or 16 percent of the firm’s business. Revenue was up more than 41 percent from 2005 in Asia, while it climbed 3 percent in the U.S. in the same period, according to Bloomberg data.

Yu said she went to an export trade show in Hong Kong two years ago and met Chow Chi Chung, a salesman for Amsterdam-based ABN Amro Holding NV. He offered her a better return on her savings if she switched banks, she said. So she did.

Two-thirds of Yu’s money, about $100,000, came from a settlement with her employer after an elevator fell half a floor, injuring her pelvis, according to Yu, who still drags her right leg when she walks.

Didn’t Read Prospectus

A month after their meeting, Yu said Chow called her to say he had a new product that could return as much as 20 percent a year because it was linked to the stock performance of three large Chinese companies -- China Communications Construction Co.,China Merchants Bank Co. and Ping An Insurance Co.

Yu said she didn’t read the fine print, trusting Chow when he told her she couldn’t lose her principal. Had she looked at the prospectus and understood it she would have discovered that she had essentially bought three call options -- contracts that would capture gains if the shares of the three companies rose by a certain amount -- coupled with the equivalent of a Lehman corporate bond. If Lehman defaulted, her money would be gone.

Cash Bonus

ABN Amro, now part of Edinburgh-based Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, also recruited Yu to sell the same product to her family, giving her a cash bonus of about $155 for each person who signed up, she said.

Yuk Min Hui, a Hong Kong-based spokeswoman for RBS, declined to comment about Yu’s case. She said in an e-mail that if the bank determined that “sales processes and guidelines were not properly followed,” it would offer “appropriate remedies.” Only a small number of investors fall in this category, she said.

Chow couldn’t be located.

There are 873 issues of such Lehman equity-linked structured notes outstanding with a combined face value of about $8.7 billion, all now in default, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Bonds were denominated in pounds, Swiss francs and Hungarian forint, as well as Australian and Hong Kong dollars.

Banks also sold $1.8 billion of Lehman minibonds to an estimated 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, where the notes were first marketed in 2003, according to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. The biggest seller was BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd., a unit of Beijing-based Bank of China Ltd.

Financial Dumplings

The minibonds were all issued by a Cayman Islands-based entity called Pacific International Finance Ltd., set up by Lehman with trustees from London-based HSBC Holdings Plc. The notes were financial dumplings -- derivatives contracts tied to the creditworthiness of major companies wrapped inside Lehman corporate bonds. Series 19 notes, for instance, were linked to securities dealers including Citigroup Inc. and Goldman Sachs. If any of those businesses or Lehman defaulted, the investor wouldn’t get paid.

In effect, investors in Series 19 notes bought the losing end of credit-default swaps, or insurance policies pegged to the survival of financial institutions. If any of those companies failed, the noteholders were the ones responsible for paying off the principal on the derivative.

Lehman took payments from investors in exchange for a guaranteed yield, then placed the cash in a Lehman-managed money market fund and issued commercial paper to borrow more money. Those funds were in turn used to invest in CDOs sold by Lehman off-balance-sheet entities in places such as Ireland and the Cayman Islands.

‘Blood and Sweat’

Sun Kwan, a 58-year-old retired parks worker, was among those who bought Lehman minibonds. He stood outside the I.M. Pei-designed Hong Kong headquarters of the Bank of China on June 15, along with Yu and 51 other protesters, banging a chipped red drum with a stick every two seconds. Raindrops beaded on the brim of his blue cap. A sign around his neck, hand-lettered in Chinese characters, read: “The Bank of China is a hooker. Give me back my money earned with blood and sweat.”

Sun, who has a high school education, invested about $285,000 in Lehman Minibond Series 12 notes, sold to him by BOC Hong Kong, which paid about 4 percent interest a year.

He said he thought he was putting his money into a certificate of deposit. Instead, as the prospectus explained, the notes were a bet against the default of the Chinese government and five companies, including Hutchison Whampoa Ltd., which operates ports and telecommunications services, Chinese state-owned oil producer CNOOC Ltd. and Lehman.

As an incentive, he was given $26 in supermarket coupons.

Rhinos, Whales

Sun also purchased $40,000 worth of Octave Series 10 notes, a similarly structured product created by Morgan Stanley, in which the investor would lose all of his money if Lehman or any of six other companies defaulted. He said he never heard of Lehman and thought the notes were backed by the People’s Republic of China because most of the businesses were state- owned.

Nick Footitt, a spokesman for Morgan Stanley in Hong Kong, declined to comment.

Each minibond series was custom-made, so their characteristics differed. Packagers skipped using some numbers, including 4, which is considered unlucky in Chinese culture and would make the bond difficult to market. Investors got prizes, including video cameras and flat-screen televisions, according to newspaper advertisements and fliers handed out at banks. The ads, in both Chinese and English, featured rhinoceroses, whales and other symbols of potency, luck or profit.

‘Rotten Deal’

“It’s all gone,” Sun said in an interview conducted through a Chinese translator at the demonstration. “I almost wanted to kill myself. I’ve been crying for months, even though I am a man.”

He said he hadn’t yet told his 25-year-old son, Sun Chi Yan, what had happened to his nest egg, most of which came from a settlement when the government bought his family’s land.

Sun and Yu were among investors who staged protests almost every business day for nine months, sparking a Hong Kong legislative investigation and calls for more protection for retail customers. The raucous demonstrations in the city’s financial district, including a tent encampment and bullhorns connected to an iPod that blared the looped chant “Rotten Deal -- Money Back,” became an embarrassment to the banks.

In a city of 7 million, where only 30 percent of workers had pensions before 2001, the Lehman protesters struck a chord, according to Audrey Eu, one of 60 members of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council.

Bank Offer

“A lot of them lost their life savings,” Eu said in an interview in June. “They’re all crying. They work as cleaners, and $50,000 is a lot of money to them.”

Angel Yip, a spokeswoman for BOC Hong Kong, said in an e- mail that “we understand and sympathize with customers” who lost money as a result of the Lehman collapse. She said advertisements and prospectuses distributed by the bank “contained a detailed description of the structure and risks” of the investments.

In July, 16 retail banks, including BOC Hong Kong, offered to repay minibond investors at least 60 cents on the dollar, a deal brokered by the city’s securities regulator that would amount to $813 million. About two-thirds of eligible noteholders accepted the offer, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority said in a statement on Sept. 4. Sun said he hadn’t yet made up his mind.

“The compensation offer is totally unfair and based on groundless calculations,” Sun said. “If we have to accept it eventually, it’ll be because we’ve exhausted all other means.”

‘Grotesquely Wrong’

While investors in Hong Kong have the right to sue banks, there are no class-action laws or contingency fees, making it difficult to find lawyers willing to take cases.

Patrick Daniels, a lawyer with Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP in San Diego, has filed a class-action suit against Lehman in federal court in New York on behalf of minibond holders like Sun in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore seeking $1.6 billion from Bank of New York Mellon Corp. The money, mostly shares in Lehman’s Institutional Money Market Fund, is being held by the bank as collateral to secure the minibonds, Daniels said. Other Lehman creditors are trying to get the same funds from the Bank of New York Mellon, which isn’t accused of wrongdoing. The case is pending.

“Something is grotesquely wrong here,” Daniels said in an interview in July. “These people were just flat-out lied to and stolen from.”

Neither the lawsuit nor the settlement applies to Yu or other holders of equity-linked notes from Houston to Singapore.

London Suicide

Hong Kong retirees weren’t the only victims. Even professional investors were stuck with Lehman losses.

The stocks and bonds of Lehman’s London brokerage customers, used as collateral to borrow more money, were frozen on Sept. 15. About 3,500 clients, including 700 hedge funds, couldn’t get access to an estimated $65 billion of assets. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Lehman’s U.K. bankruptcy administrator, is still sorting out who should get paid and how much. Some firms have closed, and others may have to wait as long as a decade to get their assets back, Tony Lomas, the PwC partner in charge of the U.K. administration, said in August.

It took only 10 days for the ice-nine to get to Kirk Stephenson, chief operating officer of Olivant Ltd., a London private-equity firm run by former UBS AG Chairman Luqman Arnold. On Sept. 25, Stephenson, 47, jumped in front of a train going 125 mph at a station in Taplow, 28 miles (45 kilometers) west of London.

The coroner’s office for the county of Buckinghamshire ruled the death a suicide. Stephenson, a native of New Zealand, was despondent about the financial crisis and talked about killing himself one week after Lehman’s demise, according to a statement from his wife read at the coroner’s inquest.

U.K. Lock-Up

Lehman Brothers International (Europe) was Olivant’s prime broker. It held the firm’s 2.78 percent stake in UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank by assets, according to a statement from Olivant on Oct. 1. The shares were worth 1.6 billion francs ($1.44 billion) at the time.

The hedge fund lock-up led the U.K. to reconsider its procedures when firms fail. While Lehman’s broker-dealer in the U.S. stayed out of bankruptcy long enough to process many of its trades, the business seized up in the U.K.

“In the U.S., everything was wrapped in cotton wool for four days,” said PwC’s Lomas. In the U.K., “everything failed come 7:56 a.m. that Monday morning.”

‘Black Hole’

The U.K. had an advantage in attracting hedge fund assets before the Lehman bankruptcy. While U.S. prime brokers face limits on how much they can loan hedge funds, those rules could be circumvented with overseas units like Lehman’s in London. Some U.S. clients didn’t know they were customers of Lehman Brothers International (Europe).

“If you didn’t pay attention to what you were signing, you would have missed it,” said Michael Romanek, principal at Rise Partners Ltd., which arranges financing for funds from London. “It was called enhanced prime brokerage, where they could be more accommodating with more leverage or loans. It just took signing some extra papers in New York. Most people didn’t realize it.”

Some fund managers with frozen assets say they’ve gone from extreme anger to resignation that they’ll have to wait a long time to see any return.

“I still don’t know if I’ll ever get any money back,” said Edward Chin, whose Hong Kong-based Pride Revelation Fund used Lehman as its sole prime broker. “We’re in a black hole.”

$30 Billion Gap

The ice-nine also halted construction projects from Wall Street to the Turks and Caicos Islands.

Lehman borrowed against property investments that couldn’t easily be sold, such as construction loans. So when the property market turned sour and creditors demanded more collateral for the loans or their money back, the investment bank was stuck.

The property portfolio doomed Lehman when a rescue still seemed possible. On Saturday, Sept. 13, 2008, Timothy Geithner, then president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and now U.S. Treasury secretary, asked a team of the world’s top bankers to evaluate Lehman’s real estate holdings as part of an effort to facilitate a sale of the investment bank to London-based Barclays Plc.

The team, including representatives from Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse Group AG, determined that Lehman had overvalued its real estate investments by $20 billion to $30 billion, according to people who attended meetings at the New York Fed last September.

Watergate Hotel

When Barclays pulled out of an agreement to buy the firm, Lehman was forced to file for bankruptcy. Only then did Barclays buy Lehman’s U.S. securities business, including its headquarters in Manhattan’s Times Square.

The bankruptcy deprived the international real estate market of a major source of financing. The bank was known for doing deals nobody else would touch, according to a former Lehman executive.

The Watergate Hotel, made famous by the 1972 break-in that led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon, was sold at auction in August for $25 million after its owner, Washington- based Monument Realty LLC, defaulted on its mortgage. Monument was financed by Lehman.

A condo conversion at 25 Broad St. in Manhattan, two blocks from Goldman Sachs’s headquarters, was suspended by developers. It too was financed by Lehman.

SunCal, Depfa

Irvine, California-based SunCal Cos., a closely held developer, said it had $1.6 billion in financing from Lehman. Since the bank’s failure, 19 projects, all in California, have filed for bankruptcy, SunCal said. Work has stopped on all of them, including the 248-acre Marblehead Coastal community in San Clemente, which was supposed to feature 69 single-family homes, 244 other residences, a movie theater, parks and hiking trails.

Munich-based Hypo Real Estate Holding AG received 102 billion euros ($143 billion) in debt guarantees and credit lines from the German government after its Depfa unit was stuck without short-term funding following Lehman’s bankruptcy. Like Lehman, Hypo funded long-term real estate assets with short-term loans such as commercial paper.

German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck defended the bailout of the lender because the global financial system was just “millimeters from the abyss.”

Molasses Reef

On West Caicos, an otherwise uninhabited island 250 miles northeast of Cuba, work stopped on the Molasses Reef Ritz- Carlton Hotel and Residences, slated to include a cluster of $6.5 million cottages. About 400 Chinese employees of Tel Aviv- based construction firm Ashtrom Properties Ltd. didn’t get paid when Lehman funding dried up, according to Jonathan Siegel, New York-based managing director of Logwood Hotel Development Co.

About 60 electrical workers rebelled, taking a dozen managers hostage and refusing to let them leave the island.

“We had 400 to 500 unhappy men, and we were concerned violence would erupt,” Siegel said. “The Turks and Caicos government was very unhappy with the situation. There was a limited supply of food and water.”

Ashtrom ended the standoff after a week by paying what it considered “a ransom,” Siegel said. The project, about 70 percent completed, is still on hold, said Verona Carter, Ritz- Carlton Hotel Co.’s director of public relations for the Caribbean area.

Financial Leadership

The vulnerability of the global financial system revealed by Lehman’s bankruptcy -- from ordinary investors like Sun and Yu to London hedge funds and German lenders -- makes it all the harder to regulate.

“The difficulty you have in getting control is that you need a global alliance,” said former World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn in an e-mail. “You need all the finance ministers to come together, because if a transaction can’t be done here, it can be done in Lichtenstein or France or the Far East.”

Lehman’s bankruptcy also poses a challenge to America’s financial leadership.

Wall Street profited by arranging financing that allowed other countries to tap global capital markets to build offices, factories, resorts and housing. What’s broken now is the trust the rest of the world had in U.S. banks, said Phillip Yin, a native of Seattle who is managing director of Asia Investors Partners Ltd., a Hong Kong-based research firm.

“All that has happened since -- the job losses, the slump, everything -- is tied to one thing and one event,” Yin said. “And that’s Lehman.”

(Lehman’s Lessons: Next, Too Big to Fail)

To contact the reporters on this story: Mark Pittman in New York at mpittman@bloomberg.net; Bob Ivry in New York at bivry@bloomberg.net.



from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aNFuVRL73wJc

2009年8月20日 星期四

Open Letter to Commissioner of Police Regarding to Police Abuse of Powers

(轉載)
An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of Police Abuse of Powers

Mr. TANG King Shing

Commissioner of Police , Police Headquarters,

Sirs,

I write on behalf of Ms. Tracy Ho as well as the Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims in Hong Kong to complain against your officers who authorise the ‘dawn raid’ against Ms. Ho for reason that she is suspected of having committed an act of common assault.
The alleged assault takes place at about 1625 hours on 21st May 2009 outside the Bank of China Building, which is situate at no. 1 Garden Road, Central. In addition to the gross disproportion between police action and the nature of the allegation, there are numerous dubious acts on the part of your officers during the process that could only be explained as intending to maximize the harassment and distress inflicted on Ms. Ho and her family.

The Dawn Raid

2. At about 07:30 hours on 19th August 2009 five detectives (three male and two female) in plain clothes claiming to be attached to the Central Police District or Division knocked on the door of Ms. Ho’s Residence in Choi Hung. The visit is a total surprise and when Ms. Ho answered the door your officers insisted that they wanted to enter the premises before they would reveal the purpose of their visit.

3. With utmost reluctance and distress of her family, Ms. allowed the officers into her home. One of the officers then produced a photograph to Ms. Ho and asked if she is the person in it. Although the photograph does not show her face, Ms. Ho recalled the scene which is the protest outside the Bank of China Building mentioned above.

4. When Ms. Ho was about to admit that she is the lady on the photograph, one of the officer threatened her to immediately produce the clothes and shoes she worn that day or else they would search for the items themselves. Perplexed by the sudden police interest in the event that happened months ago and pressured by the threatening language, Ms. Ho complied with the demand and produced the items accordingly. She was then asked to follow the officers to the police station for further enquiries but before leaving the premises she was asked to sign on the notebook of one of the officers that it was not an arrest and she was not therefore handcuffed.

A Trivial Offence

5. Ms. Ho arrived at the Central Police Station at Arsenal Street at about 0930 hours after having been taken to and asked to wait at the Ngau Tau Kok Police Station for some time during which your officers were presumably completing some formalities to record their action in another police area.

6. In the Central Police Station, Ms. Ho was shown a video footage lasting for about 10 to 15 seconds in which her right foot seemed to have a momentary contact with the buttock of a bank staff. Apparently the footage was shot in a commotion where attempt was made by the bank staff to forcibly remove the protesters. It is understandable that in such circumstances people were jostling against each another and what Ms. Ho was doing then is crucial in establishing the plausibility of the allegation against her.

7. Ms. Ho has a flair for electronic video and audio devices and she has been responsible for filming the public activities of the Alliance almost since the creation of it. When the assault was allegedly taken place, Ms. Ho was actually holding her video device filming the forcible removal of the protesters by the bank staff. Her attention was on the action in front of her and the display screen of her video. It is, to say the least, very unlikely that a person would in the circumstances feel like joining the fray.

8. There is another factor that discounts the truthfulness of the allegation. Ms. Ho is a small, slim young lady whose weight would not be much more than 90 lbs. Could a person with that physique be inclined to provoke a fight? And could a lady like Ms. Ho who has taken part in so many protests relating to the fraud of Lehman Brothers and has always behaved properly, suddenly and without any provocation whatsoever, acted contrary to her personality and disposition? The allegation is so preposterous that no person in his right mind would seriously entertain it. Yet your officers have concluded that the offence is so grave that it justifies a deployment of five officers to carry out a dawn raid for an allegation of common assault where the supposed victim does not seem to have suffered any visible or detectable injury and does not complain for months after the event.

Assault on Law by Abuses of Powers

9. How should the public comprehend a dawn raid by five detectives against a young lady suspected of common assault? Does it not indicate the new low of the state of policing in this city under your watch?
But that is not all in so far as the outrageous police conduct is concerned. For almost one year now Ms. Ho has been the contact person between the police and the Alliance on many occasions especially in respect of application for approval to assemble and conduct procession. Your officers at the Police Community Relations Office in Central District know Ms. Ho well and it would take only a phone call to get Ms. Ho to the Central Police Station to view the video footage and to assist police investigation into the allegation. The differences between asking Ms. Ho to the police station and the dawn raid are that only the latter could inflict the distress, sudden sense of fear, and helplessness on Ms. Ho and her family.

10. The connection between the decision to harass Ms. Ho and another assault complaint against the bank staff at the scene of protest is clear. As mentioned above, the moment when Ms. Ho was accused of committing assault on the anonymous bank staff, she was filming an assault in progress by the bank staff against a protester.
It is hardly surprising that the protester would sustain injury given the way she was man-handled by the bank staff. As it was, she was taken to hospital, and stayed there for days for medical treatment. We also learn that a complaint of assault was lodged with the police by her or subsequently with the medical findings of the injury she sustained. Despite the evidence, no action has been taken against the bank or the assailant by the police, just like other crimes related to the Lehman Brothers fraud.

11. In the circumstances, it is an irresistible inference that the police harassment against Ms. Ho is motivated by the desire to please certain influential individuals affiliated with the bank.

12. The allegation against Ms. Ho is so trivial that she is granted a police bail of HKD100. Against an allegation of common assault that could, technically speaking, be committed by everyone in this crowded community, the police deployed five detectives to conduct a dawn raid on the basis of the flimsiest evidence which comes into being in a commotion caused largely by the bank itself. The commotion would not have happened had the police had the courage and sense of decency to enforce the law. Against the banks for fraud that is proven by documentary evidence that no government official would dare to dispute, not a single officer of yours has the courage to follow your own orders to classify the complaints after almost one year of their lodgments with the Commercial Crime Bureau. Insofar as the Lehman Brothers fraud is concerned, the victims have been deprived of any legal rights and remedies. Would any of the government officials to whom this complaint is addressed care to respond to this latest episode of police abuse of powers?

c.c.
Mr. TANG Ying Yen, Henry, Chief Secretary for Administration
Mr. Wong Yan Lung, Secretary for Justice
Mr. Ian Grenville Cross, Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Ian McWalters, Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Lee Ka Chiu, Director of Crime & Security, HKP

======================================================
From: An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of police abuse of powers

2009年8月19日 星期三

Is HK now a Heaven for Banking Crooks ?



What have HK Police / Justice department done regarding all the financial fraud related complaints by Minibond / Constellation / Octave victims /other-products, since 15 sept. 2008?
(a) act upon banks' request & demand: Arrested and raided some minibond / constellation victims who participated in protesting banks' over 5 years' fraudulent act;
(b) Taking photos of those who participated in the demonstrations ...
(c) What ELSE ????????

While HK Police have been busy with responding to banks' request & demand: searching & raiding Minibond/Constellation victims because of their involvement in protest against Banks' cheating behavior on Minibond / Constellation / Octave,
What have the financial center New York's legal system done so far?


In the recent news:

1. "New York Attorney General sues Charles Schwab over securities sales" (Aug.17)
NEW YORK - New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo filed a lawsuit Monday against the brokerage unit of Charles Schwab Corp., claiming the firm misled customers about the safety of auction-rate securities.
Cuomo's office has been at the forefront of pushing brokers and underwriters of auction-rate securities to repurchase them from investors who were left with steep losses after the market for the investments collapsed in early 2008.
The suit against Schwab is aimed at forcing the retail brokerage firm to repurchase the securities at face value from investors.
...
Last month, Cuomo's office notified San Francisco-based Charles Schwab that it was planning to file the suit against the retail brokerage firm for claiming the securities were safe investments while selling them to customers.
In a statement Monday, Cuomo said: "Charles Schwab owed its customers a duty to properly understand and make accurate representations concerning auction-rate securities. Today we commenced a lawsuit to remedy Schwab's repeated breach of that duty."
...
related link: http://www.cnbc.com/id/32447041

2. "Credit Suisse broker convicted of fraud" (Aug.17)
A former Credit Suisse broker was on Monday convicted by a jury of fraudulently selling risky auction-rate securities in one of the first criminal prosecutions to emerge from the two-year-long credit crisis.

The guilty verdict against Eric Butler, 36, comes after a three-week trial in which prosecutors accused him and his former colleague, Julian Tzolov, of scheming to generate higher sales commissions by lying to clients about what kind of securities they were being sold.

“The defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations saddled investors with unknown risks they did not bargain for,” said Benton Campbell, US attorney for the eastern district of New York.

“This case shows that those who engage in such schemes will be held to account for their criminal activity.”

related links:
- http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE57G4HK20090817?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticNews (reuters)
- http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/nyfo081709a.htm (FBI press release)

3. 2008-News:
US Regulators alleged that brokerages misled investors into believing that auction rate securities were safe, cash-equivalent products, when in fact they faced increasing liquidity risk. Major financial companies Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia Corp.,and others that sold auction-rate securities have reached 100% buy-back settlements.


2009年8月4日 星期二

SCMP:Watchdog accused over Lehman probe decision

4 August 2009

Lawmakers criticised the financial regulator for suspending an investigation over the selling of non-minibond products after banks agreed a HK$6.3 billion deal to repay Lehman Brothers minibonds buyers.

Securities and Futures Commission chief executive Martin Wheatley said the commission had not only ended its top-down inquiry into minibonds, but also suspended investigation of other products from the 16 banks under the agreement.

He was speaking at a hearing of the subcommittee on the debacle surrounding the sale of Lehman Brothers financial products.

Democrat James To Kun-sun told the five-hour meeting: "It's about the minibonds agreement with the banks, but you {hellip} voluntarily suspended your statutory duty to investigate the systematic failure [over the selling] of non-minibonds products."

Another democrat, Kam Nai-wai, asked Mr Wheatley if he thought the interests of other buyers who bought Constellation Notes, a derivative similar to minibonds also issued by Lehman Brothers, or equity-linked notes had been sacrificed.

Lehman Brothers minibonds holders will receive letters before Monday from the banks who will repay them at least 60 per cent of the value of their initial investment.

Mr Wheatley said the investigation into non-minibonds products, involving about 500 cases, had been suspended because the latest deal required the banks to immediately implement improved complaints-handling procedures to resolve all complaints they received.

He said the investigation of three other banks, which were not included in the payout deal because they sold Lehman-related products apart from minibonds, continued. Investors should first turn to banks if they had complaints, and then the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.

Subcommittee chairman Raymond Ho Chung-tai said it would ask the commission to submit an original copy of the agreement, investigation findings of the 16 minibond-selling banks, as well as e-mail exchanges the commission had with the Monetary Authority and financial officials before it reached the deal.

Minibonds are not corporate bonds, but consist of high-risk credit-linked derivatives, and are marketed as a proxy investment in well-known companies. Hong Kong investors lost billions of dollars on minibonds guaranteed by Lehman Brothers when the US investment bank went bankrupt last September

From SCMP:Watchdog accused over Lehman probe decision

2009年7月30日 星期四

Repeating History after Ignoring It - Lehman's mini-bonds scandal ends with a whimper

[Article from Asia Sentinel]

Hong Kong's Lehman mini-bonds saga, in which outraged investors lost millions with the collapse of what was once thought to be an impregnable American financial institution, appears to be finally coming to an end, potentially drawing the curtain on a 10-month nightmare for both investors and regulators, given what the Securities and Futures Commission reportedly described as a 'good compromise."

But before crediting the SFC for putting an end to the misery of the 30,000 beleaguered investors, or before the regulator champions itself for its masterstrokes, be forewarned that the impact of the Lehman mini-bonds saga could have been minimized, if not prevented, if the SFC had acted decisively three years ago in a similar case involving Clerical Medical Insurance, a unit of Halifax Bank of Scotland. But from its inception, the SFC has been a largely toothless watchdog, occasionally gumming on some luckless small offenders and largely leaving the heavyweights alone.

Under the terms of the Lehman settlement, announced July 23, 16 banks agreed to return US$807 million - about 60 cents on the dollar -- to investors, with BOC Hong Kong Holdings agreeing to stump up nearly half of that, at US$401 million. The 16 banks sold an estimated US$1.8 billion of the so-called mini-bonds, which fell sharply in value after the US investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings was forced into bankruptcy last September.

Just as with Lehman, the CMI case involved gross mis-selling of financial investment products - larger in scale in dollar terms but less well known.


The SFC could have punished the wrongdoers to send out the right message, restructured the regulatory landscape to prevent any similar episodes and seized the opportunity to demonstrate its seriousness in dealing with misconduct of financial institutions.


No, thank you. The SFC did none of the above. What it eventually did - investigate the case but take no action - was to splash out television advertisements to forewarn investors to be alert and ask the right questions when making investment decisions, without tackling the core of the problem. The timing was critical: had the SFC taken the right measures then, it would have been between 2005-2006 when the Lehman minibonds were flowing into the Hong Kong market.

Obviously those splashy TV ads didn't work but the SFC has once again resorted to an even larger scale commercial campaign to accompany its new television advertisements following the Lehman case.

The earlier case refers to a product generally known as "offshore with-profits" (OWP) funds, sold in Hong Kong via several carriers but largely through market leader Clerical Medical Insurance (CMI) which alone has reportedly over 7,000 wealthy investors, mostly expatriates, with what many said amounted to some billions of US dollars invested - CMI was part of HBOS (Halifax Bank of Scotland), the largest mortgage and savings provider in the United Kingdom, which was bought by Lloyd's early this year and subsequently bailed out by the British government.

The OWP products were never sold directly by CMI but through many independent financial advisers , or IFAs, acting as intermediaries. Potential investors were encouraged to gear up to three times their own investment to maximize gains, given the supposedly good track records of these funds. These investors later said their advisers, motivated by extra commissions, only emphasized the upside but never forewarned them of the potential downside risks involved with gearing. The IFAs in turn claimed the marketing materials they used originated from CMI - whose products were approved by the SFC - though the company denied it ever promoted gearing.

The investors who geared up not only lost most of their principal but had to repay part of their loans when the value of their fund holdings pledged as collateral fell sharply, after the OWP funds performed badly following market shocks in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001, when CMI found itself on the wrong sides of the equation in the investment markets.

While not all investors were geared, all who tried to get out of the funds were subject to exit penalties, known as "market value adjusters" (MVAs), which reached more than 25 percent at some stage - neither did CMI nor the IFAs explain much about these MVAs or mentioned how high the MVA rates would reach in their sales pitch, according to many angry investors.

Either way, these investors found themselves stuck with huge losses and some are still pursuing lawsuits today to fight their cause.

Much like the Lehman mini-bonds case, the CMI matter was one of gross mis-selling to potential and unwary investors - in the latter, mostly highly educated professionals. Just like the Lehman case, the CMI products were approved by the SFC.

And like the Lehman case, the CMI products were sold through a retail distribution channel with frontline sales staff carrying approved brochures. More importantly, both cases featured gross mis-selling with commission-driven sales staff allegedly more eager to secure signatures than to explain in detail the complexity of the financial products, if they understood them at all, on the table.

With such parallels, and perhaps sadly on hindsight, one may be tempted to blame the SFC for not doing enough to protect the interest of the public.

One may also argue that the SFC did the right thing in both the Lehman and CMI cases: that investors took their risk, informed or ill-informed, calculated or speculative, even though the products were approved and by that token the SFC can only resort to public education via commercial advertisements.

Granted, but the reality is the public placed trust in the regulators to have the house in order with little or hopefully no room for any propensity to mislead potential investors, rich or poor alike. The regulators of today's ever increasingly complex financial markets are also expected to have an iron grip on the conduct of its players and act swiftly to correct any disequilibrium.

But in the Hong Kong context, there is much more the SFC could have done over the years to build a more efficient and better regulated financial market to protect the public - and thus prevent the resulting bad press from the Lehman mini-bonds saga.

For starters, one may question if the frontline sales staff of financial products, including professional independent financial advisers, are properly qualified. After all, much like doctors and surgeons whom we count upon for life or death, the men on the street rely on these financial intermediaries for their financial well-being - the Lehman case in particular has thrown this issue into the spotlight given the highly complex financial instruments involved.

Regulators and related supervisory trade bodies in Hong Kong will be quick to point out the Continuing Professional Development (CPD) program, found in several professional industries as a well managed way to update its members and also renew licenses.

Sounds good? But what good can there be if the IFAs (with a considerable number of non-Chinese speaking Western expatriates) cannot understand a word in some of these Cantonese-only classes? This was the situation faced by some insurance professionals and IFAs, according to sources, and all they need is to find ways to kill time and mark their attendance at the end of the courses to gain the necessary credits.

"They do not even check if you are fluent in the language in which the course is given," said a practicing insurance broker. "Most attendants just sit in the venue for 2 hours playing games on their mobile phones, or by catching up with sleep. The quality of the speakers, most of the time staff of law firms eager to advertise their firm's name and they work free of charge, as I understand, is poor to very poor."

Certainly not the best way to update on the latest financial literature.

With the blurring of lines in the modern financial sectors, cross-selling has become commonplace, thus we find insurance companies selling investment-type products and banks selling insurance-related products. Consequently, insurance professionals and IFAs need the appropriate licenses to sell complex financial investment products. In Hong Kong, insurance professionals with the appropriate license from any of the two respective insurance brokers associations earned the license to sell while those who gained a license from the SFC, being the IFAs, have the license to advise on investment-type products, industry sources say.

The implications may not be obvious to casual observers, according to some market professionals. A person with only a license to sell means he cannot offer any advice on the products he tried to push to his potential client. Consider the client may (inevitably) ask questions about the products. What can the financial intermediary say? "Sorry, I can only sell you these and not licensed to offer advice. So just pick one and sign"?

Sorry, that is not how the real world works.

Perhaps the regulators should get rid of the license to sell and offer just the license to advise requirement so as to better protect the public interest?

The one other troubling issue that remains: commissions. In both the Lehman and CMI cases, the financial intermediaries were allegedly motivated by commissions earned from the sales transacted. How else do you suppose salesmen work - thus we cannot possibly remove commissions out of the equation, can we?

Hence, the SFC took the right stance that investors take their own risks given the best information they can gather - ie, market risk. However, if the financial markets are not properly regulated, giving way to mis-selling, investors are exposed to further (non-market) risks.

Sadly, Hong Kong investors have short memories, especially when faced with lucrative offers. With the Lehman mini-bonds saga soon to be behind us, one can only hope that the SFC took cues and promptly put things in order before another similar episode surfaces.

From Asia Sentinel: "http://asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1984&Itemid=224

2009年7月15日 星期三

Why banks can't answer queries regarding the "Fund" (Minibond collateral)?



作為受過良好教育,有包括CDS/CDO和各類信貸掛鈎產品在內的投資經驗的專業人員和管理層的銀行,作為銷售了迷債4-6年的迷債分銷商,
- 銀行為甚麼不能回答以下關於關於抵押品之疑問?
- 銀行的協約精神和對客戶的Duty of Care 職責去了哪裡了呢?

Enquiry on the"NOTICE OF REIVESTMENT OF COLLATERAL FOR UNDERLYING SECURITIES” (letter from HSBC USA and Bank of New York). The following questions are addressed to BANKS who sold minibond to us.

The "Fund" below refers to the Fund mentioned in the "NOTICE OF REIVESTMENT OF COLLATERAL FOR UNDERLYING SECURITIES” (dated 18 March 2009). Use Minibond Series #27 as an example:

(a) Where can I find out the role and functions of Bank of New York in respect of the Minibond Series 27?

(b) Can BANKS please clarify the relationship between the Series 27 and the Fund ?
Because I have looked at the prospectuses but could not find any mention of the Fund. (c) Can you please advise where in the prospectuses for Series 27 the Fund is mentioned?

(c) Can BANKS please advise where in the prospectuses for Series 27 the Fund is mentioned?

Banks are regulated financial institutions. Banks' responsibility as minibond-distributors is NOT confined to passing on the enquiries from the note-holders to the trustee and replies from the trustee to the note-holders, regardless if the enquiries concern matter within banks' knowledge or the replies given by the trustee do not really answers the queries raised. Banks are not no-asking & no-telling & commission-collection middle-man only. Banks are bound by SFC Code of Conduct!

2009年7月13日 星期一

"well-educated", disclosure of Minibond risks, and banks' Duty of Care



One of banks’ excuses on dismissing Minibond complaints is that some Minibond victims are reasonably well-educated and should have been alerted by the ‘red flag’ scattered around in the prospectuses.

Understandably, the Minibond designers & promoters would argue (in their heart) that: the ‘ref flag’ is indicative of the real nature of the products and has been well hidden, notwithstanding the reassuring façade ("credit-linked to 7 well-known companies") and the message of safe and diversification that it is designed to convey.


No professional intermediary could have valued the Minibond using only the information provided in marketing material (including Prospectus).

"Minibond Structure and Pricing Report" by Ernest & Young to Hong Kong Bank Associations (Dec.2008) reveals the material information and risk disclosure that are missing from Minibond prospectus.

Banks are blaming SFC for the minibond approval, in additaional to banks' claim that well-educated clients should have known the true feature and risks of Minibond. Can banks repeat their view on the material risks of Minibond today, after over 4-6 years' minibond sale?

Banks seemed to behave like a no-asking & no-telling commission-collecting only middle-man. What happened to banks' duty of care to its clients?

Did banks' well-educated professional & management who have expertise in CDS / CDO / CDS / credit derivative /other investments products forget that they are bound by "Code of Conduct" (knowing the product, explain the true nature and risks to clients, make adequate disclosure of relevant material information)?

Financial institutions engage in improper conduct for financial gain. As in the case of those who evade tax, penalties must have a deterrent effect. Like tax evaders, the financial institutions should have faced penalties of up to three times the fees and commissions they earned as a result of their misconduct. Regulators in other jurisdictions have found that removing the financial gain is an effective deterrent.

In other jurisdictions, when misconduct by financial institutions has been shown, compensating all affected investors is the norm. The onus is on the financial institution to demonstrate why an investor should not be compensated. Our process of putting the onus on the investor to prove his claim puts many ordinary investors at a disadvantage.

The outcome of this saga does not appear to be just and does not augur well for consumer protection in thefinancial service sector.

2009年6月24日 星期三

《連載-1》雷曼骗局之根源 Root Cause of Lehman Minibond Fraud



序: 監管部門之瀆職 和 金融機構之詐騙

本文是繼“雷曼事件研究報告”之後的由雷曼苦主大聯盟所作的第二份研究報告。以便公眾瞭解雷曼相關產品所涉及的欺詐行徑並提供深入的分析。原文及有關文件的引用請詳見英文版。本文為中文簡要。

“禍心結構”指把一個投資工具捆綁於另一個投資工具之中。有何必要把兩個信貸掛鈎產品串聯一起而不作為一個信貸掛鈎產品推出呢?好處是可以借用看似安全的表面層(“跟 7 個著名公司掛鈎”)做掩蓋,而把具更大風險的低層“禍心”(跟多達150-194個公司掛鈎)包藏起來,達到金玉其外,敗絮其中的欺騙效果,去欺騙對信貸金融工具不熟悉的市民。此類欺騙性產品的策划者和共謀者們則取得巨大利潤。誠如某S&P高層承認他們為了公司的利潤而把靈魂出賣給魔鬼。通過投資於一些新的主要由機構投資者參與的缺乏透明度的投資工具,使用大量公眾不熟悉的新技術名詞(如CDO, 合成CDO, 信貸破產掉期等),混以公眾熟悉的詞彙(如債券,AAA評級,AAA評級的傳統債券的破產概率的20年歷史數據等),達到半真半假,魚目混珠的欺騙公眾的目的。當然,如果監管部門是警覺性高和認真處理的話,類似“迷你債劵”的騙人伎倆就有可能功虧一簣。

可惜,在雷曼事件發生的過去幾年裡,金管局和證監會在監察和阻止雷曼騙局上是完全失敗了,從而造成了持續幾年的迷債騙局 。欺騙性的章程、含糊其詞或無實質披露、甚或誤導性的陳述。證監會對此卻卻視而不見,大開綠燈。

雷曼事件發生之後,金管局和證監會對於公眾投訴的處理手法, 意味著兩個監管機構早就意識到他們的寬鬆放縱難免為金融欺詐敞開大門 。 證監會給政府的調查報告顯示對於該產品的“禍心結構”其實是心裡有數的。而金管局則把問題預先定性為“錯誤銷售”。把矛頭對准銀行的前線銷售人員。為了給自己開脫,他們只能保持模棱兩可,找些膚淺表面的問題來調查,找替罪羊,而避開問題的欺騙性的實質。
雷曼騙局帶出一個獨特的現象: 規管金融市場的執法和規管部門都如同虛設。金管局不去檢查銀行在銷售上是否違規,而去盤問受害人,想方設法蒙哄受害人跟銀行和解。監管部門一直企圖文過飾非,為了揭露這種跡近無法無天的惡行,促使我們不斷研究及發表報告。
證監會和金管局簽訂了 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU,諒解備忘錄、 於2002年終)。第一,二章將圍繞著 MOU開展。 因為 MOU揭示了證監會對金管局拱手相讓其職責,變相地鼓勵銀行肆意為所欲為,第三章將列出金管局的失職和證監會對文書披露方面的失職。第四章安永會計師為銀行公會提供的“迷債結構和定價”報告,提供了第三章的証據。儘管兩個監管機構的報告都有不公開部分,歪曲真相的企圖卻是令人一目瞭然。

雷曼騙局的根源,在金管局和證監會的私相授受,包庇被監管的機構。甚者,曾特首的縱容放任,讓香港的政治及社會制度,全面受到侵蝕及腐化,這正是我們憂心如焚的原因。

2009年6月17日 星期三

銀行怕甚麼?銀行心虛了嗎?

迷你債券之核心為迷債抵押品(即任總所指之"第二層債務抵押證券“)。這就是為甚麼,7 個著名掛鈎公司沒有問提,迷債價值卻到了要跟零掛鈎的地步。

為甚麼政府和監管機構不敢要求銀行披露銀行對於迷債抵押品(即迷債"第二層債務抵押證券“)之理解?
為甚麼银行至今為止不能 (/不敢?) 回答關於迷債抵押品問題?

2008年9月27日,在銷售了4-5年 共 36 個迷你債券系列之後, 當時的銀行公會主席和廣北公開承認:
“現時本港銀行作為雷曼迷你債的包銷商或分銷商,掌握的信息十分有限。這些債券狀況如何﹖債券抵押品的性質是什麼﹖。。。目前包銷商都不掌握確切信息。”

懇請政府徹查銀行是否有系統性不瞭解(或隱瞞)迷債抵押品(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)的性質之問題。
懇請政府就以下迷債抵押品(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)相關問題, 徹查銀行之理解和內部之相關資料。
懇請政府就以下迷債抵押品(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)相關問題, 徹查銀行對客戶做的解釋和披露。

這個調查,是關係到迷債之關鍵。這也是金管局至今不願意調查之願意,因為金管局一心為銀行護航,於是把矛頭指向職員。儘管和廣北先生不是說某個或某些銀行職員對於迷你“債券抵押品的性質”不確切瞭解, 和廣北先生是說“銀行”對於迷你“債券抵押品的性質”不確切瞭解。 和廣北先生用”債券“來簡稱”迷你債券“ ! 在和廣北先生的心裡,是否下意識地把本質為多層 Credit-Linked-Notes 的迷你債券等同“債券”來看待了? 是否也間接地反映了銀行的在對於迷你債券的本質的理解上有系統性錯誤?

銀行界有著理解並且買賣 CDO / Synthetic CDO / CDS /Credit-Linked Notes 的專業知識和多年豐富投資經驗之專業人士。 根據安永為銀行公會提供的“迷債結構和定價“報告(2008年12月), 在2004-2008年內,銀行銷售的迷債系列 10(2004年5月發行)至36均為類似性質的以合成CDO為第二層債務抵押證券。而合成CDO 之資料於迷債正式發行日(通常是購買截至日之後的3個星期左右)之前就已經有了, 因為雷曼必須在迷債正式發行日之前把合成CDO 評級拿到,再名正言順地用迷債之資金去買入自己打包的合成CDO 。

至今為止,銀行堅持自己在迷債銷售上是沒有錯誤的。也就是說,他們明白賣的產品究竟是甚麼。銀行是沒有任何理由拒絕公眾對此之要求的。银行也可以公開他們不能回答關於這些問題的理由。 銀行也可以公开宣告:我是銀行我怕誰!

儘管 “銀行於銷售信貸掛勾票據時,不知悉第二層債務抵押證券所掛勾之信貸參考機構“ (任總語),

(1) 2008年8月,在銷售了4-5年 共 36 個迷你債券系列之後,銀行是否知道這 迷債抵押品”(即"第二層債務抵押證券)之合成CDO 是賣跟由 97-194個相關主體組成的一攬子信貸保險? 以及: 銀行是否知道 如果這合成CDO之一攬子掛鈎相關主體裡發生了 足夠的信貸事件的話 造成合成CDO本金損失 ?

(2) 以系列19為例125個相關主體內,當第9個信貸事件發生時,就會造成合成CDO本金損失 ,而第10個信貸事件發生時,就會造成合成CDO 100% 本金損失 銀行是何時了解到這些系列19之具體信貸掛鈎主體及信貸事件影響之條件的?

(3) 從2004年5月的第一個以合成CDO作為”第二層債務抵押證券“的 系列10 開始,直至 2008年的 系列 36,在2008年8月之前這幾年的期間, 銀行有沒有跟雷曼(或發行商)要求過並且看過任何其中任何一個或幾個迷債系列的”迷債抵押品資料”(即:“第二層債務抵押證券“ 合成CDO 資料) ?

(4) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到: 這”迷債抵押品”(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)之 合成CDO 信息和風險 為迷債相關重大信息和重大風險 (material information and material risk) ?

(5) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到 : 這”迷債抵押品”(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)為 合成CDO ?

(6) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到 :這"迷債抵押品”之合成CDO 的主要特徵是跟一攬子信貸主體掛鈎?

(7) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到: 這 合成CDO 是賣 由 諸多 個相關主體組成的一攬子信貸保險 ? 以及其 ‘ 如果一攬子掛鈎相關主體裡發生了足夠的信貸事件的話,就會造成合成CDO本金損失’ 之特徵?

(8) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到: 而這”足夠“信貸事件,絕不是指合成CDO之一攬子信掛鈎主體之50% 或90%的相關主體發生信貸事件? 以及 ‘ 通常是會當8%-10%(或更低的百分比)的相關主體發生信貸事件的時候,就會造成合成CDO本金損失,最終造成迷債的利息及本金損失’

(9) 銀行於銷售信貸掛勾票據 (即:迷你債券)時,關於這 迷債抵押品,即今天的””第二層債務抵押證券““, 是如何跟客戶解釋和披露的呢?有沒有披露過其信貸風險?

(10) 銷售的時候,銀行有沒有跟客戶解釋,這“抵押品資料” 可以稍後於迷債正式發行之前(由雷曼或發行商)准備好,可以提供給客戶?
銷售之後,當這“抵押品資料”已經(由雷曼或發行商)准備好了的時候,銀行有沒有告知客戶? 以便提供給客戶或者由客戶去索取閱讀。
無論是銷售前,銷售時或銷售之後,銀行有沒有跟客戶提起過/或披露過任何“抵押品資料” 相關資料或相關信貸資料?

2009年6月11日 星期四

轉載安永報告的迷債示意圖

1。 迷債系列10-36之結構。 為甚麼迷債章程跟銀行的解釋完全沒有 合成CDO (层) 這一層解釋呢?


安永報告指出:SPV PIFL把迷債資金投資於合成CDO, 該合成CDO”是由不同的SPV發行的。而迷債中的兩類掉期 (即“迷債層次的FTD掉期”和“合成CDO 層次的掉期)是為向雷曼賣信貸保險而設計的。合成CDO was backed by the collateral which is the Lehman USD Liquidity Fund. 因此,迷債只有一個資產(即:雷曼貨幣基金),和許多負債(liability)(即兩個層次的信貸掉期)”。迷債層次的FTD掉期幾乎不為迷債持有者帶來收入,所有CDO層次(包括雷曼貨幣基金的利息)的收入均歸於雷曼。

2。安永報告明確指出:在合成CDO層次的SPV是由97-194個相關主體組成的一攬子信貸保險如果一攬子掛鈎相關主體裡發生了足夠的信貸事件的話,就會造成合成CDO本金損失,從而觸發迷債層次的“underlying securities破產事件”,最終造成迷債的利息及本金損失

這好像也是在描述發行商健在的“精明債券”?

為甚麼在幾年的迷債銷售期間,從迷債章程和證監會審批人員,到金管局和銀行,
從 系列10 到 系列36 的幾年之間,
- 都從不知道 合成CDO究竟為何物?
- 銀行,證監會是否都認為 合成CDO 不屬於重大風險的信息?
- 也從未試圖瞭解過 合成CDO ? 2004年5月發行 系列10 的時候可能不瞭解成CDO具體組成,之後也從沒有去瞭解過?
直至2008年9月之後/或者安永報告出來才瞭解?
- 2004年5月-2008年8月, 銀行從沒有跟雷曼要求過抵押品文件?銷售迷債是抵押品文件可能還沒有出籠,在迷債抵押品購買之後是一定有的啊。
迷債抵押品是跟迷債相關的重大風險。迷債抵押品信息可是跟迷債風險相關的充分信息啊。
- 都沒有人跟客戶解釋過這些?
- 為甚麼沒有一個發行章程都寫一些類似的內容的?


3. 安永報告的一些定義(對照示意圖).
(a) FTD Swap: First To Default Swap. In a FTD Swap, the protection seller (ie.. PIFL) will take the loss caused by the first default to occur among a poool of up to 8 reference obligations. Upon occurrence of the first default within the reference pool, the settlment amount for the FTD Swap is dependent on the credit event of the FTD Swap reference obligations and the value of the underlying Synhtetic cDO for Series 10-36.


(b) CSO = Collateralized Swap Obligations. The CSO represents a swap arangement between the Synthetic CDO-level PSVs and LBSF in which the SPVs sell credit protection on a basket of between 97-194 underlying reference entities and surrender the total return of the Colalteral in exchange for periodic interest payment from LBSF. The CSO offers higher yield as the periodic interest payments are passed through the SPVs. However, the SPVs can be at risk of losing their initial investmtns if serveral credit events occcur in the reference portfolio.CSO

2009年6月8日 星期一

SFC Coverup for Minibond prospectuses?

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮表示: “證監會角色並非要監察投資產品價格是否穩定, 而是要確保所批核之投資產品, 有全面市場披露”.

Does SFC consider the Issuer Prospectuses & Program Prospectuses meet the above “全面市場披露” requirement? Does SFC consider the Issue Prospectuses meet SFC's claimed "clear, non-leading, adequate disclosure" standard ? (SFC may use Series #19 (2005) or #27 (2006) or #35 or #36 (2007) as examples).

From SFC CEO's testimony in Oct.13, 2008 Legco Meeting, (http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/chinese/hc/minutes/hc20081013.pdf).

SFC CEO 韋奕禮先生 seemed to be fooled by misleading statements in Minibond Issue Prospectuses, and was fooling the public by quoting the misleading statements from the Minibond Issue Prospectus.

1. SFC CDO 韋奕禮先生 said tthat “These products were backed by triple A collaterals and the likely cumulative historical rate of failure for triple A collaterals over the past 25 years between 1981 and 2006 is 0.09 percent for the first three years.”
The SFC CEO seemed to quote the historical default probability data in the Issue Prospectus of Minibond Series #36 (page 54). Such data obviously intended to show that Minibond was backed by collateral with such default historical data. However, such data does not apply to the Minibond (synthetic) CDO collateral at all! Because the quoted 25 year data was based on the default performance of all conventional AAA-rated debt issues. The Minibond (Synthetic) CDO collateral (Series 36 and many earlier Series) were Synthetic CDO which does not even have a 10-year historic data for data/record tracking.
Was SFC CEO fooled by such misleading data and considered the Minibond was ‘backed by’ ‘triple A collateral’ that had similar characteristics (in terms of default rate) as to the triple A conventional bond/debt?
Or: Was SFC CEO trying to fool the public by quoting the above misleading data ?

2. SFC CEO used "backed by triple A collateral" (in his speech quoted in #1 above).

"backed by" was a totally wrong or misleading descriptions here. The Minibond (money) was really INVESTED into triple A rated Synthetic CDO that sold credit protection on a basket of between 97-194 underlying reference entities to Lehman Brother. That is, the so-called "triple A collateral" was itself credit-linked to over 100 reference entities in its true nature, It was not a a conventional bond/debt by any definition,

By using 'backe by', SFC CEO was suggesting that the Minibond value was dependent on the (synthetic CDO) collateral, and effectively hinted that the synthetic CDO collateral had the similar quality as of a triple A conventional bond/debt.

Either the SFC CEO was misled by the Minibond Prospectus or was trying to mislead the public on the truth of Minibond.

In fact, If sufficient credit events occur within the Synthetic CDO basket's credit obligations, the resulting loss will be taken up by the Synthetic CDO through reduction of the Synthetic CDO principal. This leads to an "underlying securities default event" at the Minibond-level.

Was the Mr. SFC CEO aware of this?

It was the synthetic CDO that was secured by Collateral which was the Lehman USD (Money Market) Fund. The intention was probably to ensure the payment to the credit-protection buyer Lehman for the basket reference entities of 97-194 included in the Synthetic CDO.


3. [SFC CEO韋奕禮先生: Series 36. There are a number of different series. Generally, each series will have something akin to the statement in series 36, which said they are not suitable for everybody. They are suitable for people who want a fixed rate quarterly interest in US Dollars or Hong Kong Dollars and are confident that none of the seven named referred entities will be affected by a credit event and they are willing to accept the risk that our notes are not principal-protected and if a credit event happens to any one of the referred entities, you will only receive back in a credit event an early redemption amount which could be significantly less than the principal amount of our notes. That is a fairly typical disclosure of each of the documents.]

韋奕禮先生 was quoting from the Section "Who should buy our Notes? Are they suitable for everyone? ", which can be found in the Issue Prospectus (page 10, Series #27) as below:

[“Who should buy our Notes? Are they suitable for everyone?
Our Notes are not suitable for everyone. (...)
Our Notes are only suitable for investors who are:
- looking for fixed rate quarterly interest income in USD or HKD;
- confident that none of the 7 named reference entities will be affected by a credit event (that is, “Bankruptcy”, “Failure to Pay” or “Restructuring”, which include events such as a major borrowing default, bankruptcy or adverse debt restructuring) between the issue date and the second business day prior to the maturity date of our Notes and who are able to take the risk that they may lose their investment if one of these events does happen;
- willing to accept extension of the maturity date for our Tranche A Notes (...)
- willing to accept early repayment of principal (...). ]

Above statements in plain English clearly suggested (to retail clients) that, although it was not suitable for everyone, IF you were confident on the 7 reference entities, the Notes was for you! SFC CEO seemed to be content with the above misleading statement, and was fairly happy about the disclosure of ‘confident that none of the seven named reference entities will be affected by a credit event.". SFC CEO AGREED with such misleading statement, and was quoting it to defend the Minibond prospectuses.

After all, the key risks of the Minibond is the default-event with the 7 reference entities, is that right, MR. SFC CEO ?

Don’t we also need to be confident on the MANY never-mentioned & undisclosed reference-entities hidden in the Minibond CDO collateral, along with our confidence on the 7 well-known companies? Minibond CDO collateral was in fact credit-linked to many (over 100) reference entities, but not to the same 7 well-known companies. Use Series #19 as an example. Don’t we need to be confident that there would be less than 9 default event out of 125 reference entities? Because, out of 125 entities in Minibond CDO Collateral, the 9th default event would cause collateral principal loss, and the 10th default event would cause 100% collateral principal loss. Confidence on the 7 reference entities would catch us total surprise in seeing the 100% principal loss caused by the 10th default event out of the 125 reference entities which was mentioned nowhere in the prospectuses.

Was SFC CEO fooled by the Minibond prospectuses as HK retail minibond-buyers?

or: Was SFC CEO trying to fool the public in order to defend Minibond prospectuses?

2009年6月6日 星期六

銀行不瞭解(Lehman Minibond)迷債抵押品的性質? 不是系統性失誤是甚麼?



請問金管局:
如果銀行不瞭解迷你債卷抵押品的性質,銀行能夠系統性地清晰瞭解並跟客戶解釋迷你債卷的真實特徵和風險嗎?


前銀行公會主席和廣北先生於2008年9月27日的言論告訴金管局:銀行對於迷你“債卷抵押品的性質”不確切瞭解。銀行在這個迷你”債卷“的銷售上是犯了系統性的錯誤的。

為甚麼金管局至今還是堅持銀行無系統性失誤,只要按金管局的 既定 “從下至上”的方針,,一個個案例地查“違規銷售”?

金管局的如意算盤是:如果等 N 年後 2萬多例都查出有類似的問題的話,再查銀行的系統性失誤也不遲。反正在此事上的經濟效益和調查效益不是主要的。

金管局慷慨地以公款 庇護銀行和銀行家之心,路人皆知。 何人問責?

2008年9月27日明報: 銀行公會主席和廣北公開錶示:
“現時本港銀行作為雷曼迷你債的包銷商或分銷商,掌握的信息十分有限。這些債券狀況如何﹖債券抵押品的性質是什麼﹖。。。目前包銷商都不掌握確切信息。”



1。 和廣北先生用”債卷“來簡稱”迷你債卷“ !
這是否說明在和廣北先生的心裡,下意識地把本質為多層 Credit-Linked-Notes 的迷你債卷等同“債卷”來看待了?
或者說:和廣北先生或銀行口中的“債卷”只是個沒有任何意義的品牌名稱?
將來銀行管理層和銀行會否以“股票”作為品牌名來通稱期指和窩輪等一切產品呢?

2。 如果銀行確如和廣北先生所聲稱:對”債卷抵押品的性質“不掌握確切信息。
是否錶示:銀行並不知道迷你“債卷的抵押品“本質其實也是一個信貸掛鈎產品? ,
是否錶示:銀行並不知道迷你“債卷的抵押品”是跟諸多(100多個)各種評級的公司的信貸掛鈎的(而不再是甚麼七個著名公司)?
如果銀行真的是不清楚 迷你“債卷的抵押品“的確切特徵的話,
那麼,銀行該如何理解迷你“債卷”的真實特徵和風險呢? 真實特徵和風險在於跟 七個著名公司信貸掛鈎?
這是否也解釋了為甚麼銀行至今緘口不言迷你“債卷”的真實特徵和風險呢?


如果金管局監察銀行給銀行職員的迷債相關的培訓和銷售指引的話,就會發現銀行的(迷債相關的)內部培訓和指引都不提“債卷抵押品“, 更不提”債卷抵押品的性質““。

3。 銀行界有著理解並且買賣 CDO / Synthetic CDO / CDS /Credit-Linked Notes 的專業知識和專業人士。如果銀行都不能理解所謂迷你“債卷抵押品”的真實性質的話,如何解釋銀行的零售客戶們都是理解了迷你“債卷”的真實特徵和風險才買入迷你”債卷“的呢?

4。銀行銷售迷債不是偶爾的一次兩次。 在長達三,四年內,銀行共銷售了 20-30 多個類似性質系列的迷你債卷,如果銀行確實是沒有瞭解”債卷抵押品的性質”的話,那麼,
- 銀行是如何理解迷你債卷這種“債卷”的真實特徵和風險的呢?
- 銀行系統是如何作對於迷你債卷的盡職審查的呢?
- 銀行給與職員的培訓和銷售指引究竟是怎樣介紹迷債的真實特徵和風險的呢?風險為:跟 7 個著名公司信貸掛鈎?
- 銀行職員能給客戶介紹哪些迷債的真實特徵和風險的呢?
- 銀行不是犯了系統性的錯誤, 又是甚麼呢?!!!!!


4。以銀行界的專業知識和專業人員背景,
- 銀行是真的確實沒有瞭解“債卷抵押品的性質“呢?
-還是擔心披露“債卷抵押品的性質“ 會影響迷你“債卷”的銷售?

金管局如果調查的話,就會發現有一批銀行管理人員不僅是理解了“債卷抵押品的性質“, 還理解到了“債卷抵押品的性質“對迷你債卷銷售的危害力(例如:上海商業銀行等)。畢竟:“跟 7 個著名公司掛鈎” 的風險 和”跟 7 個著名公司 + 100多個各種評級的公司信貸掛鈎” 是完全不同的!對此銀行是完全清楚的。

這也解釋了為甚麼銀行的(迷債相關的)內部培訓和指引都不提“債卷抵押品“, 更不提”債卷抵押品的性質““。


金管局慷慨地以公款一味庇護銀行和銀行家的行徑,何時可以停止? ???

2009年5月27日 星期三

(轉載) 大聯盟給警務處處長鄧竟成 的一封信



Letter to Commissioner of Police Mr. Tang King Shing

Mr. Ian Grenville Cross, SC, JP
Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Ian McWalters, SC
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Lee Ka Chiu, Director of Crime & Security, HKP
Mr. Chan Yiu Kwok, CSP (Crime Commercial Bureau), HKP
Sirs,

The most important message of this letter is to inform you that your inaction and foot-dragging tactic is being exploited by the banks to carry out a second fraud against the victim investors defrauded by them. These victims were deceived by the banks as to the true nature of the Lehman-related securities when they were induced to make the purchase and now, courtesy of your inaction, they are subject to a second round of deception regarding their legal rights. Before you resort to the cliché that the victims should seek their own legal advice, they as well as the wider public are entitled to know what the government generally, and the relevant departments inclusive of yours in particular, have done.

2. What has happened in the last several months is an artificial environment created by you and other officials, with varying degree of intent, indifference, and culpability; to enable the banks to coerce the victims to agree to the so-called settlement. We are informed by some victims that the bank staff has adopted an intimidating attitude to:
(a) induce the victims to agree to settle on terms dictated by the banks;
(b) mislead the victims into believing that the terms of settlement would be harsher with the passage of time thereby putting pressure on the victims to surrender their rights to whatever terms offered to them;
(c) deny the victims the right to be accompanied by relatives or friends in the settlement process;
(d) deny the victims the right to have a full written record of the terms and conditions of the settlement.

3. The risk that a majority, if not all, of these settlements are reached under duress is substantial and real. The HKMA and the SFC have the profiles of the victims and they know how many and who are vulnerable to duress or misrepresentation. The senior officials of these two bodies are by far the most culpable for allowing the banks this ‘window of opportunity’ to perpetrate the second fraud.

4. It is not disputed that the extent to which this second fraud is properly so characterized is dependent on whether the original complaint of fraud is well-grounded in our jurisprudence. It is therefore apposite to recount in summary form what is known and what evidence is at hand. We are only a handful of victims not having legal or financial expertise, nor do we have any privileged right of access to information not available to the public, yet we have been able to unearthed the following within months after the fraud came to light. This convinces us that you undoubtedly are in possession of sufficient evidence, and information that will lead to further evidence, that would satisfy any reasonable police officers and prosecutors that criminal prosecution against the suspects is fully justified.

5. The evidence we rely on to demand immediate intensification of investigation and prosecution is as follows:
(a) The prospectuses in pursuance of which the Lehman-related securities were sold (the ‘Lehman prospectuses’) are incapable of describing the nature of the products or explaining the risks inherent therein by a massive margin.
(b) The Lehman-related securities feature a ‘piggybacked structure’ with a façade, typically a first-to-default credit-linked note (the ‘FTD’) concealing a hidden component varyingly referred to as ‘security’ or ‘collateral’ in the Lehman prospectuses. At least in majority of cases, the ‘hidden component’ is synthetic floating rate notes that are the sine qua non of the Lehman-related securities. This hidden component will be referred to as ‘Security’ below in order to distinguish it from the ‘real collateral’ the existence of which is not disclosed in the Lehman prospectuses.
(c) Structure note resembling the FTD in every material aspect was sold by HSBC Bank in Hong Kong (the ‘HSBC notes’) during the material time when the Lehman-related securities were sold. The issuer of HSBC notes and issuer of ‘minibond’ are almost identical in the sense that the individuals sit on these two boards of directors during the material time are almost the same. If the corporate veil is lifted, both issuers are clearly controlled by the same unit or department within the HSBC group.
(d) The law firm Linklaters advised the two issuers in respect of the two different products – the relevant Lehman-related securities known as ‘minibond’ and the HSBC notes. Despite the enormous differences between the two – one a ‘piggybacked structure’ while the other is just a FTD, the two prospectuses concerned are almost identical in structure, content and layout.
(e) Structure notes resembling the ‘Security’ in every material aspect were sold by Lehman Brothers in Australia during the material time through an entity under its control – Mahogany Capital Limited. The Mahogany prospectuses provide a rough but insightful estimate of what and how extensive details about the ‘Security’ were withheld from the Lehman prospectuses.
(f) Numerous victims defrauded by this fraud have enquired the banks concerned about the training to which the relevant staff involved in the sales of the Lehman-related securities had been given. The responses received all indicate that training for the Lehman-related securities was provided by the Sun Hung Kai Financial (the ‘SHKF’). In the past two months or so, we have repeatedly invited SHKF to admit or deny whether it has anything to do with the training of staff of other distributor banks regarding the sales of the Lehman-related securities. So far, all replies from SHKF have been evasive refusing to address its role over the training issue.

6. The above points (a) to (f) are factual and they are grounded on documentary evidence and the following are reasonable inferences that we believe also to be factual:
(a) The façade and the Security are products capable of and are being sold as stand-alone products. They were sold separately by Lehman Brothers.
(b) The purpose of ‘piggybacking’ a façade on the Security is solely for deception purpose. There is no other economic or legitimate commercial purpose.
(c) SHKF as coordinating distributor either knew, or recklessly indifferent of, the true nature of the Lehman-related securities. In its training provided to the bank staff responsible for selling the securities, it put emphasis only on the façade as if it is the be all and end all of the products. This is a misrepresentation of the true nature of the Lehman-related securities, but the Lehman prospectuses are designed and organized in such a way to facilitate such misrepresentation. At any event, the Security level of synthetic derivative notes would be too complicated for the bank staff and the prospective investors.

7. The fraud is commonplace in terms of its modus operandi, namely by means of misstatement of facts. It is unusual in terms of the parties involved and their status, namely almost two dozens of banks and financial institutions ranging from global dominant players to local runners-up are implicated. The amount of money involved is also unprecedented by local history. A further dimension of complexity is that the same ‘piggybacked structured’ financial products marketed by the same modus operandi was adopted by another, or other, major financial institutions. Because the suspects are too powerful and well-connected with the political leadership, the criminal law is halted right at doorstep of the banks. The latent privileges, including potential immunity from the law, enjoyed by the banks and the well-connected (such as the Linklaters) crystallize which turns law enforcement into a consensual matter in so far as these suspects are concerned.

8. Is there any reason why the police and the DPP are indulging in this wait-and-see trick? Already in their brief should be the following ingredients sufficient for bringing the suspects to court:
(a) Indictment: fraud contrary to section 16A of the Theft Ordinance (Cap. 210 of the Laws of Hong Kong).
(b) Defendants: (i) HSBC Bank and its individual employees serving on the boards of directors of the issuers authorizing the issuance of the Lehman-related securities.
(ii) SHKF and the distributor banks
(iii) Lehman Brothers Asia Limited and Mr. Leon Hindle.
(c) Evidence: (i) the Lehman prospectuses; (ii) testimonies of the victim informants who have lodged complaints with the police.
(d) Points of law that may be disputed: the nature of Lehman-related securities.
The reports produced by the HKMA and SFC contain numerous misstatements of facts, especially in respect of the securities. There are also articles appear in locally based professional periodicals purported to explain the fraud in a misleading way. This is reminiscent of burning the Reichstag by Hitler in 1933. Is it not a concerted effort to whitewash the fact and paint over it with fiction?

9. In the recently adjudicated case of HKSAR v HO Ka Keung (Criminal Appeal No. 196 of 2007), the defendant, a professional insurance broker, was charged with the same offence as abovesaid. It was held that recklessness suffices to found a conviction and the personal attributes of the defendant were ‘obviously relevant’ to the question of guilt. In paragraph 51 of the judgement, the learned judge endorsed the observation of the trial judge as to the state of knowledge of the defendant. In this connection, the defendant was held at the trial that he ‘knew that commission was to be paid ... at a very attractive level and, quite clearly, he knew that the whole purpose ... was churning through insurance forms without any attempt ... to ensure that they were honest, truthful and complete’. The same description could properly be applied to the distributor banks and the HSBC Bank. The defendant in this case had been found guilty and his appeal was dismissed. If what he did is unlawful, so is the conduct of the suspects identified above.

10. According to professor Alastair Hudson of Queen Mary, University of London, actionable loss arising from the context of financial derivative products could generally be classified into two categories: ‘failure of model’ and ‘suitability failure’. HSBC Bank and Mr. Hindle knew the model is doomed to disaster for the retail investors but they decided that their personal gains override the concern that the model is fraudulent. The ‘suitability failure’ follows inevitably from it. (See ‘The Law on Financial Derivatives’ 2nd Ed., (Sweet & Maxwell, 1998)).

11. In our polity, it is the judiciary that decides whether the suspects are guilty. The refusal of the police and the DPP to prosecute this crime rigorously verges perilously on perverting the course of justice. If the refusal of the suspects to cooperate is a reason for delay, the public should be informed of this fact and decide for themselves their best course of action.

Yours faithfully
The Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims in Hong Kong

From: http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/letter-to-director-of-public-prosecutions2733.php

2009年5月22日 星期五

要求金管局公開“違規銷售”的(定義)範疇並回答以下相關問題

[2009年5月23日 新聞報道:]
金管局總裁任志剛【圖左】昨天第六次出席立法會作證,...... 任志剛表示,當局目前的監察重點仍在如何更快調查出銀行的違規銷售.]


任總多次錶示 “違規銷售需受懲罰”。 再次確認金管局對於迷債的調查著重於“違規銷售”。

何謂“違規銷售”?

銀行以黑箱作業手法調查其客戶對銀行自己的投訴。金管局的調查也是黑箱作業方式。出於對投訴人和公眾的公平合理,
我們要求金管局應該給公眾公開“違規銷售”的基本定義範疇。
公開“違規銷售”的基本定義範疇可以增加投訴人和公眾的對於金管局調查的公平合理性的信心。
黑箱作業只能增加公眾對金管局調查的公平性的疑問,有害於公眾利益。當然,黑箱調查是銀行和銀行家最為期待的。

我們同時也要求金管局並回答以下問題,(如果不能回答的話,請金管局給與其理由)。
1。 ”失實陳訴“是否屬於“違規銷售”?
2。 如果職員沒有跟客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險, 只跟客戶解釋跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎,而根本不提抵押品,是否屬於“不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險”? 是否屬於違背了操守准則的要求? 是否屬於“違規銷售”?
3。 如果職員沒有「透徹理解」投資產品,違背了操守准則的要求的話,是否屬於“違規銷售”?
4。 如果银行沒有跟客戶提供提供充足的迷你債卷風險的相關資料,(操守准則: "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information“),是否屬於“違規銷售” ?
5。 新鴻基金融為迷債的co-distributor, 曾為許多銀行提供了關於跟迷債相關的培訓。事實上,許多銀行(如:永亨銀行等)的迷債銷售是直接跟新鴻基金融合作,而不是直接跟雷曼亞洲合作的。 證監會就新鴻基金融的迷債銷售提出的關註
[ 一、對產品進行的盡職審查是否足夠;二、對前線人員提供的培訓是否足夠,從而確保投資者理解產品涉及的一切重大風險;三、迷債系列的風險水平;向零售銷售人員傳達迷債風險評級的信息;及採取理應採取的措施,確保銷售人員提供合理適當意見;]
- 如果銀行於以上 三個方面的某一個或都有有問題的話, 是否屬於“違規銷售”?
- 金管局對於銀行於以上 三個方面有沒有進行任何相關的調查?如果沒有的話,請告知理由。

希望金管局不要把香港打造成 “國際金融糖衣毒藥銷售中心” !

2009年5月21日 星期四

金管局浪費資源,只為保護銀行和銀行家的利益,誰人“問責”?

"AN ERROR DOES NOT BECOME A MISTAKE UNTIL YOU REFUSE TO CORRECT IT"

1。 證監會就迷你債券涉及的內部系統及監控進行調查後, 有效地發現了涉及迷你債卷銷售的基本問題。 證監會譴責了迷你債卷 co-distributor 新鴻基 SHK Securities Limited 和 凱基證券亞洲有限公司(凱基證券)。

證監會的調查方式迅速有效,不僅僅是保障了公眾利益,還有效地使用了證監會的(人力財力)資源。

2。金管局卻調查伊始就完全排除有銀行系統性錯誤的可能, 將可能出現的的錯誤定性為(個別)銷售人員的“錯誤銷售”。

雷曼破產之後,銀行職員和銀行的錶態都充分顯示了銀行並不清楚迷債的真實特徵和風險,並不清楚迷債的最“精華”部分:抵押品的性質。(當然,不排除有銀行高層是完全明白理解迷債實質但有意隱瞞,這有待於律政司/警察商業犯罪調查科的進一步調查)。

是甚麼原因促使金管局決定不首先對銀行系統做基本調查的呢? 是甚麼原因促使金管局決定採用需要大量人力耗時且低效益的方式來調查2萬多迷債投訴呢?

3。2009年1月,證監會就新鴻基金融的迷債銷售提出的關註包括:

[ 一、對產品進行的盡職審查是否足夠;二、對前線人員提供的培訓是否足夠,從而確保投資者理解產品涉及的一切重大風險;三、迷債系列的風險水平;向零售銷售人員傳達迷債風險評級的信息;及採取理應採取的措施,確保銷售人員提供合理適當意見;等等]


新鴻基金融曾為許多銀行提供了關於跟迷債相關的培訓。事實上,許多銀行(如:永亨銀行等)的迷債銷售是直接跟新鴻基金融合作,而不是直接跟雷曼亞洲合作的。

這就再次提出一個基本問題:

甚麼原因造成金管局(一再)堅持決定不做基本的調查,為甚麼金管局這麼確信銀行沒有系統性失誤呢? 竊鈎者誅,竊國者侯?


4。 金管局的調查方式是:假定銀行沒有系統性失誤(可意會不可言傳),對每一個投訴案例,按金管局預先設定的問題,逐個詢問。金管局收到超過2萬多關於迷你債卷的投訴。至今處理了400多個個案。

金管局調查人員跟我進行電話詢問的時候,連我的投訴信都沒有看過,根本都不知道我的投訴內容是甚麼,只知道是迷債。只字不問我的投訴信裡到底具體投訴了些甚麼。就根據金管局的預定問題,包括年齡,收入,是否由職員介紹買入迷債,買迷債的資金是否由定期而來,等等。卻只字不詢問買入的時候,我對於對於 迷債的理解,以及 銀行是如何解釋 迷債的真實特徵和相關風險的。

如果,根本不過問投訴人的具體投訴,只是根據金管局預定的詢問問題進行問答,那麼,會有個甚麼結果呢? 應該是根據金管局預定問題的方曏而得出的期待的結果?

儘管客戶就迷債的真實特徵和相關風險投訴被誤導。金管局的調查方式幾乎是假定了一個默認的調查邏輯:如果是投訴迷債的,那麼就是跟“錯誤銷售”有關。這也是金管局人員不主動詢問投訴人具體的是投訴和因由。這大概也是金管局人員不詢問關於迷債的真實特徵和相關風險的問題。

5。對於2萬多人的關於同一個產品(迷你債卷)的投訴,通常應該是首先清除有沒有系統性失誤。而迷債之謎的關鍵是其真實特徵和相關風險。通常的 bottom-up 邏輯應該是:

《首先》:銀行職員「透徹理解」投資產品;

《其次》 銀行職員曏客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險;

《其它》瞭解客戶。。。。。。

〈最後》銷售迷债。

銀行職員有沒有 ‘解釋產品的真實特徵及風險’ 以及職員對投資產品的「透徹理解」,應該是調查迷你債卷投訴的基本問題吧。


6。金管局選擇的調查方式是否更有效地調查和找出事件的主要原因?或則只是更有效地需求更多人力/財力和時間來完成調查? 對於2萬多投訴,這是最佳方式呢還是最低效益方式之一呢?

金管局這麼多高薪專業人才,好像非常善於選擇 "只看枝節,不看問題的基本關鍵"," 只見樹枝 ,不見森林 "(恐怕連樹都沒看見)的調查方式。其結果是勞民傷財,且效益低下。不能夠象證監會一樣地迅速查出和糾正銀行的系統性錯誤。造成金管局以浪費公款來縱容和庇護銀行的錯誤的局面,既損害公眾利益,也損害了香港政府和香港金融界的公信力。

如果將來事實證明金管局的調查邏輯和方式只是有效地將主要問題和次要枝節問題混淆,從而造成需要更長地時間和浪費公款(納稅人的錢)去調查(關於迷你債卷的)投訴。那麼,有沒有‘問責’的人?

7。不要讓“迷債之都”變成“金融中心”的代名詞

公眾利益不僅僅是銀行和銀行家的利益。銀行和金管局聯手掩蓋事實的企圖只能達到欲蓋彌張 的效果。或許可能會短期保護了銀行家的既得利益。長遠終究會進一步地損害銀行的聲譽,讓香港作為金融中心的聲譽徹底地跟“老千”掛鈎。 當然,這些恐怕是不在銀行家的考慮之中的了。諸多的銀行家們看來是非常精於“厚黑學” (李宗吾: 「厚」是厚臉皮,「黑」是黑心腸))。

2009年5月12日 星期二

金管局的黑箱調查對投訴人是否公平合理?

金管局的職責 : ”保障銀行和銀行家的利益“ ???

金管局從去年雷曼破產之後,收到超過2萬多關於迷你債卷的投訴。金管局發布了一個調查報告,將調查進展結果分為以下幾個類別:
[ "初步評核" : “錶面證據不足”: “收集更多資料“: ”立案調查“: ]

1。 對於2萬多人的關於同一個產品(迷你債卷)的投訴,出於對公眾的公平合理的角度,金管局為甚麼不可以公布其處理投訴的基本原則?
這些基本原則,是否跟迷你債卷的抵押品一樣,只可隱藏不提,見不得光?
比如:
- "初步評核" : 如何劃分的? 基本標準是甚麼?
-“錶面證據不足”:如何劃分的? 主要指甚麼情形?常見的例子 (from 處理了的400多宗個案)?
-“收集更多資料“:如何劃分的? 主要指甚麼情形?常見的例子? 主要是指個人資產/包括銀行賬戶,房產?
- ”立案調查“: 如何劃分的? 基本標準是甚麼?

2。 對於金管局至今已經處理了的400多宗個案, 主要的共同點 Pattern 是甚麼呢?

3。 對於2萬多人的關於同一個產品(迷你債卷)的投訴, 通常的 bottom-up 邏輯應該是:
銀行職員「透徹理解」投資產品-》 銀行職員曏客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險=》瞭解客戶=》。。。》銷售。
銀行職員有沒有「透徹理解」投資產品,應該是調查迷你債卷投訴的基本問題吧。
- 金管局的調查逻辑和方式是什么呢?可否请详述?
- 金管局的調查邏輯和方式是否更有效地調查和找出事件的主要矛盾?Or: just to make the investigation require more people and more time?

金管局這麼多高薪專業人才,好像很善於做”揀了芝麻,丟了西瓜“,只看枝節,不看問題的基本關鍵, 只見樹枝 ,不見森林 (恐怕連樹都沒看見)。
這樣做的結果是:投訴人受氣,銀行高興。
如果將來事實證明金管局的調查邏輯和方式只是有效地將主要矛盾和次要枝節問題混淆,從而造成需要更長地時間和浪費公款(納稅人的錢)去調查(關於迷你債卷的)投訴。那麼,有沒有‘問責’的人?




4。 對於金管局至今已經處理了的400多宗個案, 有沒有調查銀行職員是否有違規“操守准則”?
畢竟,迷你債卷的關鍵問題是:客戶是在沒有瞭解到產品的真實特徵和相關風險的情況下買入標榜是“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎”的迷債的。
(一)從處理了的400多宗個案, 有多少是反映了銀行職員對於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」的?(操守准則”的“適合性” )
- 對於那些經過調查反映了銀行職員對於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」的個例,主要錶現在那些方面呢?
對於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」的銀行職員是如何跟客戶解釋迷債的真實特徵和風險的呢?
請舉出主要的例子.
- 或者:金管局沒有調查銀行職員對於迷你債卷是否有「透徹理解」?因為金管局認為銀行職員自然是於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」的? 請舉出主要的例子.
- 或者:金管局沒有調查銀行職員對於迷你債卷是否有「透徹理解」?因為金管局認為投訴人只是投訴被誤導產品的真實特徵和相關風險,並沒有直接指明銀行職員對於迷你債卷沒有「透徹理解」, 所以不需要調查?銀行職員對於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」與否與投訴無關?
請舉出主要的例子.

(二)從處理了的400多宗個案: 有多少是反映了銀行職員 向客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的缺點及風險?
("Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information")
主要錶現在那些方面呢?

5。 金管局給諸多的投訴人致電確認信息,包括投訴人的收入狀況,財產狀況。還有要求投訴人帶著一年的銀行月結單和物業差響單去金管局面談。美其名「適合性」的調查。

例如你在街上遇到「寶藥黨」或「祈福黨」被騙了5萬塊錢去報警,警方會不會先問你有幾多財產,拿出銀行的月結單證明你確有這些錢一直在銀行裡,或者有幾多物業及收租的收入來證明這些錢確實是你的, 警方會不會先確認你的錢產物業,再去調查騙去你的錢的人?

「適合性」還包括 “認識你推介的投資產品, 如「透徹理解」投資產品的結構、運作方式,其包含的投資項目的性質及風險”是調查投訴案的基礎“ 和 ”就客戶的情况作合適的配對,並要用淺白易懂的言語向客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的缺點及風險,對長者及缺乏投資經驗的客戶,應特別審慎。“

金管局有沒有就以上調查呢? (詳述於以上#3 & #4)。

證監會就迷你債券涉及的內部系統及監控進行調查後, 還知道 譴責迷你債卷 co-distributor 新鴻基 SHK Securities Limited 和 凱基證券亞洲有限公司(凱基證券), 以保障公眾利益.
證監會還知道為小股東的公平利益而跟權勢公司PCCW打官司。
在迷你債卷事件上,金管局則為了保護銀行和銀行家的利益竭盡其權利之所能。對於投訴人竭盡使投訴人為難之招。

金管局的所謂”保障存款人投資者利益“的職責應該改為”保障銀行和銀行家的利益“!

Shame on you, HKMA ! Shame on you, HKMA Officers!
Can you sleep well, HKMA officers?
Do you wake up by nightmares?

2009年5月7日 星期四

銀行是否按照“操守准則”來銷售迷你債卷的?

迷你債卷的關鍵問題是:客戶是在沒有瞭解到產品的真實特徵和相關風險的情況下買入標榜是“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎”的迷債的。
儘管銀行和金管局都一直把迷債的問題歸於雷曼的倒閉和某些銀行職員的“不良銷售”, 而絕口不提銀行在銷售迷你債卷是是否盡職的問題。

我們在此討論銀行對於其客戶應該付有甚麼樣的責任的問題, 討論銀行是否按照“操守准則”來銷售迷你債卷的。

SFC Code of Conduct requires that "Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling",
and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information".


1。 為甚麼銀行不敢光明正大地曏公眾再次解釋銀行對於迷債的的真實特徵和風險 ?
銀行至今一直聲稱銀行是給客戶解釋了產品的真實特徵和風險的。
在過去的幾年裡,銀行作為迷你債卷的銷售商,從來都是勇於跟其客戶解釋迷你債卷的真實特徵和風險的。
(事實是:銀行對於產品介紹的共同點是:只介紹迷債跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎而只字不提抵押品,從未解釋迷債不是投入到跟7個公司相關的債卷或資產之中, 從未介紹迷債還跟其它諸多公司(100多)信貸掛鈎的相關風險。這是幾年一貫的一致Pattern,金管局至今所調查的400多個例就可證明此 Pattern。或許銀行公會可以提供不同的個例?)
現在,沒有職員肯給客戶重新解釋一遍。
為甚麼銀行不可以光明正大地以系列19和27為例再次給公眾解釋一遍 ?


2。為甚麼銀行未有給客戶提供充足的迷你債卷風險的相關資料 ?
如果银行确实是理解了迷你债卷的跟100多个各类公司信贷挂钩的特征,而不仅仅只是了解到迷你债卷的高佣金。
那么, 在2004至2008的不同經濟環境下,銀行都是始終一貫地大肆介紹跟7個著名A/AA評級公司掛鈎,始終只字不提抵押品的風險,只字不提抵押品還跟其它100多 個(不是1個或 10個)公司掛鈎,而且那些公司的平均評級低於A並包括 sub-investment grade 的公司。
原因是什么?
银行确实了解 "跟100多 個公司 信贷掛鈎" 的風險 和 "跟 1個 或 10個 公司 信贷掛鈎" 的風險 是非常不同的吧?!

或許幾年以來銀行一直認為迷債的風險只是跟那7個著名公司信貸掛鈎?
或許銀行確實是認為以“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎”代錶了迷你債卷的真實風險和特徵?只要給出跟7個公司信貸掛鈎的有關的資料,就足以讓客戶瞭解到迷你債卷的真實風險和特徵?抵押品跟100多個公司信貸掛鈎的資料跟那7個著名公司的相關資料比是無關緊要的?7个著名公司的风险足以代表了跟其它100多个各类评级的公司的信贷风险?

- 迷你債卷是跟7個著名A/AA公司的信貸掛鈎.
- 迷你債卷的CDO抵押品是跟100多個公司的信貸掛鈎,其中有的公司的信貸評級是 低於”投資“(即sub-investment grade)評級. CDO抵押品中的信貸掉期破產合約將抵押品組合中的掛鈎公司的信貸風險合成地轉移到了抵押品的持有人(即:迷你債卷持有人)身上 。

銀行有甚麼理由以“7”代替這 100多個公司呢?如果是經濟好的緣故的話,就更不用擔心披露這100多個公司了吧?
銀行有甚麼理由认为这 合成CDO抵押品的信息不是 Material Information to Minibond ?
In fact, No professional intermediary could have valued the Minibond using only the information provided in Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus & marketing material.

3。 為甚麼銀行不敢勇於承認自己是違背了 以上“操守准則”的要求的?
银行认为自己没错的主要依据是把 Program Prospectus 和发行章程给了客户。所以,银行已经尽了责任了。

发行章程的内容监管不是银行的责任。 可是,银行在给客户发行章程的时候,是否要对产品有所理解从而确定这些章程确实是给客户提供了充分的跟产品相关的资料 ?

或者说, 银行的责任是否只是不问青红皂白,不需加以理解地,作为一个 no-brainer,按发行商指令,把发行章程给了客户就算是万事大吉了? 简单总结一下,几年以来,银行只是负责把章程给了客户,不管那章程是不是提供了充分的相关风险资料。因为银行只是一个no-brainer的挣卖产品佣金的销售商?
如果是这样的话,银行应该明确地告诉所有客户:
银行对客户的一切解释是等于零,解释了等于没有解释。银行不需要理解产品的内容。银行的职责是发行商叫给什么资料就给什么资料与客户。银行对客户的责任其实是不包括有向其客户解释和提供相关风险的信息和资料的责任的。至于发行商推荐的资料是否提供了充分的相关风险资料,那就不属于银行的责任范畴了。银行是作为一个 no-brainer 的销售商,只管销售而已。

4。 為甚麼銀行不可以曏迷債持有者披露當初在決定銷售這個產品時,所接受過的相關培訓資料以及相關公司的名稱?

5。為甚麼銀行不可以曏迷債持有者披露銀行對職員進行的(有關迷債/信貸言聲產品的)培訓課程和培訓資料?
既然銀行認為自己是沒有錯,曏公眾披露這些相關資料是最好的證明。

6。 請問:銀行對於迷債的實質的理解是否跟以下新鴻基的相關人士的言論相似呢?
新鴻基金融作為主要的分銷商,據說也曾曏諸多銀行提供相關培訓。
一些“負責任”的銀行職員跟客戶解釋的也只是:迷債跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎而只字不提抵押品,也從未解釋迷債不是投入到跟7個公司相關的債卷或資產之中,這是幾年一貫的一致Pattern,跟以下新鴻基金融的說法相差無幾。或許銀行公會可以提供不同的個例?

(i) Quotes from Sun Hung Kai News Release on Minibond Series#28 (Oct.2006)
[ Mr. Francis Wong, Head of Structured Products Distribution of SHK Securities Limited, said, “Minibond Series 28 is the ideal choice for investors who desire to yield a stable income in view of the interest rate trends that may fluctuate. Being linked to a basket of shares of high-quality international financial institutions, this minibond series renders to investors potential total returns of as high as 51.50%, provided that no credit event arises during the period. Investors could secure assured positive returns in the subsequent years when the interest rates are predicted to be on the downturn”. ]
http://www.strategic.com.hk/files.news/minibond%2028%20-%20press%20release%20_eng_final.pdf

(ii) Quotes from “The Standard Finance” (13 Aug. 2007)
[ (……) (Zoe Leung, deputy head of structured products distribution at Sun Hung Kai Financial) Leung (……). "Our product is linked to high investment grade financial institutions like Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs," she (Zoe Leung) says.
The spread on bonds issued by these investment banks are seen to be volatile lately, but this has had no impact on their fundamentals, Leung points out. (…...)
"The product appeals to those who like time deposits”, Leung says. ]
http://finance.thestandard.com.hk/chi/money_news_view.asp?aid=51085

2009年5月6日 星期三

Shameless Heartless Banking Crooks?

據報道: 銀 行 公 會 雷 曼 專 責 小 組 主 席 龔 楊 恩 慈 表 示 , 繼 續 跟 雷 曼 苦 主 商 談 和 解 , 她 說 明 白 雷 曼 苦 主 投 資 失 利 的 不 安 。
身 兼 中 銀 香 港 分 銷 網 絡 總 經 理 的 龔 楊 恩 慈 又 提 到 , 處 理 客 戶 有 關 雷 曼 迷 債 的 投 訴 仍 然 是 中 銀 香 港 首 要 任 務 。

http://www.rthk.org.hk/rthk/news/expressnews/news.htm?expressnews&20090506&55&579594

不禁令人想到:龔 楊 恩 慈 女士可否解釋何謂誠信?何謂銀行對於客戶的 Duty of Care?
龔 楊 恩 慈 是否為了銀行利益而將自己的靈魂出賣給魔鬼了? (假定龔 楊 恩 慈 女士是有靈魂的話)。

香港有諸多的人投資失利:買股票,買窩輪,買期指,因此而血本無歸的大有人在,為甚麼沒有人出來抗議銀行欺騙?

暫且不談:在4萬多雷曼迷你債卷的持有人中,有多少人買入迷你債卷的時候是當做投資買入的呢?
这個所謂的"投资"是以3-7年为锁定期间,(據銀行介紹)到期时拿回100%本金,一分钱也不会多。其余的就是那比libor略高1%左右的锁定的利息。提早赎回可导致本金损失。
龔 楊 恩 慈 是否可以跟公眾介紹一下,這個所謂的“投資”,在過去的幾年以來,銀行是如何跟客戶介紹解釋的?銀行應該是非常容易且樂意給公眾再次演示他們已經做了幾年的關於迷你債卷的真實特徵和風險的完美解釋的吧。

雷曼苦主買入迷你債卷之失利在於受銀行的誤導和欺騙。迷你債卷客戶是在沒有瞭解到產品的真實特徵和相關風險的情況下買入標榜是“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎”的迷債的, 卻不知:此”迷你債卷“非“債卷”,不是投入到任何跟那7家著名公司相關的資產或債卷的,此“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎”只是個烟幕彈,其實是“跟100多個各種評級公司的信貸掛鈎”。

龔 楊 恩 慈女士 如果還是有良知的話,是否敢以她父母丈夫孩子的名義起誓:銀行確實是跟客戶解釋了迷你債卷的真實特徵和相關風險,銀行確實是跟客戶解釋了迷你債卷抵押品的特徵和風險,銀行確實是跟客戶解釋了迷你債卷跟100多個公司信貸掛鈎的實質?

在過去的幾年裡,銀行作為迷你債卷的銷售商,從來都是勇於跟其客戶解釋迷你債卷的真實特徵和風險的。
事實是:銀行對於產品介紹的共同點是:只介紹迷債跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎而只字不提抵押品,從未解釋迷債不是投入到跟7個公司相關的債卷或資產之中, 從未介紹迷債還跟其它諸多公司(100多)信貸掛鈎的相關風險。這是幾年一貫的一致Pattern,金管局至今所調查的400多個例就可證明此 Pattern。或許銀行可以提供不同的個例?
現在,沒有職員肯給客戶重新解釋一遍。
為甚麼銀行不可以光明正大地以系列19和27為例 (或者其它系列)再次給公眾解釋一遍 迷債的的真實特徵和風險以及相關風險的資料?

- 迷你債卷是跟7個著名A/AA公司的信貸掛鈎.
- 迷你債卷的CDO抵押品是跟100多個公司的信貸掛鈎,其中有的公司的信貸評級是 低於”投資“(即sub-investment grade)評級. CDO抵押品中的信貸掉期破產合約將抵押品組合中的掛鈎公司的信貸風險合成地轉移到了抵押品的持有人(即:迷你債卷持有人)身上 。

銀行有甚麼理由以“7”代替這 100多個公司呢?如果是經濟好的緣故的話,就更不用擔心披露這100多個公司了吧?
銀行有甚麼理由認為這 合成CDO抵押品的信息不是 Material Information to Minibond ?


「銀行業的確犯了不少錯誤。我們必須緊記,雖然一般銀行家大多不斷努力為客戶提供優質的服務,但不可否認當中已
經有很多人令業界聲譽大受損害。

不少人以不當手法銷售不適當的產品,但薪酬條件之優厚形同失控,而不當的獎勵亦
導致人鋌而走險。當中的罪魁禍首卻往往是此制度下的最大得益者,確實引起廣泛的公憤。

這一切都顯示銀行業的文化與操守出了問題—–就是做事的人往往已經不問對錯,只著眼於有沒有違規犯法。銀行業應該重新以正確的動機,來驅動經營手法。」

「如果一間企業的文化並不鼓勵它的人員時刻講求行事端正,不論有多少監管的規則、規例,都不足以杜絕危機再現」
-- 引自 (汇丰)葛霖在2009「主席的話」