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2010年8月9日 星期一

Lehman, HSBC May Be Sued by Hong Kong Investors in New York

Aug. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and HSBC Holdings Plc may be sued over $1.6 billion in worthless securities sold to retail investors in Hong Kong, a judge in New York ruled yesterday.

U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley III reversed part of a decision by Lehman’s bankruptcy judge, who threw out a suit by seven holders of structured financial notes called minibonds. The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of investors in the notes from June 16, 2003, to Sept. 15, 2008, Pauley said in his decision.

An estimated $1.8 billion of minibonds were sold to about 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, according to local regulators. Lehman’s bankruptcy in 2008 wiped out the value of the investments, resulting in protests outside bank branches that have continued even after last year’s government-brokered settlement between sellers and buyers of minibonds.

This shows that the courts around the world have investor protection at heart and investors should be protected against mis-selling by those that gain commissions from these types of investment products,” said Lewis Man, a partner at Hong Kong law firm Gall.

Hong Kong doesn’t have a mechanism for filing class action lawsuits.

David Hall, a Hong Kong-based spokesman for HSBC, didn’t immediately have a response to the ruling. Kimberly Macleod, a Lehman spokeswoman, didn’t return a voice-mail message left yesterday seeking comment.

Dismissal Reversed

In two orders, issued in November and December, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that any attempt to revise their complaint would be futile. Pauley yesterday reversed the dismissal of one count against HSBC and Lehman and permitted the plaintiffs to amend two dismissed counts.

Pacific International Finance Ltd. issued the minibonds and marketed them as linked to the credit of financially sound companies and backed by AAA-rated collateral, Pauley said. A Hong Kong regulatory investigation disclosed that Lehman designed the minibonds program, the judge said. HSBC Bank USA was selected as trustee of the collateral securing the notes, Pauley said, citing testimony in the Hong Kong proceeding.

Public outcry over the collapse of the minibonds led to street protests in Hong Kong and an investigation by regulators into how banks sold the products. The head of the city’s securities watchdog, Martin Wheatley, was called repeatedly to testify before Hong Kong’s legislature.

Two BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd. managers in June pleaded not guilty in the city’s District Court to charges of fraudulently selling minibonds. BOC Hong Kong was the biggest seller of the securities. The trial of the two employees starts in November.

Hong Kong banks offered to pay at least 60 cents on the dollar to investors in July last year as part of a buyback agreement brokered by the SFC. In an Aug. 6 press release, Hong Kong’s central bank said more than 13,000 cases were resolved by the repurchase agreement, and 179 Lehman-related complaints remain under investigation.

To contact the reporter on this story: Bob Van Voris in New York atrvanvoris@bloomberg.net; Debra Mao in Hong Kong atdmao5@bloomberg.net

2010年6月10日 星期四

Goldman Sachs Hudson CDO Said to Be Target of Second SEC Probe , 高盛面臨美證監第二項調查

June 10 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc.’s $2 billion Hudson Mezzanine collateralized debt obligation, sold in 2006, is the target of a probe by the Securities and Exchange Commission, according to a person with knowledge of the matter.

The inquiry into the CDO may not lead to any additional actions against the New York-based securities firm, said the person, who declined to be identified because the investigation isn’t public. Michael DuVally, a spokesman for Goldman Sachs, declined to comment, as did SEC spokesman John Nester. The Financial Times reported the probe yesterday.

The U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, led by Levin, released e-mails in April related to Goldman Sachs’s mortgage-linked deals, including the Hudson Mezzanine transaction. In one October 2006 e-mail, a Goldman Sachs employee describes how the Hudson deal might be viewed by investors as “junk.”

Hudson Mezzanine

The Hudson Mezzanine 2006-1 CDO contained credit default swaps that referenced $2 billion in subprime, BBB-rated residential mortgage-backed securities, according to the documents released by Levin’s committee. While Goldman Sachs selected the assets in the deal, the firm was also the only investor buying credit protection on the entire transaction , the documents show.

Goldman Sachs created and sold the Hudson CDO in late 2006, near the time documents released by Levin show senior executives wanted to reduce the firm’s exposure to subprime mortgages.

“The CDO imploded within two years. Your clients lost; Goldman profited,” Levin said in an April 27 hearing during which he questioned Goldman Sachs Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein about the Hudson deal and other CDOs. “To go out and sell these securities to people and then bet against those same securities, it seems to me, is a fundamental conflict of interest and is -- raises a real ethical issue.”

(From Bloomberg: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aSNYXMe69Kh8&pos=3)

信報 2010年6月11日: 高盛面臨美證監第二項調查

面臨多項調查的高盛據報正面對美國證監第二項調查,調查目標是該行二○○六年出售的二十億美元「赫德森夾層」債務抵押債券(Hudson Mezzanine CDO)。

涉「赫德森夾層」CDO

彭博社昨天引述知情人士報道,美國證券及交易委員會(SEC)進行相關調查工作後,未必會向高盛採取進一步行動。

《金融時報》引述知情人士報道,SEC最近數周正收集「赫德森夾層」CDO交易的資料。

報道引述內部文件指出,高盛出售這些金融產品之際,亦同時沽空「赫德森夾層」CDO,以保障這批CDO的全部價值。

法律專家預期,「赫德森夾層」CDO交易的調查將集中查明,高盛是否向投資者透露足夠的資料。高盛在推廣文件中表明,其利益與投資者利益相同,因為高盛購入這些CDO。

這項調查是SEC針對華爾街有關CDO活動的更廣泛調查的一部分。《華爾街日報》昨天報道,SEC同時調查摩根士丹利等主要大行的多宗按揭相關交易。

根據參議員萊文(Carl Levin)領導的參議院常設調查小組委員會的文件,高盛這批二○○六年一級「赫德森夾層」CDO包含一批信貸違約掉期(CDS),這些CDS涉及合共二十億美元的BBB級次按抵押證券。

SEC四月十六日提出起訴高盛在二○○七年出售名為Abacus的CDO時涉嫌欺詐後,高盛股價已下跌百分之二十六。

遭澳洲對沖基金索償

在該訴訟中,SEC表示,高盛及其一名職員沒有向投資者透露,對沖基金Paulson & Co.在設計該CDO及對賭那些CDO的角色。

另外,澳洲對沖基金Basis Capital周三入稟紐約曼哈頓聯邦法院,向高盛索償十億美元,指該公司購入高盛的次按證券後,被迫清盤。

Basis Capital的代表律師表示,高盛以明知錯誤的賣點推銷,強迫投資者把有毒證券的風險從賬目中撇除,是欺詐行為■

2010年6月2日 星期三

Moody's 'Gave Up Its Analytical Distinctiveness,' Ex-Employee Says

Moody's 'Gave Up Its Analytical Distinctiveness,' Ex-Employee Says

BUSINESSJUNE 2, 2010, 9:33 A.M. ET

By AARON LUCCHETTI

A former Moody's Corp. lawyer who worked in the ratings firm's structured-finance group for a decade planned to tell a congressional panel that the company "gave up its analytical distinctiveness," partly by intimidating analysts who were too tough or angered influential investment bankers .

In written testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Mark Froeba accused Moody's managers of having "deliberately engineered a change to its culture intended to ensure that rating analysis never jeopardized market share and revenue."

Mr. Froeba is one of three former Moody's employees set to testify Wednesday at a hearing by the bipartisan commission into the credibility of credit ratings, the investment decisions based on those ratings and their role in the financial crisis.

The New York hearing also will include billionaire Warren Buffett, whose Berkshire Hathaway Inc. has long owned a stake in Moody's. Mr. Buffett, who provided no prepared testimony before the hearing, was subpoenaed by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission after declining an invitation to appear voluntarily.

The 10-member panel, led by former California Treasurer Phil Angelides, is required to submit a report on its findings by Dec. 15. Four previous hearings have zeroed in on investment banks, subprime mortgages and regulatory oversight of Wall Street, financial firms and government-sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Wednesday's hearing is set to begin at 8:30 a.m. ET. Mr. Buffett is expected to testify at about 11:30 a.m. with Moody's Chief Executive Raymond McDaniel, who has led the ratings firm since 2005.

Mr. McDaniel, in his written testimony, told the panel how the firm has improved its internal procedures. He also emphasized the limitations of credit ratings, which focus on the risk of default on debt payments.

Still, the CEO is likely to face tough questions about why the Moody's Investors Service unit of Moody's and its two biggest rivals, the Standard & Poor's unit of McGraw-Hill Cos. and Fimalac SA's Fitch Ratings, gave Triple-A marks to thousands of mortgage-related securities that later plummeted in value and suffered sharp downgrades. The three companies generated combined revenues of $3.6 billion on bond ratings last year.


Last month, Moody's disclosed it had received notice from the Securities and Exchange Commission that the ratings firm may face an enforcement action for allegedly misleading regulators in a 2007 license application. Moody's has said it fixed issues related to the SEC's concerns and has described the problem as isolated.

In his written testimony, Mr. Froeba cited as an example of undue efforts by Moody's to preserve the firm's market share a rating of European collateralized debt obligations that was one or two notches higher than justified. Mr. Froeba is particularly critical of former Moody's President Brian Clarkson, who carried out orders from Mr. McDaniel and the company's board to make the firm more friendly and responsive to bond issuers, according to the written testimony.

Under Mr. Clarkson, analysts were forced to explain even tiny slips in market share on deals, the former Moody's lawyer told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in his written testimony. Such pressure was a repudiation of the independence long cherished by the firm, Mr. Froeba wrote in his prepared remarks for the panel.

"I reject any suggestion … that Moody's sacrificed ratings quality in an effort to grow market share," Mr. Clarkson said in his prepared remarks submitted to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Mr. Clarkson left Moody's in 2008 and is set to make his first public comments about the financial crisis when he testifies Wednesday afternoon.

In his prepared remarks, Mr. Clarkson told the congressional panel that he was "disappointed" in the performance of Moody's ratings. But the firm's assumptions and methodologies "were overwhelmed by the magnitude and velocity of the unprecedented economic deterioration."

Mr. Clarkson said rating firms and investors need better disclosure from issuers about structured-finance bonds, suggesting that regulators look into stronger rules for mortgage brokers and underwriters.

Ratings firms face the likelihood of toughened oversight under financial-overhaul legislation being debated this month by a conference committee of the House and Senate. The proposals include measures to make rating firms more transparent and effective, while removing some of their market clout and stripping bankers of the ability to shop around for the firm that will give the highest rating.

At Wednesday's hearing, former Moody's rating executive Gary Witt is expected to describe how he removed a legal analyst from collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, created byGoldman Sachs Group Inc. after the securities firm asked that the analyst "not be assigned to further Goldman Sachs CDOs for the next year," according to Mr. Witt's written testimony.

Mr. Witt told the panel that he worried Goldman would complain to his superiors if he failed to do what the firm wanted, potentially costing the analyst his job. After discussing the matter with the Moody's analyst, "we both agreed that the best course of action was to comply with Goldman's request," according to Mr. Witt's testimony.

—Erik Holm in New York contributed to this article.
Write to Aaron Lucchetti at aaron.lucchetti@wsj.com

Related stories:

S & P: "We’d Do a Deal Structured by Cows" And Other Rating Agency Dirty Linen

Employees at Moody’s Investors Service told executives that issuing dubious creditworthy ratings to mortgage-backed securities made it appear they were incompetent or “sold our soul to the devil for revenue,” according to e-mails obtained by U.S. House investigators.

“The story of the credit rating agencies is a story of colossal failure,” Committee Chairman Henry Waxman, a California Democrat, said at the hearing. “The result is that our entire financial system is now at risk.”…

Former executives from S&P and Moody’s told lawmakers today that credit raters relied on outdated models in a “race to the bottom” to maximize profits.

2010年4月16日 星期五

How the Synthetic CDO "Abacus" was set up

The Abacus transactions are so-called synthetic CDO.

Abacus deals were filled with default swaps that offered payouts to Goldman Sachs if certain mortgage bonds didn’t pay as promised, in return for regular premiums from the bank.

Such securitization enabled debt with the lowest investment-grade ratings to be transformed, in part, into AAA securities that turned out to not be as safe as that ranking suggested. At least $5 billion of Abacus slices now carry junk ratings, below BBB-, from Standard & Poor’s, or have defaulted, Bloomberg data show.

The SEC said that Goldman Sachs created and sold Abacus 2007-AC1 without disclosing that hedge fund Paulson & Co. helped pick the underlying securities and also bet the CDO would default. Paulson was proved correct, and his hedge fund eventually turned a $1 billion profit and CDO investors lost a similar amount, according to the SEC

From Bloomberg http://mobile.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2065100&sid=aMVnYAF6bYCw

“The SEC’s charges are completely unfounded in law and fact and we will vigorously contest them and defend the firm and its reputation,” Goldman Sachs said in a statement today.

The firm put together the Abacus deal in 2007, a year in which Goldman Sachs earned a then-record $11.6 billion, a figure it surpassed in 2009, when it earned $13.4 billion. Goldman Sachs paid Blankfein $68.5 million for 2007 -- $600,000 in salary, plus a $67.9 million bonus.

According to the SEC’s complaint, Tourre, now 31, sent an e-mail to a friend in January 2007 saying, “The whole building is about to collapse” in reference to CDOs tied to subprime mortgages.

‘Fabulous Fab’

“Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab standing in the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all of the implications of those monstrousities!!!” Tourre wrote in the e- mail, according to the SEC. The agency didn’t identify the recipient of the note.

Reached at his London office today, Tourre declined to comment. “I need to jump, thank you, goodbye,” he told Bloomberg News before hanging up. A call to Pamela Chepiga , a lawyer for Tourre at Allen & Overy LLP, wasn’t returned. Tourre, a graduate of Ecole Centrale Paris, one of France’s top engineering schools, and Stanford University, joined Goldman Sachs in July 2001, according to his LinkedIn profile.

Goldman Sachs and Tourre knew it would be difficult, if not impossible, to sell the CDO if they disclosed to investors that Paulson played a significant role in selecting the collateral and was also betting against it, the SEC said.

‘Surreal’ ACA Meeting

The bank also knew that at least one potential investor, Dusseldorf, Germany-based IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG , wasn’t likely to invest in a CDO that didn’t have a collateral manager to analyze and select the portfolio, according to the complaint.

In January 2007, Goldman Sachs approached ACA Management LLC , a firm that analyzes credit risk, to select the portfolio for a CDO transaction sponsored by Paulson. In an internal memo on March 12, 2007, Goldman said it would “leverage ACA’s credibility and franchise” to help distribute the transaction, the SEC said.

Paulson, Tourre and a representative from ACA met in February 2007 to discuss assets that would be included in the residential-mortgage backed security, the SEC said. While Paulson and Tourre knew Paulson intended to short the security, ACA wasn’t in the loop.

“I am at this ACA meeting,” Tourre wrote in an e-mail to an unidentified Goldman Sachs employee during the meeting. “This is surreal.”

Goldman’s ‘Extensive Disclosure’

Goldman Sachs also said that it lost more than $90 million because it had an investment in the deal, overwhelming the $15 million it made in fees. The firm said it provided “extensive disclosure” to IKB and ACA about the risk of the underlying mortgage securities. Goldman Sachs never told ACA that Paulson was going to be a “long” investor in Abacus, and ACA selected the underlying securities, the firm said.



《博客主的建议》

建议高盛邀请香港金管局和证监会为他们辩护.

香港金管局和證監會會說:
合成 CDO "Abacus" 有 AAA的評級,不需要多講其它,風險披露也講了“本產品不保本”,這就是足夠的風險披露了, 就是[“vital information" about the CDO]了,不需要披露其它甚麼 [“vital information" about the CDO], 況且買家(投資者)是專業機構投資者。
看看我们香港的银行散户是什么水平。银行,雷曼亚洲以及有关的人员和机构都是只要跟散户讲雷曼迷债/星展Constellation Notes /大摩精明债券是 ’跟几个著名公司信贷挂钩,本产品不保本。抵押品是 AAA的評級‘ 就足够了! 根本不需要解释产品的抵押品的实质,特征以及具体详情呢!抵押品实为跟100多个公司信贷挂钩以及挂钩公司的信息都是多余,是不需要的信息!

什么是 “vital information" about 雷曼迷债/星展Constellation Notes /大摩精明债券? ‘ ’跟几个著名公司信贷挂钩,本产品不保本。’就是 “vital information" !

我们香港的银行散户就都会完全明白这雷曼迷债/星展Constellation Notes /大摩精明债券的真实特征和重大风险了。



Related reading:
SEC Sues Goldman Sachs, Alleging Fraud in CDO Tied to Subprime

2010年2月24日 星期三

The former Lehman Asia Pacific CDO & Structured Credit Team

Who was the creator of the Minibond ?
The product was created by the CDO & Structured Credit Asia Pacific of Lehman Brothers.

Who is Leon Hindle ?
Loen Hindle was Managing Director and Head of CDO & Structured Credit, Asia Pacific, Lehman Brothers.
According to "Derivatives Week" (Dec.8,2008), Leon Hindle oversaw Lehman's origination and distribution of all structured credit in the Asia-Pacific, including the strucuring of CDOS linked to its controversial minibond series.

Related blogs on Leon Hindle: "Why did Lehman Asia head of structure division Leon Hindle Lie"
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/06/lehman-asia-head-of-structure-division.html

Other Senior members in the Lehman Brothers Asia Pacific for CDO & Structured Credit products related may include:

George Sun: is Managing Director and Head of Global Credit Products Sales for Lehman Brothers in Asia ex-Japan. Mr. Sun heads up a team that is responsible for the distribution of all credit products including money markets, high grade credit, high yield credit, loans, private placements, structured credit, CDOs, and emerging market assets.

Ian Croft: is a senior vice president and is responsible for corporate credit securitisation opportunities in Asia ex-Japan, as well marketing and distribution of structured credit products in Singapore and South East Asia.

Patrick Kaye is a Senior Vice President, responsible for Lehman Brothers’ Principal and Structured Finance practice in non-Japan Asia. He and the group arrange securitization financings on behalf of clients as well as asset-based principal investments on behalf of the Firm.

Tay Teck How is a Vice President, in the CDO & Structured Credit, Asia Pacific, Lehman Brothers.

Steve Baker is a Senior Vice President in the CLO Banking group at Lehman Brothers US. Steve is focused on origination, structuring and placement of corporate credit securitizations, CLOs and related products.

2010年1月10日 星期日

THE VALUE OF MINIBOND ? 85%-99% ?


ARE HKMA and SFC trying to hide the true value of Minibond from Hong Kong retail investors?

ARE BANKS in Hong Kong trying to rip off their clients again from the minibond buyback plan?


On 14 December 2009, the value of Australia Mahogany Notes (a minibond alike product, arranged by Lehman Aaia) ,was announced in the ASX announcement:
Minibond-like Credit-Linked Notes sold in Australia (Mahogany Notes I & II by Lehman Asia) are worth $99 and $85. The notes/series that would mature at a later stage (2016) is worth $85. The notes/series that would mature much earlier in 2010 hence it is worth $99, is worth $99.

WHEN will Hong Kong retail investors get any updates on the value of the Minibond?

The banks buyback was only 60-70% of the issued value.

Who is losing more money?
Who is making profit from the Minibond sales & Minibond buyback?
The bank or the small investor?

In the ASX announcement as of 14 December 2009, it stated that for
"Mahogany Capital Limited – A$75 million Notes Series I and A$50 million Notes Series II ", the "Structured Credit Research has estimated a value for:
AUD 75MM ANZ Floating Rate Note maturing 10 Dec 2011 (XS0208078732) of $99 as of 30 November 2009 (the ultimate Collateral for Mahogany Notes Series I),
and a value for:
AUD 50MM RBS Floating Rate Note maturing 17 Mar 2016 (XS0247983058) of $85 as of 30 November 2009 (the ultimate Collateral for Mahogany Notes Series II). (...) These valuations represent the highest valuations received since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008."


[ full text of the ASX announcement on the value of Australia Mahogany Notes:
https://www.macquarie.com.au/edge/static/eclipse/Hidden/Company%20Announcements/ISSUED%20CAPITAL/2009-12/010222460.pdf ]

Australia Mahogany Notes (by Lehman Brother Asia) related information::

1. Summary Information:
It is credit-linked to 100-150 reference entities which are explained in the 2-page product summary. The interest rate (of the notes) and the principal loss are affected by the number of default events which are clearly outlined in the 2-page product summary.
同樣由雷曼亞洲一手安排的在澳洲銷售的信貸掛鈎票據 Mahogany Notes 清晰地介紹了
- 該信貸掛鈎票據之本金跟100個公司信貸掛鈎,(7個破產就會失去100%本金),
- 該票據之利息跟150個公司信貸掛鈎(破產事件跟票據利息之關係)
- 該票據所有信貸掛鈎主體之評級(AA 到 BBB- 及 低於 BBB- 之公司數目,等)和公司之業界類別等信息。
該票據明確指出其資金不是投入於任何信貸掛鈎主體(公司)。

2-page summary from the issuer: "Mahogany Notes II - a CDO defence",
http://www.mahoganycapital.com.au/mahogany/PageAttachmentServlet?PageID=4764

2. Prospectus
All the reference entities related information, the impact of default event(s) to the interest rate, the impact of default event(s) to the principal loss are clearly outlined in the prospectus.

http://www.mahoganycapital.com.au/mahogany/PageAttachmentServlet?PageID=4762

3. Related Analysis:
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/01/austalia-mahogany-notes-prospectus.html
and
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/01/how-was-mahogany-notes-ii-being-briefed.html

2009年9月10日 星期四

Bloomberg: London Suicide Connects Lehman Lesson Missed by Hong Kong Woman

Sept. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Yu Lia Chun, a retired hospital orderly in Hong Kong, never heard of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. before she got a call last September from her banker.

“He said, ‘Did you hear the news? Something has happened to Lehman,’” Yu, 66, recalled in an interview in June. “I didn’t get it.”

Yu, who has a sixth-grade education, said she thought her money was in a savings account. She didn’t know she had lent it to a bankrupt American securities firm. Eventually, she found out that her HK$1.2 million ($155,000) nest egg was gone. Her children lost another HK$3.8 million because Yu had persuaded them to make similar investments.

“There is no way a person like me could understand any of this,” Yu said, dabbing her eyes with a tissue in a coffee shop in Hong Kong’s financial district. “Sometimes I feel like jumping off a building.”

What hit Yu and her family was a tidal wave triggered halfway around the world by the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history. The Sept. 15, 2008, collapse of Lehman, with $613 billion in liabilities, had unforeseen and far-flung consequences that devastated those, like Yu, who didn’t know their fates were tied to the New York-based investment bank.

‘Quicker This Time’

The chief operating officer of a private-equity firm in London jumped in front of a commuter train because he blamed himself for leaving the company’s money in a Lehman account, according to a coroner’s report. The Israeli managers of a hotel construction project on the island of West Caicos, northeast of Cuba, were taken hostage by Chinese workers when an anticipated Lehman loan didn’t materialize and wages weren’t paid. In Hong Kong, Yu and thousands of others who had invested in Lehman products camped out in the rain, thumping drums and chanting, “Give us our money back.”

The realization that a U.S. securities firm so woven into the financial system couldn’t pay its debts radiated out from New York, panicking investors around the world. It was a doomsday scenario that former International Monetary Fund chief economist Simon H. Johnson likened to Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s 1963 novel “Cat’s Cradle,” in which a single crystal of the fictitious substance ice-nine hardens all of the planet’s water.

What differentiated Lehman from previous financial crises was how fast the panic spread, said Richard Sylla, an economic and financial historian at New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business in New York.

“Communications made things happen faster,” Sylla said, describing how it took six months for the 1931 failure of Austria’s Creditanstalt bank to put stress on the British financial system. “The news of everything got spread around much quicker this time.”

Goldman Sachs Debt

The freezing of global credit markets following Lehman’s demise began with professionals who traded commercial paper in New York. They were the first to feel the chill when the Reserve Primary Fund, the oldest money market fund, was inundated with requests for redemptions and seized up hours after the bankruptcy filing. The $785 million that Reserve had lent to Lehman was deemed worthless by 4 p.m. the next day.

Fear that more banks and financial firms might fail meant most investors stopped lending to anyone other than the government. Even New York-based Goldman Sachs Group Inc., which earned $11.6 billion in 2007, more than any U.S. securities firm in history, wasn’t immune. The average annual cost of insuring $10 million of Goldman Sachs debt for five years soared to a record $545,000 from $182,557 in the three days after Lehman failed, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Plummeting Prices

Lehman’s demise triggered a panic. Money fund managers were forced to raise cash to pay off investors. They tried selling what securities they held and couldn’t. The market was flooded, and prices were plummeting -- if prices could be obtained at all. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index suffered its worst decline in six years. Mistrust leaked into the corporate bond market.

The most widely traded 30-year bond of General Electric Capital Corp., the world’s biggest issuer of commercial paper, dropped by as much as 30 cents on the dollar to 62 cents by Sept. 18 because of doubts that GE would be able to persuade money funds to renew its short-term notes.

At that price, the three-day loss for owners of the issue was more than $1.9 billion, according to prices provided by Trace, the bond-trade reporting system of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.

The U.S. responded within a week to guarantee money markets and bank-to-bank lending. Within a month, Congress agreed to spend $700 billion to prop up banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. guaranteed new bank debt, and Federal Reserve lending to financial institutions ballooned by $1 trillion.

Lehman Minibonds

Those programs, which succeeded in stemming the panic, remain in place today. What they didn’t do was save Yu and thousands of other investors in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and elsewhere who had bought equity-linked notes or so-called minibonds connected to Lehman.

Equity-linked notes combine attributes of both bonds and stock by investing part of the proceeds in share options and the remainder in fixed income. Minibonds are custom-made securities linked to the creditworthiness of companies, backed by collateralized-debt obligations and sold in denominations of $5,000. They functioned like credit-default swaps in reverse, where the investor stands to lose his principal when the firm named in the note can’t pay its debts.

‘Information Asymmetry’

Yu, a mother of six who emigrated from mainland China in 1962, didn’t have a chance, according to Joseph Stiglitz, a Columbia University economics professor who won a Nobel Prize for his work on the effect of unequal access to information on buyers and sellers in financial markets.

“As securities got more complex, the opportunities for gaming, to the disadvantage of ordinary people, increased,” Stiglitz said. “Complexity opened up new venues for information asymmetry, which banks exploited.”

Asia became Lehman’s highest growth region in 2007, taking in more than $3.1 billion in revenue, or 16 percent of the firm’s business. Revenue was up more than 41 percent from 2005 in Asia, while it climbed 3 percent in the U.S. in the same period, according to Bloomberg data.

Yu said she went to an export trade show in Hong Kong two years ago and met Chow Chi Chung, a salesman for Amsterdam-based ABN Amro Holding NV. He offered her a better return on her savings if she switched banks, she said. So she did.

Two-thirds of Yu’s money, about $100,000, came from a settlement with her employer after an elevator fell half a floor, injuring her pelvis, according to Yu, who still drags her right leg when she walks.

Didn’t Read Prospectus

A month after their meeting, Yu said Chow called her to say he had a new product that could return as much as 20 percent a year because it was linked to the stock performance of three large Chinese companies -- China Communications Construction Co.,China Merchants Bank Co. and Ping An Insurance Co.

Yu said she didn’t read the fine print, trusting Chow when he told her she couldn’t lose her principal. Had she looked at the prospectus and understood it she would have discovered that she had essentially bought three call options -- contracts that would capture gains if the shares of the three companies rose by a certain amount -- coupled with the equivalent of a Lehman corporate bond. If Lehman defaulted, her money would be gone.

Cash Bonus

ABN Amro, now part of Edinburgh-based Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, also recruited Yu to sell the same product to her family, giving her a cash bonus of about $155 for each person who signed up, she said.

Yuk Min Hui, a Hong Kong-based spokeswoman for RBS, declined to comment about Yu’s case. She said in an e-mail that if the bank determined that “sales processes and guidelines were not properly followed,” it would offer “appropriate remedies.” Only a small number of investors fall in this category, she said.

Chow couldn’t be located.

There are 873 issues of such Lehman equity-linked structured notes outstanding with a combined face value of about $8.7 billion, all now in default, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Bonds were denominated in pounds, Swiss francs and Hungarian forint, as well as Australian and Hong Kong dollars.

Banks also sold $1.8 billion of Lehman minibonds to an estimated 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, where the notes were first marketed in 2003, according to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. The biggest seller was BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd., a unit of Beijing-based Bank of China Ltd.

Financial Dumplings

The minibonds were all issued by a Cayman Islands-based entity called Pacific International Finance Ltd., set up by Lehman with trustees from London-based HSBC Holdings Plc. The notes were financial dumplings -- derivatives contracts tied to the creditworthiness of major companies wrapped inside Lehman corporate bonds. Series 19 notes, for instance, were linked to securities dealers including Citigroup Inc. and Goldman Sachs. If any of those businesses or Lehman defaulted, the investor wouldn’t get paid.

In effect, investors in Series 19 notes bought the losing end of credit-default swaps, or insurance policies pegged to the survival of financial institutions. If any of those companies failed, the noteholders were the ones responsible for paying off the principal on the derivative.

Lehman took payments from investors in exchange for a guaranteed yield, then placed the cash in a Lehman-managed money market fund and issued commercial paper to borrow more money. Those funds were in turn used to invest in CDOs sold by Lehman off-balance-sheet entities in places such as Ireland and the Cayman Islands.

‘Blood and Sweat’

Sun Kwan, a 58-year-old retired parks worker, was among those who bought Lehman minibonds. He stood outside the I.M. Pei-designed Hong Kong headquarters of the Bank of China on June 15, along with Yu and 51 other protesters, banging a chipped red drum with a stick every two seconds. Raindrops beaded on the brim of his blue cap. A sign around his neck, hand-lettered in Chinese characters, read: “The Bank of China is a hooker. Give me back my money earned with blood and sweat.”

Sun, who has a high school education, invested about $285,000 in Lehman Minibond Series 12 notes, sold to him by BOC Hong Kong, which paid about 4 percent interest a year.

He said he thought he was putting his money into a certificate of deposit. Instead, as the prospectus explained, the notes were a bet against the default of the Chinese government and five companies, including Hutchison Whampoa Ltd., which operates ports and telecommunications services, Chinese state-owned oil producer CNOOC Ltd. and Lehman.

As an incentive, he was given $26 in supermarket coupons.

Rhinos, Whales

Sun also purchased $40,000 worth of Octave Series 10 notes, a similarly structured product created by Morgan Stanley, in which the investor would lose all of his money if Lehman or any of six other companies defaulted. He said he never heard of Lehman and thought the notes were backed by the People’s Republic of China because most of the businesses were state- owned.

Nick Footitt, a spokesman for Morgan Stanley in Hong Kong, declined to comment.

Each minibond series was custom-made, so their characteristics differed. Packagers skipped using some numbers, including 4, which is considered unlucky in Chinese culture and would make the bond difficult to market. Investors got prizes, including video cameras and flat-screen televisions, according to newspaper advertisements and fliers handed out at banks. The ads, in both Chinese and English, featured rhinoceroses, whales and other symbols of potency, luck or profit.

‘Rotten Deal’

“It’s all gone,” Sun said in an interview conducted through a Chinese translator at the demonstration. “I almost wanted to kill myself. I’ve been crying for months, even though I am a man.”

He said he hadn’t yet told his 25-year-old son, Sun Chi Yan, what had happened to his nest egg, most of which came from a settlement when the government bought his family’s land.

Sun and Yu were among investors who staged protests almost every business day for nine months, sparking a Hong Kong legislative investigation and calls for more protection for retail customers. The raucous demonstrations in the city’s financial district, including a tent encampment and bullhorns connected to an iPod that blared the looped chant “Rotten Deal -- Money Back,” became an embarrassment to the banks.

In a city of 7 million, where only 30 percent of workers had pensions before 2001, the Lehman protesters struck a chord, according to Audrey Eu, one of 60 members of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council.

Bank Offer

“A lot of them lost their life savings,” Eu said in an interview in June. “They’re all crying. They work as cleaners, and $50,000 is a lot of money to them.”

Angel Yip, a spokeswoman for BOC Hong Kong, said in an e- mail that “we understand and sympathize with customers” who lost money as a result of the Lehman collapse. She said advertisements and prospectuses distributed by the bank “contained a detailed description of the structure and risks” of the investments.

In July, 16 retail banks, including BOC Hong Kong, offered to repay minibond investors at least 60 cents on the dollar, a deal brokered by the city’s securities regulator that would amount to $813 million. About two-thirds of eligible noteholders accepted the offer, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority said in a statement on Sept. 4. Sun said he hadn’t yet made up his mind.

“The compensation offer is totally unfair and based on groundless calculations,” Sun said. “If we have to accept it eventually, it’ll be because we’ve exhausted all other means.”

‘Grotesquely Wrong’

While investors in Hong Kong have the right to sue banks, there are no class-action laws or contingency fees, making it difficult to find lawyers willing to take cases.

Patrick Daniels, a lawyer with Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP in San Diego, has filed a class-action suit against Lehman in federal court in New York on behalf of minibond holders like Sun in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore seeking $1.6 billion from Bank of New York Mellon Corp. The money, mostly shares in Lehman’s Institutional Money Market Fund, is being held by the bank as collateral to secure the minibonds, Daniels said. Other Lehman creditors are trying to get the same funds from the Bank of New York Mellon, which isn’t accused of wrongdoing. The case is pending.

“Something is grotesquely wrong here,” Daniels said in an interview in July. “These people were just flat-out lied to and stolen from.”

Neither the lawsuit nor the settlement applies to Yu or other holders of equity-linked notes from Houston to Singapore.

London Suicide

Hong Kong retirees weren’t the only victims. Even professional investors were stuck with Lehman losses.

The stocks and bonds of Lehman’s London brokerage customers, used as collateral to borrow more money, were frozen on Sept. 15. About 3,500 clients, including 700 hedge funds, couldn’t get access to an estimated $65 billion of assets. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Lehman’s U.K. bankruptcy administrator, is still sorting out who should get paid and how much. Some firms have closed, and others may have to wait as long as a decade to get their assets back, Tony Lomas, the PwC partner in charge of the U.K. administration, said in August.

It took only 10 days for the ice-nine to get to Kirk Stephenson, chief operating officer of Olivant Ltd., a London private-equity firm run by former UBS AG Chairman Luqman Arnold. On Sept. 25, Stephenson, 47, jumped in front of a train going 125 mph at a station in Taplow, 28 miles (45 kilometers) west of London.

The coroner’s office for the county of Buckinghamshire ruled the death a suicide. Stephenson, a native of New Zealand, was despondent about the financial crisis and talked about killing himself one week after Lehman’s demise, according to a statement from his wife read at the coroner’s inquest.

U.K. Lock-Up

Lehman Brothers International (Europe) was Olivant’s prime broker. It held the firm’s 2.78 percent stake in UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank by assets, according to a statement from Olivant on Oct. 1. The shares were worth 1.6 billion francs ($1.44 billion) at the time.

The hedge fund lock-up led the U.K. to reconsider its procedures when firms fail. While Lehman’s broker-dealer in the U.S. stayed out of bankruptcy long enough to process many of its trades, the business seized up in the U.K.

“In the U.S., everything was wrapped in cotton wool for four days,” said PwC’s Lomas. In the U.K., “everything failed come 7:56 a.m. that Monday morning.”

‘Black Hole’

The U.K. had an advantage in attracting hedge fund assets before the Lehman bankruptcy. While U.S. prime brokers face limits on how much they can loan hedge funds, those rules could be circumvented with overseas units like Lehman’s in London. Some U.S. clients didn’t know they were customers of Lehman Brothers International (Europe).

“If you didn’t pay attention to what you were signing, you would have missed it,” said Michael Romanek, principal at Rise Partners Ltd., which arranges financing for funds from London. “It was called enhanced prime brokerage, where they could be more accommodating with more leverage or loans. It just took signing some extra papers in New York. Most people didn’t realize it.”

Some fund managers with frozen assets say they’ve gone from extreme anger to resignation that they’ll have to wait a long time to see any return.

“I still don’t know if I’ll ever get any money back,” said Edward Chin, whose Hong Kong-based Pride Revelation Fund used Lehman as its sole prime broker. “We’re in a black hole.”

$30 Billion Gap

The ice-nine also halted construction projects from Wall Street to the Turks and Caicos Islands.

Lehman borrowed against property investments that couldn’t easily be sold, such as construction loans. So when the property market turned sour and creditors demanded more collateral for the loans or their money back, the investment bank was stuck.

The property portfolio doomed Lehman when a rescue still seemed possible. On Saturday, Sept. 13, 2008, Timothy Geithner, then president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and now U.S. Treasury secretary, asked a team of the world’s top bankers to evaluate Lehman’s real estate holdings as part of an effort to facilitate a sale of the investment bank to London-based Barclays Plc.

The team, including representatives from Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse Group AG, determined that Lehman had overvalued its real estate investments by $20 billion to $30 billion, according to people who attended meetings at the New York Fed last September.

Watergate Hotel

When Barclays pulled out of an agreement to buy the firm, Lehman was forced to file for bankruptcy. Only then did Barclays buy Lehman’s U.S. securities business, including its headquarters in Manhattan’s Times Square.

The bankruptcy deprived the international real estate market of a major source of financing. The bank was known for doing deals nobody else would touch, according to a former Lehman executive.

The Watergate Hotel, made famous by the 1972 break-in that led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon, was sold at auction in August for $25 million after its owner, Washington- based Monument Realty LLC, defaulted on its mortgage. Monument was financed by Lehman.

A condo conversion at 25 Broad St. in Manhattan, two blocks from Goldman Sachs’s headquarters, was suspended by developers. It too was financed by Lehman.

SunCal, Depfa

Irvine, California-based SunCal Cos., a closely held developer, said it had $1.6 billion in financing from Lehman. Since the bank’s failure, 19 projects, all in California, have filed for bankruptcy, SunCal said. Work has stopped on all of them, including the 248-acre Marblehead Coastal community in San Clemente, which was supposed to feature 69 single-family homes, 244 other residences, a movie theater, parks and hiking trails.

Munich-based Hypo Real Estate Holding AG received 102 billion euros ($143 billion) in debt guarantees and credit lines from the German government after its Depfa unit was stuck without short-term funding following Lehman’s bankruptcy. Like Lehman, Hypo funded long-term real estate assets with short-term loans such as commercial paper.

German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck defended the bailout of the lender because the global financial system was just “millimeters from the abyss.”

Molasses Reef

On West Caicos, an otherwise uninhabited island 250 miles northeast of Cuba, work stopped on the Molasses Reef Ritz- Carlton Hotel and Residences, slated to include a cluster of $6.5 million cottages. About 400 Chinese employees of Tel Aviv- based construction firm Ashtrom Properties Ltd. didn’t get paid when Lehman funding dried up, according to Jonathan Siegel, New York-based managing director of Logwood Hotel Development Co.

About 60 electrical workers rebelled, taking a dozen managers hostage and refusing to let them leave the island.

“We had 400 to 500 unhappy men, and we were concerned violence would erupt,” Siegel said. “The Turks and Caicos government was very unhappy with the situation. There was a limited supply of food and water.”

Ashtrom ended the standoff after a week by paying what it considered “a ransom,” Siegel said. The project, about 70 percent completed, is still on hold, said Verona Carter, Ritz- Carlton Hotel Co.’s director of public relations for the Caribbean area.

Financial Leadership

The vulnerability of the global financial system revealed by Lehman’s bankruptcy -- from ordinary investors like Sun and Yu to London hedge funds and German lenders -- makes it all the harder to regulate.

“The difficulty you have in getting control is that you need a global alliance,” said former World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn in an e-mail. “You need all the finance ministers to come together, because if a transaction can’t be done here, it can be done in Lichtenstein or France or the Far East.”

Lehman’s bankruptcy also poses a challenge to America’s financial leadership.

Wall Street profited by arranging financing that allowed other countries to tap global capital markets to build offices, factories, resorts and housing. What’s broken now is the trust the rest of the world had in U.S. banks, said Phillip Yin, a native of Seattle who is managing director of Asia Investors Partners Ltd., a Hong Kong-based research firm.

“All that has happened since -- the job losses, the slump, everything -- is tied to one thing and one event,” Yin said. “And that’s Lehman.”

(Lehman’s Lessons: Next, Too Big to Fail)

To contact the reporters on this story: Mark Pittman in New York at mpittman@bloomberg.net; Bob Ivry in New York at bivry@bloomberg.net.



from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aNFuVRL73wJc

2009年9月3日 星期四

CNBC news: M. Stanley, Moody's, S&P Must Defend Fraud Claims

Source of CNBC news: http://www.cnbc.com/id/32667231.

Published: Wednesday, 2 Sep 2009

A U.S. federal judge ruled that Morgan Stanley and two credit rating agencies must defend fraud charges in a class-action lawsuit accusing them of masking the risks of an investment linked to subprime mortgages, and which eventually collapsed.

U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin on Wednesday rejected efforts by Morgan Stanley [MS 27.09 -0.36 (-1.31%) ] , Moody's [MCO 26.10 -0.32 (-1.21%) ] Moody's Investors Service and McGraw-Hill's [MHP 32.31 -0.95 (-2.86%) ] Standard & Poor's to dismiss fraud claims brought by the plaintiffs, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and King County in Washington state.

She dismissed the plaintiffs' remaining claims, and all claims against a fourth defendant, Bank of New York Mellon [BK 27.95 -0.15 (-0.53%) ] , while granting permission for the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.

Scheindlin's ruling could affect other lawsuits brought by pension funds and other investors, seeking to hold banks and credit raters responsible for hyping the value of complex debt to win fees and causing investor losses as the debt collapsed.

The case concerned the Cheyne Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV), which went bankrupt in August 2007 after the quality of its assets plummeted. Many investors in Cheyne-related notes lost much or all of their investments.

SIVs are complex packages of loans and debt, including collateralized debt obligations, that once held some $350 billion of assets before falling out of favor.

The California Public Employees' Retirement System, the nation's largest public pension fund, in July sued Moody's, S&P and Fitch Ratings over losses on Cheyne and other SIVs.

In the New York case, the plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley wrongly marketed Cheyne as a high-quality investment, and that the rating agencies assigned improperly high ratings.

The complaint also accused Bank of New York Mellon, acting as a depositary and processing agent, of improperly valuing Cheyne's assets and delivering reports to the rating agencies.


In a 68-page ruling, Scheindlin said the plaintiffs pleaded enough facts to let the fraud claims case go forward.

"Where both the rating agencies and Morgan Stanley knew that the ratings process was flawed, knew that the portfolio was not a safe, stable investment, and knew that the rating agencies could not issue an objective rating because of the effect it would have on their compensation, it may be plausibly inferred that Morgan Stanley and the rating agencies knew they were disseminating false and misleading ratings,"
she wrote.

Scheindlin set an Oct. 1 status conference in the case.

McGraw-Hill spokesman Frank Briamonte said the company was pleased that Scheindlin dismissed all but one of 11 claims it faced, and said it was "confident" it would prevail on the remaining claim.

Bank of New York Mellon spokesman Kevin Heine had no immediate comment. The rest of the parties did not immediately return calls or e-mails seeking comment.

The case is Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan), No. 08-7508.

2009年8月29日 星期六

Lehman Minibond Series 6 解读迷债系列6

解读迷债系列6,
因为系列6是2003-2004两年间提供最高利息的迷债系列(跟系列5 或系列7-10相比),却是销售量最低的系列(低于5百万美金),其表面挂钩公司也跟其它系列不同:跟多达150个公司信贷挂钩。

Series 6 was issued in Sep.2003, and matured in Sep.2005, but was extended (by issuer) to Mar.2009.

Why Series 6?

It would be interesting to learn how the early Minibond Series was introduced. For Series 6, there was only a "PROSPECTUS". For Series 10 and later, Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus are offered.

Because Series 6 showed us how Minibond's upfront facade / marketing selling point had been evolved over years, It also showed us how the disclosure level of Underlying Securities related information had gone from LESS to the LEAST, while the prospectus was expanded into Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus . Similar reduction in disclosure is also observed in the DBS Constellation Notes, if one compares the much polished prospectus for Constellation Series 59 versus the Constellation Series 34-37. The Prospectus for Minibond Series 6 also showed us what banks knew at the early stage about the true features and material risks of Minibond.

Summary of Minibond Series 6.
1. Maturity Term.
Series 6 was issued in Sep.2003, with initial Maturity date in Sep.2005.
Upon maturity, the issuer has the right to extend the maturity date to Mar.2009.

2. It is credit-linked to 150 reference companies ("referecne portfolio") .
The Prospectus listed the 150 reference companies name, and their rating.

3. Prospectus listed the impact to the interest-rate with the number of default event of the 150 reference entities.
- For Sep.2003 - Sep.2005:
0 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 5%:
1 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 4.15%: ........
5 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 0.80%:
6 or more default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 0:

- For extended Sep.2005 - Mar.2009:
0 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 8 %:
1 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 6.65%: ........
5 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 1.30%:
6 or more default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 0:


4. Where did the Minibond Money go?
According to Prospectus, it would be used on purchasing "Underlying Securities" with maturity date at Mar.2009.
The Underlying Securities in fact was another structured products.
My Comments:
Prospectus did not use the term 'collateral', the document used 'Underlying Securities'.


5. It claimed to be principal protected. but it also said that if something happened to the Underlying Securities, the principal will be at loss (or total loss).

6. Procedures and Information related to the 'underlying securities' in the Prospectus.

(a) page 53: "APPLICATION PROCEDURES"
(...)
Relevant Dealers will inform prospective investors that copies of the documents listed under paragraph 10 in the section headed "General Information" are available for inspection at the office of the Arranger specified herein ."

(b) in Page 95, "General Information" ,
"10. (...) copies of the following documents will be available .....and the Initial Dealers " (i.e. the distributing banks).

(c) page 96: "(xii): Information Memorandum and all other relevant programme documentation relating to the Underlying Securities Issuer's US $18,000,000,000 EUR Medium-Term Notes Program guaranteed (...)"

(d) page 96: "(xiii) Pricing Supplement relating to the Underlying Securities which supplements the master terms and conditions of the Underlying Securrities set out in the Information Memorandum referered to in (xii) above to form the terms and conditiosn of the Underlying Securities"

My comment:
- The "(xiii)" , i.e. (d) above, refers to the crucial Underlying Securities information document.
- The Underlying Securities Information Documents were available at selling agent (distributor banks) office.
- The "APPLICATION PROCEDDURE" and "General Information" were in fact requiring selling-agent /distributors
(i) to inform clients/potential minibond-buyers all the document information including Underlying Securities Information Document,
(ii) to let clients/potential minibond-buyers inspect all the document information including Underlying Securities Information Document, at selling-agent's office (i.e. at banks if the distributor is a bank). => Both Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus for later Minibond Series never invited clients to inspect such information/documents at selling agents / distributors office any more.
- Similar requirements for inviting clients to inspect the Underlying Securities Information Documents were also found in the prospectus of Constellation Series 34-37 (in the name of "Charged Asset Information" ), but NOT in the prospectus of Constellation Series 59.

- Did selling agents/distributors inform and give clients Underlying Securities Information Document?
- Did selling agents/distributors read through Underlying Securities Information Document which were available at their site?
* What did they learn about the Underlying Securities' true feature and risks?
* How did the Underlying Securities Information affect Banks' understanding on the Minibond's true features and risks?
* How did the Underlying Securities Information affect Banks' understanding on the Minibond's material risk and material information?
- Is there a connection between such information with the Questions regarding to disclaimers in Wing Hang Bank's Minibond Purchaser Confirmation Form?
Questions: in http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/question-regarding-wing-hang-banks.html


(e) page 96: "Copies of the (...) refered to in (...) (xii), (xiii) and (xiv), will be avialable for inspection as aforesaid with effect from the Issue Date. (...)"

My Comment:
- The Prospectus disclosed that some information (e.g. Underlying Securities Information Document) will be available from the Issue Date, i.e. not available before the Sale-offer closed.
- Similar information on the availability of "Charged Asset Information" (i.e. Underlying Securities equivalent) was also found in the Constellation Series 34-37, but was not found in the prospectus for later Constellation Series (e.g. Constellation Series 59).
- Similar information (disclosure) was dropped forever in the Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus for Minibond series 10 and later. The Program Prospectus and Issue Prospects never mentioned about the availability of Underlying Securities Information Document.

In the later series (of Minibond and Constellation notes), not only there was no mentioning of the availability of Underlying Securities (collateral) Information document, the well polished Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus never invited clients to inspect such information/documents at selling-agents/distributors office any more.
WHY?
Because such information did not carry material information and was not relevant material information for understanding the true features and risks of Minibond / Constellation notes ?



7. Distributors of Minibond Series 6:
Dah Sing Bank,
ICBC (Asia),
Mervas Bank,
Shanghai Commercial Bank,
Sun Hung Kai Investment Services Limited,
Wing Hang Bank,
WIng Lung Bank;

8. Sales of Early Minibond Series (based on data from HSBC USA Trustee).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 5: $10.6 million USD; Reference Entities: 1 ; Interest Rate at 3.8%; Jun.2003- Jul.2010;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 6: $4.75 million USD; Reference Entities: 150 ; Interest Rate at 5% for year 1-2, 8% from 3rd year-maturity, pending on number of default event; Sep.2003 - Mar.2009;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 7A: $15.2 million USD; Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 4.2%: Nov.2003 - Dec.2008;
Series 7B: $32 million USD ($250 million HKD); Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 4.2%:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 9A: $22 million USD; Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 3.7% year 1-3, 4.3% year 4-maturity: Mar.2004 - Sep.2009;
Series 9B: $353 million USD; Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 3.5% year 1-3, 4.1% year 4-maturity:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 10: $44.6 million USD; Reference Entities: 7 + Additional 125 undisclosed reference entities hidden in CDO Collateral ; USD Interest Rate at 4.25% year 1-3, 4.75% year 4-maturity: May 2004 - Nov.2009;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 11: $42 million USD; Reference Entities: 1 + Additional 125 undisclosed reference entities hidden in CDO Collateral ; fixed + Libor linked float Interest Rate: Jun.2004 - Jun.2010;
------------------------------------------------------------


My Comment:
- Series 6 was offering a higher interest rate comparing to other series because Series 6 has 150 reference entities at up front.
- Series 6 Sales was the lowest amongst all the Minibond Series.
- Comparing the Interest Rate (and sales results) offered for Series 6 versus Series 10:
Both are credit linked to over 100 reference entities. But Series 6 listed 150 reference entities at up front, Series 10 listed 1 reference entities at up front and addded another 125 reference entities in the never disclosed CDO.




参考1: Series 6 Prospectus:
http://www.sfc.hk/sfcCOPro/EN/displayFileServlet?refno=0550&fname=Minibond%20Series%206_Prospectus_ENG2.pdf

参考2: 從 迷債系列 6 看 雷曼迷你債券騙局手段之 完美完善過程
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/09/6_4956.html
.
.

2009年8月20日 星期四

Open Letter to Commissioner of Police Regarding to Police Abuse of Powers

(轉載)
An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of Police Abuse of Powers

Mr. TANG King Shing

Commissioner of Police , Police Headquarters,

Sirs,

I write on behalf of Ms. Tracy Ho as well as the Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims in Hong Kong to complain against your officers who authorise the ‘dawn raid’ against Ms. Ho for reason that she is suspected of having committed an act of common assault.
The alleged assault takes place at about 1625 hours on 21st May 2009 outside the Bank of China Building, which is situate at no. 1 Garden Road, Central. In addition to the gross disproportion between police action and the nature of the allegation, there are numerous dubious acts on the part of your officers during the process that could only be explained as intending to maximize the harassment and distress inflicted on Ms. Ho and her family.

The Dawn Raid

2. At about 07:30 hours on 19th August 2009 five detectives (three male and two female) in plain clothes claiming to be attached to the Central Police District or Division knocked on the door of Ms. Ho’s Residence in Choi Hung. The visit is a total surprise and when Ms. Ho answered the door your officers insisted that they wanted to enter the premises before they would reveal the purpose of their visit.

3. With utmost reluctance and distress of her family, Ms. allowed the officers into her home. One of the officers then produced a photograph to Ms. Ho and asked if she is the person in it. Although the photograph does not show her face, Ms. Ho recalled the scene which is the protest outside the Bank of China Building mentioned above.

4. When Ms. Ho was about to admit that she is the lady on the photograph, one of the officer threatened her to immediately produce the clothes and shoes she worn that day or else they would search for the items themselves. Perplexed by the sudden police interest in the event that happened months ago and pressured by the threatening language, Ms. Ho complied with the demand and produced the items accordingly. She was then asked to follow the officers to the police station for further enquiries but before leaving the premises she was asked to sign on the notebook of one of the officers that it was not an arrest and she was not therefore handcuffed.

A Trivial Offence

5. Ms. Ho arrived at the Central Police Station at Arsenal Street at about 0930 hours after having been taken to and asked to wait at the Ngau Tau Kok Police Station for some time during which your officers were presumably completing some formalities to record their action in another police area.

6. In the Central Police Station, Ms. Ho was shown a video footage lasting for about 10 to 15 seconds in which her right foot seemed to have a momentary contact with the buttock of a bank staff. Apparently the footage was shot in a commotion where attempt was made by the bank staff to forcibly remove the protesters. It is understandable that in such circumstances people were jostling against each another and what Ms. Ho was doing then is crucial in establishing the plausibility of the allegation against her.

7. Ms. Ho has a flair for electronic video and audio devices and she has been responsible for filming the public activities of the Alliance almost since the creation of it. When the assault was allegedly taken place, Ms. Ho was actually holding her video device filming the forcible removal of the protesters by the bank staff. Her attention was on the action in front of her and the display screen of her video. It is, to say the least, very unlikely that a person would in the circumstances feel like joining the fray.

8. There is another factor that discounts the truthfulness of the allegation. Ms. Ho is a small, slim young lady whose weight would not be much more than 90 lbs. Could a person with that physique be inclined to provoke a fight? And could a lady like Ms. Ho who has taken part in so many protests relating to the fraud of Lehman Brothers and has always behaved properly, suddenly and without any provocation whatsoever, acted contrary to her personality and disposition? The allegation is so preposterous that no person in his right mind would seriously entertain it. Yet your officers have concluded that the offence is so grave that it justifies a deployment of five officers to carry out a dawn raid for an allegation of common assault where the supposed victim does not seem to have suffered any visible or detectable injury and does not complain for months after the event.

Assault on Law by Abuses of Powers

9. How should the public comprehend a dawn raid by five detectives against a young lady suspected of common assault? Does it not indicate the new low of the state of policing in this city under your watch?
But that is not all in so far as the outrageous police conduct is concerned. For almost one year now Ms. Ho has been the contact person between the police and the Alliance on many occasions especially in respect of application for approval to assemble and conduct procession. Your officers at the Police Community Relations Office in Central District know Ms. Ho well and it would take only a phone call to get Ms. Ho to the Central Police Station to view the video footage and to assist police investigation into the allegation. The differences between asking Ms. Ho to the police station and the dawn raid are that only the latter could inflict the distress, sudden sense of fear, and helplessness on Ms. Ho and her family.

10. The connection between the decision to harass Ms. Ho and another assault complaint against the bank staff at the scene of protest is clear. As mentioned above, the moment when Ms. Ho was accused of committing assault on the anonymous bank staff, she was filming an assault in progress by the bank staff against a protester.
It is hardly surprising that the protester would sustain injury given the way she was man-handled by the bank staff. As it was, she was taken to hospital, and stayed there for days for medical treatment. We also learn that a complaint of assault was lodged with the police by her or subsequently with the medical findings of the injury she sustained. Despite the evidence, no action has been taken against the bank or the assailant by the police, just like other crimes related to the Lehman Brothers fraud.

11. In the circumstances, it is an irresistible inference that the police harassment against Ms. Ho is motivated by the desire to please certain influential individuals affiliated with the bank.

12. The allegation against Ms. Ho is so trivial that she is granted a police bail of HKD100. Against an allegation of common assault that could, technically speaking, be committed by everyone in this crowded community, the police deployed five detectives to conduct a dawn raid on the basis of the flimsiest evidence which comes into being in a commotion caused largely by the bank itself. The commotion would not have happened had the police had the courage and sense of decency to enforce the law. Against the banks for fraud that is proven by documentary evidence that no government official would dare to dispute, not a single officer of yours has the courage to follow your own orders to classify the complaints after almost one year of their lodgments with the Commercial Crime Bureau. Insofar as the Lehman Brothers fraud is concerned, the victims have been deprived of any legal rights and remedies. Would any of the government officials to whom this complaint is addressed care to respond to this latest episode of police abuse of powers?

c.c.
Mr. TANG Ying Yen, Henry, Chief Secretary for Administration
Mr. Wong Yan Lung, Secretary for Justice
Mr. Ian Grenville Cross, Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Ian McWalters, Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Lee Ka Chiu, Director of Crime & Security, HKP

======================================================
From: An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of police abuse of powers

2009年8月19日 星期三

Is HK now a Heaven for Banking Crooks ?



What have HK Police / Justice department done regarding all the financial fraud related complaints by Minibond / Constellation / Octave victims /other-products, since 15 sept. 2008?
(a) act upon banks' request & demand: Arrested and raided some minibond / constellation victims who participated in protesting banks' over 5 years' fraudulent act;
(b) Taking photos of those who participated in the demonstrations ...
(c) What ELSE ????????

While HK Police have been busy with responding to banks' request & demand: searching & raiding Minibond/Constellation victims because of their involvement in protest against Banks' cheating behavior on Minibond / Constellation / Octave,
What have the financial center New York's legal system done so far?


In the recent news:

1. "New York Attorney General sues Charles Schwab over securities sales" (Aug.17)
NEW YORK - New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo filed a lawsuit Monday against the brokerage unit of Charles Schwab Corp., claiming the firm misled customers about the safety of auction-rate securities.
Cuomo's office has been at the forefront of pushing brokers and underwriters of auction-rate securities to repurchase them from investors who were left with steep losses after the market for the investments collapsed in early 2008.
The suit against Schwab is aimed at forcing the retail brokerage firm to repurchase the securities at face value from investors.
...
Last month, Cuomo's office notified San Francisco-based Charles Schwab that it was planning to file the suit against the retail brokerage firm for claiming the securities were safe investments while selling them to customers.
In a statement Monday, Cuomo said: "Charles Schwab owed its customers a duty to properly understand and make accurate representations concerning auction-rate securities. Today we commenced a lawsuit to remedy Schwab's repeated breach of that duty."
...
related link: http://www.cnbc.com/id/32447041

2. "Credit Suisse broker convicted of fraud" (Aug.17)
A former Credit Suisse broker was on Monday convicted by a jury of fraudulently selling risky auction-rate securities in one of the first criminal prosecutions to emerge from the two-year-long credit crisis.

The guilty verdict against Eric Butler, 36, comes after a three-week trial in which prosecutors accused him and his former colleague, Julian Tzolov, of scheming to generate higher sales commissions by lying to clients about what kind of securities they were being sold.

“The defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations saddled investors with unknown risks they did not bargain for,” said Benton Campbell, US attorney for the eastern district of New York.

“This case shows that those who engage in such schemes will be held to account for their criminal activity.”

related links:
- http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE57G4HK20090817?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticNews (reuters)
- http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/nyfo081709a.htm (FBI press release)

3. 2008-News:
US Regulators alleged that brokerages misled investors into believing that auction rate securities were safe, cash-equivalent products, when in fact they faced increasing liquidity risk. Major financial companies Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia Corp.,and others that sold auction-rate securities have reached 100% buy-back settlements.


2009年7月15日 星期三

Why banks can't answer queries regarding the "Fund" (Minibond collateral)?



作為受過良好教育,有包括CDS/CDO和各類信貸掛鈎產品在內的投資經驗的專業人員和管理層的銀行,作為銷售了迷債4-6年的迷債分銷商,
- 銀行為甚麼不能回答以下關於關於抵押品之疑問?
- 銀行的協約精神和對客戶的Duty of Care 職責去了哪裡了呢?

Enquiry on the"NOTICE OF REIVESTMENT OF COLLATERAL FOR UNDERLYING SECURITIES” (letter from HSBC USA and Bank of New York). The following questions are addressed to BANKS who sold minibond to us.

The "Fund" below refers to the Fund mentioned in the "NOTICE OF REIVESTMENT OF COLLATERAL FOR UNDERLYING SECURITIES” (dated 18 March 2009). Use Minibond Series #27 as an example:

(a) Where can I find out the role and functions of Bank of New York in respect of the Minibond Series 27?

(b) Can BANKS please clarify the relationship between the Series 27 and the Fund ?
Because I have looked at the prospectuses but could not find any mention of the Fund. (c) Can you please advise where in the prospectuses for Series 27 the Fund is mentioned?

(c) Can BANKS please advise where in the prospectuses for Series 27 the Fund is mentioned?

Banks are regulated financial institutions. Banks' responsibility as minibond-distributors is NOT confined to passing on the enquiries from the note-holders to the trustee and replies from the trustee to the note-holders, regardless if the enquiries concern matter within banks' knowledge or the replies given by the trustee do not really answers the queries raised. Banks are not no-asking & no-telling & commission-collection middle-man only. Banks are bound by SFC Code of Conduct!

2009年7月13日 星期一

"well-educated", disclosure of Minibond risks, and banks' Duty of Care



One of banks’ excuses on dismissing Minibond complaints is that some Minibond victims are reasonably well-educated and should have been alerted by the ‘red flag’ scattered around in the prospectuses.

Understandably, the Minibond designers & promoters would argue (in their heart) that: the ‘ref flag’ is indicative of the real nature of the products and has been well hidden, notwithstanding the reassuring façade ("credit-linked to 7 well-known companies") and the message of safe and diversification that it is designed to convey.


No professional intermediary could have valued the Minibond using only the information provided in marketing material (including Prospectus).

"Minibond Structure and Pricing Report" by Ernest & Young to Hong Kong Bank Associations (Dec.2008) reveals the material information and risk disclosure that are missing from Minibond prospectus.

Banks are blaming SFC for the minibond approval, in additaional to banks' claim that well-educated clients should have known the true feature and risks of Minibond. Can banks repeat their view on the material risks of Minibond today, after over 4-6 years' minibond sale?

Banks seemed to behave like a no-asking & no-telling commission-collecting only middle-man. What happened to banks' duty of care to its clients?

Did banks' well-educated professional & management who have expertise in CDS / CDO / CDS / credit derivative /other investments products forget that they are bound by "Code of Conduct" (knowing the product, explain the true nature and risks to clients, make adequate disclosure of relevant material information)?

Financial institutions engage in improper conduct for financial gain. As in the case of those who evade tax, penalties must have a deterrent effect. Like tax evaders, the financial institutions should have faced penalties of up to three times the fees and commissions they earned as a result of their misconduct. Regulators in other jurisdictions have found that removing the financial gain is an effective deterrent.

In other jurisdictions, when misconduct by financial institutions has been shown, compensating all affected investors is the norm. The onus is on the financial institution to demonstrate why an investor should not be compensated. Our process of putting the onus on the investor to prove his claim puts many ordinary investors at a disadvantage.

The outcome of this saga does not appear to be just and does not augur well for consumer protection in thefinancial service sector.

2009年6月25日 星期四

《連載-2》雷曼骗局之根源 Root Cause of Lehman Minibond Fraud



1. MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) 之誕生和金管局之權限

《證券及期貨條例》(簡稱"SFO",證券法) 指出了證監會的職責和目的:
"把規管證券及期貨市場的10條現有條例綜合及更新,成為一條單一條例。訂定一個方便易行的規管架構,以建立一個公平、井然有序及具透明度的市場,在國際上具有競爭力,又對投資者、證券發行人及中介人有吸引力."

《證券及期貨條例草案》主要規管措施的條文旨指出了證監會的權力範圍:
- 透過對投資產品的要約作出規管,以加強對投資者的保障;
- 訂明證監會的查訊、監管、調查、紀律處分及干預權力
- 透過成立市場失當行為審裁處作為民事審裁制度,以及把現行刑事審裁制度的範圍擴大至包括檢控市場失當行為及其他罪行,以打擊市場失當行為

根據《銀行業條例》(簡稱“BO”)金融管理專員的職能(條文7), 金管局的主要職責是:
- 促進銀行業體系的整體穩定與有效運作,負責監管遵從本條例條文的事宜
- 採取一切合理步驟,以確保所有認可機構… 以負責、誠實與務實而有條理的態度經營
- 促進與鼓勵認可機構及貨幣經紀維持正當操守標準及良好和穩妥的業務常規
- 遏止或協助遏止與認可機構的業務常規有關的非法、不名譽或不正當的行為
- 採取一切合理步驟,以確保任何認可機構所經營的任何銀行業務、任何接受存款業務或任何其他業務是─
(i) 以持正和審慎的方式以及適度的專業能力經營的;及
(ii) 以無損存款人的利益的方式經營的。

MOU (Memorandum of Understanding,諒解備忘錄)的出籠並沒有使對於銀行的監管變得更為有效,而只是為金管局和證監會提供了互相推卸的合理依據。跟跟SFO相比,MOU更多的是含糊不清的責任定義,沒有清晰指出誰應該做甚麼。MOU給與金管局的具體職責即是金管局的“前線人員的監管”之職能。

金管局就有關人士採取紀律行動(條文58A)的權力:
(1) 如—
(a) 某有關人士犯失當行為或曾在任何時間犯失當行為;或
(b) 金融管理專員認為某有關人士並非或已不再是適當人選,
則金融管理專員可在諮詢證監會後—
(c) 將該人士的有關資料的全部或部分自紀錄冊刪除;或
(d) 將該人士的有關資料的全部或部分暫時中止載在紀錄冊中。
(2) 金融管理專員可完全或局部基於證監會曏他披露的資料而行使此權力,不論該等資料是否由於根據 SFO第182條進行的調查而產生的

事實是:對於銀行裡跟證券相關的部門,金管局並無更有效的調查和懲罰銀行相關部門的權力。而依據SFO,證監會卻有著全部的權利。

2009年6月24日 星期三

《連載-1》雷曼骗局之根源 Root Cause of Lehman Minibond Fraud



序: 監管部門之瀆職 和 金融機構之詐騙

本文是繼“雷曼事件研究報告”之後的由雷曼苦主大聯盟所作的第二份研究報告。以便公眾瞭解雷曼相關產品所涉及的欺詐行徑並提供深入的分析。原文及有關文件的引用請詳見英文版。本文為中文簡要。

“禍心結構”指把一個投資工具捆綁於另一個投資工具之中。有何必要把兩個信貸掛鈎產品串聯一起而不作為一個信貸掛鈎產品推出呢?好處是可以借用看似安全的表面層(“跟 7 個著名公司掛鈎”)做掩蓋,而把具更大風險的低層“禍心”(跟多達150-194個公司掛鈎)包藏起來,達到金玉其外,敗絮其中的欺騙效果,去欺騙對信貸金融工具不熟悉的市民。此類欺騙性產品的策划者和共謀者們則取得巨大利潤。誠如某S&P高層承認他們為了公司的利潤而把靈魂出賣給魔鬼。通過投資於一些新的主要由機構投資者參與的缺乏透明度的投資工具,使用大量公眾不熟悉的新技術名詞(如CDO, 合成CDO, 信貸破產掉期等),混以公眾熟悉的詞彙(如債券,AAA評級,AAA評級的傳統債券的破產概率的20年歷史數據等),達到半真半假,魚目混珠的欺騙公眾的目的。當然,如果監管部門是警覺性高和認真處理的話,類似“迷你債劵”的騙人伎倆就有可能功虧一簣。

可惜,在雷曼事件發生的過去幾年裡,金管局和證監會在監察和阻止雷曼騙局上是完全失敗了,從而造成了持續幾年的迷債騙局 。欺騙性的章程、含糊其詞或無實質披露、甚或誤導性的陳述。證監會對此卻卻視而不見,大開綠燈。

雷曼事件發生之後,金管局和證監會對於公眾投訴的處理手法, 意味著兩個監管機構早就意識到他們的寬鬆放縱難免為金融欺詐敞開大門 。 證監會給政府的調查報告顯示對於該產品的“禍心結構”其實是心裡有數的。而金管局則把問題預先定性為“錯誤銷售”。把矛頭對准銀行的前線銷售人員。為了給自己開脫,他們只能保持模棱兩可,找些膚淺表面的問題來調查,找替罪羊,而避開問題的欺騙性的實質。
雷曼騙局帶出一個獨特的現象: 規管金融市場的執法和規管部門都如同虛設。金管局不去檢查銀行在銷售上是否違規,而去盤問受害人,想方設法蒙哄受害人跟銀行和解。監管部門一直企圖文過飾非,為了揭露這種跡近無法無天的惡行,促使我們不斷研究及發表報告。
證監會和金管局簽訂了 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU,諒解備忘錄、 於2002年終)。第一,二章將圍繞著 MOU開展。 因為 MOU揭示了證監會對金管局拱手相讓其職責,變相地鼓勵銀行肆意為所欲為,第三章將列出金管局的失職和證監會對文書披露方面的失職。第四章安永會計師為銀行公會提供的“迷債結構和定價”報告,提供了第三章的証據。儘管兩個監管機構的報告都有不公開部分,歪曲真相的企圖卻是令人一目瞭然。

雷曼騙局的根源,在金管局和證監會的私相授受,包庇被監管的機構。甚者,曾特首的縱容放任,讓香港的政治及社會制度,全面受到侵蝕及腐化,這正是我們憂心如焚的原因。

2009年6月17日 星期三

銀行怕甚麼?銀行心虛了嗎?

迷你債券之核心為迷債抵押品(即任總所指之"第二層債務抵押證券“)。這就是為甚麼,7 個著名掛鈎公司沒有問提,迷債價值卻到了要跟零掛鈎的地步。

為甚麼政府和監管機構不敢要求銀行披露銀行對於迷債抵押品(即迷債"第二層債務抵押證券“)之理解?
為甚麼银行至今為止不能 (/不敢?) 回答關於迷債抵押品問題?

2008年9月27日,在銷售了4-5年 共 36 個迷你債券系列之後, 當時的銀行公會主席和廣北公開承認:
“現時本港銀行作為雷曼迷你債的包銷商或分銷商,掌握的信息十分有限。這些債券狀況如何﹖債券抵押品的性質是什麼﹖。。。目前包銷商都不掌握確切信息。”

懇請政府徹查銀行是否有系統性不瞭解(或隱瞞)迷債抵押品(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)的性質之問題。
懇請政府就以下迷債抵押品(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)相關問題, 徹查銀行之理解和內部之相關資料。
懇請政府就以下迷債抵押品(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)相關問題, 徹查銀行對客戶做的解釋和披露。

這個調查,是關係到迷債之關鍵。這也是金管局至今不願意調查之願意,因為金管局一心為銀行護航,於是把矛頭指向職員。儘管和廣北先生不是說某個或某些銀行職員對於迷你“債券抵押品的性質”不確切瞭解, 和廣北先生是說“銀行”對於迷你“債券抵押品的性質”不確切瞭解。 和廣北先生用”債券“來簡稱”迷你債券“ ! 在和廣北先生的心裡,是否下意識地把本質為多層 Credit-Linked-Notes 的迷你債券等同“債券”來看待了? 是否也間接地反映了銀行的在對於迷你債券的本質的理解上有系統性錯誤?

銀行界有著理解並且買賣 CDO / Synthetic CDO / CDS /Credit-Linked Notes 的專業知識和多年豐富投資經驗之專業人士。 根據安永為銀行公會提供的“迷債結構和定價“報告(2008年12月), 在2004-2008年內,銀行銷售的迷債系列 10(2004年5月發行)至36均為類似性質的以合成CDO為第二層債務抵押證券。而合成CDO 之資料於迷債正式發行日(通常是購買截至日之後的3個星期左右)之前就已經有了, 因為雷曼必須在迷債正式發行日之前把合成CDO 評級拿到,再名正言順地用迷債之資金去買入自己打包的合成CDO 。

至今為止,銀行堅持自己在迷債銷售上是沒有錯誤的。也就是說,他們明白賣的產品究竟是甚麼。銀行是沒有任何理由拒絕公眾對此之要求的。银行也可以公開他們不能回答關於這些問題的理由。 銀行也可以公开宣告:我是銀行我怕誰!

儘管 “銀行於銷售信貸掛勾票據時,不知悉第二層債務抵押證券所掛勾之信貸參考機構“ (任總語),

(1) 2008年8月,在銷售了4-5年 共 36 個迷你債券系列之後,銀行是否知道這 迷債抵押品”(即"第二層債務抵押證券)之合成CDO 是賣跟由 97-194個相關主體組成的一攬子信貸保險? 以及: 銀行是否知道 如果這合成CDO之一攬子掛鈎相關主體裡發生了 足夠的信貸事件的話 造成合成CDO本金損失 ?

(2) 以系列19為例125個相關主體內,當第9個信貸事件發生時,就會造成合成CDO本金損失 ,而第10個信貸事件發生時,就會造成合成CDO 100% 本金損失 銀行是何時了解到這些系列19之具體信貸掛鈎主體及信貸事件影響之條件的?

(3) 從2004年5月的第一個以合成CDO作為”第二層債務抵押證券“的 系列10 開始,直至 2008年的 系列 36,在2008年8月之前這幾年的期間, 銀行有沒有跟雷曼(或發行商)要求過並且看過任何其中任何一個或幾個迷債系列的”迷債抵押品資料”(即:“第二層債務抵押證券“ 合成CDO 資料) ?

(4) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到: 這”迷債抵押品”(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)之 合成CDO 信息和風險 為迷債相關重大信息和重大風險 (material information and material risk) ?

(5) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到 : 這”迷債抵押品”(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)為 合成CDO ?

(6) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到 :這"迷債抵押品”之合成CDO 的主要特徵是跟一攬子信貸主體掛鈎?

(7) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到: 這 合成CDO 是賣 由 諸多 個相關主體組成的一攬子信貸保險 ? 以及其 ‘ 如果一攬子掛鈎相關主體裡發生了足夠的信貸事件的話,就會造成合成CDO本金損失’ 之特徵?

(8) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到: 而這”足夠“信貸事件,絕不是指合成CDO之一攬子信掛鈎主體之50% 或90%的相關主體發生信貸事件? 以及 ‘ 通常是會當8%-10%(或更低的百分比)的相關主體發生信貸事件的時候,就會造成合成CDO本金損失,最終造成迷債的利息及本金損失’

(9) 銀行於銷售信貸掛勾票據 (即:迷你債券)時,關於這 迷債抵押品,即今天的””第二層債務抵押證券““, 是如何跟客戶解釋和披露的呢?有沒有披露過其信貸風險?

(10) 銷售的時候,銀行有沒有跟客戶解釋,這“抵押品資料” 可以稍後於迷債正式發行之前(由雷曼或發行商)准備好,可以提供給客戶?
銷售之後,當這“抵押品資料”已經(由雷曼或發行商)准備好了的時候,銀行有沒有告知客戶? 以便提供給客戶或者由客戶去索取閱讀。
無論是銷售前,銷售時或銷售之後,銀行有沒有跟客戶提起過/或披露過任何“抵押品資料” 相關資料或相關信貸資料?

2009年6月11日 星期四

轉載安永報告的迷債示意圖

1。 迷債系列10-36之結構。 為甚麼迷債章程跟銀行的解釋完全沒有 合成CDO (层) 這一層解釋呢?


安永報告指出:SPV PIFL把迷債資金投資於合成CDO, 該合成CDO”是由不同的SPV發行的。而迷債中的兩類掉期 (即“迷債層次的FTD掉期”和“合成CDO 層次的掉期)是為向雷曼賣信貸保險而設計的。合成CDO was backed by the collateral which is the Lehman USD Liquidity Fund. 因此,迷債只有一個資產(即:雷曼貨幣基金),和許多負債(liability)(即兩個層次的信貸掉期)”。迷債層次的FTD掉期幾乎不為迷債持有者帶來收入,所有CDO層次(包括雷曼貨幣基金的利息)的收入均歸於雷曼。

2。安永報告明確指出:在合成CDO層次的SPV是由97-194個相關主體組成的一攬子信貸保險如果一攬子掛鈎相關主體裡發生了足夠的信貸事件的話,就會造成合成CDO本金損失,從而觸發迷債層次的“underlying securities破產事件”,最終造成迷債的利息及本金損失

這好像也是在描述發行商健在的“精明債券”?

為甚麼在幾年的迷債銷售期間,從迷債章程和證監會審批人員,到金管局和銀行,
從 系列10 到 系列36 的幾年之間,
- 都從不知道 合成CDO究竟為何物?
- 銀行,證監會是否都認為 合成CDO 不屬於重大風險的信息?
- 也從未試圖瞭解過 合成CDO ? 2004年5月發行 系列10 的時候可能不瞭解成CDO具體組成,之後也從沒有去瞭解過?
直至2008年9月之後/或者安永報告出來才瞭解?
- 2004年5月-2008年8月, 銀行從沒有跟雷曼要求過抵押品文件?銷售迷債是抵押品文件可能還沒有出籠,在迷債抵押品購買之後是一定有的啊。
迷債抵押品是跟迷債相關的重大風險。迷債抵押品信息可是跟迷債風險相關的充分信息啊。
- 都沒有人跟客戶解釋過這些?
- 為甚麼沒有一個發行章程都寫一些類似的內容的?


3. 安永報告的一些定義(對照示意圖).
(a) FTD Swap: First To Default Swap. In a FTD Swap, the protection seller (ie.. PIFL) will take the loss caused by the first default to occur among a poool of up to 8 reference obligations. Upon occurrence of the first default within the reference pool, the settlment amount for the FTD Swap is dependent on the credit event of the FTD Swap reference obligations and the value of the underlying Synhtetic cDO for Series 10-36.


(b) CSO = Collateralized Swap Obligations. The CSO represents a swap arangement between the Synthetic CDO-level PSVs and LBSF in which the SPVs sell credit protection on a basket of between 97-194 underlying reference entities and surrender the total return of the Colalteral in exchange for periodic interest payment from LBSF. The CSO offers higher yield as the periodic interest payments are passed through the SPVs. However, the SPVs can be at risk of losing their initial investmtns if serveral credit events occcur in the reference portfolio.CSO

2009年6月8日 星期一

SFC Coverup for Minibond prospectuses?

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮表示: “證監會角色並非要監察投資產品價格是否穩定, 而是要確保所批核之投資產品, 有全面市場披露”.

Does SFC consider the Issuer Prospectuses & Program Prospectuses meet the above “全面市場披露” requirement? Does SFC consider the Issue Prospectuses meet SFC's claimed "clear, non-leading, adequate disclosure" standard ? (SFC may use Series #19 (2005) or #27 (2006) or #35 or #36 (2007) as examples).

From SFC CEO's testimony in Oct.13, 2008 Legco Meeting, (http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/chinese/hc/minutes/hc20081013.pdf).

SFC CEO 韋奕禮先生 seemed to be fooled by misleading statements in Minibond Issue Prospectuses, and was fooling the public by quoting the misleading statements from the Minibond Issue Prospectus.

1. SFC CDO 韋奕禮先生 said tthat “These products were backed by triple A collaterals and the likely cumulative historical rate of failure for triple A collaterals over the past 25 years between 1981 and 2006 is 0.09 percent for the first three years.”
The SFC CEO seemed to quote the historical default probability data in the Issue Prospectus of Minibond Series #36 (page 54). Such data obviously intended to show that Minibond was backed by collateral with such default historical data. However, such data does not apply to the Minibond (synthetic) CDO collateral at all! Because the quoted 25 year data was based on the default performance of all conventional AAA-rated debt issues. The Minibond (Synthetic) CDO collateral (Series 36 and many earlier Series) were Synthetic CDO which does not even have a 10-year historic data for data/record tracking.
Was SFC CEO fooled by such misleading data and considered the Minibond was ‘backed by’ ‘triple A collateral’ that had similar characteristics (in terms of default rate) as to the triple A conventional bond/debt?
Or: Was SFC CEO trying to fool the public by quoting the above misleading data ?

2. SFC CEO used "backed by triple A collateral" (in his speech quoted in #1 above).

"backed by" was a totally wrong or misleading descriptions here. The Minibond (money) was really INVESTED into triple A rated Synthetic CDO that sold credit protection on a basket of between 97-194 underlying reference entities to Lehman Brother. That is, the so-called "triple A collateral" was itself credit-linked to over 100 reference entities in its true nature, It was not a a conventional bond/debt by any definition,

By using 'backe by', SFC CEO was suggesting that the Minibond value was dependent on the (synthetic CDO) collateral, and effectively hinted that the synthetic CDO collateral had the similar quality as of a triple A conventional bond/debt.

Either the SFC CEO was misled by the Minibond Prospectus or was trying to mislead the public on the truth of Minibond.

In fact, If sufficient credit events occur within the Synthetic CDO basket's credit obligations, the resulting loss will be taken up by the Synthetic CDO through reduction of the Synthetic CDO principal. This leads to an "underlying securities default event" at the Minibond-level.

Was the Mr. SFC CEO aware of this?

It was the synthetic CDO that was secured by Collateral which was the Lehman USD (Money Market) Fund. The intention was probably to ensure the payment to the credit-protection buyer Lehman for the basket reference entities of 97-194 included in the Synthetic CDO.


3. [SFC CEO韋奕禮先生: Series 36. There are a number of different series. Generally, each series will have something akin to the statement in series 36, which said they are not suitable for everybody. They are suitable for people who want a fixed rate quarterly interest in US Dollars or Hong Kong Dollars and are confident that none of the seven named referred entities will be affected by a credit event and they are willing to accept the risk that our notes are not principal-protected and if a credit event happens to any one of the referred entities, you will only receive back in a credit event an early redemption amount which could be significantly less than the principal amount of our notes. That is a fairly typical disclosure of each of the documents.]

韋奕禮先生 was quoting from the Section "Who should buy our Notes? Are they suitable for everyone? ", which can be found in the Issue Prospectus (page 10, Series #27) as below:

[“Who should buy our Notes? Are they suitable for everyone?
Our Notes are not suitable for everyone. (...)
Our Notes are only suitable for investors who are:
- looking for fixed rate quarterly interest income in USD or HKD;
- confident that none of the 7 named reference entities will be affected by a credit event (that is, “Bankruptcy”, “Failure to Pay” or “Restructuring”, which include events such as a major borrowing default, bankruptcy or adverse debt restructuring) between the issue date and the second business day prior to the maturity date of our Notes and who are able to take the risk that they may lose their investment if one of these events does happen;
- willing to accept extension of the maturity date for our Tranche A Notes (...)
- willing to accept early repayment of principal (...). ]

Above statements in plain English clearly suggested (to retail clients) that, although it was not suitable for everyone, IF you were confident on the 7 reference entities, the Notes was for you! SFC CEO seemed to be content with the above misleading statement, and was fairly happy about the disclosure of ‘confident that none of the seven named reference entities will be affected by a credit event.". SFC CEO AGREED with such misleading statement, and was quoting it to defend the Minibond prospectuses.

After all, the key risks of the Minibond is the default-event with the 7 reference entities, is that right, MR. SFC CEO ?

Don’t we also need to be confident on the MANY never-mentioned & undisclosed reference-entities hidden in the Minibond CDO collateral, along with our confidence on the 7 well-known companies? Minibond CDO collateral was in fact credit-linked to many (over 100) reference entities, but not to the same 7 well-known companies. Use Series #19 as an example. Don’t we need to be confident that there would be less than 9 default event out of 125 reference entities? Because, out of 125 entities in Minibond CDO Collateral, the 9th default event would cause collateral principal loss, and the 10th default event would cause 100% collateral principal loss. Confidence on the 7 reference entities would catch us total surprise in seeing the 100% principal loss caused by the 10th default event out of the 125 reference entities which was mentioned nowhere in the prospectuses.

Was SFC CEO fooled by the Minibond prospectuses as HK retail minibond-buyers?

or: Was SFC CEO trying to fool the public in order to defend Minibond prospectuses?

2009年6月3日 星期三

金管調解中心既未幫助投訴人取得最佳利益,又毀滅罪證並損害公眾利益

蔡耀君對於金管設立調解中心毀滅罪證的供詞. 蔡耀君聲稱“看不到(客戶和解和影響調查)兩者有甚麼矛盾”因為他認為"和解或客戶取消投訴都不會影響金管局的繼續調查”。
可是,蔡也承認並同意任志剛之前講過的“如果個別客戶因為和解之後,他自己不願意提供資料,那麼會對調查有影響的”。

對於有表面證據成立的轉介到證監會的案例,金管局顯然是清楚地明白:如果投訴人跟銀行和解並因銀行要求撤消於金管局的投訴而且之後也不再提供相關資料的話,金管局的調查儘管會繼續,卻會得個不了了之的結果,也就是說,金管局的調查有很大可能由於投訴者不在提供資料而得不到任何結果。

調查是手段不是目的。調查的目的是為了辨別是非,為了有個明確的結論,以便懲罰犯了錯的一方,一是保護投訴人的利益,同時也是為保障公眾利益,以免造成其他的客戶在將來再受其害。

如果知道和解可能會造成調查結果泡湯的話,那麼,影不影響“繼續調查”有甚麼實際意義呢?影不影響“調查結果”才是至為關鍵的。
正如審判黑社會大頭目一樣,如果大頭目在開審之後,把證人都給收買或者滅口了,既使可以接著審判,最後也不會有甚麼結果。那麼,審判就會是沒有達到目的。這就是為甚麼會有“證人保護”一說。


蔡聲稱這樣做是為了幫助該投訴人盡快拿回金錢,顯然金管局認為該投訴人的金錢損失是由於銀行過錯而造成的了。
對於迷債有這麼多的投訴人。金管局儘管不承認有系統性錯誤,採用“由下至上“的方式。現在,如果,每一個”有錶面證據成立”的個案都由於投訴人跟銀行和解而不再給金管局提供資料的話,那麼就有非常大的機會造成每一個”有錶面證據成立”的個案的調查結論是‘缺乏證據’的不了了之的結果。那麼,既使銀行有系統性錯誤,金管局也查不出來了,因為每一個個案均無調查結論。

蔡耀君聲稱想幫助的該投訴人盡快拿回金錢。事實是:鑒於迷債的長時間的投訴所造成的精神疲勞,由於是在金管局沒有完成調查定論的時候跟銀行和解的,很可能因此屈服於銀行而達成一個不是很好的賠償金額,而沒有得到他/她應該得到的最佳賠償。

金管局這樣這種貌似幫助投訴人的短視做法, 看似幫助某一個投訴人盡快拿回其損失的金錢,事實是既沒有真正維護該投訴人的利益,也犧牲了公眾利益。因為,金管局的調解機制等於是:
- 既沒有幫助投訴人拿回應該得到的最佳金錢數額, (對於有錶面證據成立的個案,如果等到最後定罪的話,投訴人應該是可以拿到最佳金錢數額的)。
- 又使許多相同深受銀行錯誤之害的市民們(也是投訴人們) 的利益得不到金管局的保護,不能拿回由於銀行錯誤造成的金錢損失;
- 而銀行的錯誤由於逃過了這次金管局的調查,銀行很可能會繼續犯類似的錯誤,從而在將來危害更多的市民們。

金管局調解中心是短視決定,既未幫助投訴人取得最佳利益,又由於毀滅罪證從而損害了公眾利益。只有銀行是受益人。

1. (轉載) 要求金管局馬上停止為銀行洗擦罪證http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/E8A681E6B182E98791E7AEA1E5B180E9A6ACE4B88AE5819CE6ADA2E782BAE98A80E8A18CE6B497E693A6E7BDAAE8AD89-E887B4E98791E7AEA1E5B180E8ADB4E8B2ACE4BFA12997.php

2. (轉載) 要求金管局停止毀滅罪證
http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/E887B4E98791E7AEA1E5B180E4BFA1-E5819CE6ADA2E6AF80E6BB85E7BDAAE8AD893111.php

2009年5月30日 星期六

清查銀行 “七個代表” 之 騙術



銀行職員有否告訴客戶迷你債卷實質是跟七個著名公司和諸多其它各類公司信貸挂鉤?

銀行敢不敢自己做事自己負責? 把當初賣迷債時講的話和對迷債的理解再講一次?現在銀行對於賣了幾年的產品的特征是屁也不敢放一個 ! (sorry for my language, But banks deserve it !).

銀行成了街頭的傻啞巴小販:No-Brainer 式的按發行商指示把章程給客戶了,客戶自願簽字了。之后管收錢就是了。章程內容是否充分披露了迷債的特征和風險了 & 跟客戶解釋真實特征和風險 呢,那就不管銀行的事了。

銀行有理的就出來當眾講講:迷你債卷到底是跟幾個公司信貸挂鉤?銀行給與客戶的資料裡到底提到了多少個挂鉤公司 以及 關於挂鉤公司的信息到底披露了多少?銀行自己對於迷債抵押品的性質是否了解?

七個代表”概括了 迷你債卷 和 精明債卷 和 星展零售債卷 的銷售手法之精髓。以“跟七個著名公司信貸掛鈎”代表了“跟 100-150 多個評級由AAA至CCC不等公司信貸掛夠的”的實質, 以“跟七個著名公司信貸掛鈎”代表並遮掩了沒有買入任何相關公司的實際資產,而是「對賭」信貸狀況的實質. 發行商不同, 騙術卻是類似的。

金管局之前在立法會還大言不慚地說甚麼迷債之所以出問題,在於雷曼出了問題。現在大摩 okay,可是精明債卷出了問題。關鍵問題何在呢?
金管局的精英們大概會說:關鍵還是在於雷曼。 "如果雷曼不破產...","如果...不...",..., 精明債卷的抵押品中的100多個掛鈎公司就不會有問題了。

(一)"如果。。。不。。。”:

- “如果銀行是有錯的話,如果銀行確是把產品的真實特徵和風險跟客戶講清楚了的話,銀行应该会毫不犹豫地堂堂正正地再次給大家解釋和演繹一次关于產品的真實特徵和風險的,对吧?
反正银行在2004-2008年之間已經演繹了多次,金管局都认为任何只是少數人對產品認識不足的。在银行的销售职员里,随便找个人都可以給大家解釋和演繹一次关于產品的真實特徵和風險的,对吧?”

- “如果銀行是有系統性失誤的話,那麼,銀行可以有大堆文件証明相關產品的培訓和盡職審查。對吧?”
新鴻基金融曾為許多銀行提供了關於跟迷債相關的培訓。事實上,許多銀行(如:永亨銀行等)的迷債銷售是直接跟新鴻基金融合作,而不是直接跟雷曼亞洲合作的。
證監會卻就新鴻基金融的迷債銷售提出了以下關註:
[ 1、對產品進行的盡職審查是否足夠;2、對前線人員提供的培訓是否足夠,從而確保投資者理解產品涉及的一切重大風險;3、迷債系列的風險水平;向零售銷售人員傳達迷債風險評級的信息;及採取理應採取的措施,確保銷售人員提供合理適當意見;等等


(二)[ 蔡耀君。。。金管局在已處理的投訴中,亦發現個別員工對金融產品的性質風險認知有所不足。不過,他強調,由於目前尚有很多投訴尚未完成,故難確定這普遍情況。]

- 在金管局已經處理的投訴中,“對金融產品的性質風險認知有所不足”的“個別員工”的比例范圍是多少?10% 20% ? 

- 如果在金管局已經處理的投訴中普遍“不是認識不足”的話,那麼,“不是認識不足”的銀行職員們通常有那些認識呢?又是如何跟客戶解釋關於迷債的真實特征和風險的呢?
比如跟客戶解釋:﹝“跟7個公司信貸掛鈎,要鎖定3-7年,到期後可拿回本金”,同時把Program Prospectus 和 發行章程給了客戶﹞?

是否是屬於認識充足並跟客戶解釋了迷債的真實特征和風險了呢?金管局可否回答這個簡單直接的問題呢?

- 在金管局已經處理的投訴中,可否請金管局從那眾多的“不是認識不足”的銀行職員裡提供幾個例子,隨便找出10-20個的銷售過迷債的銀行職員來跟公眾再次演示和解釋一下他們對產品的“透徹理解”。
讓公眾看看“不是認識不足”的銀行職員是如何理解和解釋迷債的真實特征和風險的?  讓公眾看看那些 “不是認識不足” 的銀行職員是如何理解並跟客戶解釋抵押品的實質和風險? (或則說,抵押品的實質和風險跟迷債的真實特徵和風險是不相關因而沒必要提及抵押品的實質和風險?請金管局向公眾下個定論。)

依我之見,這個請求應該是銀行求之不得的吧。 終於再次有機會跟公眾演示和解釋一下他們對產品的“透徹理解”了,這可是大長銀行名譽的絕好機會啊。

(三)[ 蔡耀君...透露,金管局接獲的相關投訴中,以前線銷售人員未有清楚解釋風險的類別最多,並強調前線銷售人員應當全面就迷你債券的性質風險向客戶解釋

- 金管局為甚麼不公布金管局對於產品的真實特徵和相關風險的基本定義?
- 金管局為甚麼不公布"全面就迷你債券的性質風險向客戶解釋"的基本定義?
難道說金管局跟銀行在迷債的真實特征和風險的定義上有分歧?如果是這樣的話,干脆把金管局跟銀行的定義都公布於眾。有透明度才有公平合理,黑箱調查隻能讓人覺得有偏袒一方之嫌。
當然,金管局是大權在握,銀行有是有財有勢,普通百姓覺得金管局保護銀行,金管局和銀行也無須懼怕無錢無權的普通百姓。金管局和銀行家們心想:"Who cares? What else can you do?!!"

- 除了解釋“七個代表”(即跟七個著名公司信貸挂鉤)以外,銀行職員有沒有告訴客戶:
* 迷債還跟其它諸多公司的信貸挂鉤?
* 迷債的抵押品不是投入於任何實質資產的。
* 迷債的抵押品是跟其它諸多公司的信貸挂鉤?這都是在抵押品資料之中。這諸多公司通常會是100多家,這些公司的平均評級通常是遠低於那七個代表的,可以是包括AAA-CCC不等。

- 在目前金管局已經處理的投訴中,達到以上要求的比例的職員是多少?
或者:
- 請金管局給出關於迷債的真實特征和風險的定義,並告知公眾: 在目前金管局已經處理的投訴中,達到金管局要求的比例的職員是多少?


(四)[ 蔡耀君。。。強調相關的調查同時牽涉前線員工與銀行機構內部監控工作,其中金管局在調查過程會與有關前線員工會面取證,了解他們因甚麼原因令有關交易未能夠遵守操守準則。

金管局至今為止的調查的結果是什麼?例如:
- 從銀行對其職員的培訓 以及 銀行的關於迷債的銷售指引等文件?証明銀行內部機構監控工作是適當的?可否給公眾公布一個(或數個)銀行的迷債相關的培訓�銷售指引的文件?可以略去佣金部分啊。產品都賣了幾年了,這些培訓等文件不應該是“機密”了吧?也不應該會損害公眾利益吧?
-銀行職員了解迷債的真實特征和風險,但決定隻跟客戶介紹“七個代表”?
- 銀行職員自己都根本就不知道以上特征和風險。如果是這個原因的話,金管局目前為止調查出來的原因是什麼?或則:不管銀行是如何做的,隻要銀行職員沒有理解或解釋產品的真實特征和風險,就是銷售人員的錯,一定不可能是以銀行的系統性錯誤.原因是:莫須有?

永亨銀行 Ms Carmen Ng 於2008年十月初承認 [銀行(不僅僅是她個人 )並不知道抵押品的實質,並不知道迷你債卷是無實質資產的]。 Ms Carmen Ng 在給我解釋迷債的時候,根本就沒有提過抵押品,只是解釋並跟我探討了7個公司的破產可能性,還指出系列27‘的幾個掛鈎公司是在眾多迷債系列掛鈎公司中非常高質量的選擇。因為我對於那 7個挂鉤公司 和破產事件的定義都是非常小心的。Ms Carmen Ng承認她給我的解釋是她當時對迷債的理解。
Ms Carmen Ng 沒有「透徹理解」投資產品,實際是反映了永亨銀行的系統性錯誤,而不僅僅是某個銷售人員的"違規銷售”. 永亨銀行對於迷債的和關於迷債的培訓及銷售指引等資料,都可以証明這點。


關鍵是:金管局和政府是否一直打算閉眼不看,幫助銀行蒙混過關?

(五) [ 蔡耀君:金管局倡設風險「說明書

設立風險說明書是好事。關鍵在於:何謂風險。以迷你債卷為例,
- 風險到底是跟7個著名公司挂鉤,還是跟132個各類評級公司挂鉤?
- 迷債的錢是投入於實質資產還是沒有投入於任何實質資產而隻是賣保險等,
如何清晰准確均衡無誤導地,真真實實地把真實特征和風險給客戶介紹,這才是問題的關鍵。

銀行賣了3-4年以以賣信貸破產掉期合約(即:賣保險)為抵押品的迷你債卷,卻幾年如一日地堅持向客戶介紹“七個代表”論(即跟七個著名公司信貸挂鉤),抵押品的真實特征和風險是一律不提。原因在於沒有風險「說明書」呢,還是在於不想把真正風險向客戶披露?


謊言重復一千遍還是謊言! 除非你可以把相關人員都趕盡殺絕。真理終會戰勝謊言。銀行集體欺騙普通市民,依靠權勢來遮蓋其丑行。是可忍,熟不可忍! 不管是一個月,一年,十年。生命不息,奮爭不止。

"You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the people all of the time."