2010年12月29日 星期三

韋奕禮請辭揭監管危機 - 王岸然

2010年12月29日

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮於本月9日突然請辭,此事反映政府在金融危機與雷曼事件爆發之後,並無認真正視危機及汲取教訓,進而要迫走韋奕禮這一類國際級的行政專才,令香港的金融監管變得更加虛假和人治。

一個人的去留,本來不應與一個制度的存廢掛鈎,但若然將這幾年間發生的重要財經事件與韋奕禮的突然離任串在一起,便看到香港的深層次危機再次顯現,政府已經為財團操控,獨立的監管制度已名存實亡。

人才離職 庸才到位

香港只有一個證監會,證券監管工作予人與其他獨立非政府機關,如申訴專員或私隱專員屬同樣的東西,主管其事者不過是一名首長級人物而已,其位置可以隨便更換。不同的是,韋奕禮年薪900多萬,比特首高出幾倍,比負責監管他的財經事務局局長陳家強及財政司司長曾俊華高出更大比數;為何他值那樣的高薪?

韋奕禮不是那些一生在本地官僚系統內打滾的人物,而是國際證監集團人才的一員,有沒有工作一回事,身價與個人名譽是國際級別,毋庸置疑。證監是一門國際化的專業,國際證監會有一百八十多個會員,全世界的證券業九成以上受到同一類別的證監制度所監管(英、美、澳、加的證監為先進的代表模式);世上比香港先進的監管制度其實不多,香港能夠付出比先進地區更為優厚的薪酬,卻不能留住人才,高薪位置由本地或是來自國內的人治庸才所佔據,這就是金融災難及失誤連番出現的原因。

苦主不忿 抗爭至今

韋奕禮「劈炮」之後,政府透過自己的媒體放出消息,指韋是另有高就,會返回倫敦交易所任職云云。事實上,韋當年正是失意於倫敦交易所的人事鬥爭,已經回到鄉下準備搞點小生意終老,適逢香港證監會總裁有空缺,所以到來搵食。當然,此一時、彼一時,今天韋奕禮衣錦還鄉,有更高成就,是完全可能的事。不過,高級任命不可能不會多等三個月、到韋9月合約期滿為止;今天韋奕禮主動辭職,繼任無人,並不是好來好去的安排。

眾所周知,韋奕禮在雷曼事件的立場,一直是投資產品持牌者若有違規銷售的問題(mis-selling),會依國際證監的慣例,要銷售者負起全責,亦因而證監成功迫令包括新鴻基在內的三家雷曼產品分銷商要百分百賠償。這是去年初的事。

問題在於,經銀行監管出售同一類產品之時,監管之責與權全在銀行,而銀行的監管者任志剛卻站到銀行一邊,於是出現同一雷曼事件,卻出現不同賠償的六成方案;亦所以被迫接受六成賠償的苦主心存不忿,抗爭到今天,依然堅持事件尚未解決。

韋奕禮與任志剛的分別在哪裏?不是誰更有能力,而是一個是過江龍,以國際證監的監管標準為念;一個則是一生在香港的官僚與商界銀行之間打滾為生的地頭蟲。 大家同樣面對特區政府可在適當時候另請高明的局面,韋堅持保護投資者為優先的國際證監專業,另一人則盤算要與業界打好關係, 準備退休之時還可有再上層樓的空間。 香港的官僚莫不如是。

自11月底,雷曼苦主不停向證監會施壓,要求證監依〈證券及期貨條例〉第一百零七條檢控銀行從業員;這一着擊中銀行的死穴,因為執行證券大法的權力還在證監之手,不須得到金管局的同意,因為不是業界監管而是刑事檢控。

問題是政府在最初就經由陳家強與曾俊華提議銀行先支付六成的所謂和解方案,作為政府不再追究的交換條件,而曾政府一直以官僚應付刁民的思維看問題,以為一人讓一步是最好的方案,只是這個六成和解方案本質是「不平等條約」,迷債苦主固然從不順氣,迷債以外的雷曼苦主只能私下與銀行和解,賠償有多有少,但亦無一人順氣,雷曼問題從無解決。

轉向國際 提出申訴

過去兩個月的中環,雷曼苦主的示威威力比法輪功更強大,證監會不肯接受苦主報案的笑話,連外國金融報章亦已開始報道;這本是金融中心的天大笑話,只是香港人面對曾政府多樣的施政荒謬,已經麻木不覺。

這就是韋奕禮提早盡快離職的主要原因。去年政府拋出六成方案之時,是趁韋奕禮放假不在港,要證監會董事會通過決議接受;韋奕禮揹了黑鍋,卻受制於保密法例不能多言,今天面對苦主的天天示威,為保一己的清譽,只好提早離任。

可以預見,面對這樣一個官商橫行、不講法治的政府,證監會之內的國際人才專家會紛紛離去,國際的證監專才亦望而卻步,不肯來港,香港的監管制度名存實亡。

還有年半時間的曾蔭權不會拆彈,這是官僚習性,人人只會在任內自保。能藉第一百零七條迫銀行合理賠償的,只有政府及證監會,政府不動,苦主豈非無望?

筆者以為,苦主應將事件帶到國際層面,苦主可以直接向各國的證監會提交事件的報告,也可以直接向國際證監會組織(International Organization of Securities Commissions)提出申訴,給全球一百八十多個證監會評評道理,讓拒絕依法保護投資者的香港證監與香港政府在國際上名譽掃地。


2010年11月30日 星期二

檢控銀行職員 雷曼事件新發展

檢控銀行職員 雷曼事件新發展 - 王岸然, 2010年12月1日

過去個多星期在中環上班而又有機會行經遮打大廈的中產一族,一定十分奇怪,為何遮打大廈似乎已經被示威者封鎖了,但新聞沒有報道是什麼事。幾個示威者到中聯辦請願,議題耳熟能詳,新聞報道不會缺少,但百多名雷曼苦主圍困了一座內有大量國際投資公司的大廈個多星期,沒有報道也沒有分析文章告訴大家發生了什麼事情。本文可能是大家疑惑的唯一解說資訊。

只知追逐慣性新聞的記者也許應該上雷曼苦主大聯盟的網頁參考一下那些Youtube,以決定事件是否符合新聞價值,但對一直有評論雷曼事件的筆者而言,這是一件涉及以百億計的金融大案,結果可能是有數以千計的銀行家(從業員)被刑事檢控,事件是從根基上動搖了香港的金融中心地位。這樣的大事沒有新聞價值乎?

似乎也不盡然,上星期地方法院開審了第一宗雷曼銷售過程的刑事檢控,依據的是《證券及期貨條例》第一○七條,被告的銀行經理涉嫌「以欺詐地或罔顧實情地誘使他人投資金錢」,經理被控九項控罪,涉及誘騙六名客戶近680萬元購買迷債產品。

雙重標準非法治

此案肯定只屬冰山一角,成千上萬的苦主有類似經歷,並曾經到證監、金管局及警方申訴,只是大多苦主及市民對事件屬刑事(詐騙投資者),還是民事(投資失誤,不良銷售手法)根本搞不清楚,普通市民還以為在所謂六成賠償方案之後,事件已經了結。殊不知整批雷曼產品以不同名目有問題的銷售手法,落入投資者手中涉及240億元,所謂六成和解的迷債項目,只涉數十億元,而和解只涉及民事,不涉及刑事的責任。

本欄早在本年3月31日已經清楚介紹什麼是一○七條,同時建議雷曼苦主應發動一次萬人報案大行動,不能讓事件不了了之。這不單是關係個別苦主的私人投資得失問題,而是關係我們的金融經濟體系之內,不能容許大量詐騙性的銷售行為,而我們的法治體系,亦不能容許雙重標準,對小販商戶欺詐一塊幾毛就嚴厲執法,但大商家大銀行就享有特權,中資銀行就更享有特權中的特權,大家反而不聞不問。

大家以為事件已經曲解,忽略了和解只屬迷債系列,在整個雷曼產品的銷售過程之中只佔五成多的比例,而和解只屬民事,沒有解決違法欺詐銷售的更嚴重問題,而所謂和解方案,只及六成,那是銀行必定能從雷曼遺下的抵押產品取回的金額,銀行不單沒有承認任何責任,更可以有掙!投資者是在沒有選擇的情況下接受了「不平等條約」,去年有社論級的評論讚賞和解方案,呼籲苦主接受,報刊更從此當完成了輿論監督的責任,社會的反智沉淪,豈是偶然?

事隔兩年零三個月,始有第一宗依據第一○七條的刑事檢控,這個延誤何等驚人,背後的政治含義如何且不論,法治原則是延誤就會破壞公平(delay defeats equity),兩年間已經有不少年紀大的苦主因病過身或成危疾,如果一年只檢控幾人,要多少年才能完成還苦主一個公道的責任?苦主要等政府先檢控,取得勝訴的結果,才能展開民事的訴訟,因為這才有取勝的把握。民事官司從來是燒金錢的遊戲,香港沒有集體訴訟(class action)的制度,對無財勢的小投資者如何公道?正義大狀議員當年高調干預,抽完政治油水就不聞不問,這是哪一門子的正義?

爭取權益要團結

上星期五在地院檢控的中銀經理張瑰瑰案,傳媒算是有詳細報道,案件的內容,大家若不善忘,兩年前就聽過不少類同的故事。銀行職員形容雷曼產品是「保本」,與七大企業掛鈎,與一般基金或是定息債券無異,這都是典型的失實陳述手法,從來都是法律所不容許,只是有財勢的銀行不承認責任,背後給予特區政府壓力,靠銀行家支持上位的任志剛終於下台之後,政府才肯進行第一單案件的檢控,這與「六四」時的中共領導人一天不死盡,「六四」不會平反一樣,這是人話,不是法治,香港在這方面日漸與大陸「統一」。

公權力不可靠,跟紅頂白的傳媒也不主持公道之時,雷曼苦主能依靠的,只有自身的力量,公民直接行動(Direct Action)爭取自身的權益,從來是最為有效。菜園村的村民只有一百幾十人,但行動堅定勇敢,就令到政府的收地行動一再延後。

雷曼苦主也不團結,也不是人人積極,坐待別人行動,坐待政府行動的大有人在,這與社會的大環境一樣,但還是有少數人努力不懈;遮打大廈是證監會所在,證監會本來有法定責任接受投案,但由於在枱底下與金管局達成協議,同意銀行的六成和解方案就是事件的了結,所以今天在沒有合理法律理由的情況下,拒絕雷曼苦主報案,造成過去個多星期遮打大廈外又棺材又打鼓的奇景。證監會的職責本來是要當小投資者的守護天使,但在官僚政治之下反而出賣了小投資者的利益,於心無愧嗎?

2010年9月24日 星期五

迷債,銀行銷售,風險披露,騙局,

騙局,騙子, 西裝革履的騙子,道貌岸然的銀行家, 這之間都有甚麼聯繫呢?

電影“Public Enemy”, 一貫以搶劫銀行為生的大盜對在銀行里的客戶說:“我們只搶劫銀行,我們不搶劫銀行客戶”。

電影“華爾街”的格言是:“貪婪是好” ("greedy is good")。
從設計和銷售迷你債券,星債,和精明債券的銀行和銀行家身上,我們看到了 “greedy is good” 的精神。

現在“華爾街2:Money Never Sleeps" 要上映了。不知會有甚麼新的格言。


迷債發行章程的「本公司債券是甚麼?」一節,
有「誰應購買本公司債券?本公司債券是否適合所有人?」


本公司債券僅適合以下投資者:

 尋求美元或港元定息季度利息收入;

有信心所述的七間該等相關主體在本公司債券發行日至到期日前第二個營業日不會受到信貸事件 (即「破產」、「未能償債」或「重組」,包括例如未能償還大額借貸、破產、進行不利的債券重組)影響等事件,且可以承擔當發生任何上述事件後可能損失投資的風險;

 願意接受本公司可選擇延長A組及/或B組債券的到期日;及

 就任何組別的本公司債券而言,願意接受本公司可選擇在二零零七年九月十五日或其後任何付息日提早償還本金額。



這四點具體要求大概是最容易讓零售客戶讀懂的,也是對潛在客戶的一個簡明要求。

大家可見,這只是提到7間著名公司,完全沒有提到CDO裏面信貸掛鉤的100多個公司。寫出這麼個簡要的“誰應購買本公司債券?本公司債券是否適合所有人?”,目的是甚麼呢? 令投資者誤以爲迷債的風險只跟6-7個著名公司信貸掛鉤 ?

2010年8月13日 星期五

Court Filing (abstract)

Case 1:10-cv-00017-WHP, Filed 08/09/10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
USDC SDNYDOCUMENTELECTRONICALLYFILED
DOC #:
DATE FILED:~$ ~(C)

KA KIN WONG, et al.,10 Civ. 0096 (WHP)Appeal from Bankruptcy
Plaintiffs/Appellants,Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)
-against-
HSBC USA, INC., et al.,Defendants/Appellees.

WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge:

Plaintiffs/Appellants Ka Kin Wong and six other noteholders appeal from twoorders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Peck,Bankr. J.)(the "Bankruptcy Court") dated November 23, 2009 and December 3, 2009 dismissingtheir Class Action Complaint (the "Complaint") with prejudice. While the events giving rise tothis adversary proceeding are complicated, two discrete issues are presented on appeal: (1)whether Plaintiffs have standing to sue, and (2) whether amendment of the Complaint would befutile.For the following reasons, this Court affirms in part, reverses in part, and vacates in part the Bankruptcy Court's orders.

BACKGROUND

1.Parties on Appeal

Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of purchasers of structured finance notes-alsoknown as "Minibonds"between June 16, 2003 and September 15, 2008. (Appellants'Designation of Contents of the Record Designation Number ("DN") 1: Complaint against HSBC,USA, et al. dated Mar. 12, 2009 ("Compl.") ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs brought claims against PacificInternational Finance Limited ("Pacific Finance" or the "Issuer"), the issuer of the Minibonds, aswell as several other entities and individuals. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-38.) The underlying transactionsand relationships among the various entities are opaque.

On appeal, Plaintiffs pursue their claims against only two entities: HSBC BankUSA, N.A. ("HSBC Bank" or the "Trustee"), and Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.("LBSF"). HSBC Bank is the trustee of collateral securing Pacific Finance's paymentobligations to the Minibonds holders and LBSF. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs mistakenly namedHSBC Bank's predecessor as trustee, (DN 6 Ex. 2: Affidavit of Song Qun Sworn, ProgrammeProspectus dated Mar. 12, 2007 at 7), and now appeal the Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave toamend the Complaint to name HSBC Bank. Defendant LSBF is a bankrupt Delawarecorporation and a debtor in the underlying bankruptcy proceedings, which involve severalLehman entities (the "Lehman Bankruptcy"). (Compl.IT38, 67.)


II.The Minibonds Program

Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief relating to $1.6 billion in Minibonds issued by Pacific Finance in separate, but virtually identical, series. (Compl. ¶ 45.) PacificFinance sold the Minibonds to retail investors located primarily in Hong Kong, and marketedthem as "credit-linked" to financially stable companies and backed by AAA-rated collateral.(Compl. ¶¶ 45, 47, 51.) As a consequence of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.'s ("LehmanBrothers") collapse, the Minibonds are now worthless. (Compl.T~67-69, 101-04.)

While the Minibonds were issued by Pacific Finance, Lehman Brothers and otherLehman entities designed the Minibonds program. (Compl. ¶¶ 46, 48, 50, 82.) The details ofLehman Brothers' involvement emerged during an inquiry conducted by Hong Kong regulatoryauthorities. In that proceeding, officers of HSBC Holdings Plc ("HSBC Holdings"), thecompany at the top of the HSBC pyramid, testified that Lehman Brothers appointed HSBC Bankas trustee of the Minibonds collateral.'(Compl. ¶ 82.) Lehman Brothers also compiled theprospectus for each Minibonds series. (Compl. ¶ 82.) Pacific Finance existed only "to issue the[Minibonds]. It [was for] all intents and purposes a creature of Lehman's design .... [PacificFinance was] not an active company ... and HSBC's role as a Director [was] not an active role.. . ." (Compl. 182.) Indeed, the Complaint alleges that Lehman Brothers and LBSF, not the Issuer, "selected the collateral" for the Minibonds. (Compl. ¶ 50.)

Pacific Finance secured its obligation to pay interest to the Minibonds holdersthrough two related transactions.'First, Pacific Finance purchased notes from Saphir FinancePublic Limited Company (the "Saphir Notes"). (DN 9 Ex.1, Ex. B: Tenth Supplemental Trust

1 The Hong Kong testimony in the Complaint does not distinguish among the various HSBC andLehman entities. At times, it is difficult to discern the specific entity referenced in the testimony.

Deed ("Tenth Deed") at 1.) The Saphir Notes were placed in trust with HSBC Bank as Trustee.(Tenth Deed at 1.) Pacific Finance also executed a credit default swap agreement with LBSF.(Tenth Deed at 1; Compl. 154.) Under the credit default swap, LBSF agreed to pay PacificFinance a sum equal to what Pacific Finance owed the Minibonds holders in exchange for theinterest earned by Pacific Finance on the Saphir Notes. (Tenth Deed at 15-16.) Because LehmanBrothers and LBSF exercised control over the Minibonds program, Plaintiffs assert that LBSF"negotiate[d] with itself over the essential terms of the swap agreements." (Compl. 150.)

The Saphir Notes are governed by a principal trust deed and a supplemental trustdeed issued for each series of Minibonds. (Compl.IT84-85.) These trust deeds and theprospectuses advertising the Minibonds sale set forth the "duties and obligations" of the Trusteeand the Issuer. (Compl.~T84-87.) The trust deeds contain,inter alia,provisions governing thepriority of payment in the event the Saphir Notes are liquidated. (Compl.IT84, 90.) The partiesdisagree about the operation of these provisions and who has priority to the Saphir Notes.Choice of law provisions in the trust deeds provide that they are to be construed under Englishlaw. (DN 9 Ex. 1: Principal Trust Deed ("Principal Trust Deed"), Sec. 17(a).) The prospectusesrepresented that "neither Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. nor any of its subsidiaries or affiliateshas any equity interest in, or any control over, us [Pacific Finance/HSBC]." (Compl. ¶¶ 84, 87.)

According to the Complaint, Pacific Finance is controlled by HSBC Bank(Cayman) Limited ("HSBC Cayman"). (Compl. 129.) In turn, HSBC Cayman is controlled byHSBC Holdings. (Compl. ¶ 31.) HSBC Holdings also controls the Trustee's predecessor,

2 Plaintiffs brought claims against other entities and individuals alleging rights to collateralpurchased as part of additional transactions. (Compl.118,32-37, 110, 118.) Because Plaintiffsdo not appeal the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of these claims, that collateral is not at issue.

HSBC Bank USA.3(Compl. 13 1.)
Another HSBC entity---HSBC Bank Plc-filed a claim for $234 million in theLehman Bankruptcy. (DN 30 Ex. 6: Amended Schedule of Assets and Liabilities for LehmanBrothers at 3.) In addition, a Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner's report published after the orderson appeal discloses that HSBC Holdings and Lehman Brothers cooperated extensively duringLehman's collapse to ensure that Lehman Brothers satisfied its obligations to HSBC Holdings.(Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, dated Mar. 11, 2010 at 1321-26.)

III.Procedural History

On October 3, 2008, LBSF filed for bankruptcy. (Counter-Designation of ItemsTo Be Included In Record On Appeal ("C-DN") 10: Supplement to Proof of Claim in Chapter 11Case of LBSF ¶ 10; Compl. ¶ 67.) Thereafter, LBSF's counsel informed HSBC Bank that anyattempt to liquidate the Saphir Notes may be subject to the automatic stay provisions of theUnited States Bankruptcy Code and demanded the Trustee cease all further action. (DN 30 Ex.5: Pls.' Opp'n to Def. [LBSF's] Mot. to Dismiss the Compl., Letter dated Nov. 25, 2008.)HSBC Bank complied.

On March 12, 2009, Plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding in the BankruptcyCourt. Count One of the Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the Minibonds collateral isthe property of the Minibonds holders, not the bankruptcy estate, based on breaches of contractand fiduciary duty by the Issuer and Trustee. (Compl. ¶¶ 97-108.) Count Two seeks to enjoin LBSF and the Trustee from impairing the Minibonds collateral and requests transfer of the

3 This Court presumes that an amended complaint would include the same allegation.

collateral to the Minibonds holders. (Compl.IT109-13.) Count Three seeks a resulting orconstructive trust on the Minibonds collateral for the benefit of the Minibonds purchasers.(Compl. ¶¶ 114-21.) Finally, the remaining counts of the Complaint-Counts Four throughThirteen-assert damages claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence,unjust enrichment, and aiding and abetting against the Trustee, the Issuer, and the Issuer'sdirectors and parent company. (Compl. ¶¶ 122-89.)

On May 27, 2009, LBSF and HSBC Bank USA each moved to dismiss theComplaint. (DN 5: Notice of HSBC USA, Inc.'s Mot. to Dismiss the [Complaint], Abstain orStay the Adversary Proceeding; DN 9: Notice of Mot. of [LBSF] for an Order Dismissing theAdversary Compl.)

In a ruling from the bench, Bankruptcy Judge Peck dismissed the Complaint. TheBankruptcy Court dismissed Counts One through Three for lack of standing on three principalgrounds. First, relying on the trust deeds and English law, the Bankruptcy Court held thatPlaintiffs lack standing to bring a direct claim against Defendants. The relevant provisions of thetrust deeds state that "[a] person who is not a party to [the deed] has no right under the Contracts(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 [("Contracts Act of 1999")] to enforce any term of [the deed]except and to the extent (if any) that [the deed] expressly provides for such Act to apply to any ofits terms." (Principal Trust Deed at 3; Tenth Deed at 3). The Bankruptcy Court held that"[t]hese provisions fit squarely within the tenets of governing English law," which "provides thatit is a trustee and not a beneficiary of a trust that is the appropriate party to bring an action onbehalf of the trust beneficiaries." (Tr. of Nov. 18, 2009 Hr'g (the "Bankr. Ct. Ruling") at 25.)

Second, the Bankruptcy Court held that it would be futile to allow Plaintiffs to amend the Complaint to bring a derivative claim on behalf of the Trustee. (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at26.) Construing English law, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that a trust beneficiary may stepinto the shoes of the Trustee and sue on its behalf only in special circumstances. (Bankr. Ct.Ruling at 26.) Applying this standard, the Bankruptcy Court reasoned that (i) the "mere fact thatthe trustee has not filed a lawsuit [seeking to enforce Plaintiffs' right to the Minibonds collateral]is not a sufficient `special circumstance;"' and (ii) the fact that an HSBC affiliate filed a proof ofclaim in the Lehman Bankruptcy does not establish that the Trustee is conflicted because "thereis no allegation of any actual conflict." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 26.)

Third, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that it would be futile to allowamendment of the Complaint to name the proper trustee-HSBC Bank-"for the reasons setforth in this ruling." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 22.) However, it is not apparent from the transcript ofthe ruling what those reasons were.

The Bankruptcy Court also dismissed Counts Four through Thirteen because theywere "not related to the debtors' proceedings." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 29.) The Bankruptcy Courtstated that an adversary proceeding is considered related to a bankruptcy case "if the outcomemight have a conceivable [e]ffect on the estate." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 28.) After noting thatCounts Four through Thirteen "involve tort, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary dutyclaims against various defendants, none of whom are debtors" in the Lehman Bankruptcy,(Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 27), the Bankruptcy Court held that "[i]nasmuch as Counts [Four] through[Thirteen] comprise actions governed by foreign law between two or more non-debtors, suchclaims, regardless of the outcome, will not affect the debtor's bankruptcy cases.... Resolutionof these claims will have no [e]ffect on the rights of debtors or creditors in the debtors' bankruptcy cases, nor will it have any [e]ffect on the debtors' estates." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 29.)DISCUSSION

1.Standard of Review

A district court reviews a bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear error and itslegal conclusionsde novo.Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013;In re Vouzianas,259 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir.2001);In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.,146 F.3d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1998). The dismissal of acomplaint is a legal conclusion which is subject tode novoreview.Selevan v. N.Y. ThruwayAuth.,584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) ("We reviewde novoa district court's dismissal of acomplaint for lack of standing.");see alsoRaine v. Lorimar Prods., Inc.,71 B.R. 450, 452(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (`Because this is an appeal from [a Bankruptcy Court's] decision on a motionto dismiss for failure to state a claim, purely legal considerations are involved, and thus thiscourt's review must bedenovo.").When reviewing such a dismissal, a court "accept[s] allfactual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor."ATSI Commcn's, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).

Generally, "[a] bankruptcy court's denial of a request to amend [the complaint] isreviewed for abuse of discretion."In re Calpine Corp.,406 B.R. 463, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)(citingIn re Enron Corp.,419 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). However, "[i]f that denial wasbased on an interpretation of law," such as the determination that an amendment would be futile,a court employsde novoreview. SeeDougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of ZoningAppeals,282 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2002);see alsoRicciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,941 F.2d119, 122-24 (2d Cir. 1991) (reviewingde novothe lower court's determination that amendment would be futile).

A court "should freely give leave [to amend the Complaint] when justice sorequires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Particularly where a court grants a motion to dismiss, "theusual practice is to grant leave to amend."Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau,180 F.3d 42, 53 (2d Cir.1999).A court may deny leave to amend as futile only "if the proposed claim could notwithstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)."Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Mach.Corp.,310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002). Indeed, futility means that it is "beyond doubt that theplaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his amended claims."Pangburn v. Culbertson,200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotations and citations omitted).

II.Claims Against LBSF: Counts One & Two

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their direct claims against LBSF and the denialof leave to replead those claims derivatively. This Court addresses Count Three of theComplaint separately for the reasons articulated in Section IV,infra.

a. Direct Claim Against LBSF

Plaintiffs appeal the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of their direct claims againstLBSF on two principal grounds: (1) Plaintiffs have standing under English law to sue LBSFdirectly because LBSF is a co-beneficiary under the trust; and (2) the Bankruptcy Court'sreliance on the provisions of the trust deeds prohibiting non-parties from enforcing the deeds'terms was misplaced. Because Plaintiffs lack standing under English law to bring a direct claimagainst LBSF, this Court need not address Plaintiffs' second contention.

Under English law, a trustee generally has "a duty to protect and preserve the trust estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries ...."Alsop Wilkinson v. Neary,[ 1996] 1 W.L.R.1220, 1224 (Ch.). As such, "[n]ormally [it is] the trustee who has a right of action [and] is theproper person to enforce [the trust]."Hayim v. Citibank NA,[1987] A.C. 730, 733 (P.C.); seealsoAlsop,1W.L.R. at 1224 ("Trustees have a duty to ... represent the trust in a third partydispute."). Plaintiffs seek to circumvent this general principle by invoking the so-called"beneficiaries dispute" theory.Under that theory, "where the dispute is between rival claimantsto a beneficial interest in the subject matter of the trust.... the duty of the trustee is to remainneutral and ... leav[e] it to the rivals to fight their battles."Alsop,1W.L.R. at 1225.

Plaintiffsargue this theory applies here because LBSF persuaded the Bankruptcy Court that it is abeneficiary rather than a third party under the trust.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs mischaracterize the Bankruptcy Court's ruling.The Bankruptcy Court did not describe LBSF as a trust beneficiary. Instead, relying onGregsonv. HAE Trs. Ltd.,[2008] EWHC 1006 (Ch.), the Bankruptcy Court found that the Trustee wasthe appropriate party to bring an action on behalf of the trust beneficiaries, InGregson,a trustbeneficiary brought suit against the director of a corporate trustee for impairment of trustproperty. The beneficiary argued that a corporate trustee's claims against its directors are heldfor the trust's beneficiaries, thereby empowering them to sue directly.Gregson,EWHC 1006 at119,22.TheGreszsoncourt rejected this notion and described the general rule that "a director ofa trustee company does not owe a fiduciary duty to the beneficiary of the trust," and absent thatduty, a trust beneficiary has no direct claim against the director.Gregson,EWHC 1006 atIT44,56, 69.

As the Gregsonanalysis illustrates, the core inquiry is whether the potentially liable third party owed a duty to the trust's beneficiaries. SeeGregson,EWHC 1006 at¶T44,46, 57-58 (stating that if a direct claim against the directors was valid, it would "circumvent theclear and established principle that no direct duty is owed by the directors to the beneficiaries");see alsoRoberts v. Gill & Co,[2010] UKSC 22, ¶¶ 46, 110 (S.C.) (beneficiary sought to amendto bring a derivative claim where it was "accepted that a claim that the [third parties] owed aduty of care to the beneficiaries would be difficult to sustain").While LBSF is a party to thetrust deeds, Plaintiffs do not allege the existence of any fiduciary relationship betweenthemselves and LBSF, Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court properly held that Plaintiffs lackstanding under English law to sue LBSF directly.

b.Derivative Claims Against LBSF

The Bankruptcy Court also concluded that re-pleading derivative claims againstLBSF would be futile because Plaintiffs cannot allege the existence of special circumstances. Inmaking this determination, the Bankruptcy Court considered Plaintiffs' allegations that theTrustee failed to bring suit against LBSF and that an HSBC entity filed a proof of claim in theLehman Bankruptcy.

Under English law, a trust beneficiary may bring a derivative suit against a thirdparty when "special circumstances" are present. The "special circumstances"rule, articulated inHayim v. Citibank NA,provides:

[A] beneficiary has no cause of action against a third party save inspecial circumstanceswhich embrace a failure, excusable orinexcusable, by the trustees to the beneficiary to protect the trustestate or to protect the interests of the beneficiary in the trustestate.Hayim,A.C. 730 at 748. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom recently addressed the "special circumstances" rule and summarized the relevant authorities as follows:
The special circumstances which were identified in the earliestauthorities as justifying a beneficiary's action were fraud on thepart of the trustee, or collusion between the trustee and the thirdparty, or the insolvency of the trustee, but it has always been clearthat these are merely examples of special circumstances, and thatthe underlying question is whether the circumstancesaresufficiently special to make it iust for the beneficiary to have theremedy.Roberts,UKSC 22 at746, 114 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of the United Kingdomnoted that a court has "wide latitude in evaluating ... special circumstances," taking into account"all [of] the relevant circumstances."Roberts,UKSC 22 at ¶¶ 76, 78, 114.

Through the prism of these English law principles, this Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs cannot allege special circumstances. Despite representations in the Minibonds prospectuses that neither Lehman Brothers nor any of itssubsidiaries exercised control over the Issuer, Lehman Brothers designed the Minibonds programand directed the Issuer's activities.As a party to the trust deeds, LSBF was substantiallyinvolved in that process. The Issuer then created a trust that, in certain circumstances, distributesits only collateral to aLehmanentity, rather than the trust'ssolebeneficiary. Juxtaposed againstthe promise that the Minibonds would be secured by highly-rated collateral, this is an odd result.SeeRoyal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v. Tan,[1995] 2 A.C. 378, 386-87 (P.C.) ("If, for his ownpurposes, a third party deliberately interferes in that relationship by assisting the trustee indepriving the beneficiary of the property held for him by the trustee, the beneficiary should beable to look for recompense to the third party as well as the trustee.");see alsoRoberts,UKSC22 at ¶¶ 46, 114 ("[T]he underlying question is whether the circumstances are sufficiently specialto make it just for the beneficiary to have the remedy.");In re Field,[ 1971 ] 1 W.L.R. 555, 561

Case 1:10-cv-00017-WHP
Document 14Filed 08/09/10
Page 13 of 18

(Ch.)(holding that special circumstances existed and "justice require[d] that the plaintiff, who isthe only other person interested [in the property], should be allowed to have [his claim] properlytried before a court"), Furthermore, the recently released Examiner's report reveals cooperationbetween HSBC and Lehman Brothers at the highest levels during Lehman Brothers' collapse.

Given the totality of these circumstances, this Court cannot find that it is "beyond doubt that theplaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] amended claims."Pangburn v.Culbertson,200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999).

On appeal, the parties advance arguments concerning the operation of the trustdeeds' payment priority provisions and potential class certification problems caused by asettlement arranged by Hong Kong regulatory authorities.While interesting, these arguments areextraneous to the issue of standing; they concern the merits of Plaintiffs' claims and are notbefore this Court on appeal. At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs should be permitted toreplead Counts One and Two as derivative claims against LBSF. The Bankruptcy Court's denialof leave to replead is reversed.

III.Claims Against the Trustee: Counts One & Two

Plaintiffs also contend that the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying leave to amendthe Complaint to name HSBC Bank as the Trustee. The Bankruptcy Court held that amendingthe Complaint would be futile for the reasons set forth in its ruling, but did not articulate thosereasons.

As an initial matter, the Bankruptcy Court's analysis of English case law ignoredthe differences between Plaintiffs' relationship with the Trustee and Plaintiffs' relationship with LBSF and the other dismissed entities. Under English law, "the basic right of a beneficiary is tohave the trust duly administered in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument ... andthe general law."Target Holdings Ltd. v. Redferns,[1996] 1 AC 421, 434 (H.L.).When atrustee unlawfully administers the trust, a trust beneficiary may sue the trustee directly. SeeHayim,A.C. at 735 ("The beneficiaries have a right to enforce the trust directly against the ...trustee.");Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co. Ltd.,[1980] 2 W.L.R. 430, 444, 452 (Ch.)(holding a trustee liable to the trust beneficiaries for willful "breach of trust");see alsoTargetHoldings,1AC at 437 ("A trustee who wrongly pays away trust money ... commits a breach oftrust and comes under an immediate duty to remedy such breach.").

The Bankruptcy Court heldthat the trustee is the proper party to bring suit on behalf of a trust beneficiary.While that mayexplain Plaintiffs' lack of standing to sue LBSF directly, it does not resolve the issue of whethera beneficiary has standing to sue his trustee. Indeed, Counts One and Two are premised onalleged breaches of contract and fiduciary duty by the Trustee for failing to distribute the SaphirNotes to Plaintiffs.

The standing provisions of the trust deeds provide that a non-party to the trust hasno right under the Contracts Act of 1999 to enforce any of the deeds' terms.While theBankruptcy Court held that these provisions fit squarely within English law, it merely quoted theprovisions without analyzing their language or the statute on which they rely. Notably, theContracts Act of 1999 allows a non-party to a contract to enforce the contract's terms if they"purport[] to confer a benefit on him," Contracts Act of 1999, c. 31, § 1 (U.K.), but expresslystates that it does not "affect any right or remedy of a third party that exists or is available apartfrom th[e] Act." Contracts Act of 1999, c. 31, § 7. Thus, while the trust deeds deprive Plaintiffs of rights derived from the Contracts Act of 1999, Plaintiffs may hold rights outside of the Act, anissue the Bankruptcy Court did not consider.

Finally, the Bankruptcy Court's rationale for dismissing Counts Four throughThirteen fails to render futile an amended complaint naming the correct trustee. The BankruptcyCourt reasoned that these counts involve questions of foreign law which will have no effect onthe rights of debtors or creditors in the underlying bankruptcy. The applicable rule is that "[a]proceeding is `related to' a [bankruptcy] case ... if the outcome might have a `conceivableeffect' on the estate."In re New 118th LLC,396 B.R. 885, 890 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citingIn re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.,980 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1992)). A conceivable effect is onewhich "could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positivelyor negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of thebankrupt estate."In re New 118th LLC,396 B.R. at 890 (citingIn re Pacor, Inc.,743 F.2d 984,994 (3d Cir. 1984),overruled on other grounds byThings Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,516U.S. 124, 134-35 (1995)). In this case, Plaintiffs seek to prevent the transfer of the SaphirNotes-worth $1.6 billion-to the bankruptcy estate. The effect of $1.6 billion on thebankruptcy estate is self-evident.Moreover, by instructing the Trustee to postpone distributionof the Saphir Notes, LBSF-not Plaintiffs-tethered the Saphir Notes to the LehmanBankruptcy. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave to replead Counts One andTwo against the Trustee is reversed.

IV.Constructive & Resulting Trust Claims: Count Three

In Count Three of the Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to impose a constructive or resulting trust on the Mimbonds collateral.While the Bankruptcy Court made a passingreference to these claims, it provided no analysis in its ruling. Understandably, the BankruptcyJudge was juggling a host of complex and urgent issues. Nonetheless, this Court cannot discernwhy the constructive and resulting trust claims were dismissed. SeeIn re Gucci,309 B.R. 679,685 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("This Court ... has no way of knowing whether and to what extent thedefense or elements thereof were rejected as a matter of law, [and] the reasons for any suchrejection ....").A constructive trust relies on equitable, as opposed to contractual and formaltrust, principles.See, e.g.,Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co„194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Aconstructive trust is an equitable remedy ... [whose] purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment.").Without some analysis of why standing principles derived from the trust deeds' and English lawapply to claims for a constructive or resulting trust, denial of leave to replead Count Threeagainst both the Trustee and LBSF was inappropriate. SeePanaburn,200 F.3d at 70 (denial ofleave to replead is warranted only when it is "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set offacts in support of [the] amended claims").Moreover, it is not evident whether these claims aregoverned by English law, an issue the Bankruptcy Court did not address. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Count Three is vacated and remanded for further consideration.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Counts One andTwo against LBSF is affirmed, and its denial of leave to replead those claims derivatively against LBSF is reversed. The Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave to replead Counts One and Twoagainst the Trustee is reversed. The Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Count Three is vacated.This action is remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with thisMemorandum and Order.

Dated: August 9, 2010
New York, New York

SO ORDERED:

WILLIAM H. PAULEY IIIU.S.D.J.

Counsel of Record:

Jason C. Davis, Esq.
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP100 Pine Street, Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94111

Counsel for Appellants

Howard Grant Sloane, Esq.Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP80 Pine Street
New York, NY 10005

Counsel for the HSBC Appellees

Richard W. Slack, Esq.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10153

Counsel for Appellee Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.

David S. Cohen, Esq.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP
1850 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Counsel for Intervenor Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lehman Brothers HoldingsInc. et al.

2010年8月9日 星期一

Lehman, HSBC May Be Sued by Hong Kong Investors in New York

Aug. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and HSBC Holdings Plc may be sued over $1.6 billion in worthless securities sold to retail investors in Hong Kong, a judge in New York ruled yesterday.

U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley III reversed part of a decision by Lehman’s bankruptcy judge, who threw out a suit by seven holders of structured financial notes called minibonds. The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of investors in the notes from June 16, 2003, to Sept. 15, 2008, Pauley said in his decision.

An estimated $1.8 billion of minibonds were sold to about 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, according to local regulators. Lehman’s bankruptcy in 2008 wiped out the value of the investments, resulting in protests outside bank branches that have continued even after last year’s government-brokered settlement between sellers and buyers of minibonds.

“This shows that the courts around the world have investor protection at heart and investors should be protected against mis-selling by those that gain commissions from these types of investment products,” said Lewis Man, a partner at Hong Kong law firm Gall.

Hong Kong doesn’t have a mechanism for filing class action lawsuits.

David Hall, a Hong Kong-based spokesman for HSBC, didn’t immediately have a response to the ruling. Kimberly Macleod, a Lehman spokeswoman, didn’t return a voice-mail message left yesterday seeking comment.

Dismissal Reversed

In two orders, issued in November and December, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that any attempt to revise their complaint would be futile. Pauley yesterday reversed the dismissal of one count against HSBC and Lehman and permitted the plaintiffs to amend two dismissed counts.

Pacific International Finance Ltd. issued the minibonds and marketed them as linked to the credit of financially sound companies and backed by AAA-rated collateral, Pauley said. A Hong Kong regulatory investigation disclosed that Lehman designed the minibonds program, the judge said. HSBC Bank USA was selected as trustee of the collateral securing the notes, Pauley said, citing testimony in the Hong Kong proceeding.

Public outcry over the collapse of the minibonds led to street protests in Hong Kong and an investigation by regulators into how banks sold the products. The head of the city’s securities watchdog, Martin Wheatley, was called repeatedly to testify before Hong Kong’s legislature.

Two BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd. managers in June pleaded not guilty in the city’s District Court to charges of fraudulently selling minibonds. BOC Hong Kong was the biggest seller of the securities. The trial of the two employees starts in November.

Hong Kong banks offered to pay at least 60 cents on the dollar to investors in July last year as part of a buyback agreement brokered by the SFC. In an Aug. 6 press release, Hong Kong’s central bank said more than 13,000 cases were resolved by the repurchase agreement, and 179 Lehman-related complaints remain under investigation.

To contact the reporter on this story: Bob Van Voris in New York atrvanvoris@bloomberg.net; Debra Mao in Hong Kong atdmao5@bloomberg.net

2010年7月21日 星期三

2010年7月17日星債苦主記招新聞稿

(转)2010年7月17日星債苦主記招新聞稿
2010年7月17日新聞會講稿

(關於7月14日) 証監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation 債券達成協議 (下稱協議)

是一份官商勾結, 互相卸責, 嫁禍於人的協議.

是一份不公開, 不公平, 不公正的三不公協議.



Constellation 債券受害苦主 (包括得到和解與得不到和解者)會繼續抗爭, 行動升級, 考慮對協議中某些條款進行司法覆核, 去信立法會. 請求第六次傳召星展作供. 并且追究星展銀行違反香港証監及期貨條例第107條, 欺詐地或罔顧實情地誘使他人投資金錢的罪行. 直至星展公開承認誤導, 退賠100%苦主, 100%本金.


1) 不公開

a) 協議稱: “星展香港在不承認任何責任下提出和解”, 有別於不承認任何錯失. 金管, 証監在調查過程中, 是否發現星展銀行”有錯”? 什麼錯? 必須公開.

b) 協議中, 証監會關注點的第1,2點, 可以理解為, 星展內部對星債評級有爭議, 一個評高, 一個評低. 現在看來, 評低的是錯, 評高的才對. 但錯在哪裡, 對在哪裡? 資料理據必須公開.

2) 不公平

a) 對被評為4級或5級風險類別客戶不公平

協議只說: “產品評為較高風險級別”. 但葉約德在証人陳述書14.10段寫明在2008年3月星展已將星債風險變為第5級高風險.第4級風險的客戶應該也不能買到第5級風險的產品,點解無得賠?

b) 即使被評為4或5級風險客戶,購買時見到產品風險是2而不是4或5, 難道他便不可以買低風險的產品嗎? 好像一個著名的賽車手,有一天他駕着一輛普通私家車時被其他車撞到,可否說他常常揸跑車,所以應該知駕車危險而不作賠償?當然不能,只要那宗交通意外不是他引致便有賠償。

c) 協議中証監會顧及:〝客戶若有較高的風險承受能力, 且具備衍生工具交易的經驗及知識,Constellation 債券可能本應是適合他們的投資產品”, 那麼有較高的風險承受能力, 但沒有衍生工具交易的經驗及知識的客戶便同是不適合購買星債,所以理應一樣獲得全賠。


d) 未見過有政府機構在嚴肅文件中, 採用”可能本應是”這種不定向的, 猜度的字眼, “可能是”, 亦可以”可能不是”, 50/50. 但協議則在這種靠估的前題下, 要執行一些真實的行動.太離譜.

3) 不公正


a) 單就產品風險一項而言, 星展在星債的申購表格, 白紙黑字標明: 產品風險程度2, 賣給客戶. 星展在交立法會迷你債券小經陳述書14.5段解釋原因時, 遺漏了星債掛勾公司”首先失責” (即一間死, 等於八間死晒) 為基準這一要項, 巳經違反証監及期貨條例298條, “披露虛假或具誤導性的資料以誘使進行交易的罪行. 葉約德在立法會答問, 回應債券掛勾多間公司, 說是分散風險, 也是遺漏星債”首先失責”條款. 協議又講 “星展香港另一部門曾將同一產品評為較高風險級別產品”. 是否顯示星展銀行高層自己都未明白產品結構和風險. 何況銷售員工? 不能做到”認識你的產品”, 星展巳屬違規, 如此明顯嚴重罪行, 不予揭露. 遣責, 處罰. 甚至起訴. 反而為星展開脫, 卸責, 并幫星展轉嫁損失, 轉嫁麻煩. 其實是証監知道星展有罪, 自己也難逃監管疏忽之責. 互相幫忙, 共同卸責. 對苦主太不公!


b) 星債產品風險定錯, 是銷售誤導. 理應通賠. 協議卻不賠予被星展香港列為較高風險級別客戶. (即4或5級), 要這些人經星展香港投訴處理程序逐一覆核, 真是豈有此理?! 這種先判你該死再要你自己舉証申訴方法, 不符合香港律法的”無罪推定”精神, 為此將考慮司法覆核.


c) 協議稱: 即使証監會成功對星展香港及/或其主管人員及僱員採取法律處分, 亦不能達到此協議取得結果. 講得冠冕堂皇, 其實是欺人之談. 只要金管, 証監判定星展 “失實陳述”. 根據香港法例284章, 苦主購買星債時所訂立的合約就有權撤銷. 撤銷合約, 苦主當然可以取回100%本金, 并可追討損害賠償. 百分之百苦主受惠.


d) 星展給客戶進行風險評級, 是以推銷產品為目的. 其中種種不良手法, 留待苦主向各位作証.

最後要說的是, 星展, 金管, 証監做出這樣協議, 非常不智.

(1) 時代不同了, 看一看美國政府告高盛, 高盛想和解. 除支付罰款, 還要認錯.

(2) 星展不賠給4或5級風險的客戶, 這些人會放過星展嗎? 星展有明顯的銷售誤導, 難道有人可以隻手遮天? 最後還是要賠. 不如就早點賠!


From: 2010年7月17日星債苦主記招新聞http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/2010E5B9B47E69C8817E697A5E6989FE582B5E88BA6E4B8BBE8A898E68B9BE696B0E8819EE7A8BF9236.php

證監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation債券達成協議

2010年 7月 14日 新聞稿
證監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation債券達成協議
(From: http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/TC/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=10PR80)


證券及期貨事務監察委員會(證監會)及香港金融管理局(金管局)今天公布,就星展銀行(香港)有限公司(星展香港)分銷與雷曼兄弟集團相關的Constellation債券(雷曼相關Constellation債券)的事宜,與星展香港達成協議(註1及2)。

繼證監會早前作出調查後,星展香港在不承認任何責任下,同意提出有關雷曼相關Constellation債券的和解計劃。根據有關和解協議:
星展香港將會向已購買雷曼相關Constellation債券的星展香港客戶,提出總額約6.51億元的付款建議,這些客戶必須是在購買該等債券時,獲星展香港按照其投資風險評估系統評為屬低至中級風險,即第1、2或3級風險類別的客戶(低風險客戶)(註3);
星展香港將會向低風險客戶支付一筆款項(和解款項),金額相等於有關低風險客戶對雷曼相關Constellation債券的投資總額,加上這筆投資總額若在投資當日以定期存款形式存入星展香港,在投資當日直至今天日期為止,星展香港就該筆款項應付予有關客戶的利息,再減去迄今已支付予他們的票息後所得款項(註4);
對於那些已經與星展香港達成和解協議的低風險客戶,星展香港將會向他們提出補發款項的建議,以達至這批客戶得以與其他低風險客戶享有相同待遇;
至於星展香港列入較高風險級別的客戶(即評定為第4或5級風險類別的客戶)所進行的雷曼相關Constellation債券的交易,星展香港將以加強的投訴處理程序逐一覆核有關這些交易的投訴(註5);及
對於星展香港在今天日期前售出的雷曼相關Constellation債券以外的非上市結構性產品,星展香港將會採用加強的投訴處理程序,覆核有關這些產品分銷事宜的客戶投訴。

證監會在調查過程中提出以下關注:
星展香港將雷曼相關Constellation債券售予高風險級別及低風險級別這兩類客戶時,將雷曼相關Constellation債券評為低至中級風險產品(按照星展香港的風險評級制度,這些產品在1至5級的風險評級(低至高風險)中,獲評為2級風險);
星展香港另一部門曾將同一產品評為較高風險級別的產品;

有關發行章程已述明,準投資者可能會損失全部或大部分對該等Constellation債券的投資;及
對於當時在客戶風險評級中,那些應選擇保守、穩健及均衡型投資的低至中級風險類別的客戶,雷曼相關Constellation債券未必適合他們。

這項協議的作用是,約2,160個帳戶的低風險客戶若接納上述和解計劃,便可以取回投資款項及利息並扣減作為債券持有人已收取的票息後的款項,而高風險客戶的投訴亦可獲星展香港根據加強的投訴處理程序,全面覆核有關個案。

證監會根據《證券及期貨條例》第201條達成此項協議,在考慮星展香港將提出的和解計劃時,已顧及到銷售雷曼相關Constellation債券與銷售雷曼兄弟迷你債券兩者之間多項不同之處,因此本個案的和解協議條款與迷你債券個案的不盡相同。證監會在考慮過程中顧及的重要因素包括:
有別於雷曼兄弟迷你債券,雷曼相關Constellation債券並沒有可分發予投資者的抵押品;
根據與16家銀行就迷你債券事宜達成的協議,分銷銀行同意交出從銷售迷你債券所得佣金,以成立追討基金,加快取回相關抵押品,但在本個案中,星展香港無需提供有關款項;及
有別於那些接納迷你債券協議所提出的回購建議的客戶,雷曼相關Constellation債券的持有人並無機會獲額外或補發款項或發還債款,換言之,星展香港的付款將會是低風險客戶唯一可獲付的款項。

證監會在考慮此協議的條款時,亦顧及到以下幾點:
客戶若有較高的風險承受能力,且具備衍生工具交易的經驗及知識,Constellation債券可能本應是適合他們投資的產品;
加強的投訴處理程序會處理涉及第4至5級風險類別客戶的每宗個案;對於獲星展香港投資風險評估系統評為風險承受能力較高的客戶,上述投訴處理程序應足以處理星展香港將雷曼相關Constellation債券分銷予這批客戶的過程中,可能出現的其他不規範情況;
星展香港承諾委聘獨立機構,檢討分銷制度及監控措施,確保星展香港日後以適當方式分銷非上市結構性產品;
此協議使本個案得到適當的解決,對星展香港及其客戶均有利;
即使證監會成功對星展香港及/或其主管人員及僱員採取紀律處分,亦不能達到此協議取得的結果;及
此協議取得的結果,可為雷曼相關Constellation債券的其他分銷商提供指引,從而解決已購買這些產品的客戶的投訴。

證監會及金管局認為,就它們向星展香港在監管方面提出的關注,星展香港提出的和解計劃屬合理及適當;協議亦符合公眾利益。

鑑於星展香港提出上述和解計劃,證監會將不會就雷曼相關Constellation債券的分銷事宜,對星展香港及其僱員採取進一步執法行動,但有關方面涉嫌犯有不誠實、欺詐、欺騙或屬刑事性質行為的情況除外。金管局已知會星展香港,對於那些接納星展香港和解建議的低風險客戶,金管局不打算就該等客戶的雷曼相關Constellation債券個案,對星展香港採取執法行動。

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮先生(Mr Martin Wheatley)表示:"對於從星展香港購入雷曼相關Constellation債券的全部客戶而言,是次協議為他們取得成果;對於銷售這項產品的其他銀行及中介人,這項協議提供有用的指引,有助其解決較低風險客戶的相關投訴。"

他續說:"中介人向客戶提供投資意見時,必須運用適當的專業知識和技能。證監會就雷曼相關的結構性產品個案進行的調查,清楚顯示證監會《操守準則》所訂的各項準則,是中介人行事的重要依據。認識產品、了解客戶的情況並向客戶提供清晰正確的資料,都是中介人必須履行的職責。這不但可以確保客戶的利益永遠居於首位,亦同時能夠保障銷售產品的中介人。"

韋奕禮先生指出:"證監會一直竭力減低香港市場出現不當銷售的風險。今次這類和解計劃,使大家更清楚認識到,若我們將來未能妥善處理有關事宜,所有市場參與者將要為此付出高昂的代價。"

金管局副總裁阮國恒先生表示:"金管局歡迎這項和解計劃。金管局相信,這項和解計劃既合適且合理,在考慮到各種情況下提供一個務實的解決方法,符合投資者的利益。"

完

備註:

1. 星展香港是根據《證券及期貨條例》獲發牌從事第1類(證券交易)、第4類(就證券提供意見)、第6類(就機構融資提供意見)及第9類(提供資產管理)受規管活動的註冊機構。

2. Constellation債券的發行商為Constellation Investment Ltd,安排人則為星展香港的有聯繫實體DBS Bank Ltd(星展銀行有限公司)。2004年至2007年間,星展香港向香港公眾分銷了以港元或美元計值的約77個系列的Constellation債券。

Constellation債券中,系列34至37、43至46、55至58、59至62、63至66、67至70、71至74及78至81債券屬信貸掛鉤票據,雷曼兄弟是上述系列的其中一家信貸參考機構(或稱"相關機構")。星展香港向約3,400個客戶帳戶分銷雷曼相關Constellation債券,當中涉及約4,380宗交易,款額約13.16億元。

雷曼兄弟於2008年9月申請破產保護後,星展銀行有限公司宣布,受雷曼兄弟的信貸事件所影響,雷曼相關Constellation債券變得一文不值。

Constellation債券的其中一項主要特點是,投資者買入有關債券後,實際上要承擔的風險是,包括雷曼兄弟在內的信貸參考機構中,任何一家可能會出現破產等信貸事件。因應投資者承擔了這項風險,星展銀行有限公司在Constellation債券的投資期內,向投資者支付一項承擔風險款額。若債券到期時,信貸參考機構中並無信貸事件發生,投資者便可取回投資本金。然而,若發生信貸事件,投資者便可取回所謂"信貸事件贖回款額",金額相等於雷曼兄弟的參考債項(或稱"相關債項")的價值,但這些參考債項在雷曼兄弟申請破產後的買賣價已跌至接近零。雷曼兄弟在美國申請破產保護後,便出現上述的情況。

3. 星展香港分銷雷曼相關Constellation債券時,根據在星展香港投資風險評估問卷上所填寫的資料,將客戶列入五大級別,第1級為保守型,第2級為穩健型,第3級為均衡型,第4級為增長型,第5級為進取型。

另一方面,星展香港亦為其分銷的各項投資產品定下風險評級。產品風險評級分為五個級別,第1級為低風險,第2級為低至中風險,第3級為中風險,第4級為中至高風險,第5級為高風險。

若投資產品的風險評級低於或相等於有關客戶的投資風險評級,星展香港便會認為該產品適合該客戶投資。

4. 星展香港會以每名投資雷曼相關Constellation債券的低風險客戶的名義投資總值為基準,採用星展香港就不同到期日的定期存款所支付的最高利率,即向12個月定期存款戶所支付的利率,計算出由有關雷曼相關Constellation債券的發行日開始,直至今天日期這段期間的利息。根據星展香港計算,已付予每名低風險客戶的票息,與就有關投資的上述名義價值應支付的利息之間的差額,約為1,300萬元。

5. 加強的投訴處理程序由證監會制訂,旨在確保星展香港深入覆核高風險客戶的相關交易,確保星展香港以公平合理方式處理有關這些交易的投訴。有關程序與分銷銀行根據迷你債券協議所執行的投訴處理程序相同。

6. 請按此連結閱覽有關星展香港的建議和解計劃的問題解答。