銀行職員對於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」嗎？

銀行至今一直不敢光明正大地曏公眾再次解釋銀行對於迷債的真實特徵和風險的理解. 為甚麼?
為甚麼金管局不要求銀行對公眾作出解釋？ 請金管局和銀行各自詳述因由。

以金管局至今所調查的400多個例，有多少是反映了銀行職員對於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」的？對於那些反映了銀行職員對於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」的個例，具體是錶現在那些方面呢？於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」的銀行職員是如何跟客戶解釋迷債的真實特徵和風險的呢？
請金管局詳述其理由和至今為止的個案 Pattern。

或者：金管局認為銀行職員對於迷你債卷是否有「透徹理解」是無關緊要的？

金管局在關於迷你債卷的調查中，金管局自己對於產品的真實特徵和相關風險的基本定義是甚麼？這牽扯到操守准則的關於［銀行職員對於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」］的要求和關於［ "Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information" ］的要求。

如果金管局自己不瞭解迷你債卷的真實風險和特徵，如何去判斷投訴呢?
如何去判斷銀行職員對於迷你債卷是否有「透徹理解」呢？
如何去判斷銀行職員銷售迷你債卷的時候是否盡職地跟客戶解釋產品的真實風險和特徵呢？
為甚麼金管局至今一直不跟公眾公布對於迷你債卷的真實特徵和相關風險的基本定義？請金管局詳述其理由

或者：金管局擔心披露其對迷你債卷的真實風險和特徵會對影響社會（或銀行）的利益？
金管局的黑箱作業對於銀行的利益顯然是有最大的好處的。可是，金管局有沒有考慮過金管局的黑箱作業會對社會公眾造成不公平呢？請金管局詳述其理由。

轉載 信报：金管局在迷債事件有否失職？曾廣海、尹靖廷 －2009年5月9日

立法會雷曼迷債調查小組的主要目標是調查事件有否涉及官員在監管上的失職、如何改善現行的監管制度、及如何妥善解決事件。要達到此等目標，首要任務是從法例上，釐清各監管機構在事前和事後的職責，過程是否存在失職。這才能追本溯源，有效探索如何改善現行的監管制度和尋求妥善解決辦法。
保障存款人投資者利益
在銀行經存款業務的監管方面，金管局的職責是確保銀行「以持正和審慎的方式，以及適度的專業能力經營」及「以無損或相當不可能損及存款人或潛在存款人的利益的方式經營」（《銀行業條例》)。
另外，在銀行經營證券業務方面，根據金管局與證監會所簽訂的備忘錄，金管局取代了證監會對銀行的前線監管，以及開立調查檔案這二方面的職責，並在顧及投資者對投資產品的「認知水平和專門知識所達程度後，確保他們獲得適當程度的保障」的責任（《證券及期貨條例》)。在探討金管局對事件是否存在失職時，應以此作為標準。
根據上述的二條法例和相關安排，金管局具有監管銀行不以違規或違法的手法向存戶或投資者銷售證券產品的法定責任。
此外，金管局對銀行在這方面的監管，應較證監會對證券行的監管要求為高、審查應更頻密、處分應更嚴厲，主要原因是銀行較證券行更直接地掌握了存戶可動用財富的資料，更易取得存戶的信任，而且，投資經驗不足及希望穩健、保本的投資者，大多數是將儲蓄存放於銀行，這些人對投資風險的認識一般較證券行客戶為低。
再者，銀行對這些非傳統的銀行業務是於近年才開展，故經驗不足。他們快速膨漲前線員工隊伍，對迷債這類較股票或債券掛鈎複雜得多的產品的風險，認識亦未必足夠。目前所見，迷債的分銷銀行幾乎全是中小型及中資銀行，這些銀行除了本身應負一定責任外，其實它們也是金管局監管力度不足的受害者。他們因受收取較高佣金的吸引，負責人為求增加銀行收入，將經營多年建立的客戶關係，押在這些自己也認識不深的金融工具上，最後不單賠上金錢，亦賠上客戶對銀行的多年信任和銀行本身的聲譽。
為何說金管局的監管力度不足？這可從多方面看出，首先，按任志剛向立法會的作供，金管局並未如上所述，對銀行參與這些新業務於早期便給予較高的重視，只集中力度在他們熟悉的傳统的系統性風險監管，將資源放於監察銀行20萬億計的資產負債表，對幾十億的迷債及信貸掛鈎產品一直只當小事處理，直至2008年才對這些產品的銷售作專題審查。審查了四間已發現大批違規個案，但監管當局仍未採取強力手段，制止違規活動。直至去年8、9月雷曼倒閉前，個別銀行仍誘使不少客戶購進雷曼產品。
「適合性」處理令人失望
另外，金管局對「適合性」的處理亦令人失望。證監會提交的雷曼報告書指出，政府對投資產品銷售的監管架構，是建基於「披露」和「適合性」這「兩大支柱」。證監會發放給銀行的「適合性」要求，包括三項主要方面：
（一）認識你的客戶； 如投資知識、投資期、承受風險的能力；
（二）認識你推介的投資產品， 如「透徹理解」投資產品的結構、運作方式，其包含的投資項目的性質及風險；
（三）就客戶的情况作合適的配對，並要用淺白易懂的言語向客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的缺點及風險，對長者及缺乏投資經驗的客戶，應特別審慎。
至於懲處方面，該報告强調違反「適合性」就是違反《操守準則》，可導致被除牌（證券經營牌）、或被公開譴責及罰款。

迷債是一個結構極其複雜的金融產品，涉及一些保險承擔如CDS，貨幣及利率掉期及CDO等衍生工具，而這些迷債是由一個實則是「皮包公司」的公司所發行，亦涉及一些與他相關連的跨國公司的複雜關係，相信沒有相當水平的金融、公司法及合同法的知識，難以明白其中的各項風險，更不用說用準確及易明的語言向客戶解釋，以讓他們明白內裏的風險。
真不明白，金管局為何可以讓銀行賣給非專業投資者達數年之久，而且客戶有數萬之眾，其中包括弱智、弱視及文盲人士，而在雷曼出事前，一直查不到違反「適合性」、以至足以被公開譴責的個案。*

任志剛在立法局雷曼小組作供時承認，《證券及期貨條例》較《銀行業條例》賦予金管局較多權力以執行前線監管工作，例如《證券及期貨條例》第180條對中介人的監管及調查的權力，遠較《銀行業條例》第55條的相應條款為高。
任志剛承認金管局一直未有使用《証券及期貨條例》，而只用《銀行業條例》，實在是把自己的老虎牙剝掉。沒牙老虎便只能在調查時答應銀行一些條件，以換取他們的合作，造成今天的被動局面。據上文列舉的資料及分析，金管局在雷曼事件的監管上是否失職，讀者可自行判斷，更期待金管局在下次立法會作證供時能給予進一步闡釋。
註 *參考任志剛於4月28日立法會雷曼迷債調查小組回答余若薇議員供詞

True Features and Associated Risks of Minibond

Wing Hang Bank (永亨) had been selling Minibond over a few years. Most minibond series were rated as "Medium Risk Investments". Minibond was promoted and explained to clients as "Credit-Linked to 7 well-known companies" as the key features and risks. The fact that the CDO Colalteral was credit-linked to over 100 companies had never been discussed to clients.

1. Downplayed Risk Rating ?

The Minibond’s only asset was collateral and Swaps. The CDO collateral in fact was comprised of CDS referencing to credit risk of over 100 entities and could be credit-linked to entities at sub-investment grade. The CDS in the CDO collateral synthetically transferred the credit risk of over 100 reference entities to Minibond holders. Therefore, the value of minibond was not only affected by the credit-event with the 7 well-known companies, but also was greatly affected by the credit events related to the 100+ reference entities in the (synthetic) CDO collateral.

Did the "Medium Risk Investments" rating significantly downplay the true risk of minibond ?

Maybe, the “Medium Risk” rating on the Minibond is a strong evidence to suggest that the BBanKK either intentionally downplayed the true risk of the minibond, or the BBanKK proceeded with the Minibond sale without thorough understanding of the true risks related to the Minibond, all for the purpose of maximizing the sale of the Minibond ?


2. Omission of Material Information ?

the BBanKK passed Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus to their clients. The prospectus dedicated many pages on the “credit-linked to 7 well-reference entities”, the 7 reference entities’ ratings, and the impact of any default event related to the 7 well-known reference entities.

The CDO collateral of Series 27 in fact had 155 CDS with 25 entities at sub-investment grade. The CDS in the minibond’s CDO collateral synthetically transferred the credit risk of the reference portfolio to Minibond holders. The risks of the Minibond greatly depended on the information regarding number / name / rating of the reference entities & reference obligations in the (synthetic) CDO collateral and the rules regarding their default event. No professional intermediary could have valued the Minibond using only the information provided in Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus & marketing material.

SFC Code of Conduct requires that "Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information".

Let's take a look at now disclosed Minibond structure:
(i) Minibond had CDS with 7 well-known reference entities;
and:
(ii) Minibond CDO Colalteral had CDS with over 100 reference entities (some were at sub-investment grade).

What ware the reasons for the BBanKK to decide that only informaiton of (i) was material information and information of (ii) was not relevant material information to clients ?
What were the reasons for the BBanKK to decide that information of (i) reprensented the true features and associated risks of minibond?
What were the reasons for the BBanKK to decide not mentioning a word on information of(ii), and disclose all the information of (i) only?

The interest rate of Minibond (on average) was about 1% - 1.5% higher than the libor rate at the purchase time, for the long 4-7 year lock up period (due to no liquidity). Imagine what kind of people would be attracted to a long 4-7 year lock up period with such a return.

7 versus 100+ (or 7 versus 155), CDO Collateral information and the 100+ reference entities' information should be the more relevant material information to the true risk of the Minibond than the 7 well-known companies' information.
- was there any staff from the BBanKK ever discuss with their clients about the CDO collateral?
- was there any staff from the BBanKK offer their clients any collateral information (document) ?



3. Explanations givens by the BBanKK's staff
Some BBanKK staff explained the product feature and associated risk as following:
- Credit Event of the 7 reference entities;
- No liquidity and had to hold till maturity;
- Get 100% principal back on maturity if no credit event happens.

BBanKK staff seemed to only aware of the information about “credit-linked to 7 reference entities”, because they never discussed with their clients about the reference entities in the CDO collateral.

4. Misprepresenation of the True Nature of the Minibond ?

The Minibond was presented and explained as "Credit Linked to 7 Reference Entities”. The CDS in the minibond’s CDO collateral synthetically transferred the credit risk of the reference portfolio to Minibond holders. The Minibond was in fact credit-linked to “7+over100” reference entities.

Is it possible that the BBanKK negligently, or worse, intentionally, misrepresented the true nature and characteristics of the Minibond, omitted the material risk associated with the minibond either because the BBanKK did not understand the true nature and risk of the Minibond or because the BBanKK worried that truthful and transparent information would hurt the Minibond sale.

Further, clients were never told exactly how the proceeds of the Minibond sale would be used and were not told that such proceeds were in fact not invested into any real debt/loans of the reference companies.

5. Inadequate and Faulty Due Diligence ?
the BBanKK's due diligence was inadequate and faulty, on the contrary of their own claim “product due diligence was properly conducted by our Bank” (Dec2008). Evidence is as follows:
a) the BBanKK rated the Minibond as Medium Risk Investment, considerably downplaying the product's true risk level.
b) It was never mentioned to clients that the Minibond was not invested into any debt / loans / bonds issued by any of the 7 reference entities. It was never explained to clients that the Minibond CDO collateral was referencing to the credit risk of many (over 100) entities.
c) It was never mentioned to clints that a "AAA-rated CDO" may not invest into any debt/loan/bond at all, and that "AAA-rated CDO" was not the same as a "AAA-rated" bond.
d) It was never explained to clients about the risk related to CDO or Synthetic CDO.
e) And clients was never told to be aware that the Minibond was, in fact, not only credit-linked to the 7 reference entities, but also credit-linked to over 100 entities in the CDO collateral portfolio.

Could it be that, instead of exercising reasonable due diligence, the BBanKK in fact collaborated (possible fraudulently), with the Minibond issuer, hiding the risk of the synthetic CDO from their retail clients, with the objective of increasing the sale of the Minibonds.


6. "香港銀行業向來依據最高的專業守則經營".
Can we ask Wing Hang Bank to give us a brief description about the key feature and associate risks of the Minibond? Wing Hang Bank's staffs were not shy of explaning the features and associated of risks in the past few years' minibond sales period.

All the relevant training procedure and sales guidence would show public that the Wing Hang Bank in deed 依據專業守則經營.


"You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the people all of the time."