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2009年9月10日 星期四

Bloomberg: London Suicide Connects Lehman Lesson Missed by Hong Kong Woman

Sept. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Yu Lia Chun, a retired hospital orderly in Hong Kong, never heard of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. before she got a call last September from her banker.

“He said, ‘Did you hear the news? Something has happened to Lehman,’” Yu, 66, recalled in an interview in June. “I didn’t get it.”

Yu, who has a sixth-grade education, said she thought her money was in a savings account. She didn’t know she had lent it to a bankrupt American securities firm. Eventually, she found out that her HK$1.2 million ($155,000) nest egg was gone. Her children lost another HK$3.8 million because Yu had persuaded them to make similar investments.

“There is no way a person like me could understand any of this,” Yu said, dabbing her eyes with a tissue in a coffee shop in Hong Kong’s financial district. “Sometimes I feel like jumping off a building.”

What hit Yu and her family was a tidal wave triggered halfway around the world by the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history. The Sept. 15, 2008, collapse of Lehman, with $613 billion in liabilities, had unforeseen and far-flung consequences that devastated those, like Yu, who didn’t know their fates were tied to the New York-based investment bank.

‘Quicker This Time’

The chief operating officer of a private-equity firm in London jumped in front of a commuter train because he blamed himself for leaving the company’s money in a Lehman account, according to a coroner’s report. The Israeli managers of a hotel construction project on the island of West Caicos, northeast of Cuba, were taken hostage by Chinese workers when an anticipated Lehman loan didn’t materialize and wages weren’t paid. In Hong Kong, Yu and thousands of others who had invested in Lehman products camped out in the rain, thumping drums and chanting, “Give us our money back.”

The realization that a U.S. securities firm so woven into the financial system couldn’t pay its debts radiated out from New York, panicking investors around the world. It was a doomsday scenario that former International Monetary Fund chief economist Simon H. Johnson likened to Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s 1963 novel “Cat’s Cradle,” in which a single crystal of the fictitious substance ice-nine hardens all of the planet’s water.

What differentiated Lehman from previous financial crises was how fast the panic spread, said Richard Sylla, an economic and financial historian at New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business in New York.

“Communications made things happen faster,” Sylla said, describing how it took six months for the 1931 failure of Austria’s Creditanstalt bank to put stress on the British financial system. “The news of everything got spread around much quicker this time.”

Goldman Sachs Debt

The freezing of global credit markets following Lehman’s demise began with professionals who traded commercial paper in New York. They were the first to feel the chill when the Reserve Primary Fund, the oldest money market fund, was inundated with requests for redemptions and seized up hours after the bankruptcy filing. The $785 million that Reserve had lent to Lehman was deemed worthless by 4 p.m. the next day.

Fear that more banks and financial firms might fail meant most investors stopped lending to anyone other than the government. Even New York-based Goldman Sachs Group Inc., which earned $11.6 billion in 2007, more than any U.S. securities firm in history, wasn’t immune. The average annual cost of insuring $10 million of Goldman Sachs debt for five years soared to a record $545,000 from $182,557 in the three days after Lehman failed, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Plummeting Prices

Lehman’s demise triggered a panic. Money fund managers were forced to raise cash to pay off investors. They tried selling what securities they held and couldn’t. The market was flooded, and prices were plummeting -- if prices could be obtained at all. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index suffered its worst decline in six years. Mistrust leaked into the corporate bond market.

The most widely traded 30-year bond of General Electric Capital Corp., the world’s biggest issuer of commercial paper, dropped by as much as 30 cents on the dollar to 62 cents by Sept. 18 because of doubts that GE would be able to persuade money funds to renew its short-term notes.

At that price, the three-day loss for owners of the issue was more than $1.9 billion, according to prices provided by Trace, the bond-trade reporting system of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.

The U.S. responded within a week to guarantee money markets and bank-to-bank lending. Within a month, Congress agreed to spend $700 billion to prop up banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. guaranteed new bank debt, and Federal Reserve lending to financial institutions ballooned by $1 trillion.

Lehman Minibonds

Those programs, which succeeded in stemming the panic, remain in place today. What they didn’t do was save Yu and thousands of other investors in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and elsewhere who had bought equity-linked notes or so-called minibonds connected to Lehman.

Equity-linked notes combine attributes of both bonds and stock by investing part of the proceeds in share options and the remainder in fixed income. Minibonds are custom-made securities linked to the creditworthiness of companies, backed by collateralized-debt obligations and sold in denominations of $5,000. They functioned like credit-default swaps in reverse, where the investor stands to lose his principal when the firm named in the note can’t pay its debts.

‘Information Asymmetry’

Yu, a mother of six who emigrated from mainland China in 1962, didn’t have a chance, according to Joseph Stiglitz, a Columbia University economics professor who won a Nobel Prize for his work on the effect of unequal access to information on buyers and sellers in financial markets.

“As securities got more complex, the opportunities for gaming, to the disadvantage of ordinary people, increased,” Stiglitz said. “Complexity opened up new venues for information asymmetry, which banks exploited.”

Asia became Lehman’s highest growth region in 2007, taking in more than $3.1 billion in revenue, or 16 percent of the firm’s business. Revenue was up more than 41 percent from 2005 in Asia, while it climbed 3 percent in the U.S. in the same period, according to Bloomberg data.

Yu said she went to an export trade show in Hong Kong two years ago and met Chow Chi Chung, a salesman for Amsterdam-based ABN Amro Holding NV. He offered her a better return on her savings if she switched banks, she said. So she did.

Two-thirds of Yu’s money, about $100,000, came from a settlement with her employer after an elevator fell half a floor, injuring her pelvis, according to Yu, who still drags her right leg when she walks.

Didn’t Read Prospectus

A month after their meeting, Yu said Chow called her to say he had a new product that could return as much as 20 percent a year because it was linked to the stock performance of three large Chinese companies -- China Communications Construction Co.,China Merchants Bank Co. and Ping An Insurance Co.

Yu said she didn’t read the fine print, trusting Chow when he told her she couldn’t lose her principal. Had she looked at the prospectus and understood it she would have discovered that she had essentially bought three call options -- contracts that would capture gains if the shares of the three companies rose by a certain amount -- coupled with the equivalent of a Lehman corporate bond. If Lehman defaulted, her money would be gone.

Cash Bonus

ABN Amro, now part of Edinburgh-based Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, also recruited Yu to sell the same product to her family, giving her a cash bonus of about $155 for each person who signed up, she said.

Yuk Min Hui, a Hong Kong-based spokeswoman for RBS, declined to comment about Yu’s case. She said in an e-mail that if the bank determined that “sales processes and guidelines were not properly followed,” it would offer “appropriate remedies.” Only a small number of investors fall in this category, she said.

Chow couldn’t be located.

There are 873 issues of such Lehman equity-linked structured notes outstanding with a combined face value of about $8.7 billion, all now in default, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Bonds were denominated in pounds, Swiss francs and Hungarian forint, as well as Australian and Hong Kong dollars.

Banks also sold $1.8 billion of Lehman minibonds to an estimated 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, where the notes were first marketed in 2003, according to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. The biggest seller was BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd., a unit of Beijing-based Bank of China Ltd.

Financial Dumplings

The minibonds were all issued by a Cayman Islands-based entity called Pacific International Finance Ltd., set up by Lehman with trustees from London-based HSBC Holdings Plc. The notes were financial dumplings -- derivatives contracts tied to the creditworthiness of major companies wrapped inside Lehman corporate bonds. Series 19 notes, for instance, were linked to securities dealers including Citigroup Inc. and Goldman Sachs. If any of those businesses or Lehman defaulted, the investor wouldn’t get paid.

In effect, investors in Series 19 notes bought the losing end of credit-default swaps, or insurance policies pegged to the survival of financial institutions. If any of those companies failed, the noteholders were the ones responsible for paying off the principal on the derivative.

Lehman took payments from investors in exchange for a guaranteed yield, then placed the cash in a Lehman-managed money market fund and issued commercial paper to borrow more money. Those funds were in turn used to invest in CDOs sold by Lehman off-balance-sheet entities in places such as Ireland and the Cayman Islands.

‘Blood and Sweat’

Sun Kwan, a 58-year-old retired parks worker, was among those who bought Lehman minibonds. He stood outside the I.M. Pei-designed Hong Kong headquarters of the Bank of China on June 15, along with Yu and 51 other protesters, banging a chipped red drum with a stick every two seconds. Raindrops beaded on the brim of his blue cap. A sign around his neck, hand-lettered in Chinese characters, read: “The Bank of China is a hooker. Give me back my money earned with blood and sweat.”

Sun, who has a high school education, invested about $285,000 in Lehman Minibond Series 12 notes, sold to him by BOC Hong Kong, which paid about 4 percent interest a year.

He said he thought he was putting his money into a certificate of deposit. Instead, as the prospectus explained, the notes were a bet against the default of the Chinese government and five companies, including Hutchison Whampoa Ltd., which operates ports and telecommunications services, Chinese state-owned oil producer CNOOC Ltd. and Lehman.

As an incentive, he was given $26 in supermarket coupons.

Rhinos, Whales

Sun also purchased $40,000 worth of Octave Series 10 notes, a similarly structured product created by Morgan Stanley, in which the investor would lose all of his money if Lehman or any of six other companies defaulted. He said he never heard of Lehman and thought the notes were backed by the People’s Republic of China because most of the businesses were state- owned.

Nick Footitt, a spokesman for Morgan Stanley in Hong Kong, declined to comment.

Each minibond series was custom-made, so their characteristics differed. Packagers skipped using some numbers, including 4, which is considered unlucky in Chinese culture and would make the bond difficult to market. Investors got prizes, including video cameras and flat-screen televisions, according to newspaper advertisements and fliers handed out at banks. The ads, in both Chinese and English, featured rhinoceroses, whales and other symbols of potency, luck or profit.

‘Rotten Deal’

“It’s all gone,” Sun said in an interview conducted through a Chinese translator at the demonstration. “I almost wanted to kill myself. I’ve been crying for months, even though I am a man.”

He said he hadn’t yet told his 25-year-old son, Sun Chi Yan, what had happened to his nest egg, most of which came from a settlement when the government bought his family’s land.

Sun and Yu were among investors who staged protests almost every business day for nine months, sparking a Hong Kong legislative investigation and calls for more protection for retail customers. The raucous demonstrations in the city’s financial district, including a tent encampment and bullhorns connected to an iPod that blared the looped chant “Rotten Deal -- Money Back,” became an embarrassment to the banks.

In a city of 7 million, where only 30 percent of workers had pensions before 2001, the Lehman protesters struck a chord, according to Audrey Eu, one of 60 members of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council.

Bank Offer

“A lot of them lost their life savings,” Eu said in an interview in June. “They’re all crying. They work as cleaners, and $50,000 is a lot of money to them.”

Angel Yip, a spokeswoman for BOC Hong Kong, said in an e- mail that “we understand and sympathize with customers” who lost money as a result of the Lehman collapse. She said advertisements and prospectuses distributed by the bank “contained a detailed description of the structure and risks” of the investments.

In July, 16 retail banks, including BOC Hong Kong, offered to repay minibond investors at least 60 cents on the dollar, a deal brokered by the city’s securities regulator that would amount to $813 million. About two-thirds of eligible noteholders accepted the offer, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority said in a statement on Sept. 4. Sun said he hadn’t yet made up his mind.

“The compensation offer is totally unfair and based on groundless calculations,” Sun said. “If we have to accept it eventually, it’ll be because we’ve exhausted all other means.”

‘Grotesquely Wrong’

While investors in Hong Kong have the right to sue banks, there are no class-action laws or contingency fees, making it difficult to find lawyers willing to take cases.

Patrick Daniels, a lawyer with Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP in San Diego, has filed a class-action suit against Lehman in federal court in New York on behalf of minibond holders like Sun in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore seeking $1.6 billion from Bank of New York Mellon Corp. The money, mostly shares in Lehman’s Institutional Money Market Fund, is being held by the bank as collateral to secure the minibonds, Daniels said. Other Lehman creditors are trying to get the same funds from the Bank of New York Mellon, which isn’t accused of wrongdoing. The case is pending.

“Something is grotesquely wrong here,” Daniels said in an interview in July. “These people were just flat-out lied to and stolen from.”

Neither the lawsuit nor the settlement applies to Yu or other holders of equity-linked notes from Houston to Singapore.

London Suicide

Hong Kong retirees weren’t the only victims. Even professional investors were stuck with Lehman losses.

The stocks and bonds of Lehman’s London brokerage customers, used as collateral to borrow more money, were frozen on Sept. 15. About 3,500 clients, including 700 hedge funds, couldn’t get access to an estimated $65 billion of assets. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Lehman’s U.K. bankruptcy administrator, is still sorting out who should get paid and how much. Some firms have closed, and others may have to wait as long as a decade to get their assets back, Tony Lomas, the PwC partner in charge of the U.K. administration, said in August.

It took only 10 days for the ice-nine to get to Kirk Stephenson, chief operating officer of Olivant Ltd., a London private-equity firm run by former UBS AG Chairman Luqman Arnold. On Sept. 25, Stephenson, 47, jumped in front of a train going 125 mph at a station in Taplow, 28 miles (45 kilometers) west of London.

The coroner’s office for the county of Buckinghamshire ruled the death a suicide. Stephenson, a native of New Zealand, was despondent about the financial crisis and talked about killing himself one week after Lehman’s demise, according to a statement from his wife read at the coroner’s inquest.

U.K. Lock-Up

Lehman Brothers International (Europe) was Olivant’s prime broker. It held the firm’s 2.78 percent stake in UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank by assets, according to a statement from Olivant on Oct. 1. The shares were worth 1.6 billion francs ($1.44 billion) at the time.

The hedge fund lock-up led the U.K. to reconsider its procedures when firms fail. While Lehman’s broker-dealer in the U.S. stayed out of bankruptcy long enough to process many of its trades, the business seized up in the U.K.

“In the U.S., everything was wrapped in cotton wool for four days,” said PwC’s Lomas. In the U.K., “everything failed come 7:56 a.m. that Monday morning.”

‘Black Hole’

The U.K. had an advantage in attracting hedge fund assets before the Lehman bankruptcy. While U.S. prime brokers face limits on how much they can loan hedge funds, those rules could be circumvented with overseas units like Lehman’s in London. Some U.S. clients didn’t know they were customers of Lehman Brothers International (Europe).

“If you didn’t pay attention to what you were signing, you would have missed it,” said Michael Romanek, principal at Rise Partners Ltd., which arranges financing for funds from London. “It was called enhanced prime brokerage, where they could be more accommodating with more leverage or loans. It just took signing some extra papers in New York. Most people didn’t realize it.”

Some fund managers with frozen assets say they’ve gone from extreme anger to resignation that they’ll have to wait a long time to see any return.

“I still don’t know if I’ll ever get any money back,” said Edward Chin, whose Hong Kong-based Pride Revelation Fund used Lehman as its sole prime broker. “We’re in a black hole.”

$30 Billion Gap

The ice-nine also halted construction projects from Wall Street to the Turks and Caicos Islands.

Lehman borrowed against property investments that couldn’t easily be sold, such as construction loans. So when the property market turned sour and creditors demanded more collateral for the loans or their money back, the investment bank was stuck.

The property portfolio doomed Lehman when a rescue still seemed possible. On Saturday, Sept. 13, 2008, Timothy Geithner, then president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and now U.S. Treasury secretary, asked a team of the world’s top bankers to evaluate Lehman’s real estate holdings as part of an effort to facilitate a sale of the investment bank to London-based Barclays Plc.

The team, including representatives from Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse Group AG, determined that Lehman had overvalued its real estate investments by $20 billion to $30 billion, according to people who attended meetings at the New York Fed last September.

Watergate Hotel

When Barclays pulled out of an agreement to buy the firm, Lehman was forced to file for bankruptcy. Only then did Barclays buy Lehman’s U.S. securities business, including its headquarters in Manhattan’s Times Square.

The bankruptcy deprived the international real estate market of a major source of financing. The bank was known for doing deals nobody else would touch, according to a former Lehman executive.

The Watergate Hotel, made famous by the 1972 break-in that led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon, was sold at auction in August for $25 million after its owner, Washington- based Monument Realty LLC, defaulted on its mortgage. Monument was financed by Lehman.

A condo conversion at 25 Broad St. in Manhattan, two blocks from Goldman Sachs’s headquarters, was suspended by developers. It too was financed by Lehman.

SunCal, Depfa

Irvine, California-based SunCal Cos., a closely held developer, said it had $1.6 billion in financing from Lehman. Since the bank’s failure, 19 projects, all in California, have filed for bankruptcy, SunCal said. Work has stopped on all of them, including the 248-acre Marblehead Coastal community in San Clemente, which was supposed to feature 69 single-family homes, 244 other residences, a movie theater, parks and hiking trails.

Munich-based Hypo Real Estate Holding AG received 102 billion euros ($143 billion) in debt guarantees and credit lines from the German government after its Depfa unit was stuck without short-term funding following Lehman’s bankruptcy. Like Lehman, Hypo funded long-term real estate assets with short-term loans such as commercial paper.

German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck defended the bailout of the lender because the global financial system was just “millimeters from the abyss.”

Molasses Reef

On West Caicos, an otherwise uninhabited island 250 miles northeast of Cuba, work stopped on the Molasses Reef Ritz- Carlton Hotel and Residences, slated to include a cluster of $6.5 million cottages. About 400 Chinese employees of Tel Aviv- based construction firm Ashtrom Properties Ltd. didn’t get paid when Lehman funding dried up, according to Jonathan Siegel, New York-based managing director of Logwood Hotel Development Co.

About 60 electrical workers rebelled, taking a dozen managers hostage and refusing to let them leave the island.

“We had 400 to 500 unhappy men, and we were concerned violence would erupt,” Siegel said. “The Turks and Caicos government was very unhappy with the situation. There was a limited supply of food and water.”

Ashtrom ended the standoff after a week by paying what it considered “a ransom,” Siegel said. The project, about 70 percent completed, is still on hold, said Verona Carter, Ritz- Carlton Hotel Co.’s director of public relations for the Caribbean area.

Financial Leadership

The vulnerability of the global financial system revealed by Lehman’s bankruptcy -- from ordinary investors like Sun and Yu to London hedge funds and German lenders -- makes it all the harder to regulate.

“The difficulty you have in getting control is that you need a global alliance,” said former World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn in an e-mail. “You need all the finance ministers to come together, because if a transaction can’t be done here, it can be done in Lichtenstein or France or the Far East.”

Lehman’s bankruptcy also poses a challenge to America’s financial leadership.

Wall Street profited by arranging financing that allowed other countries to tap global capital markets to build offices, factories, resorts and housing. What’s broken now is the trust the rest of the world had in U.S. banks, said Phillip Yin, a native of Seattle who is managing director of Asia Investors Partners Ltd., a Hong Kong-based research firm.

“All that has happened since -- the job losses, the slump, everything -- is tied to one thing and one event,” Yin said. “And that’s Lehman.”

(Lehman’s Lessons: Next, Too Big to Fail)

To contact the reporters on this story: Mark Pittman in New York at mpittman@bloomberg.net; Bob Ivry in New York at bivry@bloomberg.net.



from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aNFuVRL73wJc

2009年9月3日 星期四

CNBC news: M. Stanley, Moody's, S&P Must Defend Fraud Claims

Source of CNBC news: http://www.cnbc.com/id/32667231.

Published: Wednesday, 2 Sep 2009

A U.S. federal judge ruled that Morgan Stanley and two credit rating agencies must defend fraud charges in a class-action lawsuit accusing them of masking the risks of an investment linked to subprime mortgages, and which eventually collapsed.

U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin on Wednesday rejected efforts by Morgan Stanley [MS 27.09 -0.36 (-1.31%) ] , Moody's [MCO 26.10 -0.32 (-1.21%) ] Moody's Investors Service and McGraw-Hill's [MHP 32.31 -0.95 (-2.86%) ] Standard & Poor's to dismiss fraud claims brought by the plaintiffs, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and King County in Washington state.

She dismissed the plaintiffs' remaining claims, and all claims against a fourth defendant, Bank of New York Mellon [BK 27.95 -0.15 (-0.53%) ] , while granting permission for the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.

Scheindlin's ruling could affect other lawsuits brought by pension funds and other investors, seeking to hold banks and credit raters responsible for hyping the value of complex debt to win fees and causing investor losses as the debt collapsed.

The case concerned the Cheyne Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV), which went bankrupt in August 2007 after the quality of its assets plummeted. Many investors in Cheyne-related notes lost much or all of their investments.

SIVs are complex packages of loans and debt, including collateralized debt obligations, that once held some $350 billion of assets before falling out of favor.

The California Public Employees' Retirement System, the nation's largest public pension fund, in July sued Moody's, S&P and Fitch Ratings over losses on Cheyne and other SIVs.

In the New York case, the plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley wrongly marketed Cheyne as a high-quality investment, and that the rating agencies assigned improperly high ratings.

The complaint also accused Bank of New York Mellon, acting as a depositary and processing agent, of improperly valuing Cheyne's assets and delivering reports to the rating agencies.


In a 68-page ruling, Scheindlin said the plaintiffs pleaded enough facts to let the fraud claims case go forward.

"Where both the rating agencies and Morgan Stanley knew that the ratings process was flawed, knew that the portfolio was not a safe, stable investment, and knew that the rating agencies could not issue an objective rating because of the effect it would have on their compensation, it may be plausibly inferred that Morgan Stanley and the rating agencies knew they were disseminating false and misleading ratings,"
she wrote.

Scheindlin set an Oct. 1 status conference in the case.

McGraw-Hill spokesman Frank Briamonte said the company was pleased that Scheindlin dismissed all but one of 11 claims it faced, and said it was "confident" it would prevail on the remaining claim.

Bank of New York Mellon spokesman Kevin Heine had no immediate comment. The rest of the parties did not immediately return calls or e-mails seeking comment.

The case is Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan), No. 08-7508.

2009年8月20日 星期四

Open Letter to Commissioner of Police Regarding to Police Abuse of Powers

(轉載)
An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of Police Abuse of Powers

Mr. TANG King Shing

Commissioner of Police , Police Headquarters,

Sirs,

I write on behalf of Ms. Tracy Ho as well as the Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims in Hong Kong to complain against your officers who authorise the ‘dawn raid’ against Ms. Ho for reason that she is suspected of having committed an act of common assault.
The alleged assault takes place at about 1625 hours on 21st May 2009 outside the Bank of China Building, which is situate at no. 1 Garden Road, Central. In addition to the gross disproportion between police action and the nature of the allegation, there are numerous dubious acts on the part of your officers during the process that could only be explained as intending to maximize the harassment and distress inflicted on Ms. Ho and her family.

The Dawn Raid

2. At about 07:30 hours on 19th August 2009 five detectives (three male and two female) in plain clothes claiming to be attached to the Central Police District or Division knocked on the door of Ms. Ho’s Residence in Choi Hung. The visit is a total surprise and when Ms. Ho answered the door your officers insisted that they wanted to enter the premises before they would reveal the purpose of their visit.

3. With utmost reluctance and distress of her family, Ms. allowed the officers into her home. One of the officers then produced a photograph to Ms. Ho and asked if she is the person in it. Although the photograph does not show her face, Ms. Ho recalled the scene which is the protest outside the Bank of China Building mentioned above.

4. When Ms. Ho was about to admit that she is the lady on the photograph, one of the officer threatened her to immediately produce the clothes and shoes she worn that day or else they would search for the items themselves. Perplexed by the sudden police interest in the event that happened months ago and pressured by the threatening language, Ms. Ho complied with the demand and produced the items accordingly. She was then asked to follow the officers to the police station for further enquiries but before leaving the premises she was asked to sign on the notebook of one of the officers that it was not an arrest and she was not therefore handcuffed.

A Trivial Offence

5. Ms. Ho arrived at the Central Police Station at Arsenal Street at about 0930 hours after having been taken to and asked to wait at the Ngau Tau Kok Police Station for some time during which your officers were presumably completing some formalities to record their action in another police area.

6. In the Central Police Station, Ms. Ho was shown a video footage lasting for about 10 to 15 seconds in which her right foot seemed to have a momentary contact with the buttock of a bank staff. Apparently the footage was shot in a commotion where attempt was made by the bank staff to forcibly remove the protesters. It is understandable that in such circumstances people were jostling against each another and what Ms. Ho was doing then is crucial in establishing the plausibility of the allegation against her.

7. Ms. Ho has a flair for electronic video and audio devices and she has been responsible for filming the public activities of the Alliance almost since the creation of it. When the assault was allegedly taken place, Ms. Ho was actually holding her video device filming the forcible removal of the protesters by the bank staff. Her attention was on the action in front of her and the display screen of her video. It is, to say the least, very unlikely that a person would in the circumstances feel like joining the fray.

8. There is another factor that discounts the truthfulness of the allegation. Ms. Ho is a small, slim young lady whose weight would not be much more than 90 lbs. Could a person with that physique be inclined to provoke a fight? And could a lady like Ms. Ho who has taken part in so many protests relating to the fraud of Lehman Brothers and has always behaved properly, suddenly and without any provocation whatsoever, acted contrary to her personality and disposition? The allegation is so preposterous that no person in his right mind would seriously entertain it. Yet your officers have concluded that the offence is so grave that it justifies a deployment of five officers to carry out a dawn raid for an allegation of common assault where the supposed victim does not seem to have suffered any visible or detectable injury and does not complain for months after the event.

Assault on Law by Abuses of Powers

9. How should the public comprehend a dawn raid by five detectives against a young lady suspected of common assault? Does it not indicate the new low of the state of policing in this city under your watch?
But that is not all in so far as the outrageous police conduct is concerned. For almost one year now Ms. Ho has been the contact person between the police and the Alliance on many occasions especially in respect of application for approval to assemble and conduct procession. Your officers at the Police Community Relations Office in Central District know Ms. Ho well and it would take only a phone call to get Ms. Ho to the Central Police Station to view the video footage and to assist police investigation into the allegation. The differences between asking Ms. Ho to the police station and the dawn raid are that only the latter could inflict the distress, sudden sense of fear, and helplessness on Ms. Ho and her family.

10. The connection between the decision to harass Ms. Ho and another assault complaint against the bank staff at the scene of protest is clear. As mentioned above, the moment when Ms. Ho was accused of committing assault on the anonymous bank staff, she was filming an assault in progress by the bank staff against a protester.
It is hardly surprising that the protester would sustain injury given the way she was man-handled by the bank staff. As it was, she was taken to hospital, and stayed there for days for medical treatment. We also learn that a complaint of assault was lodged with the police by her or subsequently with the medical findings of the injury she sustained. Despite the evidence, no action has been taken against the bank or the assailant by the police, just like other crimes related to the Lehman Brothers fraud.

11. In the circumstances, it is an irresistible inference that the police harassment against Ms. Ho is motivated by the desire to please certain influential individuals affiliated with the bank.

12. The allegation against Ms. Ho is so trivial that she is granted a police bail of HKD100. Against an allegation of common assault that could, technically speaking, be committed by everyone in this crowded community, the police deployed five detectives to conduct a dawn raid on the basis of the flimsiest evidence which comes into being in a commotion caused largely by the bank itself. The commotion would not have happened had the police had the courage and sense of decency to enforce the law. Against the banks for fraud that is proven by documentary evidence that no government official would dare to dispute, not a single officer of yours has the courage to follow your own orders to classify the complaints after almost one year of their lodgments with the Commercial Crime Bureau. Insofar as the Lehman Brothers fraud is concerned, the victims have been deprived of any legal rights and remedies. Would any of the government officials to whom this complaint is addressed care to respond to this latest episode of police abuse of powers?

c.c.
Mr. TANG Ying Yen, Henry, Chief Secretary for Administration
Mr. Wong Yan Lung, Secretary for Justice
Mr. Ian Grenville Cross, Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Ian McWalters, Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Lee Ka Chiu, Director of Crime & Security, HKP

======================================================
From: An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of police abuse of powers

2009年8月19日 星期三

Is HK now a Heaven for Banking Crooks ?



What have HK Police / Justice department done regarding all the financial fraud related complaints by Minibond / Constellation / Octave victims /other-products, since 15 sept. 2008?
(a) act upon banks' request & demand: Arrested and raided some minibond / constellation victims who participated in protesting banks' over 5 years' fraudulent act;
(b) Taking photos of those who participated in the demonstrations ...
(c) What ELSE ????????

While HK Police have been busy with responding to banks' request & demand: searching & raiding Minibond/Constellation victims because of their involvement in protest against Banks' cheating behavior on Minibond / Constellation / Octave,
What have the financial center New York's legal system done so far?


In the recent news:

1. "New York Attorney General sues Charles Schwab over securities sales" (Aug.17)
NEW YORK - New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo filed a lawsuit Monday against the brokerage unit of Charles Schwab Corp., claiming the firm misled customers about the safety of auction-rate securities.
Cuomo's office has been at the forefront of pushing brokers and underwriters of auction-rate securities to repurchase them from investors who were left with steep losses after the market for the investments collapsed in early 2008.
The suit against Schwab is aimed at forcing the retail brokerage firm to repurchase the securities at face value from investors.
...
Last month, Cuomo's office notified San Francisco-based Charles Schwab that it was planning to file the suit against the retail brokerage firm for claiming the securities were safe investments while selling them to customers.
In a statement Monday, Cuomo said: "Charles Schwab owed its customers a duty to properly understand and make accurate representations concerning auction-rate securities. Today we commenced a lawsuit to remedy Schwab's repeated breach of that duty."
...
related link: http://www.cnbc.com/id/32447041

2. "Credit Suisse broker convicted of fraud" (Aug.17)
A former Credit Suisse broker was on Monday convicted by a jury of fraudulently selling risky auction-rate securities in one of the first criminal prosecutions to emerge from the two-year-long credit crisis.

The guilty verdict against Eric Butler, 36, comes after a three-week trial in which prosecutors accused him and his former colleague, Julian Tzolov, of scheming to generate higher sales commissions by lying to clients about what kind of securities they were being sold.

“The defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations saddled investors with unknown risks they did not bargain for,” said Benton Campbell, US attorney for the eastern district of New York.

“This case shows that those who engage in such schemes will be held to account for their criminal activity.”

related links:
- http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE57G4HK20090817?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticNews (reuters)
- http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/nyfo081709a.htm (FBI press release)

3. 2008-News:
US Regulators alleged that brokerages misled investors into believing that auction rate securities were safe, cash-equivalent products, when in fact they faced increasing liquidity risk. Major financial companies Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia Corp.,and others that sold auction-rate securities have reached 100% buy-back settlements.


2009年7月30日 星期四

Repeating History after Ignoring It - Lehman's mini-bonds scandal ends with a whimper

[Article from Asia Sentinel]

Hong Kong's Lehman mini-bonds saga, in which outraged investors lost millions with the collapse of what was once thought to be an impregnable American financial institution, appears to be finally coming to an end, potentially drawing the curtain on a 10-month nightmare for both investors and regulators, given what the Securities and Futures Commission reportedly described as a 'good compromise."

But before crediting the SFC for putting an end to the misery of the 30,000 beleaguered investors, or before the regulator champions itself for its masterstrokes, be forewarned that the impact of the Lehman mini-bonds saga could have been minimized, if not prevented, if the SFC had acted decisively three years ago in a similar case involving Clerical Medical Insurance, a unit of Halifax Bank of Scotland. But from its inception, the SFC has been a largely toothless watchdog, occasionally gumming on some luckless small offenders and largely leaving the heavyweights alone.

Under the terms of the Lehman settlement, announced July 23, 16 banks agreed to return US$807 million - about 60 cents on the dollar -- to investors, with BOC Hong Kong Holdings agreeing to stump up nearly half of that, at US$401 million. The 16 banks sold an estimated US$1.8 billion of the so-called mini-bonds, which fell sharply in value after the US investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings was forced into bankruptcy last September.

Just as with Lehman, the CMI case involved gross mis-selling of financial investment products - larger in scale in dollar terms but less well known.


The SFC could have punished the wrongdoers to send out the right message, restructured the regulatory landscape to prevent any similar episodes and seized the opportunity to demonstrate its seriousness in dealing with misconduct of financial institutions.


No, thank you. The SFC did none of the above. What it eventually did - investigate the case but take no action - was to splash out television advertisements to forewarn investors to be alert and ask the right questions when making investment decisions, without tackling the core of the problem. The timing was critical: had the SFC taken the right measures then, it would have been between 2005-2006 when the Lehman minibonds were flowing into the Hong Kong market.

Obviously those splashy TV ads didn't work but the SFC has once again resorted to an even larger scale commercial campaign to accompany its new television advertisements following the Lehman case.

The earlier case refers to a product generally known as "offshore with-profits" (OWP) funds, sold in Hong Kong via several carriers but largely through market leader Clerical Medical Insurance (CMI) which alone has reportedly over 7,000 wealthy investors, mostly expatriates, with what many said amounted to some billions of US dollars invested - CMI was part of HBOS (Halifax Bank of Scotland), the largest mortgage and savings provider in the United Kingdom, which was bought by Lloyd's early this year and subsequently bailed out by the British government.

The OWP products were never sold directly by CMI but through many independent financial advisers , or IFAs, acting as intermediaries. Potential investors were encouraged to gear up to three times their own investment to maximize gains, given the supposedly good track records of these funds. These investors later said their advisers, motivated by extra commissions, only emphasized the upside but never forewarned them of the potential downside risks involved with gearing. The IFAs in turn claimed the marketing materials they used originated from CMI - whose products were approved by the SFC - though the company denied it ever promoted gearing.

The investors who geared up not only lost most of their principal but had to repay part of their loans when the value of their fund holdings pledged as collateral fell sharply, after the OWP funds performed badly following market shocks in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001, when CMI found itself on the wrong sides of the equation in the investment markets.

While not all investors were geared, all who tried to get out of the funds were subject to exit penalties, known as "market value adjusters" (MVAs), which reached more than 25 percent at some stage - neither did CMI nor the IFAs explain much about these MVAs or mentioned how high the MVA rates would reach in their sales pitch, according to many angry investors.

Either way, these investors found themselves stuck with huge losses and some are still pursuing lawsuits today to fight their cause.

Much like the Lehman mini-bonds case, the CMI matter was one of gross mis-selling to potential and unwary investors - in the latter, mostly highly educated professionals. Just like the Lehman case, the CMI products were approved by the SFC.

And like the Lehman case, the CMI products were sold through a retail distribution channel with frontline sales staff carrying approved brochures. More importantly, both cases featured gross mis-selling with commission-driven sales staff allegedly more eager to secure signatures than to explain in detail the complexity of the financial products, if they understood them at all, on the table.

With such parallels, and perhaps sadly on hindsight, one may be tempted to blame the SFC for not doing enough to protect the interest of the public.

One may also argue that the SFC did the right thing in both the Lehman and CMI cases: that investors took their risk, informed or ill-informed, calculated or speculative, even though the products were approved and by that token the SFC can only resort to public education via commercial advertisements.

Granted, but the reality is the public placed trust in the regulators to have the house in order with little or hopefully no room for any propensity to mislead potential investors, rich or poor alike. The regulators of today's ever increasingly complex financial markets are also expected to have an iron grip on the conduct of its players and act swiftly to correct any disequilibrium.

But in the Hong Kong context, there is much more the SFC could have done over the years to build a more efficient and better regulated financial market to protect the public - and thus prevent the resulting bad press from the Lehman mini-bonds saga.

For starters, one may question if the frontline sales staff of financial products, including professional independent financial advisers, are properly qualified. After all, much like doctors and surgeons whom we count upon for life or death, the men on the street rely on these financial intermediaries for their financial well-being - the Lehman case in particular has thrown this issue into the spotlight given the highly complex financial instruments involved.

Regulators and related supervisory trade bodies in Hong Kong will be quick to point out the Continuing Professional Development (CPD) program, found in several professional industries as a well managed way to update its members and also renew licenses.

Sounds good? But what good can there be if the IFAs (with a considerable number of non-Chinese speaking Western expatriates) cannot understand a word in some of these Cantonese-only classes? This was the situation faced by some insurance professionals and IFAs, according to sources, and all they need is to find ways to kill time and mark their attendance at the end of the courses to gain the necessary credits.

"They do not even check if you are fluent in the language in which the course is given," said a practicing insurance broker. "Most attendants just sit in the venue for 2 hours playing games on their mobile phones, or by catching up with sleep. The quality of the speakers, most of the time staff of law firms eager to advertise their firm's name and they work free of charge, as I understand, is poor to very poor."

Certainly not the best way to update on the latest financial literature.

With the blurring of lines in the modern financial sectors, cross-selling has become commonplace, thus we find insurance companies selling investment-type products and banks selling insurance-related products. Consequently, insurance professionals and IFAs need the appropriate licenses to sell complex financial investment products. In Hong Kong, insurance professionals with the appropriate license from any of the two respective insurance brokers associations earned the license to sell while those who gained a license from the SFC, being the IFAs, have the license to advise on investment-type products, industry sources say.

The implications may not be obvious to casual observers, according to some market professionals. A person with only a license to sell means he cannot offer any advice on the products he tried to push to his potential client. Consider the client may (inevitably) ask questions about the products. What can the financial intermediary say? "Sorry, I can only sell you these and not licensed to offer advice. So just pick one and sign"?

Sorry, that is not how the real world works.

Perhaps the regulators should get rid of the license to sell and offer just the license to advise requirement so as to better protect the public interest?

The one other troubling issue that remains: commissions. In both the Lehman and CMI cases, the financial intermediaries were allegedly motivated by commissions earned from the sales transacted. How else do you suppose salesmen work - thus we cannot possibly remove commissions out of the equation, can we?

Hence, the SFC took the right stance that investors take their own risks given the best information they can gather - ie, market risk. However, if the financial markets are not properly regulated, giving way to mis-selling, investors are exposed to further (non-market) risks.

Sadly, Hong Kong investors have short memories, especially when faced with lucrative offers. With the Lehman mini-bonds saga soon to be behind us, one can only hope that the SFC took cues and promptly put things in order before another similar episode surfaces.

From Asia Sentinel: "http://asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1984&Itemid=224

2009年6月17日 星期三

銀行怕甚麼?銀行心虛了嗎?

迷你債券之核心為迷債抵押品(即任總所指之"第二層債務抵押證券“)。這就是為甚麼,7 個著名掛鈎公司沒有問提,迷債價值卻到了要跟零掛鈎的地步。

為甚麼政府和監管機構不敢要求銀行披露銀行對於迷債抵押品(即迷債"第二層債務抵押證券“)之理解?
為甚麼银行至今為止不能 (/不敢?) 回答關於迷債抵押品問題?

2008年9月27日,在銷售了4-5年 共 36 個迷你債券系列之後, 當時的銀行公會主席和廣北公開承認:
“現時本港銀行作為雷曼迷你債的包銷商或分銷商,掌握的信息十分有限。這些債券狀況如何﹖債券抵押品的性質是什麼﹖。。。目前包銷商都不掌握確切信息。”

懇請政府徹查銀行是否有系統性不瞭解(或隱瞞)迷債抵押品(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)的性質之問題。
懇請政府就以下迷債抵押品(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)相關問題, 徹查銀行之理解和內部之相關資料。
懇請政府就以下迷債抵押品(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)相關問題, 徹查銀行對客戶做的解釋和披露。

這個調查,是關係到迷債之關鍵。這也是金管局至今不願意調查之願意,因為金管局一心為銀行護航,於是把矛頭指向職員。儘管和廣北先生不是說某個或某些銀行職員對於迷你“債券抵押品的性質”不確切瞭解, 和廣北先生是說“銀行”對於迷你“債券抵押品的性質”不確切瞭解。 和廣北先生用”債券“來簡稱”迷你債券“ ! 在和廣北先生的心裡,是否下意識地把本質為多層 Credit-Linked-Notes 的迷你債券等同“債券”來看待了? 是否也間接地反映了銀行的在對於迷你債券的本質的理解上有系統性錯誤?

銀行界有著理解並且買賣 CDO / Synthetic CDO / CDS /Credit-Linked Notes 的專業知識和多年豐富投資經驗之專業人士。 根據安永為銀行公會提供的“迷債結構和定價“報告(2008年12月), 在2004-2008年內,銀行銷售的迷債系列 10(2004年5月發行)至36均為類似性質的以合成CDO為第二層債務抵押證券。而合成CDO 之資料於迷債正式發行日(通常是購買截至日之後的3個星期左右)之前就已經有了, 因為雷曼必須在迷債正式發行日之前把合成CDO 評級拿到,再名正言順地用迷債之資金去買入自己打包的合成CDO 。

至今為止,銀行堅持自己在迷債銷售上是沒有錯誤的。也就是說,他們明白賣的產品究竟是甚麼。銀行是沒有任何理由拒絕公眾對此之要求的。银行也可以公開他們不能回答關於這些問題的理由。 銀行也可以公开宣告:我是銀行我怕誰!

儘管 “銀行於銷售信貸掛勾票據時,不知悉第二層債務抵押證券所掛勾之信貸參考機構“ (任總語),

(1) 2008年8月,在銷售了4-5年 共 36 個迷你債券系列之後,銀行是否知道這 迷債抵押品”(即"第二層債務抵押證券)之合成CDO 是賣跟由 97-194個相關主體組成的一攬子信貸保險? 以及: 銀行是否知道 如果這合成CDO之一攬子掛鈎相關主體裡發生了 足夠的信貸事件的話 造成合成CDO本金損失 ?

(2) 以系列19為例:125個相關主體內,當第9個信貸事件發生時,就會造成合成CDO本金損失 ,而第10個信貸事件發生時,就會造成合成CDO 100% 本金損失。 銀行是何時了解到這些系列19之具體信貸掛鈎主體及信貸事件影響之條件的?

(3) 從2004年5月的第一個以合成CDO作為”第二層債務抵押證券“的 系列10 開始,直至 2008年的 系列 36,在2008年8月之前這幾年的期間, 銀行有沒有跟雷曼(或發行商)要求過並且看過任何其中任何一個或幾個迷債系列的”迷債抵押品資料”(即:“第二層債務抵押證券“ 合成CDO 資料) ?

(4) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到: 這”迷債抵押品”(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)之 合成CDO 信息和風險 為迷債相關重大信息和重大風險 (material information and material risk) ?

(5) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到 : 這”迷債抵押品”(即"第二層債務抵押證券“)為 合成CDO ?

(6) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到 :這"迷債抵押品”之合成CDO 的主要特徵是跟一攬子信貸主體掛鈎?

(7) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到: 這 合成CDO 是賣 由 諸多 個相關主體組成的一攬子信貸保險 ? 以及其 ‘ 如果一攬子掛鈎相關主體裡發生了足夠的信貸事件的話,就會造成合成CDO本金損失’ 之特徵?

(8) 銀行於銷售迷你債券 時, 是否理解到: 而這”足夠“信貸事件,絕不是指合成CDO之一攬子信掛鈎主體之50% 或90%的相關主體發生信貸事件? 以及 ‘ 通常是會當8%-10%(或更低的百分比)的相關主體發生信貸事件的時候,就會造成合成CDO本金損失,最終造成迷債的利息及本金損失’

(9) 銀行於銷售信貸掛勾票據 (即:迷你債券)時,關於這 迷債抵押品,即今天的””第二層債務抵押證券““, 是如何跟客戶解釋和披露的呢?有沒有披露過其信貸風險?

(10) 銷售的時候,銀行有沒有跟客戶解釋,這“抵押品資料” 可以稍後於迷債正式發行之前(由雷曼或發行商)准備好,可以提供給客戶?
銷售之後,當這“抵押品資料”已經(由雷曼或發行商)准備好了的時候,銀行有沒有告知客戶? 以便提供給客戶或者由客戶去索取閱讀。
無論是銷售前,銷售時或銷售之後,銀行有沒有跟客戶提起過/或披露過任何“抵押品資料” 相關資料或相關信貸資料?

2009年6月11日 星期四

轉載安永報告的迷債示意圖

1。 迷債系列10-36之結構。 為甚麼迷債章程跟銀行的解釋完全沒有 合成CDO (层) 這一層解釋呢?


安永報告指出:SPV PIFL把迷債資金投資於合成CDO, 該合成CDO”是由不同的SPV發行的。而迷債中的兩類掉期 (即“迷債層次的FTD掉期”和“合成CDO 層次的掉期)是為向雷曼賣信貸保險而設計的。合成CDO was backed by the collateral which is the Lehman USD Liquidity Fund. 因此,迷債只有一個資產(即:雷曼貨幣基金),和許多負債(liability)(即兩個層次的信貸掉期)”。迷債層次的FTD掉期幾乎不為迷債持有者帶來收入,所有CDO層次(包括雷曼貨幣基金的利息)的收入均歸於雷曼。

2。安永報告明確指出:在合成CDO層次的SPV是賣由97-194個相關主體組成的一攬子信貸保險。如果一攬子掛鈎相關主體裡發生了足夠的信貸事件的話,就會造成合成CDO本金損失,從而觸發迷債層次的“underlying securities破產事件”,最終造成迷債的利息及本金損失。

這好像也是在描述發行商健在的“精明債券”?

為甚麼在幾年的迷債銷售期間,從迷債章程和證監會審批人員,到金管局和銀行,
從 系列10 到 系列36 的幾年之間,
- 都從不知道 合成CDO究竟為何物?
- 銀行,證監會是否都認為 合成CDO 不屬於重大風險的信息?
- 也從未試圖瞭解過 合成CDO ? 2004年5月發行 系列10 的時候可能不瞭解成CDO具體組成,之後也從沒有去瞭解過?
直至2008年9月之後/或者安永報告出來才瞭解?
- 2004年5月-2008年8月, 銀行從沒有跟雷曼要求過抵押品文件?銷售迷債是抵押品文件可能還沒有出籠,在迷債抵押品購買之後是一定有的啊。
迷債抵押品是跟迷債相關的重大風險。迷債抵押品信息可是跟迷債風險相關的充分信息啊。
- 都沒有人跟客戶解釋過這些?
- 為甚麼沒有一個發行章程都寫一些類似的內容的?


3. 安永報告的一些定義(對照示意圖).
(a) FTD Swap: First To Default Swap. In a FTD Swap, the protection seller (ie.. PIFL) will take the loss caused by the first default to occur among a poool of up to 8 reference obligations. Upon occurrence of the first default within the reference pool, the settlment amount for the FTD Swap is dependent on the credit event of the FTD Swap reference obligations and the value of the underlying Synhtetic cDO for Series 10-36.


(b) CSO = Collateralized Swap Obligations. The CSO represents a swap arangement between the Synthetic CDO-level PSVs and LBSF in which the SPVs sell credit protection on a basket of between 97-194 underlying reference entities and surrender the total return of the Colalteral in exchange for periodic interest payment from LBSF. The CSO offers higher yield as the periodic interest payments are passed through the SPVs. However, the SPVs can be at risk of losing their initial investmtns if serveral credit events occcur in the reference portfolio.CSO

2009年6月6日 星期六

銀行不瞭解(Lehman Minibond)迷債抵押品的性質? 不是系統性失誤是甚麼?



請問金管局:
如果銀行不瞭解迷你債卷抵押品的性質,銀行能夠系統性地清晰瞭解並跟客戶解釋迷你債卷的真實特徵和風險嗎?


前銀行公會主席和廣北先生於2008年9月27日的言論告訴金管局:銀行對於迷你“債卷抵押品的性質”不確切瞭解。銀行在這個迷你”債卷“的銷售上是犯了系統性的錯誤的。

為甚麼金管局至今還是堅持銀行無系統性失誤,只要按金管局的 既定 “從下至上”的方針,,一個個案例地查“違規銷售”?

金管局的如意算盤是:如果等 N 年後 2萬多例都查出有類似的問題的話,再查銀行的系統性失誤也不遲。反正在此事上的經濟效益和調查效益不是主要的。

金管局慷慨地以公款 庇護銀行和銀行家之心,路人皆知。 何人問責?

2008年9月27日明報: 銀行公會主席和廣北公開錶示:
“現時本港銀行作為雷曼迷你債的包銷商或分銷商,掌握的信息十分有限。這些債券狀況如何﹖債券抵押品的性質是什麼﹖。。。目前包銷商都不掌握確切信息。”



1。 和廣北先生用”債卷“來簡稱”迷你債卷“ !
這是否說明在和廣北先生的心裡,下意識地把本質為多層 Credit-Linked-Notes 的迷你債卷等同“債卷”來看待了?
或者說:和廣北先生或銀行口中的“債卷”只是個沒有任何意義的品牌名稱?
將來銀行管理層和銀行會否以“股票”作為品牌名來通稱期指和窩輪等一切產品呢?

2。 如果銀行確如和廣北先生所聲稱:對”債卷抵押品的性質“不掌握確切信息。
是否錶示:銀行並不知道迷你“債卷的抵押品“本質其實也是一個信貸掛鈎產品? ,
是否錶示:銀行並不知道迷你“債卷的抵押品”是跟諸多(100多個)各種評級的公司的信貸掛鈎的(而不再是甚麼七個著名公司)?
如果銀行真的是不清楚 迷你“債卷的抵押品“的確切特徵的話,
那麼,銀行該如何理解迷你“債卷”的真實特徵和風險呢? 真實特徵和風險在於跟 七個著名公司信貸掛鈎?
這是否也解釋了為甚麼銀行至今緘口不言迷你“債卷”的真實特徵和風險呢?


如果金管局監察銀行給銀行職員的迷債相關的培訓和銷售指引的話,就會發現銀行的(迷債相關的)內部培訓和指引都不提“債卷抵押品“, 更不提”債卷抵押品的性質““。

3。 銀行界有著理解並且買賣 CDO / Synthetic CDO / CDS /Credit-Linked Notes 的專業知識和專業人士。如果銀行都不能理解所謂迷你“債卷抵押品”的真實性質的話,如何解釋銀行的零售客戶們都是理解了迷你“債卷”的真實特徵和風險才買入迷你”債卷“的呢?

4。銀行銷售迷債不是偶爾的一次兩次。 在長達三,四年內,銀行共銷售了 20-30 多個類似性質系列的迷你債卷,如果銀行確實是沒有瞭解”債卷抵押品的性質”的話,那麼,
- 銀行是如何理解迷你債卷這種“債卷”的真實特徵和風險的呢?
- 銀行系統是如何作對於迷你債卷的盡職審查的呢?
- 銀行給與職員的培訓和銷售指引究竟是怎樣介紹迷債的真實特徵和風險的呢?風險為:跟 7 個著名公司信貸掛鈎?
- 銀行職員能給客戶介紹哪些迷債的真實特徵和風險的呢?
- 銀行不是犯了系統性的錯誤, 又是甚麼呢?!!!!!


4。以銀行界的專業知識和專業人員背景,
- 銀行是真的確實沒有瞭解“債卷抵押品的性質“呢?
-還是擔心披露“債卷抵押品的性質“ 會影響迷你“債卷”的銷售?

金管局如果調查的話,就會發現有一批銀行管理人員不僅是理解了“債卷抵押品的性質“, 還理解到了“債卷抵押品的性質“對迷你債卷銷售的危害力(例如:上海商業銀行等)。畢竟:“跟 7 個著名公司掛鈎” 的風險 和”跟 7 個著名公司 + 100多個各種評級的公司信貸掛鈎” 是完全不同的!對此銀行是完全清楚的。

這也解釋了為甚麼銀行的(迷債相關的)內部培訓和指引都不提“債卷抵押品“, 更不提”債卷抵押品的性質““。


金管局慷慨地以公款一味庇護銀行和銀行家的行徑,何時可以停止? ???

2009年5月30日 星期六

清查銀行 “七個代表” 之 騙術



銀行職員有否告訴客戶迷你債卷實質是跟七個著名公司和諸多其它各類公司信貸挂鉤?

銀行敢不敢自己做事自己負責? 把當初賣迷債時講的話和對迷債的理解再講一次?現在銀行對於賣了幾年的產品的特征是屁也不敢放一個 ! (sorry for my language, But banks deserve it !).

銀行成了街頭的傻啞巴小販:No-Brainer 式的按發行商指示把章程給客戶了,客戶自願簽字了。之后管收錢就是了。章程內容是否充分披露了迷債的特征和風險了 & 跟客戶解釋真實特征和風險 呢,那就不管銀行的事了。

銀行有理的就出來當眾講講:迷你債卷到底是跟幾個公司信貸挂鉤?銀行給與客戶的資料裡到底提到了多少個挂鉤公司 以及 關於挂鉤公司的信息到底披露了多少?銀行自己對於迷債抵押品的性質是否了解?

“七個代表”概括了 迷你債卷 和 精明債卷 和 星展零售債卷 的銷售手法之精髓。以“跟七個著名公司信貸掛鈎”代表了“跟 100-150 多個評級由AAA至CCC不等公司信貸掛夠的”的實質, 以“跟七個著名公司信貸掛鈎”代表並遮掩了沒有買入任何相關公司的實際資產,而是「對賭」信貸狀況的實質. 發行商不同, 騙術卻是類似的。

金管局之前在立法會還大言不慚地說甚麼迷債之所以出問題,在於雷曼出了問題。現在大摩 okay,可是精明債卷出了問題。關鍵問題何在呢?
金管局的精英們大概會說:關鍵還是在於雷曼。 "如果雷曼不破產...","如果...不...",..., 精明債卷的抵押品中的100多個掛鈎公司就不會有問題了。

(一)"如果。。。不。。。”:

- “如果銀行不是有錯的話,如果銀行確是把產品的真實特徵和風險跟客戶講清楚了的話,銀行应该会毫不犹豫地堂堂正正地再次給大家解釋和演繹一次关于產品的真實特徵和風險的,对吧?
反正银行在2004-2008年之間已經演繹了多次,金管局都认为任何只是少數人對產品認識不足的。在银行的销售职员里,随便找个人都可以給大家解釋和演繹一次关于產品的真實特徵和風險的,对吧?”

- “如果銀行不是有系統性失誤的話,那麼,銀行可以有大堆文件証明相關產品的培訓和盡職審查。對吧?”
新鴻基金融曾為許多銀行提供了關於跟迷債相關的培訓。事實上,許多銀行(如:永亨銀行等)的迷債銷售是直接跟新鴻基金融合作,而不是直接跟雷曼亞洲合作的。
而證監會卻就新鴻基金融的迷債銷售提出了以下關註:
[ 1、對產品進行的盡職審查是否足夠;2、對前線人員提供的培訓是否足夠,從而確保投資者理解產品涉及的一切重大風險;3、迷債系列的風險水平;向零售銷售人員傳達迷債風險評級的信息;及採取理應採取的措施,確保銷售人員提供合理適當意見;等等
]

(二)[ 蔡耀君。。。金管局在已處理的投訴中,亦發現個別員工對金融產品的性質風險認知有所不足。不過,他強調,由於目前尚有很多投訴尚未完成,故難確定這普遍情況。]

- 在金管局已經處理的投訴中,“對金融產品的性質風險認知有所不足”的“個別員工”的比例范圍是多少?10% 20% ? 

- 如果在金管局已經處理的投訴中普遍“不是認識不足”的話,那麼,“不是認識不足”的銀行職員們通常有那些認識呢?又是如何跟客戶解釋關於迷債的真實特征和風險的呢?
比如跟客戶解釋:﹝“跟7個公司信貸掛鈎,要鎖定3-7年,到期後可拿回本金”,同時把Program Prospectus 和 發行章程給了客戶﹞?

是否是屬於認識充足並跟客戶解釋了迷債的真實特征和風險了呢?金管局可否回答這個簡單直接的問題呢?

- 在金管局已經處理的投訴中,可否請金管局從那眾多的“不是認識不足”的銀行職員裡提供幾個例子,隨便找出10-20個的銷售過迷債的銀行職員來跟公眾再次演示和解釋一下他們對產品的“透徹理解”。
讓公眾看看“不是認識不足”的銀行職員是如何理解和解釋迷債的真實特征和風險的?  讓公眾看看那些 “不是認識不足” 的銀行職員是如何理解並跟客戶解釋抵押品的實質和風險? (或則說,抵押品的實質和風險跟迷債的真實特徵和風險是不相關因而沒必要提及抵押品的實質和風險?請金管局向公眾下個定論。)

依我之見,這個請求應該是銀行求之不得的吧。 終於再次有機會跟公眾演示和解釋一下他們對產品的“透徹理解”了,這可是大長銀行名譽的絕好機會啊。

(三)[ 蔡耀君...透露,金管局接獲的相關投訴中,以前線銷售人員未有清楚解釋風險的類別最多,並強調前線銷售人員應當全面就迷你債券的性質風險向客戶解釋 ]

- 金管局為甚麼不公布金管局對於產品的真實特徵和相關風險的基本定義?
- 金管局為甚麼不公布"全面就迷你債券的性質風險向客戶解釋"的基本定義?
難道說金管局跟銀行在迷債的真實特征和風險的定義上有分歧?如果是這樣的話,干脆把金管局跟銀行的定義都公布於眾。有透明度才有公平合理,黑箱調查隻能讓人覺得有偏袒一方之嫌。
當然,金管局是大權在握,銀行有是有財有勢,普通百姓覺得金管局保護銀行,金管局和銀行也無須懼怕無錢無權的普通百姓。金管局和銀行家們心想:"Who cares? What else can you do?!!"

- 除了解釋“七個代表”(即跟七個著名公司信貸挂鉤)以外,銀行職員有沒有告訴客戶:
* 迷債還跟其它諸多公司的信貸挂鉤?
* 迷債的抵押品不是投入於任何實質資產的。
* 迷債的抵押品是跟其它諸多公司的信貸挂鉤?這都是在抵押品資料之中。這諸多公司通常會是100多家,這些公司的平均評級通常是遠低於那七個代表的,可以是包括AAA-CCC不等。

- 在目前金管局已經處理的投訴中,達到以上要求的比例的職員是多少?
或者:
- 請金管局給出關於迷債的真實特征和風險的定義,並告知公眾: 在目前金管局已經處理的投訴中,達到金管局要求的比例的職員是多少?


(四)[ 蔡耀君。。。強調相關的調查同時牽涉前線員工與銀行機構內部監控工作,其中金管局在調查過程會與有關前線員工會面取證,了解他們因甚麼原因令有關交易未能夠遵守操守準則。]

金管局至今為止的調查的結果是什麼?例如:
- 從銀行對其職員的培訓 以及 銀行的關於迷債的銷售指引等文件?証明銀行內部機構監控工作是適當的?可否給公眾公布一個(或數個)銀行的迷債相關的培訓�銷售指引的文件?可以略去佣金部分啊。產品都賣了幾年了,這些培訓等文件不應該是“機密”了吧?也不應該會損害公眾利益吧?
-銀行職員了解迷債的真實特征和風險,但決定隻跟客戶介紹“七個代表”?
- 銀行職員自己都根本就不知道以上特征和風險。如果是這個原因的話,金管局目前為止調查出來的原因是什麼?或則:不管銀行是如何做的,隻要銀行職員沒有理解或解釋產品的真實特征和風險,就是銷售人員的錯,一定不可能是以銀行的系統性錯誤.原因是:莫須有?

永亨銀行 Ms Carmen Ng 於2008年十月初承認 [銀行(不僅僅是她個人 )並不知道抵押品的實質,並不知道迷你債卷是無實質資產的]。 Ms Carmen Ng 在給我解釋迷債的時候,根本就沒有提過抵押品,只是解釋並跟我探討了7個公司的破產可能性,還指出系列27‘的幾個掛鈎公司是在眾多迷債系列掛鈎公司中非常高質量的選擇。因為我對於那 7個挂鉤公司 和破產事件的定義都是非常小心的。Ms Carmen Ng承認她給我的解釋是她當時對迷債的理解。
Ms Carmen Ng 沒有「透徹理解」投資產品,實際是反映了永亨銀行的系統性錯誤,而不僅僅是某個銷售人員的"違規銷售”. 永亨銀行對於迷債的和關於迷債的培訓及銷售指引等資料,都可以証明這點。


關鍵是:金管局和政府是否一直打算閉眼不看,幫助銀行蒙混過關?

(五) [ 蔡耀君:金管局倡設風險「說明書」

設立風險說明書是好事。關鍵在於:何謂風險。以迷你債卷為例,
- 風險到底是跟7個著名公司挂鉤,還是跟132個各類評級公司挂鉤?
- 迷債的錢是投入於實質資產還是沒有投入於任何實質資產而隻是賣保險等,
如何清晰准確均衡無誤導地,真真實實地把真實特征和風險給客戶介紹,這才是問題的關鍵。

銀行賣了3-4年以以賣信貸破產掉期合約(即:賣保險)為抵押品的迷你債卷,卻幾年如一日地堅持向客戶介紹“七個代表”論(即跟七個著名公司信貸挂鉤),抵押品的真實特征和風險是一律不提。原因在於沒有風險「說明書」呢,還是在於不想把真正風險向客戶披露?


謊言重復一千遍還是謊言! 除非你可以把相關人員都趕盡殺絕。真理終會戰勝謊言。銀行集體欺騙普通市民,依靠權勢來遮蓋其丑行。是可忍,熟不可忍! 不管是一個月,一年,十年。生命不息,奮爭不止。

"You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the people all of the time."

2009年5月27日 星期三

(轉載) 大聯盟給警務處處長鄧竟成 的一封信



Letter to Commissioner of Police Mr. Tang King Shing

Mr. Ian Grenville Cross, SC, JP
Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Ian McWalters, SC
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Lee Ka Chiu, Director of Crime & Security, HKP
Mr. Chan Yiu Kwok, CSP (Crime Commercial Bureau), HKP
Sirs,

The most important message of this letter is to inform you that your inaction and foot-dragging tactic is being exploited by the banks to carry out a second fraud against the victim investors defrauded by them. These victims were deceived by the banks as to the true nature of the Lehman-related securities when they were induced to make the purchase and now, courtesy of your inaction, they are subject to a second round of deception regarding their legal rights. Before you resort to the cliché that the victims should seek their own legal advice, they as well as the wider public are entitled to know what the government generally, and the relevant departments inclusive of yours in particular, have done.

2. What has happened in the last several months is an artificial environment created by you and other officials, with varying degree of intent, indifference, and culpability; to enable the banks to coerce the victims to agree to the so-called settlement. We are informed by some victims that the bank staff has adopted an intimidating attitude to:
(a) induce the victims to agree to settle on terms dictated by the banks;
(b) mislead the victims into believing that the terms of settlement would be harsher with the passage of time thereby putting pressure on the victims to surrender their rights to whatever terms offered to them;
(c) deny the victims the right to be accompanied by relatives or friends in the settlement process;
(d) deny the victims the right to have a full written record of the terms and conditions of the settlement.

3. The risk that a majority, if not all, of these settlements are reached under duress is substantial and real. The HKMA and the SFC have the profiles of the victims and they know how many and who are vulnerable to duress or misrepresentation. The senior officials of these two bodies are by far the most culpable for allowing the banks this ‘window of opportunity’ to perpetrate the second fraud.

4. It is not disputed that the extent to which this second fraud is properly so characterized is dependent on whether the original complaint of fraud is well-grounded in our jurisprudence. It is therefore apposite to recount in summary form what is known and what evidence is at hand. We are only a handful of victims not having legal or financial expertise, nor do we have any privileged right of access to information not available to the public, yet we have been able to unearthed the following within months after the fraud came to light. This convinces us that you undoubtedly are in possession of sufficient evidence, and information that will lead to further evidence, that would satisfy any reasonable police officers and prosecutors that criminal prosecution against the suspects is fully justified.

5. The evidence we rely on to demand immediate intensification of investigation and prosecution is as follows:
(a) The prospectuses in pursuance of which the Lehman-related securities were sold (the ‘Lehman prospectuses’) are incapable of describing the nature of the products or explaining the risks inherent therein by a massive margin.
(b) The Lehman-related securities feature a ‘piggybacked structure’ with a façade, typically a first-to-default credit-linked note (the ‘FTD’) concealing a hidden component varyingly referred to as ‘security’ or ‘collateral’ in the Lehman prospectuses. At least in majority of cases, the ‘hidden component’ is synthetic floating rate notes that are the sine qua non of the Lehman-related securities. This hidden component will be referred to as ‘Security’ below in order to distinguish it from the ‘real collateral’ the existence of which is not disclosed in the Lehman prospectuses.
(c) Structure note resembling the FTD in every material aspect was sold by HSBC Bank in Hong Kong (the ‘HSBC notes’) during the material time when the Lehman-related securities were sold. The issuer of HSBC notes and issuer of ‘minibond’ are almost identical in the sense that the individuals sit on these two boards of directors during the material time are almost the same. If the corporate veil is lifted, both issuers are clearly controlled by the same unit or department within the HSBC group.
(d) The law firm Linklaters advised the two issuers in respect of the two different products – the relevant Lehman-related securities known as ‘minibond’ and the HSBC notes. Despite the enormous differences between the two – one a ‘piggybacked structure’ while the other is just a FTD, the two prospectuses concerned are almost identical in structure, content and layout.
(e) Structure notes resembling the ‘Security’ in every material aspect were sold by Lehman Brothers in Australia during the material time through an entity under its control – Mahogany Capital Limited. The Mahogany prospectuses provide a rough but insightful estimate of what and how extensive details about the ‘Security’ were withheld from the Lehman prospectuses.
(f) Numerous victims defrauded by this fraud have enquired the banks concerned about the training to which the relevant staff involved in the sales of the Lehman-related securities had been given. The responses received all indicate that training for the Lehman-related securities was provided by the Sun Hung Kai Financial (the ‘SHKF’). In the past two months or so, we have repeatedly invited SHKF to admit or deny whether it has anything to do with the training of staff of other distributor banks regarding the sales of the Lehman-related securities. So far, all replies from SHKF have been evasive refusing to address its role over the training issue.

6. The above points (a) to (f) are factual and they are grounded on documentary evidence and the following are reasonable inferences that we believe also to be factual:
(a) The façade and the Security are products capable of and are being sold as stand-alone products. They were sold separately by Lehman Brothers.
(b) The purpose of ‘piggybacking’ a façade on the Security is solely for deception purpose. There is no other economic or legitimate commercial purpose.
(c) SHKF as coordinating distributor either knew, or recklessly indifferent of, the true nature of the Lehman-related securities. In its training provided to the bank staff responsible for selling the securities, it put emphasis only on the façade as if it is the be all and end all of the products. This is a misrepresentation of the true nature of the Lehman-related securities, but the Lehman prospectuses are designed and organized in such a way to facilitate such misrepresentation. At any event, the Security level of synthetic derivative notes would be too complicated for the bank staff and the prospective investors.

7. The fraud is commonplace in terms of its modus operandi, namely by means of misstatement of facts. It is unusual in terms of the parties involved and their status, namely almost two dozens of banks and financial institutions ranging from global dominant players to local runners-up are implicated. The amount of money involved is also unprecedented by local history. A further dimension of complexity is that the same ‘piggybacked structured’ financial products marketed by the same modus operandi was adopted by another, or other, major financial institutions. Because the suspects are too powerful and well-connected with the political leadership, the criminal law is halted right at doorstep of the banks. The latent privileges, including potential immunity from the law, enjoyed by the banks and the well-connected (such as the Linklaters) crystallize which turns law enforcement into a consensual matter in so far as these suspects are concerned.

8. Is there any reason why the police and the DPP are indulging in this wait-and-see trick? Already in their brief should be the following ingredients sufficient for bringing the suspects to court:
(a) Indictment: fraud contrary to section 16A of the Theft Ordinance (Cap. 210 of the Laws of Hong Kong).
(b) Defendants: (i) HSBC Bank and its individual employees serving on the boards of directors of the issuers authorizing the issuance of the Lehman-related securities.
(ii) SHKF and the distributor banks
(iii) Lehman Brothers Asia Limited and Mr. Leon Hindle.
(c) Evidence: (i) the Lehman prospectuses; (ii) testimonies of the victim informants who have lodged complaints with the police.
(d) Points of law that may be disputed: the nature of Lehman-related securities.
The reports produced by the HKMA and SFC contain numerous misstatements of facts, especially in respect of the securities. There are also articles appear in locally based professional periodicals purported to explain the fraud in a misleading way. This is reminiscent of burning the Reichstag by Hitler in 1933. Is it not a concerted effort to whitewash the fact and paint over it with fiction?

9. In the recently adjudicated case of HKSAR v HO Ka Keung (Criminal Appeal No. 196 of 2007), the defendant, a professional insurance broker, was charged with the same offence as abovesaid. It was held that recklessness suffices to found a conviction and the personal attributes of the defendant were ‘obviously relevant’ to the question of guilt. In paragraph 51 of the judgement, the learned judge endorsed the observation of the trial judge as to the state of knowledge of the defendant. In this connection, the defendant was held at the trial that he ‘knew that commission was to be paid ... at a very attractive level and, quite clearly, he knew that the whole purpose ... was churning through insurance forms without any attempt ... to ensure that they were honest, truthful and complete’. The same description could properly be applied to the distributor banks and the HSBC Bank. The defendant in this case had been found guilty and his appeal was dismissed. If what he did is unlawful, so is the conduct of the suspects identified above.

10. According to professor Alastair Hudson of Queen Mary, University of London, actionable loss arising from the context of financial derivative products could generally be classified into two categories: ‘failure of model’ and ‘suitability failure’. HSBC Bank and Mr. Hindle knew the model is doomed to disaster for the retail investors but they decided that their personal gains override the concern that the model is fraudulent. The ‘suitability failure’ follows inevitably from it. (See ‘The Law on Financial Derivatives’ 2nd Ed., (Sweet & Maxwell, 1998)).

11. In our polity, it is the judiciary that decides whether the suspects are guilty. The refusal of the police and the DPP to prosecute this crime rigorously verges perilously on perverting the course of justice. If the refusal of the suspects to cooperate is a reason for delay, the public should be informed of this fact and decide for themselves their best course of action.

Yours faithfully
The Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims in Hong Kong

From: http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/letter-to-director-of-public-prosecutions2733.php

2009年5月25日 星期一

"客戶所須簽訂的銷售文件無可挑剔" is NOT true

From News....


[.... 公民黨余若薇反映,不少個案都是客戶所須簽訂的銷售文件無可挑剔,但銀行口頭上未有解釋清楚]

The "客戶所須簽訂的銷售文件無可挑剔" is a myth that HKMA and banks try to let everyone believe. "客戶所須簽訂的銷售文件無可挑剔" is NOT true because banks omitted material information. Banks never gave clients Minibond's (Synthetic CDO) Collateral Information which is material information to the true nature & risks of Minibond. No professional intermediary could have valued the Minibond using only the information provided in Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus & marketing material.

Banks and HKMA have been silence on the "collateral information" from day 0.

Why was Minibond Collateral information material information?

or: Why did banks consider Collateral Information as immaterial information?

1. First, let's take a look at the now well-exposed Minibond structure (e.g. Series 19-36, and earlier ones with Synthetic CDO Collateral):
(i) Minibond had CDS with 7 well-known reference entities;
and:
(ii) Minibond CDO Colalteral had CDS with over 100 reference entities (some were at sub-investment grade).
The Bank passed us the Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus that dedicated many pages on the “credit-linked to 7 well-reference entities”, the 7 reference entities’ ratings, and the impact of any default event related to the 7 well-known reference entities.

What kind of collateral information was disclosed in the Issue Prospectus? It was described as AAA-rated CDO, or: AAA-rated Synthetic CDO to be exact.

1. Does the AAA rating suggest that the collateral would be at low default rate and thus no need for disclosure?

The Issue Prospectus provided default rate based on historic data from 1981-2004. However, such data does not provide any meaningful reference for the AAA-rated synthetic CDO collateral. Because the default rate data was based on AAA/AA/A/BBB-rated bond that is very different from Synthetic CDO (whose history is shorter than 20 years).

2. Does CDO information needs to be disclosed?

Regardless if CDO information needs to be disclosed or not, the CDO collateral selected by Minibond (arranger) was in fact Synthetic CDO, as stated in the "selection of collateral" (of Issue Prospectus). That is, the Minibond collateral is not a 'conventional' CDO (without CDS), it is a Synthetic CDO (i.e. comprised with CDS).

3. What was the most important feature of Synthetic CDO?

Synthetic CDO may not invest into any debt/loan/bond at all. Its value is decided by the credit risk of its portfolio holding. Thus, the collateral is credit-linked to portfolio of reference entities. (sounds familiar?)

3. For Minibond Series 19:
The collateral was credit-linked to 125 reference entities. The collateral would loose 100% principal on the 10th default event out of the 125 reference entities, That is, a mere 8% of default rate (out of the reference entities portfolio) would result in collateral 100% principal loss! (On the Minibond top layer, minibond could lose principal on the first default event, i.e. 1 out 7, which is over 14% default rate. Although the chance of hitting the 8% default rate seems to be higher than the 14% of default rate. That is, Minibond top layer started to crack, there is better chance to lose the collateral principal value which requires 8% of default rate of the collateral reference entities pool. ).

The CDS in the CDO collateral synthetically transferred the credit risk of 125 reference entities to Minibond holders. Therefore, the value of minibond was not only affected by the credit-event with the 7 well-known companies, but also was greatly affected by the credit events related to the 125 reference entities in the CDO collateral.

4. If the fact that Minibond was credit-linked to 7 well-known companies was important and was material information to the Minibond's true feature and risks,

we can CONCLUDE that the risks of the Minibond also greatly depended on the information regarding number / name / rating of the reference entities & reference obligations in the (synthetic) CDO collateral and the rules regarding their default event. The risk of minibond would vary greatly If collateral were credit-linked with 7 or 50 or 125 or 155 reference entities. The risk of minibond would vary greatly if collateral would lose 100% principal upon the 10th or 50th or 100th or 125th default event out of the 125 reference entities.

5. Our questions are:

why did banks consider collateral informations such as number of reference entities / their credit-rating / default impact to the collateral principal (loss) as immaterial ?

Why the above collateral information was never discussed / disclosed to clients?

and:

How many people would be interested in buying the minibond (for the same term & return rate) if they were told/given the collateral information ?

Lehman could argue that the Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus touched every aspects (in a selective in-balanced way). However, regardless what Lehman provided or not-provided as mandatory documents (or display documents), regardless what was or was not disclosed in the Issuer Prospectus, banks are not no-brainer minibond-sellers (HKMA or banks can correct me if I were wrong about this). Banks are regulated financial intermediaries by SFC Code of Conduct which requires that "Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information".

Therefore, banks should understand the product (per Code of Conduct), after exercising reasonable due diligence. Banks should have realized that the collateral information is part of material information for clients to understand the true feature and risks of minibond. Banks should have requested such information for their clients. Banks should have provided and/or discussed with clients on the collateral information. Because we bought minibond from banks, not from Lehman.

You can suggest banks to provide evidence of institutional buyers that bought Synthetic CDO without Synthetic CDO documents. Would "AAA rating" be sufficient information for Synthetic-CDO ? Would they need to have document/information describing the number of reference entities / reference entities' rating /reference entities industry range / impact of default rate (e.g. 8% or 20% default event would lead to 100% principal loss)/etc.

My guess is that, Minibond (and DBS Constellation) were probably the only examples that banks can find.
Because banks (as selling-agent) were in fact willing to collaborate, I would suggest fraudulently, with Lehman, to hide the information and risks of synthetic CDO from the Bank's retail clients, with the objective of increasing the sale of the Minibonds. For a product like synthetic-CDO / CDS, how many people in HK really know ?

I am sure when banks selling CDS or buying CDS, they knew exactly how many reference entities are associated with the CDS or Synthetic CDO. Like group insurance for a company, it makes difference to insure a company that has 10 or 50 or 100 or 150 employee. The Insurance company needs to know the rough range of employee number.

"Mahogany Notes" is a Credit-Linked Notes sold in Australia by a Lehman entity, arranged by Lehman Asia (the same department that arranged Minibond in HK and Singapore). It was summarized in the web page below:
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/01/austalia-mahogany-notes-prospectus.html

2009年5月22日 星期五

要求金管局公開“違規銷售”的(定義)範疇並回答以下相關問題

[2009年5月23日 新聞報道:]
金管局總裁任志剛【圖左】昨天第六次出席立法會作證,...... 任志剛表示,當局目前的監察重點仍在如何更快調查出銀行的違規銷售.]
,

任總多次錶示 “違規銷售需受懲罰”。 再次確認金管局對於迷債的調查著重於“違規銷售”。

何謂“違規銷售”?

銀行以黑箱作業手法調查其客戶對銀行自己的投訴。金管局的調查也是黑箱作業方式。出於對投訴人和公眾的公平合理,
我們要求金管局應該給公眾公開“違規銷售”的基本定義範疇。
公開“違規銷售”的基本定義範疇可以增加投訴人和公眾的對於金管局調查的公平合理性的信心。
黑箱作業只能增加公眾對金管局調查的公平性的疑問,有害於公眾利益。當然,黑箱調查是銀行和銀行家最為期待的。

我們同時也要求金管局並回答以下問題,(如果不能回答的話,請金管局給與其理由)。
1。 ”失實陳訴“是否屬於“違規銷售”?
2。 如果職員沒有跟客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險, 只跟客戶解釋跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎,而根本不提抵押品,是否屬於“不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險”? 是否屬於違背了操守准則的要求? 是否屬於“違規銷售”?
3。 如果職員沒有「透徹理解」投資產品,違背了操守准則的要求的話,是否屬於“違規銷售”?
4。 如果银行沒有跟客戶提供提供充足的迷你債卷風險的相關資料,(操守准則: "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information“),是否屬於“違規銷售” ?
5。 新鴻基金融為迷債的co-distributor, 曾為許多銀行提供了關於跟迷債相關的培訓。事實上,許多銀行(如:永亨銀行等)的迷債銷售是直接跟新鴻基金融合作,而不是直接跟雷曼亞洲合作的。 證監會就新鴻基金融的迷債銷售提出的關註
[ 一、對產品進行的盡職審查是否足夠;二、對前線人員提供的培訓是否足夠,從而確保投資者理解產品涉及的一切重大風險;三、迷債系列的風險水平;向零售銷售人員傳達迷債風險評級的信息;及採取理應採取的措施,確保銷售人員提供合理適當意見;]
- 如果銀行於以上 三個方面的某一個或都有有問題的話, 是否屬於“違規銷售”?
- 金管局對於銀行於以上 三個方面有沒有進行任何相關的調查?如果沒有的話,請告知理由。

希望金管局不要把香港打造成 “國際金融糖衣毒藥銷售中心” !

2009年5月18日 星期一

血 染 的 迷 債

------------------

也許我告別 將不再 信任你,
你是否羞愧?
你是否難眠?

也許我倒下 將不再 起來 ,
你是否還要永久的欺騙 ?

你們的靈魂
已出賣給魔鬼

都是為了
銀行的收入傭金和花紅。

如果是這樣
你無法否認,

你們揮霍的傭金裡
有我們血染的迷債。


也許我的眼睛再不能睜開
你是否理解我沉默的蔑視。
也許我長眠再不能醒來
你是否相信我化作了雷霆。

你們的靈魂
已出賣給魔鬼

你們揮霍的傭金是,
欺騙市民而得到,

-----------
如果是這樣
你不要忘記,

銀行界的歷史上
會永遠記得這迷債。

如果是這樣
你不要忘記,

銀行家的傭金裡,
有我們血染的迷債

如果是這樣
你不要忘記,

銀行界的歷史上
會有我們血染的迷債。

血染的迷債

< 求助:請哪位歌手給幫忙錄唱? 謝謝.
如果您有興趣,可以聯繫: minibondvictim@gmail.com>

2009年5月12日 星期二

金管局的黑箱調查對投訴人是否公平合理?

金管局的職責 : ”保障銀行和銀行家的利益“ ???

金管局從去年雷曼破產之後,收到超過2萬多關於迷你債卷的投訴。金管局發布了一個調查報告,將調查進展結果分為以下幾個類別:
[ "初步評核" : “錶面證據不足”: “收集更多資料“: ”立案調查“: ]

1。 對於2萬多人的關於同一個產品(迷你債卷)的投訴,出於對公眾的公平合理的角度,金管局為甚麼不可以公布其處理投訴的基本原則?
這些基本原則,是否跟迷你債卷的抵押品一樣,只可隱藏不提,見不得光?
比如:
- "初步評核" : 如何劃分的? 基本標準是甚麼?
-“錶面證據不足”:如何劃分的? 主要指甚麼情形?常見的例子 (from 處理了的400多宗個案)?
-“收集更多資料“:如何劃分的? 主要指甚麼情形?常見的例子? 主要是指個人資產/包括銀行賬戶,房產?
- ”立案調查“: 如何劃分的? 基本標準是甚麼?

2。 對於金管局至今已經處理了的400多宗個案, 主要的共同點 Pattern 是甚麼呢?

3。 對於2萬多人的關於同一個產品(迷你債卷)的投訴, 通常的 bottom-up 邏輯應該是:
銀行職員「透徹理解」投資產品-》 銀行職員曏客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險=》瞭解客戶=》。。。》銷售。
銀行職員有沒有「透徹理解」投資產品,應該是調查迷你債卷投訴的基本問題吧。
- 金管局的調查逻辑和方式是什么呢?可否请详述?
- 金管局的調查邏輯和方式是否更有效地調查和找出事件的主要矛盾?Or: just to make the investigation require more people and more time?

金管局這麼多高薪專業人才,好像很善於做”揀了芝麻,丟了西瓜“,只看枝節,不看問題的基本關鍵, 只見樹枝 ,不見森林 (恐怕連樹都沒看見)。
這樣做的結果是:投訴人受氣,銀行高興。
如果將來事實證明金管局的調查邏輯和方式只是有效地將主要矛盾和次要枝節問題混淆,從而造成需要更長地時間和浪費公款(納稅人的錢)去調查(關於迷你債卷的)投訴。那麼,有沒有‘問責’的人?




4。 對於金管局至今已經處理了的400多宗個案, 有沒有調查銀行職員是否有違規“操守准則”?
畢竟,迷你債卷的關鍵問題是:客戶是在沒有瞭解到產品的真實特徵和相關風險的情況下買入標榜是“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎”的迷債的。
(一)從處理了的400多宗個案, 有多少是反映了銀行職員對於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」的?(操守准則”的“適合性” )
- 對於那些經過調查反映了銀行職員對於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」的個例,主要錶現在那些方面呢?
對於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」的銀行職員是如何跟客戶解釋迷債的真實特徵和風險的呢?
請舉出主要的例子.
- 或者:金管局沒有調查銀行職員對於迷你債卷是否有「透徹理解」?因為金管局認為銀行職員自然是於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」的? 請舉出主要的例子.
- 或者:金管局沒有調查銀行職員對於迷你債卷是否有「透徹理解」?因為金管局認為投訴人只是投訴被誤導產品的真實特徵和相關風險,並沒有直接指明銀行職員對於迷你債卷沒有「透徹理解」, 所以不需要調查?銀行職員對於迷你債卷有「透徹理解」與否與投訴無關?
請舉出主要的例子.

(二)從處理了的400多宗個案: 有多少是反映了銀行職員 向客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的缺點及風險?
("Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information")
主要錶現在那些方面呢?

5。 金管局給諸多的投訴人致電確認信息,包括投訴人的收入狀況,財產狀況。還有要求投訴人帶著一年的銀行月結單和物業差響單去金管局面談。美其名「適合性」的調查。

例如你在街上遇到「寶藥黨」或「祈福黨」被騙了5萬塊錢去報警,警方會不會先問你有幾多財產,拿出銀行的月結單證明你確有這些錢一直在銀行裡,或者有幾多物業及收租的收入來證明這些錢確實是你的, 警方會不會先確認你的錢產物業,再去調查騙去你的錢的人?

「適合性」還包括 “認識你推介的投資產品, 如「透徹理解」投資產品的結構、運作方式,其包含的投資項目的性質及風險”是調查投訴案的基礎“ 和 ”就客戶的情况作合適的配對,並要用淺白易懂的言語向客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的缺點及風險,對長者及缺乏投資經驗的客戶,應特別審慎。“

金管局有沒有就以上調查呢? (詳述於以上#3 & #4)。

證監會就迷你債券涉及的內部系統及監控進行調查後, 還知道 譴責迷你債卷 co-distributor 新鴻基 SHK Securities Limited 和 凱基證券亞洲有限公司(凱基證券), 以保障公眾利益.
證監會還知道為小股東的公平利益而跟權勢公司PCCW打官司。
在迷你債卷事件上,金管局則為了保護銀行和銀行家的利益竭盡其權利之所能。對於投訴人竭盡使投訴人為難之招。

金管局的所謂”保障存款人投資者利益“的職責應該改為”保障銀行和銀行家的利益“!

Shame on you, HKMA ! Shame on you, HKMA Officers!
Can you sleep well, HKMA officers?
Do you wake up by nightmares?

2009年5月10日 星期日

轉載 信报:金管局在迷債事件有否失職?曾廣海、尹靖廷 -2009年5月9日

立法會雷曼迷債調查小組的主要目標是調查事件有否涉及官員在監管上的失職、如何改善現行的監管制度、及如何妥善解決事件。要達到此等目標,首要任務是從法例上,釐清各監管機構在事前和事後的職責,過程是否存在失職。這才能追本溯源,有效探索如何改善現行的監管制度和尋求妥善解決辦法。
保障存款人投資者利益
在銀行經存款業務的監管方面,金管局的職責是確保銀行「以持正和審慎的方式,以及適度的專業能力經營」及「以無損或相當不可能損及存款人或潛在存款人的利益的方式經營」(《銀行業條例》)。
另外,在銀行經營證券業務方面,根據金管局與證監會所簽訂的備忘錄,金管局取代了證監會對銀行的前線監管,以及開立調查檔案這二方面的職責,並在顧及投資者對投資產品的「認知水平和專門知識所達程度後,確保他們獲得適當程度的保障」的責任(《證券及期貨條例》)。在探討金管局對事件是否存在失職時,應以此作為標準。
根據上述的二條法例和相關安排,金管局具有監管銀行不以違規或違法的手法向存戶或投資者銷售證券產品的法定責任。
此外,金管局對銀行在這方面的監管,應較證監會對證券行的監管要求為高、審查應更頻密、處分應更嚴厲,主要原因是銀行較證券行更直接地掌握了存戶可動用財富的資料,更易取得存戶的信任,而且,投資經驗不足及希望穩健、保本的投資者,大多數是將儲蓄存放於銀行,這些人對投資風險的認識一般較證券行客戶為低。
再者,銀行對這些非傳統的銀行業務是於近年才開展,故經驗不足。他們快速膨漲前線員工隊伍,對迷債這類較股票或債券掛鈎複雜得多的產品的風險,認識亦未必足夠。目前所見,迷債的分銷銀行幾乎全是中小型及中資銀行,這些銀行除了本身應負一定責任外,其實它們也是金管局監管力度不足的受害者。他們因受收取較高佣金的吸引,負責人為求增加銀行收入,將經營多年建立的客戶關係,押在這些自己也認識不深的金融工具上,最後不單賠上金錢,亦賠上客戶對銀行的多年信任和銀行本身的聲譽。
為何說金管局的監管力度不足?這可從多方面看出,首先,按任志剛向立法會的作供,金管局並未如上所述,對銀行參與這些新業務於早期便給予較高的重視,只集中力度在他們熟悉的傳统的系統性風險監管,將資源放於監察銀行20萬億計的資產負債表,對幾十億的迷債及信貸掛鈎產品一直只當小事處理,直至2008年才對這些產品的銷售作專題審查。審查了四間已發現大批違規個案,但監管當局仍未採取強力手段,制止違規活動。直至去年8、9月雷曼倒閉前,個別銀行仍誘使不少客戶購進雷曼產品。
「適合性」處理令人失望
另外,金管局對「適合性」的處理亦令人失望。證監會提交的雷曼報告書指出,政府對投資產品銷售的監管架構,是建基於「披露」和「適合性」這「兩大支柱」。證監會發放給銀行的「適合性」要求,包括三項主要方面:
(一)認識你的客戶; 如投資知識、投資期、承受風險的能力;
(二)認識你推介的投資產品, 如「透徹理解」投資產品的結構、運作方式,其包含的投資項目的性質及風險;
(三)就客戶的情况作合適的配對,並要用淺白易懂的言語向客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的缺點及風險,對長者及缺乏投資經驗的客戶,應特別審慎。
至於懲處方面,該報告强調違反「適合性」就是違反《操守準則》,可導致被除牌(證券經營牌)、或被公開譴責及罰款。

迷債是一個結構極其複雜的金融產品,涉及一些保險承擔如CDS,貨幣及利率掉期及CDO等衍生工具,而這些迷債是由一個實則是「皮包公司」的公司所發行,亦涉及一些與他相關連的跨國公司的複雜關係,相信沒有相當水平的金融、公司法及合同法的知識,難以明白其中的各項風險,更不用說用準確及易明的語言向客戶解釋,以讓他們明白內裏的風險。
真不明白,金管局為何可以讓銀行賣給非專業投資者達數年之久,而且客戶有數萬之眾,其中包括弱智、弱視及文盲人士,而在雷曼出事前,一直查不到違反「適合性」、以至足以被公開譴責的個案。*

任志剛在立法局雷曼小組作供時承認,《證券及期貨條例》較《銀行業條例》賦予金管局較多權力以執行前線監管工作,例如《證券及期貨條例》第180條對中介人的監管及調查的權力,遠較《銀行業條例》第55條的相應條款為高。
任志剛承認金管局一直未有使用《証券及期貨條例》,而只用《銀行業條例》,實在是把自己的老虎牙剝掉。沒牙老虎便只能在調查時答應銀行一些條件,以換取他們的合作,造成今天的被動局面。據上文列舉的資料及分析,金管局在雷曼事件的監管上是否失職,讀者可自行判斷,更期待金管局在下次立法會作證供時能給予進一步闡釋。
註 *參考任志剛於4月28日立法會雷曼迷債調查小組回答余若薇議員供詞

2009年5月6日 星期三

Shameless Heartless Banking Crooks?

據報道: 銀 行 公 會 雷 曼 專 責 小 組 主 席 龔 楊 恩 慈 表 示 , 繼 續 跟 雷 曼 苦 主 商 談 和 解 , 她 說 明 白 雷 曼 苦 主 投 資 失 利 的 不 安 。
身 兼 中 銀 香 港 分 銷 網 絡 總 經 理 的 龔 楊 恩 慈 又 提 到 , 處 理 客 戶 有 關 雷 曼 迷 債 的 投 訴 仍 然 是 中 銀 香 港 首 要 任 務 。

http://www.rthk.org.hk/rthk/news/expressnews/news.htm?expressnews&20090506&55&579594

不禁令人想到:龔 楊 恩 慈 女士可否解釋何謂誠信?何謂銀行對於客戶的 Duty of Care?
龔 楊 恩 慈 是否為了銀行利益而將自己的靈魂出賣給魔鬼了? (假定龔 楊 恩 慈 女士是有靈魂的話)。

香港有諸多的人投資失利:買股票,買窩輪,買期指,因此而血本無歸的大有人在,為甚麼沒有人出來抗議銀行欺騙?

暫且不談:在4萬多雷曼迷你債卷的持有人中,有多少人買入迷你債卷的時候是當做投資買入的呢?
这個所謂的"投资"是以3-7年为锁定期间,(據銀行介紹)到期时拿回100%本金,一分钱也不会多。其余的就是那比libor略高1%左右的锁定的利息。提早赎回可导致本金损失。
龔 楊 恩 慈 是否可以跟公眾介紹一下,這個所謂的“投資”,在過去的幾年以來,銀行是如何跟客戶介紹解釋的?銀行應該是非常容易且樂意給公眾再次演示他們已經做了幾年的關於迷你債卷的真實特徵和風險的完美解釋的吧。

雷曼苦主買入迷你債卷之失利在於受銀行的誤導和欺騙。迷你債卷客戶是在沒有瞭解到產品的真實特徵和相關風險的情況下買入標榜是“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎”的迷債的, 卻不知:此”迷你債卷“非“債卷”,不是投入到任何跟那7家著名公司相關的資產或債卷的,此“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎”只是個烟幕彈,其實是“跟100多個各種評級公司的信貸掛鈎”。

龔 楊 恩 慈女士 如果還是有良知的話,是否敢以她父母丈夫孩子的名義起誓:銀行確實是跟客戶解釋了迷你債卷的真實特徵和相關風險,銀行確實是跟客戶解釋了迷你債卷抵押品的特徵和風險,銀行確實是跟客戶解釋了迷你債卷跟100多個公司信貸掛鈎的實質?

在過去的幾年裡,銀行作為迷你債卷的銷售商,從來都是勇於跟其客戶解釋迷你債卷的真實特徵和風險的。
事實是:銀行對於產品介紹的共同點是:只介紹迷債跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎而只字不提抵押品,從未解釋迷債不是投入到跟7個公司相關的債卷或資產之中, 從未介紹迷債還跟其它諸多公司(100多)信貸掛鈎的相關風險。這是幾年一貫的一致Pattern,金管局至今所調查的400多個例就可證明此 Pattern。或許銀行可以提供不同的個例?
現在,沒有職員肯給客戶重新解釋一遍。
為甚麼銀行不可以光明正大地以系列19和27為例 (或者其它系列)再次給公眾解釋一遍 迷債的的真實特徵和風險以及相關風險的資料?

- 迷你債卷是跟7個著名A/AA公司的信貸掛鈎.
- 迷你債卷的CDO抵押品是跟100多個公司的信貸掛鈎,其中有的公司的信貸評級是 低於”投資“(即sub-investment grade)評級. CDO抵押品中的信貸掉期破產合約將抵押品組合中的掛鈎公司的信貸風險合成地轉移到了抵押品的持有人(即:迷你債卷持有人)身上 。

銀行有甚麼理由以“7”代替這 100多個公司呢?如果是經濟好的緣故的話,就更不用擔心披露這100多個公司了吧?
銀行有甚麼理由認為這 合成CDO抵押品的信息不是 Material Information to Minibond ?


「銀行業的確犯了不少錯誤。我們必須緊記,雖然一般銀行家大多不斷努力為客戶提供優質的服務,但不可否認當中已
經有很多人令業界聲譽大受損害。

不少人以不當手法銷售不適當的產品,但薪酬條件之優厚形同失控,而不當的獎勵亦
導致人鋌而走險。當中的罪魁禍首卻往往是此制度下的最大得益者,確實引起廣泛的公憤。

這一切都顯示銀行業的文化與操守出了問題—–就是做事的人往往已經不問對錯,只著眼於有沒有違規犯法。銀行業應該重新以正確的動機,來驅動經營手法。」

「如果一間企業的文化並不鼓勵它的人員時刻講求行事端正,不論有多少監管的規則、規例,都不足以杜絕危機再現」
-- 引自 (汇丰)葛霖在2009「主席的話」

2009年5月2日 星期六

香港銀行家的告白

如果騙不了外人,就先騙了香港市民的錢。”兔子不吃窩邊草“,那是傻瓜兔子。
銀行家們是聰明人。 香港市民的錢也是錢吶。騙美國市民的錢的難度就大了,弄不好還有甚麼集體訴訟。 美國那幫貪心的律師們居然整天盯著銀行,還是香港好啊,到底是銀號金官舉+正富一家親。 銀號的利益大過天。聽聽任老先知是怎樣對銀號家們唱的:“Eveything I do, I do it for YOU”。

說實話,香港市民的錢是不騙白不騙,不騙是白痴。即使騙局一旦被戳穿,也有 正富和金官舉一起為銀號護航,不允許集體訴訟。個人敢打官司?有幾個打得起的?我們銀號可以奉陪到底。看誰錢多勢眾!所以,有這麼好的適於騙局的環境,不好好利用,我們這銀號家不就是傻瓜了麼。不可以對不起我們銀號高層的花紅啊。

公眾讀不懂銀號和金官舉監管銀號的規則的原由在於:銀號的所謂信譽和對客戶的責任,其實是跟迷你債卷的“跟7個著名公司掛鈎”的金玉其外招牌一樣,只是錶面上連篇纍牘地解釋銀號的責任和職責。銀號真正的的責任,就跟那從不披露詳情的敗絮其內的(實為“跟125個各式各樣公司的信貸掛鈎”)迷你債卷抵押品一樣,關鍵是:”傭金,花紅“。所以從不公開於眾,天機不可泄露。 公眾如果多花些時間和心思,仔細再三地解讀金官舉為銀號的辯護,並加以多次解讀和猜謎,就會理解到:

(1) 香港的銀號的第一責任是瞭解該產品的傭金結構。
(2)香港的銀號的第二責任是瞭解該產品的傭金對高層花紅的影響.
(3) 香港的銀號的第三責任是想出如何促銷的方式。比如:“跟132個各式各樣的公司信貸掛鈎,一旦125家各種評級的公司中有10家破產就本金全失”或“跟100多家包括BB或更低評級的公司信貸掛鈎” 之類的介紹,只會把喜歡穩陣的客戶們給嚇跑。所以,只要講:“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎“之金招牌就行了。
(4) 香港的銀號的第四責任是對高層花紅負責。跟客戶負責是指保證客戶買了產品並簽了字。 甚麼”Duty Of Care“,其實是指對銀行高層花紅的”Duty Of Care“, 不是對客戶的“Duty Of Care“。市民們對此“Duty Of Care“有誤解, 這不是負責任的市民的錶現。
(5) 香港的銀號的第五責任是:請看第一責任。

所以,銀號的信譽麼,其實是跟”老千“掛鈎的, 銀號是可以而且應該“見利忘義”,丟掉一切誠信良心。甚麼“社會公益”,“社會責任”等,那都是錶面文章,就跟那“跟7個著名公司掛鈎”的招牌是一樣的, 是騙人的

2009年4月28日 星期二

轉載:"自古皆有死,民無信不立”

轉載:4月28日金管局總裁任志剛第三次傳召出席公開研訊, 雷曼苦主大聯盟 (新聞稿) 28/4/2009

縱觀任志剛先生於立法會的回答,充斥著避實就虛,保護銀行之意。 溫家寶總理倡導「企業家身上要流淌著道德的血液」,不應「見利忘義,損害公眾利益,喪失道德底線」。 金管局打算為銀行當保護傘到幾時?

任志剛認為,迷債事件顯示本港投資者原來期望得到更大的保障,這與目前「披露為本」的監管政策明顯有落差。此言差也!在要求更多的保障之前,零售客戶期待的基本保障是:披露為本,給予客戶的投資產品文件應該公平地充分披露所發售投資產品的真實性質及風險。 對於所銷售的產品,銀行應該盡責地給客戶解釋產品的真實特徵和相關風險, 而不是片面誤導性的解釋。銀行會給與客戶充分的資料以便客戶瞭解產品的真實特徵和風險。

迷債暴露出來的最大系統性問題之一是: 銀行在銷售時,幾年來一直未有盡責曏零售客戶解釋並充分披露迷債的真實特徵和相關風險。 造成迷債災難的根本原因不是“披露為本“的政策,而是沒有對投資者作出充分披露。 雷曼和發行商從不在發行章程中明確披露抵押品跟100多家公司信貸掛鈎之特徵, 只把重點放在7個著名公司方面, 以起到“你如果對7個著名公司有信心,就可以買入迷債”的誤導風險的效果。作為銷售商的銀行應該是充分理解到迷債的真實特徵和風險的。但是銀行完全背棄了對客戶的責任,銷售時既不跟客戶解釋抵押品的風險也不給予合成CDO抵押品的相關資料。迷債抵押品是包含了 信貸破產掉期CDS 的合成CDO。 抵押品中的信貸破產掉期把抵押品中的百多個掛鈎公司的信貸風險轉嫁到了 迷債 上。迷債於是從標榜的“跟7個著名公司掛鈎”變成事實上的跟“7+125 ”或“7+155”個各類公司信貸掛鈎。

任志剛強調審批產品文件的工作是由證監負責,金管局無權審核。 是否任總也認為僅僅有發行章程和計劃章程而沒有合成CDO 抵押品資料,無法讓客戶瞭解到迷債的真實風險呢?銀行是由金管局監管的。根據證監會的“操守准則”:
“Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling”, and “make adequate disclosure of relevant material information”。

銀行必須向客戶解釋和充分披露迷債相關的特徵和風險。明知合成CDO抵押品的風險和發行章程沒有充分披露合成CDO抵押品的風險,作為銷售商的銀行有責任跟零售客戶解釋和充分披露合成CDO抵押品的具體掛鈎公司及信貸掛鈎條件。 至於銷售之後 銀行是否“持續”有責任告訴客戶迷債CDO抵押品的市值是次要的問題。 在2004至2008的不同經濟環境下,銀行都是始終一貫地大肆介紹跟7個著名A/AA評級公司掛鈎,始終只字不提抵押品的風險,只字不提抵押品還跟其它100多 個(不是1個或 10個)公司掛鈎,而且那些公司的平均評級低於A並包括 sub-investment grade 的公司。或許幾年以來銀行一直認為迷債的風險只是跟那7個著名公司信貸掛鈎?為甚麼金管局至今還未能查出銀行的明顯失職?

任志剛提到:銀行未有向客戶提供和講解銷售資料等屬銀行違規銷售 ,金管局「責無旁貸」。每個迷債受害人的經濟/投資/文化教育背景各有不同,買入年份各有不同,可都有兩個共同點:(一)銀行只介紹迷債跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎而只字不提抵押品,也從未解釋迷債不是投入到跟7個公司相關的債卷或資產之中;(二)從未介紹迷債還跟其它諸多公司(100多)信貸掛鈎的相關風險。這是幾年一貫的一致Pattern,為甚麼金管局至今仍未能分析出來?

听听一个受害者的话:“迷債持有人願意承受7間主體掛鉤公司風險,是對 7 間主體掛鉤公司有認識及有信心唔會破產。 如果講明還要揹埋完全唔認識的125間企業信貸風險,
那麼買的人得對這125間企業有認識及有信心唔會破產。不然的話,『125』間風險喎,嚇都嚇死啦!
一定無人會敢買迷債,回報與風險根本唔相稱”。

任總的言論“美國沒有法例禁止這銷售這種產品 、主要是美國市場沒有這種需求 ,。。。其中大部份人透過退休基金購入這些產品都毫不知情”令人疑惑。(1)何處得來“沒有需求”的結論? 在美國,如果把“實質是跟 132 個公司信貸掛鈎”的產品以“跟 7個著名公司掛鈎“來推銷而不給消費者任何關於抵押品裡面的125個公司的資料,銷售金融機構不但會被集體訴訟,連政府都會介入。看看美國政府對 Auction Rated Securities 的處理手法。(2)“透過退休基金購入”即是指管理退休基金的經理們 買入信貸衍生產品。 這跟通過零售銀行買入迷債的客戶們能是同一個類別嗎? 是否有意混淆概念?

"自古皆有死,民無信不立”(《論語》)。
金融中心不是建立在欺騙公眾之上的。
掩蓋錯誤, 失去市民的信任,只能取得掩耳盜鈴和殺雞取蛋和的效果。
希望銀行家和金管局不要自毀香港的金融中心。

http://www.lbv.org.hk/

2009年4月21日 星期二

銀行未有給客戶提供充足的跟迷你債卷風險相關的資料

據有關立法會的報道, "任志剛承認,以客觀理解,投資者對迷債的印象,或會認為是一般債券。他有看過產品的資料,但重申,審批產品文件的工作由證監負責,「金管局無權作額外審核」。"

審批產品文件的工作由證監負責. 可是銀行是有責任要給投資者提供合適的跟產品相關的資料。

SFC Code of Conduct requires that "Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information". 

如果產品的基本資料( 如發行章程, Issue Prospectus and Program Prospectus) 不夠全面披露的要求,作為迷你債卷銷售商的銀行應該跟發行商要求附加資料。 而 銀行卻是甚麼也不做, 放棄自己作為迷你債卷銷售商對於客戶應該負的責任。明知发行章程没有披露合成抵押品内的信贷挂钩公司的具体资料,既不跟发行商要求抵押品资料 (collateral information, collateral transaction document),也从不跟客户提醒,从不告诫客户这迷你债卷其实是跟7+100多个公司信贷挂钩。銀行應該知道,迷你債卷的抵押品CDO 其實是 合成( Synthetic) CDO, 合成( Synthetic) CDO 的最主要的特徵是跟諸多公司的信貸風險掛鈎。

银行根本就是违反了证监会的 Code of Conduct, 没有跟客户提供 adequate disclosure of relevant material information".

No professional intermediary could have valued the notes using only the information provided in prospectuses and marketing material. 銀行必須給其客戶提供 抵押品資料 (collateral information / collateral transaction document), 以便於起客戶可以瞭解的迷你債卷的真實風險和特徵。

銀行 的 專業人士是如何斷定:不需要給客戶披露或告誡任何關於抵押品內 100 多個掛鈎公司的 ?  是因為已經跟客戶解釋了迷你債卷錶面的7個著名掛鈎公司 而可以省略那100多個掛鈎公司的情形? 還是因為由於客觀經濟條件太好了,那 100多個掛鈎公司出事的機會遠遠低於那7個著名公司?
請不要忘記:那100多個掛鈎公司的平均評級可是低於那7個著名公司的。125家公司裡,當第10家公司破產事件發生時,投資者就會失去全部本金了。  

金管局的專業人士和官員們:你們也認為銀行不需要 給客戶披露或告誡任何關於抵押品內 100 多個掛鈎公司麼? 你們也認為銀行不需要把抵押品資料(文件)給客戶麼?

2009年4月9日 星期四

HAPPY EASTER and Chocolate Chili (朱古力辣椒)


When you are enjoing the Easter Chocolate, please remember this 朱古力辣椒 story.
For a few years in Hong Kong as a financial center, many sellers were selling mini-朱古力 to people in Hong Kong.
Only recently, people found that the mini- 朱古力 was actually 朱古力辣椒, mostly 辣椒, with a bit 朱古力 flavor.
Although the sellers have the name of "xx Bank", the xx 'Bank' can be 'brand-name' only.
Many "xx Banks" are probably Shameless Heartless Banking Crooks in their true nature, and care about their bonus and commissions only.