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11 個月前
2010年1月10日 星期日
THE VALUE OF MINIBOND ? 85%-99% ?
ARE HKMA and SFC trying to hide the true value of Minibond from Hong Kong retail investors?
ARE BANKS in Hong Kong trying to rip off their clients again from the minibond buyback plan?
On 14 December 2009, the value of Australia Mahogany Notes (a minibond alike product, arranged by Lehman Aaia) ,was announced in the ASX announcement:
Minibond-like Credit-Linked Notes sold in Australia (Mahogany Notes I & II by Lehman Asia) are worth $99 and $85. The notes/series that would mature at a later stage (2016) is worth $85. The notes/series that would mature much earlier in 2010 hence it is worth $99, is worth $99.
WHEN will Hong Kong retail investors get any updates on the value of the Minibond?
The banks buyback was only 60-70% of the issued value.
Who is losing more money?
Who is making profit from the Minibond sales & Minibond buyback?
The bank or the small investor?
In the ASX announcement as of 14 December 2009, it stated that for
"Mahogany Capital Limited – A$75 million Notes Series I and A$50 million Notes Series II ", the "Structured Credit Research has estimated a value for:
AUD 75MM ANZ Floating Rate Note maturing 10 Dec 2011 (XS0208078732) of $99 as of 30 November 2009 (the ultimate Collateral for Mahogany Notes Series I),
and a value for:
AUD 50MM RBS Floating Rate Note maturing 17 Mar 2016 (XS0247983058) of $85 as of 30 November 2009 (the ultimate Collateral for Mahogany Notes Series II). (...) These valuations represent the highest valuations received since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008."
[ full text of the ASX announcement on the value of Australia Mahogany Notes:
https://www.macquarie.com.au/edge/static/eclipse/Hidden/Company%20Announcements/ISSUED%20CAPITAL/2009-12/010222460.pdf ]
Australia Mahogany Notes (by Lehman Brother Asia) related information::
1. Summary Information:
It is credit-linked to 100-150 reference entities which are explained in the 2-page product summary. The interest rate (of the notes) and the principal loss are affected by the number of default events which are clearly outlined in the 2-page product summary.
同樣由雷曼亞洲一手安排的在澳洲銷售的信貸掛鈎票據 Mahogany Notes 清晰地介紹了
- 該信貸掛鈎票據之本金跟100個公司信貸掛鈎，（7個破產就會失去100％本金），
- 該票據之利息跟150個公司信貸掛鈎（破產事件跟票據利息之關係）
- 該票據所有信貸掛鈎主體之評級（AA 到 BBB- 及 低於 BBB- 之公司數目，等）和公司之業界類別等信息。
該票據明確指出其資金不是投入於任何信貸掛鈎主體（公司）。
2-page summary from the issuer: "Mahogany Notes II - a CDO defence",
http://www.mahoganycapital.com.au/mahogany/PageAttachmentServlet?PageID=4764
2. Prospectus
All the reference entities related information, the impact of default event(s) to the interest rate, the impact of default event(s) to the principal loss are clearly outlined in the prospectus.
http://www.mahoganycapital.com.au/mahogany/PageAttachmentServlet?PageID=4762
3. Related Analysis:
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/01/austalia-mahogany-notes-prospectus.html
and
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/01/how-was-mahogany-notes-ii-being-briefed.html
2009年8月10日 星期一
Questions Regarding Wing Hang Bank's Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form
In the Wing Hang Bank's Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form, for Minibond Series 30 (January 2007),
the "Declaration " has Clause 11 as the following：
"11. I/We understand that I/we can read copies of the display documents as listed in the Programme Prospectus at the offices of the arranger as set out in the Programme Prospectus;"
However, the 'Clause 11' does not detail what the ‘display documents’ are.
By contrast, the same provision about ‘display documents’ is not available in the Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form for Series 27 (August 2006).
The Question is:
What are the 'display documents' referring to in the 'Clause 11' ?
Wing Hang Bank has been an experienced Minibond distributor since 2003. Why can't Wing Hang Bank clarify this?
關於永亨銀行迷債“購買者確認及指示表格”之疑問
永亨銀行於2007年1月銷售的迷債系列30之“購買者確認及指示表格” 的 “聲明" 之第11條有如下內容:
“11。我／我們明白我／我們可親臨安排人於計劃章程所述的辦事處，查閱計劃章程內列為可供查閱的文件；”
可是，這第11條並沒有指出這些“可供查閱的文件”究竟具體是指哪些文件。
－ 永亨銀行為甚麼不明確指出這些“可供查閱的文件”究竟具體是指哪些文件呢？給銀行的詢問也沒有回答。
－ 另一令人疑惑之處是，在2006年銷售的迷債（如8月銷售的系列27）之“購買者確認及指示表格“，並無此第11條的內容。
為甚麼2007年開始有這第11條，而2006年的就沒有呢？
永亨銀行自從2003年開始就銷售迷債了（包括系列2003年9月的迷債系列6以及更為早期的迷債系列），直至2007年7月的系列33。 儘管並沒有參與系列34－36的銷售。永亨銀行也可算是迷債的經驗分銷商了。為甚麼永亨銀行不可以 回答關於銀行自身的“購買者確認及指示表格”的問題呢？
？？？？？？
？？？？？？
the "Declaration " has Clause 11 as the following：
"11. I/We understand that I/we can read copies of the display documents as listed in the Programme Prospectus at the offices of the arranger as set out in the Programme Prospectus;"
However, the 'Clause 11' does not detail what the ‘display documents’ are.
By contrast, the same provision about ‘display documents’ is not available in the Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form for Series 27 (August 2006).
The Question is:
What are the 'display documents' referring to in the 'Clause 11' ?
Wing Hang Bank has been an experienced Minibond distributor since 2003. Why can't Wing Hang Bank clarify this?
關於永亨銀行迷債“購買者確認及指示表格”之疑問
永亨銀行於2007年1月銷售的迷債系列30之“購買者確認及指示表格” 的 “聲明" 之第11條有如下內容:
“11。我／我們明白我／我們可親臨安排人於計劃章程所述的辦事處，查閱計劃章程內列為可供查閱的文件；”
可是，這第11條並沒有指出這些“可供查閱的文件”究竟具體是指哪些文件。
－ 永亨銀行為甚麼不明確指出這些“可供查閱的文件”究竟具體是指哪些文件呢？給銀行的詢問也沒有回答。
－ 另一令人疑惑之處是，在2006年銷售的迷債（如8月銷售的系列27）之“購買者確認及指示表格“，並無此第11條的內容。
為甚麼2007年開始有這第11條，而2006年的就沒有呢？
永亨銀行自從2003年開始就銷售迷債了（包括系列2003年9月的迷債系列6以及更為早期的迷債系列），直至2007年7月的系列33。 儘管並沒有參與系列34－36的銷售。永亨銀行也可算是迷債的經驗分銷商了。為甚麼永亨銀行不可以 回答關於銀行自身的“購買者確認及指示表格”的問題呢？
？？？？？？
？？？？？？
2009年7月15日 星期三
Why banks can't answer queries regarding the "Fund" (Minibond collateral)?
作為受過良好教育，有包括CDS/CDO和各類信貸掛鈎產品在內的投資經驗的專業人員和管理層的銀行，作為銷售了迷債4－6年的迷債分銷商，
- 銀行為甚麼不能回答以下關於關於抵押品之疑問？
- 銀行的協約精神和對客戶的Duty of Care 職責去了哪裡了呢？
Enquiry on the"NOTICE OF REIVESTMENT OF COLLATERAL FOR UNDERLYING SECURITIES” (letter from HSBC USA and Bank of New York). The following questions are addressed to BANKS who sold minibond to us.
The "Fund" below refers to the Fund mentioned in the "NOTICE OF REIVESTMENT OF COLLATERAL FOR UNDERLYING SECURITIES” (dated 18 March 2009). Use Minibond Series #27 as an example:
(a) Where can I find out the role and functions of Bank of New York in respect of the Minibond Series 27?
(b) Can BANKS please clarify the relationship between the Series 27 and the Fund ?
Because I have looked at the prospectuses but could not find any mention of the Fund. (c) Can you please advise where in the prospectuses for Series 27 the Fund is mentioned?
(c) Can BANKS please advise where in the prospectuses for Series 27 the Fund is mentioned?
Banks are regulated financial institutions. Banks' responsibility as minibond-distributors is NOT confined to passing on the enquiries from the note-holders to the trustee and replies from the trustee to the note-holders, regardless if the enquiries concern matter within banks' knowledge or the replies given by the trustee do not really answers the queries raised. Banks are not no-asking & no-telling & commission-collection middle-man only. Banks are bound by SFC Code of Conduct!
2009年7月13日 星期一
"well-educated", disclosure of Minibond risks, and banks' Duty of Care
One of banks’ excuses on dismissing Minibond complaints is that some Minibond victims are reasonably well-educated and should have been alerted by the ‘red flag’ scattered around in the prospectuses.
Understandably, the Minibond designers & promoters would argue (in their heart) that: the ‘ref flag’ is indicative of the real nature of the products and has been well hidden, notwithstanding the reassuring façade ("credit-linked to 7 well-known companies") and the message of safe and diversification that it is designed to convey.
No professional intermediary could have valued the Minibond using only the information provided in marketing material (including Prospectus).
"Minibond Structure and Pricing Report" by Ernest & Young to Hong Kong Bank Associations (Dec.2008) reveals the material information and risk disclosure that are missing from Minibond prospectus.
Banks are blaming SFC for the minibond approval, in additaional to banks' claim that well-educated clients should have known the true feature and risks of Minibond. Can banks repeat their view on the material risks of Minibond today, after over 4-6 years' minibond sale?
Banks seemed to behave like a no-asking & no-telling commission-collecting only middle-man. What happened to banks' duty of care to its clients?
Did banks' well-educated professional & management who have expertise in CDS / CDO / CDS / credit derivative /other investments products forget that they are bound by "Code of Conduct" (knowing the product, explain the true nature and risks to clients, make adequate disclosure of relevant material information)?
Financial institutions engage in improper conduct for financial gain. As in the case of those who evade tax, penalties must have a deterrent effect. Like tax evaders, the financial institutions should have faced penalties of up to three times the fees and commissions they earned as a result of their misconduct. Regulators in other jurisdictions have found that removing the financial gain is an effective deterrent.
In other jurisdictions, when misconduct by financial institutions has been shown, compensating all affected investors is the norm. The onus is on the financial institution to demonstrate why an investor should not be compensated. Our process of putting the onus on the investor to prove his claim puts many ordinary investors at a disadvantage.
The outcome of this saga does not appear to be just and does not augur well for consumer protection in thefinancial service sector.
2009年6月3日 星期三
金管調解中心既未幫助投訴人取得最佳利益，又毀滅罪證並損害公眾利益
蔡耀君對於金管設立調解中心毀滅罪證的供詞. 蔡耀君聲稱“看不到(客戶和解和影響調查)兩者有甚麼矛盾”因為他認為"和解或客戶取消投訴都不會影響金管局的繼續調查”。
可是，蔡也承認並同意任志剛之前講過的“如果個別客戶因為和解之後，他自己不願意提供資料，那麼會對調查有影響的”。
對於有表面證據成立的轉介到證監會的案例，金管局顯然是清楚地明白：如果投訴人跟銀行和解並因銀行要求撤消於金管局的投訴而且之後也不再提供相關資料的話，金管局的調查儘管會繼續，卻會得個不了了之的結果，也就是說，金管局的調查有很大可能由於投訴者不在提供資料而得不到任何結果。
調查是手段不是目的。調查的目的是為了辨別是非，為了有個明確的結論，以便懲罰犯了錯的一方，一是保護投訴人的利益，同時也是為保障公眾利益，以免造成其他的客戶在將來再受其害。
如果知道和解可能會造成調查結果泡湯的話，那麼，影不影響“繼續調查”有甚麼實際意義呢？影不影響“調查結果”才是至為關鍵的。
正如審判黑社會大頭目一樣，如果大頭目在開審之後，把證人都給收買或者滅口了，既使可以接著審判，最後也不會有甚麼結果。那麼，審判就會是沒有達到目的。這就是為甚麼會有“證人保護”一說。
蔡聲稱這樣做是為了幫助該投訴人盡快拿回金錢，顯然金管局認為該投訴人的金錢損失是由於銀行過錯而造成的了。
對於迷債有這麼多的投訴人。金管局儘管不承認有系統性錯誤，採用“由下至上“的方式。現在，如果，每一個”有錶面證據成立”的個案都由於投訴人跟銀行和解而不再給金管局提供資料的話，那麼就有非常大的機會造成每一個”有錶面證據成立”的個案的調查結論是‘缺乏證據’的不了了之的結果。那麼，既使銀行有系統性錯誤，金管局也查不出來了，因為每一個個案均無調查結論。
蔡耀君聲稱想幫助的該投訴人盡快拿回金錢。事實是：鑒於迷債的長時間的投訴所造成的精神疲勞，由於是在金管局沒有完成調查定論的時候跟銀行和解的，很可能因此屈服於銀行而達成一個不是很好的賠償金額，而沒有得到他／她應該得到的最佳賠償。
金管局這樣這種貌似幫助投訴人的短視做法, 看似幫助某一個投訴人盡快拿回其損失的金錢，事實是既沒有真正維護該投訴人的利益，也犧牲了公眾利益。因為，金管局的調解機制等於是：
－ 既沒有幫助投訴人拿回應該得到的最佳金錢數額， （對於有錶面證據成立的個案，如果等到最後定罪的話，投訴人應該是可以拿到最佳金錢數額的）。
－ 又使許多相同深受銀行錯誤之害的市民們（也是投訴人們） 的利益得不到金管局的保護，不能拿回由於銀行錯誤造成的金錢損失；
－ 而銀行的錯誤由於逃過了這次金管局的調查，銀行很可能會繼續犯類似的錯誤，從而在將來危害更多的市民們。
金管局調解中心是短視決定，既未幫助投訴人取得最佳利益，又由於毀滅罪證從而損害了公眾利益。只有銀行是受益人。
1. (轉載) 要求金管局馬上停止為銀行洗擦罪證http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/E8A681E6B182E98791E7AEA1E5B180E9A6ACE4B88AE5819CE6ADA2E782BAE98A80E8A18CE6B497E693A6E7BDAAE8AD89-E887B4E98791E7AEA1E5B180E8ADB4E8B2ACE4BFA12997.php
2. (轉載) 要求金管局停止毀滅罪證
http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/E887B4E98791E7AEA1E5B180E4BFA1-E5819CE6ADA2E6AF80E6BB85E7BDAAE8AD893111.php
可是，蔡也承認並同意任志剛之前講過的“如果個別客戶因為和解之後，他自己不願意提供資料，那麼會對調查有影響的”。
對於有表面證據成立的轉介到證監會的案例，金管局顯然是清楚地明白：如果投訴人跟銀行和解並因銀行要求撤消於金管局的投訴而且之後也不再提供相關資料的話，金管局的調查儘管會繼續，卻會得個不了了之的結果，也就是說，金管局的調查有很大可能由於投訴者不在提供資料而得不到任何結果。
調查是手段不是目的。調查的目的是為了辨別是非，為了有個明確的結論，以便懲罰犯了錯的一方，一是保護投訴人的利益，同時也是為保障公眾利益，以免造成其他的客戶在將來再受其害。
如果知道和解可能會造成調查結果泡湯的話，那麼，影不影響“繼續調查”有甚麼實際意義呢？影不影響“調查結果”才是至為關鍵的。
正如審判黑社會大頭目一樣，如果大頭目在開審之後，把證人都給收買或者滅口了，既使可以接著審判，最後也不會有甚麼結果。那麼，審判就會是沒有達到目的。這就是為甚麼會有“證人保護”一說。
蔡聲稱這樣做是為了幫助該投訴人盡快拿回金錢，顯然金管局認為該投訴人的金錢損失是由於銀行過錯而造成的了。
對於迷債有這麼多的投訴人。金管局儘管不承認有系統性錯誤，採用“由下至上“的方式。現在，如果，每一個”有錶面證據成立”的個案都由於投訴人跟銀行和解而不再給金管局提供資料的話，那麼就有非常大的機會造成每一個”有錶面證據成立”的個案的調查結論是‘缺乏證據’的不了了之的結果。那麼，既使銀行有系統性錯誤，金管局也查不出來了，因為每一個個案均無調查結論。
蔡耀君聲稱想幫助的該投訴人盡快拿回金錢。事實是：鑒於迷債的長時間的投訴所造成的精神疲勞，由於是在金管局沒有完成調查定論的時候跟銀行和解的，很可能因此屈服於銀行而達成一個不是很好的賠償金額，而沒有得到他／她應該得到的最佳賠償。
金管局這樣這種貌似幫助投訴人的短視做法, 看似幫助某一個投訴人盡快拿回其損失的金錢，事實是既沒有真正維護該投訴人的利益，也犧牲了公眾利益。因為，金管局的調解機制等於是：
－ 既沒有幫助投訴人拿回應該得到的最佳金錢數額， （對於有錶面證據成立的個案，如果等到最後定罪的話，投訴人應該是可以拿到最佳金錢數額的）。
－ 又使許多相同深受銀行錯誤之害的市民們（也是投訴人們） 的利益得不到金管局的保護，不能拿回由於銀行錯誤造成的金錢損失；
－ 而銀行的錯誤由於逃過了這次金管局的調查，銀行很可能會繼續犯類似的錯誤，從而在將來危害更多的市民們。
金管局調解中心是短視決定，既未幫助投訴人取得最佳利益，又由於毀滅罪證從而損害了公眾利益。只有銀行是受益人。
1. (轉載) 要求金管局馬上停止為銀行洗擦罪證http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/E8A681E6B182E98791E7AEA1E5B180E9A6ACE4B88AE5819CE6ADA2E782BAE98A80E8A18CE6B497E693A6E7BDAAE8AD89-E887B4E98791E7AEA1E5B180E8ADB4E8B2ACE4BFA12997.php
2. (轉載) 要求金管局停止毀滅罪證
http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/E887B4E98791E7AEA1E5B180E4BFA1-E5819CE6ADA2E6AF80E6BB85E7BDAAE8AD893111.php
2009年5月30日 星期六
清查銀行 “七個代表” 之 騙術
銀行職員有否告訴客戶迷你債卷實質是跟七個著名公司和諸多其它各類公司信貸挂鉤？
銀行敢不敢自己做事自己負責？ 把當初賣迷債時講的話和對迷債的理解再講一次？現在銀行對於賣了幾年的產品的特征是屁也不敢放一個 ! (sorry for my language, But banks deserve it !).
銀行成了街頭的傻啞巴小販：No-Brainer 式的按發行商指示把章程給客戶了，客戶自願簽字了。之后管收錢就是了。章程內容是否充分披露了迷債的特征和風險了 & 跟客戶解釋真實特征和風險 呢，那就不管銀行的事了。
銀行有理的就出來當眾講講：迷你債卷到底是跟幾個公司信貸挂鉤？銀行給與客戶的資料裡到底提到了多少個挂鉤公司 以及 關於挂鉤公司的信息到底披露了多少？銀行自己對於迷債抵押品的性質是否了解？
“七個代表”概括了 迷你債卷 和 精明債卷 和 星展零售債卷 的銷售手法之精髓。以“跟七個著名公司信貸掛鈎”代表了“跟 100－150 多個評級由ＡＡＡ至ＣＣＣ不等公司信貸掛夠的”的實質, 以“跟七個著名公司信貸掛鈎”代表並遮掩了沒有買入任何相關公司的實際資產，而是「對賭」信貸狀況的實質. 發行商不同, 騙術卻是類似的。
金管局之前在立法會還大言不慚地說甚麼迷債之所以出問題，在於雷曼出了問題。現在大摩 okay，可是精明債卷出了問題。關鍵問題何在呢？
金管局的精英們大概會說：關鍵還是在於雷曼。 "如果雷曼不破產..."，"如果...不...",..., 精明債卷的抵押品中的100多個掛鈎公司就不會有問題了。
（一）"如果。。。不。。。”:
- “如果銀行不是有錯的話，如果銀行確是把產品的真實特徵和風險跟客戶講清楚了的話，銀行应该会毫不犹豫地堂堂正正地再次給大家解釋和演繹一次关于產品的真實特徵和風險的，对吧？
反正银行在2004－2008年之間已經演繹了多次，金管局都认为任何只是少數人對產品認識不足的。在银行的销售职员里，随便找个人都可以給大家解釋和演繹一次关于產品的真實特徵和風險的，对吧？”
- “如果銀行不是有系統性失誤的話，那麼，銀行可以有大堆文件証明相關產品的培訓和盡職審查。對吧？”
新鴻基金融曾為許多銀行提供了關於跟迷債相關的培訓。事實上，許多銀行（如：永亨銀行等）的迷債銷售是直接跟新鴻基金融合作，而不是直接跟雷曼亞洲合作的。
而證監會卻就新鴻基金融的迷債銷售提出了以下關註：
［ 1、對產品進行的盡職審查是否足夠；2、對前線人員提供的培訓是否足夠，從而確保投資者理解產品涉及的一切重大風險；3、迷債系列的風險水平；向零售銷售人員傳達迷債風險評級的信息；及採取理應採取的措施，確保銷售人員提供合理適當意見；等等］
（二）[ 蔡耀君。。。金管局在已處理的投訴中，亦發現個別員工對金融產品的性質風險認知有所不足。不過，他強調，由於目前尚有很多投訴尚未完成，故難確定這普遍情況。]
- 在金管局已經處理的投訴中，“對金融產品的性質風險認知有所不足”的“個別員工”的比例范圍是多少？10% 20% ？
- 如果在金管局已經處理的投訴中普遍“不是認識不足”的話，那麼，“不是認識不足”的銀行職員們通常有那些認識呢？又是如何跟客戶解釋關於迷債的真實特征和風險的呢？
比如跟客戶解釋：﹝“跟7個公司信貸掛鈎，要鎖定3－7年，到期後可拿回本金”，同時把Program Prospectus 和 發行章程給了客戶﹞？
是否是屬於認識充足並跟客戶解釋了迷債的真實特征和風險了呢？金管局可否回答這個簡單直接的問題呢？
- 在金管局已經處理的投訴中，可否請金管局從那眾多的“不是認識不足”的銀行職員裡提供幾個例子，隨便找出10－20個的銷售過迷債的銀行職員來跟公眾再次演示和解釋一下他們對產品的“透徹理解”。
讓公眾看看“不是認識不足”的銀行職員是如何理解和解釋迷債的真實特征和風險的？ 讓公眾看看那些 “不是認識不足” 的銀行職員是如何理解並跟客戶解釋抵押品的實質和風險？ （或則說，抵押品的實質和風險跟迷債的真實特徵和風險是不相關因而沒必要提及抵押品的實質和風險？請金管局向公眾下個定論。）
依我之見，這個請求應該是銀行求之不得的吧。 終於再次有機會跟公眾演示和解釋一下他們對產品的“透徹理解”了，這可是大長銀行名譽的絕好機會啊。
（三）［ 蔡耀君...透露，金管局接獲的相關投訴中，以前線銷售人員未有清楚解釋風險的類別最多，並強調前線銷售人員應當全面就迷你債券的性質風險向客戶解釋 ］
- 金管局為甚麼不公布金管局對於產品的真實特徵和相關風險的基本定義？
- 金管局為甚麼不公布"全面就迷你債券的性質風險向客戶解釋"的基本定義?
難道說金管局跟銀行在迷債的真實特征和風險的定義上有分歧？如果是這樣的話，干脆把金管局跟銀行的定義都公布於眾。有透明度才有公平合理，黑箱調查隻能讓人覺得有偏袒一方之嫌。
當然，金管局是大權在握，銀行有是有財有勢，普通百姓覺得金管局保護銀行，金管局和銀行也無須懼怕無錢無權的普通百姓。金管局和銀行家們心想："Who cares? What else can you do?!!"
- 除了解釋“七個代表”（即跟七個著名公司信貸挂鉤）以外，銀行職員有沒有告訴客戶：
* 迷債還跟其它諸多公司的信貸挂鉤？
* 迷債的抵押品不是投入於任何實質資產的。
* 迷債的抵押品是跟其它諸多公司的信貸挂鉤？這都是在抵押品資料之中。這諸多公司通常會是100多家，這些公司的平均評級通常是遠低於那七個代表的，可以是包括AAA-CCC不等。
- 在目前金管局已經處理的投訴中，達到以上要求的比例的職員是多少？
或者：
- 請金管局給出關於迷債的真實特征和風險的定義，並告知公眾： 在目前金管局已經處理的投訴中，達到金管局要求的比例的職員是多少？
（四）［ 蔡耀君。。。強調相關的調查同時牽涉前線員工與銀行機構內部監控工作，其中金管局在調查過程會與有關前線員工會面取證，了解他們因甚麼原因令有關交易未能夠遵守操守準則。］
金管局至今為止的調查的結果是什麼？例如：
－ 從銀行對其職員的培訓 以及 銀行的關於迷債的銷售指引等文件？証明銀行內部機構監控工作是適當的？可否給公眾公布一個（或數個）銀行的迷債相關的培訓�銷售指引的文件？可以略去佣金部分啊。產品都賣了幾年了，這些培訓等文件不應該是“機密”了吧？也不應該會損害公眾利益吧？
－銀行職員了解迷債的真實特征和風險，但決定隻跟客戶介紹“七個代表”？
- 銀行職員自己都根本就不知道以上特征和風險。如果是這個原因的話，金管局目前為止調查出來的原因是什麼？或則：不管銀行是如何做的，隻要銀行職員沒有理解或解釋產品的真實特征和風險，就是銷售人員的錯，一定不可能是以銀行的系統性錯誤.原因是:莫須有？
永亨銀行 Ms Carmen Ng 於2008年十月初承認 [銀行(不僅僅是她個人 )並不知道抵押品的實質，並不知道迷你債卷是無實質資產的]。 Ms Carmen Ng 在給我解釋迷債的時候，根本就沒有提過抵押品，只是解釋並跟我探討了7個公司的破產可能性，還指出系列27‘的幾個掛鈎公司是在眾多迷債系列掛鈎公司中非常高質量的選擇。因為我對於那 7個挂鉤公司 和破產事件的定義都是非常小心的。Ms Carmen Ng承認她給我的解釋是她當時對迷債的理解。
Ms Carmen Ng 沒有「透徹理解」投資產品，實際是反映了永亨銀行的系統性錯誤，而不僅僅是某個銷售人員的"違規銷售”. 永亨銀行對於迷債的和關於迷債的培訓及銷售指引等資料，都可以証明這點。
關鍵是：金管局和政府是否一直打算閉眼不看，幫助銀行蒙混過關？
(五) ［ 蔡耀君：金管局倡設風險「說明書」
設立風險說明書是好事。關鍵在於：何謂風險。以迷你債卷為例，
- 風險到底是跟7個著名公司挂鉤，還是跟132個各類評級公司挂鉤？
- 迷債的錢是投入於實質資產還是沒有投入於任何實質資產而隻是賣保險等，
如何清晰准確均衡無誤導地，真真實實地把真實特征和風險給客戶介紹，這才是問題的關鍵。
銀行賣了3-4年以以賣信貸破產掉期合約（即：賣保險）為抵押品的迷你債卷，卻幾年如一日地堅持向客戶介紹“七個代表”論（即跟七個著名公司信貸挂鉤），抵押品的真實特征和風險是一律不提。原因在於沒有風險「說明書」呢，還是在於不想把真正風險向客戶披露？
謊言重復一千遍還是謊言! 除非你可以把相關人員都趕盡殺絕。真理終會戰勝謊言。銀行集體欺騙普通市民，依靠權勢來遮蓋其丑行。是可忍，熟不可忍! 不管是一個月，一年，十年。生命不息，奮爭不止。
"You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the people all of the time."
2009年5月25日 星期一
"客戶所須簽訂的銷售文件無可挑剔" is NOT true
From News....
[.... 公民黨余若薇反映，不少個案都是客戶所須簽訂的銷售文件無可挑剔，但銀行口頭上未有解釋清楚]
The "客戶所須簽訂的銷售文件無可挑剔" is a myth that HKMA and banks try to let everyone believe. "客戶所須簽訂的銷售文件無可挑剔" is NOT true because banks omitted material information. Banks never gave clients Minibond's (Synthetic CDO) Collateral Information which is material information to the true nature & risks of Minibond. No professional intermediary could have valued the Minibond using only the information provided in Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus & marketing material.
Banks and HKMA have been silence on the "collateral information" from day 0.
Why was Minibond Collateral information material information?
or: Why did banks consider Collateral Information as immaterial information?
1. First, let's take a look at the now well-exposed Minibond structure (e.g. Series 19-36, and earlier ones with Synthetic CDO Collateral):
(i) Minibond had CDS with 7 well-known reference entities;
and:
(ii) Minibond CDO Colalteral had CDS with over 100 reference entities (some were at sub-investment grade).
The Bank passed us the Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus that dedicated many pages on the “credit-linked to 7 well-reference entities”, the 7 reference entities’ ratings, and the impact of any default event related to the 7 well-known reference entities.
What kind of collateral information was disclosed in the Issue Prospectus? It was described as AAA-rated CDO, or: AAA-rated Synthetic CDO to be exact.
1. Does the AAA rating suggest that the collateral would be at low default rate and thus no need for disclosure?
The Issue Prospectus provided default rate based on historic data from 1981-2004. However, such data does not provide any meaningful reference for the AAA-rated synthetic CDO collateral. Because the default rate data was based on AAA/AA/A/BBB-rated bond that is very different from Synthetic CDO (whose history is shorter than 20 years).
2. Does CDO information needs to be disclosed?
Regardless if CDO information needs to be disclosed or not, the CDO collateral selected by Minibond (arranger) was in fact Synthetic CDO, as stated in the "selection of collateral" (of Issue Prospectus). That is, the Minibond collateral is not a 'conventional' CDO (without CDS), it is a Synthetic CDO (i.e. comprised with CDS).
3. What was the most important feature of Synthetic CDO?
Synthetic CDO may not invest into any debt/loan/bond at all. Its value is decided by the credit risk of its portfolio holding. Thus, the collateral is credit-linked to portfolio of reference entities. (sounds familiar?)
3. For Minibond Series 19:
The collateral was credit-linked to 125 reference entities. The collateral would loose 100% principal on the 10th default event out of the 125 reference entities, That is, a mere 8% of default rate (out of the reference entities portfolio) would result in collateral 100% principal loss! (On the Minibond top layer, minibond could lose principal on the first default event, i.e. 1 out 7, which is over 14% default rate. Although the chance of hitting the 8% default rate seems to be higher than the 14% of default rate. That is, Minibond top layer started to crack, there is better chance to lose the collateral principal value which requires 8% of default rate of the collateral reference entities pool. ).
The CDS in the CDO collateral synthetically transferred the credit risk of 125 reference entities to Minibond holders. Therefore, the value of minibond was not only affected by the credit-event with the 7 well-known companies, but also was greatly affected by the credit events related to the 125 reference entities in the CDO collateral.
4. If the fact that Minibond was credit-linked to 7 well-known companies was important and was material information to the Minibond's true feature and risks,
we can CONCLUDE that the risks of the Minibond also greatly depended on the information regarding number / name / rating of the reference entities & reference obligations in the (synthetic) CDO collateral and the rules regarding their default event. The risk of minibond would vary greatly If collateral were credit-linked with 7 or 50 or 125 or 155 reference entities. The risk of minibond would vary greatly if collateral would lose 100% principal upon the 10th or 50th or 100th or 125th default event out of the 125 reference entities.
5. Our questions are:
why did banks consider collateral informations such as number of reference entities / their credit-rating / default impact to the collateral principal (loss) as immaterial ?
Why the above collateral information was never discussed / disclosed to clients?
and:
How many people would be interested in buying the minibond (for the same term & return rate) if they were told/given the collateral information ?
Lehman could argue that the Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus touched every aspects (in a selective in-balanced way). However, regardless what Lehman provided or not-provided as mandatory documents (or display documents), regardless what was or was not disclosed in the Issuer Prospectus, banks are not no-brainer minibond-sellers (HKMA or banks can correct me if I were wrong about this). Banks are regulated financial intermediaries by SFC Code of Conduct which requires that "Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information".
Therefore, banks should understand the product (per Code of Conduct), after exercising reasonable due diligence. Banks should have realized that the collateral information is part of material information for clients to understand the true feature and risks of minibond. Banks should have requested such information for their clients. Banks should have provided and/or discussed with clients on the collateral information. Because we bought minibond from banks, not from Lehman.
You can suggest banks to provide evidence of institutional buyers that bought Synthetic CDO without Synthetic CDO documents. Would "AAA rating" be sufficient information for Synthetic-CDO ? Would they need to have document/information describing the number of reference entities / reference entities' rating /reference entities industry range / impact of default rate (e.g. 8% or 20% default event would lead to 100% principal loss)/etc.
My guess is that, Minibond (and DBS Constellation) were probably the only examples that banks can find.
Because banks (as selling-agent) were in fact willing to collaborate, I would suggest fraudulently, with Lehman, to hide the information and risks of synthetic CDO from the Bank's retail clients, with the objective of increasing the sale of the Minibonds. For a product like synthetic-CDO / CDS, how many people in HK really know ?
I am sure when banks selling CDS or buying CDS, they knew exactly how many reference entities are associated with the CDS or Synthetic CDO. Like group insurance for a company, it makes difference to insure a company that has 10 or 50 or 100 or 150 employee. The Insurance company needs to know the rough range of employee number.
"Mahogany Notes" is a Credit-Linked Notes sold in Australia by a Lehman entity, arranged by Lehman Asia (the same department that arranged Minibond in HK and Singapore). It was summarized in the web page below:
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/01/austalia-mahogany-notes-prospectus.html
[.... 公民黨余若薇反映，不少個案都是客戶所須簽訂的銷售文件無可挑剔，但銀行口頭上未有解釋清楚]
The "客戶所須簽訂的銷售文件無可挑剔" is a myth that HKMA and banks try to let everyone believe. "客戶所須簽訂的銷售文件無可挑剔" is NOT true because banks omitted material information. Banks never gave clients Minibond's (Synthetic CDO) Collateral Information which is material information to the true nature & risks of Minibond. No professional intermediary could have valued the Minibond using only the information provided in Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus & marketing material.
Banks and HKMA have been silence on the "collateral information" from day 0.
Why was Minibond Collateral information material information?
or: Why did banks consider Collateral Information as immaterial information?
1. First, let's take a look at the now well-exposed Minibond structure (e.g. Series 19-36, and earlier ones with Synthetic CDO Collateral):
(i) Minibond had CDS with 7 well-known reference entities;
and:
(ii) Minibond CDO Colalteral had CDS with over 100 reference entities (some were at sub-investment grade).
The Bank passed us the Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus that dedicated many pages on the “credit-linked to 7 well-reference entities”, the 7 reference entities’ ratings, and the impact of any default event related to the 7 well-known reference entities.
What kind of collateral information was disclosed in the Issue Prospectus? It was described as AAA-rated CDO, or: AAA-rated Synthetic CDO to be exact.
1. Does the AAA rating suggest that the collateral would be at low default rate and thus no need for disclosure?
The Issue Prospectus provided default rate based on historic data from 1981-2004. However, such data does not provide any meaningful reference for the AAA-rated synthetic CDO collateral. Because the default rate data was based on AAA/AA/A/BBB-rated bond that is very different from Synthetic CDO (whose history is shorter than 20 years).
2. Does CDO information needs to be disclosed?
Regardless if CDO information needs to be disclosed or not, the CDO collateral selected by Minibond (arranger) was in fact Synthetic CDO, as stated in the "selection of collateral" (of Issue Prospectus). That is, the Minibond collateral is not a 'conventional' CDO (without CDS), it is a Synthetic CDO (i.e. comprised with CDS).
3. What was the most important feature of Synthetic CDO?
Synthetic CDO may not invest into any debt/loan/bond at all. Its value is decided by the credit risk of its portfolio holding. Thus, the collateral is credit-linked to portfolio of reference entities. (sounds familiar?)
3. For Minibond Series 19:
The collateral was credit-linked to 125 reference entities. The collateral would loose 100% principal on the 10th default event out of the 125 reference entities, That is, a mere 8% of default rate (out of the reference entities portfolio) would result in collateral 100% principal loss! (On the Minibond top layer, minibond could lose principal on the first default event, i.e. 1 out 7, which is over 14% default rate. Although the chance of hitting the 8% default rate seems to be higher than the 14% of default rate. That is, Minibond top layer started to crack, there is better chance to lose the collateral principal value which requires 8% of default rate of the collateral reference entities pool. ).
The CDS in the CDO collateral synthetically transferred the credit risk of 125 reference entities to Minibond holders. Therefore, the value of minibond was not only affected by the credit-event with the 7 well-known companies, but also was greatly affected by the credit events related to the 125 reference entities in the CDO collateral.
4. If the fact that Minibond was credit-linked to 7 well-known companies was important and was material information to the Minibond's true feature and risks,
we can CONCLUDE that the risks of the Minibond also greatly depended on the information regarding number / name / rating of the reference entities & reference obligations in the (synthetic) CDO collateral and the rules regarding their default event. The risk of minibond would vary greatly If collateral were credit-linked with 7 or 50 or 125 or 155 reference entities. The risk of minibond would vary greatly if collateral would lose 100% principal upon the 10th or 50th or 100th or 125th default event out of the 125 reference entities.
5. Our questions are:
why did banks consider collateral informations such as number of reference entities / their credit-rating / default impact to the collateral principal (loss) as immaterial ?
Why the above collateral information was never discussed / disclosed to clients?
and:
How many people would be interested in buying the minibond (for the same term & return rate) if they were told/given the collateral information ?
Lehman could argue that the Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus touched every aspects (in a selective in-balanced way). However, regardless what Lehman provided or not-provided as mandatory documents (or display documents), regardless what was or was not disclosed in the Issuer Prospectus, banks are not no-brainer minibond-sellers (HKMA or banks can correct me if I were wrong about this). Banks are regulated financial intermediaries by SFC Code of Conduct which requires that "Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information".
Therefore, banks should understand the product (per Code of Conduct), after exercising reasonable due diligence. Banks should have realized that the collateral information is part of material information for clients to understand the true feature and risks of minibond. Banks should have requested such information for their clients. Banks should have provided and/or discussed with clients on the collateral information. Because we bought minibond from banks, not from Lehman.
You can suggest banks to provide evidence of institutional buyers that bought Synthetic CDO without Synthetic CDO documents. Would "AAA rating" be sufficient information for Synthetic-CDO ? Would they need to have document/information describing the number of reference entities / reference entities' rating /reference entities industry range / impact of default rate (e.g. 8% or 20% default event would lead to 100% principal loss)/etc.
My guess is that, Minibond (and DBS Constellation) were probably the only examples that banks can find.
Because banks (as selling-agent) were in fact willing to collaborate, I would suggest fraudulently, with Lehman, to hide the information and risks of synthetic CDO from the Bank's retail clients, with the objective of increasing the sale of the Minibonds. For a product like synthetic-CDO / CDS, how many people in HK really know ?
I am sure when banks selling CDS or buying CDS, they knew exactly how many reference entities are associated with the CDS or Synthetic CDO. Like group insurance for a company, it makes difference to insure a company that has 10 or 50 or 100 or 150 employee. The Insurance company needs to know the rough range of employee number.
"Mahogany Notes" is a Credit-Linked Notes sold in Australia by a Lehman entity, arranged by Lehman Asia (the same department that arranged Minibond in HK and Singapore). It was summarized in the web page below:
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/01/austalia-mahogany-notes-prospectus.html
2009年5月22日 星期五
要求金管局公開“違規銷售”的（定義）範疇並回答以下相關問題
［2009年5月23日 新聞報道：］
金管局總裁任志剛【圖左】昨天第六次出席立法會作證，...... 任志剛表示，當局目前的監察重點仍在如何更快調查出銀行的違規銷售.] ，
任總多次錶示 “違規銷售需受懲罰”。 再次確認金管局對於迷債的調查著重於“違規銷售”。
何謂“違規銷售”？
銀行以黑箱作業手法調查其客戶對銀行自己的投訴。金管局的調查也是黑箱作業方式。出於對投訴人和公眾的公平合理，
我們要求金管局應該給公眾公開“違規銷售”的基本定義範疇。
公開“違規銷售”的基本定義範疇可以增加投訴人和公眾的對於金管局調查的公平合理性的信心。
黑箱作業只能增加公眾對金管局調查的公平性的疑問，有害於公眾利益。當然，黑箱調查是銀行和銀行家最為期待的。
我們同時也要求金管局並回答以下問題，（如果不能回答的話，請金管局給與其理由）。
1。 ”失實陳訴“是否屬於“違規銷售”？
2。 如果職員沒有跟客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險, 只跟客戶解釋跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎，而根本不提抵押品，是否屬於“不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險”？ 是否屬於違背了操守准則的要求？ 是否屬於“違規銷售”？
3。 如果職員沒有「透徹理解」投資產品，違背了操守准則的要求的話，是否屬於“違規銷售”？
4。 如果银行沒有跟客戶提供提供充足的迷你債卷風險的相關資料，（操守准則： "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information“），是否屬於“違規銷售” ？
5。 新鴻基金融為迷債的co-distributor, 曾為許多銀行提供了關於跟迷債相關的培訓。事實上，許多銀行（如：永亨銀行等）的迷債銷售是直接跟新鴻基金融合作，而不是直接跟雷曼亞洲合作的。 證監會就新鴻基金融的迷債銷售提出的關註
［ 一、對產品進行的盡職審查是否足夠；二、對前線人員提供的培訓是否足夠，從而確保投資者理解產品涉及的一切重大風險；三、迷債系列的風險水平；向零售銷售人員傳達迷債風險評級的信息；及採取理應採取的措施，確保銷售人員提供合理適當意見；］
－ 如果銀行於以上 三個方面的某一個或都有有問題的話， 是否屬於“違規銷售”？
－ 金管局對於銀行於以上 三個方面有沒有進行任何相關的調查？如果沒有的話，請告知理由。
希望金管局不要把香港打造成 “國際金融糖衣毒藥銷售中心” ！
金管局總裁任志剛【圖左】昨天第六次出席立法會作證，...... 任志剛表示，當局目前的監察重點仍在如何更快調查出銀行的違規銷售.] ，
任總多次錶示 “違規銷售需受懲罰”。 再次確認金管局對於迷債的調查著重於“違規銷售”。
何謂“違規銷售”？
銀行以黑箱作業手法調查其客戶對銀行自己的投訴。金管局的調查也是黑箱作業方式。出於對投訴人和公眾的公平合理，
我們要求金管局應該給公眾公開“違規銷售”的基本定義範疇。
公開“違規銷售”的基本定義範疇可以增加投訴人和公眾的對於金管局調查的公平合理性的信心。
黑箱作業只能增加公眾對金管局調查的公平性的疑問，有害於公眾利益。當然，黑箱調查是銀行和銀行家最為期待的。
我們同時也要求金管局並回答以下問題，（如果不能回答的話，請金管局給與其理由）。
1。 ”失實陳訴“是否屬於“違規銷售”？
2。 如果職員沒有跟客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險, 只跟客戶解釋跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎，而根本不提抵押品，是否屬於“不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險”？ 是否屬於違背了操守准則的要求？ 是否屬於“違規銷售”？
3。 如果職員沒有「透徹理解」投資產品，違背了操守准則的要求的話，是否屬於“違規銷售”？
4。 如果银行沒有跟客戶提供提供充足的迷你債卷風險的相關資料，（操守准則： "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information“），是否屬於“違規銷售” ？
5。 新鴻基金融為迷債的co-distributor, 曾為許多銀行提供了關於跟迷債相關的培訓。事實上，許多銀行（如：永亨銀行等）的迷債銷售是直接跟新鴻基金融合作，而不是直接跟雷曼亞洲合作的。 證監會就新鴻基金融的迷債銷售提出的關註
［ 一、對產品進行的盡職審查是否足夠；二、對前線人員提供的培訓是否足夠，從而確保投資者理解產品涉及的一切重大風險；三、迷債系列的風險水平；向零售銷售人員傳達迷債風險評級的信息；及採取理應採取的措施，確保銷售人員提供合理適當意見；］
－ 如果銀行於以上 三個方面的某一個或都有有問題的話， 是否屬於“違規銷售”？
－ 金管局對於銀行於以上 三個方面有沒有進行任何相關的調查？如果沒有的話，請告知理由。
希望金管局不要把香港打造成 “國際金融糖衣毒藥銷售中心” ！
2009年5月21日 星期四
金管局浪費資源，只為保護銀行和銀行家的利益，誰人“問責”？
"AN ERROR DOES NOT BECOME A MISTAKE UNTIL YOU REFUSE TO CORRECT IT"
1。 證監會就迷你債券涉及的內部系統及監控進行調查後, 有效地發現了涉及迷你債卷銷售的基本問題。 證監會譴責了迷你債卷 co-distributor 新鴻基 SHK Securities Limited 和 凱基證券亞洲有限公司（凱基證券）。
證監會的調查方式迅速有效，不僅僅是保障了公眾利益，還有效地使用了證監會的（人力財力）資源。
2。金管局卻調查伊始就完全排除有銀行系統性錯誤的可能， 將可能出現的的錯誤定性為（個別）銷售人員的“錯誤銷售”。
雷曼破產之後，銀行職員和銀行的錶態都充分顯示了銀行並不清楚迷債的真實特徵和風險，並不清楚迷債的最“精華”部分:抵押品的性質。（當然，不排除有銀行高層是完全明白理解迷債實質但有意隱瞞，這有待於律政司/警察商業犯罪調查科的進一步調查）。
是甚麼原因促使金管局決定不首先對銀行系統做基本調查的呢？ 是甚麼原因促使金管局決定採用需要大量人力耗時且低效益的方式來調查2萬多迷債投訴呢？
3。2009年1月，證監會就新鴻基金融的迷債銷售提出的關註包括：
［ 一、對產品進行的盡職審查是否足夠；二、對前線人員提供的培訓是否足夠，從而確保投資者理解產品涉及的一切重大風險；三、迷債系列的風險水平；向零售銷售人員傳達迷債風險評級的信息；及採取理應採取的措施，確保銷售人員提供合理適當意見；等等］
新鴻基金融曾為許多銀行提供了關於跟迷債相關的培訓。事實上，許多銀行（如：永亨銀行等）的迷債銷售是直接跟新鴻基金融合作，而不是直接跟雷曼亞洲合作的。
這就再次提出一個基本問題：
是甚麼原因造成金管局（一再）堅持決定不做基本的調查，為甚麼金管局這麼確信銀行沒有系統性失誤呢？ 竊鈎者誅，竊國者侯？
4。 金管局的調查方式是：假定銀行沒有系統性失誤（可意會不可言傳），對每一個投訴案例，按金管局預先設定的問題，逐個詢問。金管局收到超過2萬多關於迷你債卷的投訴。至今處理了400多個個案。
金管局調查人員跟我進行電話詢問的時候，連我的投訴信都沒有看過，根本都不知道我的投訴內容是甚麼，只知道是迷債。只字不問我的投訴信裡到底具體投訴了些甚麼。就根據金管局的預定問題，包括年齡，收入，是否由職員介紹買入迷債，買迷債的資金是否由定期而來，等等。卻只字不詢問買入的時候，我對於對於 迷債的理解，以及 銀行是如何解釋 迷債的真實特徵和相關風險的。
如果，根本不過問投訴人的具體投訴，只是根據金管局預定的詢問問題進行問答，那麼，會有個甚麼結果呢？ 應該是根據金管局預定問題的方曏而得出的期待的結果？
儘管客戶就迷債的真實特徵和相關風險投訴被誤導。金管局的調查方式幾乎是假定了一個默認的調查邏輯：如果是投訴迷債的，那麼就是跟“錯誤銷售”有關。這也是金管局人員不主動詢問投訴人具體的是投訴和因由。這大概也是金管局人員不詢問關於迷債的真實特徵和相關風險的問題。
5。對於2萬多人的關於同一個產品（迷你債卷）的投訴，通常應該是首先清除有沒有系統性失誤。而迷債之謎的關鍵是其真實特徵和相關風險。通常的 bottom-up 邏輯應該是：
《首先》：銀行職員「透徹理解」投資產品；
《其次》 銀行職員曏客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險；
《其它》瞭解客戶。。。。。。
〈最後》銷售迷债。
銀行職員有沒有 ‘解釋產品的真實特徵及風險’ 以及職員對投資產品的「透徹理解」，應該是調查迷你債卷投訴的基本問題吧。
6。金管局選擇的調查方式是否更有效地調查和找出事件的主要原因？或則只是更有效地需求更多人力／財力和時間來完成調查？ 對於2萬多投訴，這是最佳方式呢還是最低效益方式之一呢？
金管局這麼多高薪專業人才，好像非常善於選擇 "只看枝節，不看問題的基本關鍵"，" 只見樹枝 ，不見森林 "（恐怕連樹都沒看見）的調查方式。其結果是勞民傷財，且效益低下。不能夠象證監會一樣地迅速查出和糾正銀行的系統性錯誤。造成金管局以浪費公款來縱容和庇護銀行的錯誤的局面，既損害公眾利益，也損害了香港政府和香港金融界的公信力。
如果將來事實證明金管局的調查邏輯和方式只是有效地將主要問題和次要枝節問題混淆，從而造成需要更長地時間和浪費公款（納稅人的錢）去調查(關於迷你債卷的)投訴。那麼，有沒有‘問責’的人？
7。不要讓“迷債之都”變成“金融中心”的代名詞
公眾利益不僅僅是銀行和銀行家的利益。銀行和金管局聯手掩蓋事實的企圖只能達到欲蓋彌張 的效果。或許可能會短期保護了銀行家的既得利益。長遠終究會進一步地損害銀行的聲譽，讓香港作為金融中心的聲譽徹底地跟“老千”掛鈎。 當然，這些恐怕是不在銀行家的考慮之中的了。諸多的銀行家們看來是非常精於“厚黑學” （李宗吾： 「厚」是厚臉皮，「黑」是黑心腸））。
1。 證監會就迷你債券涉及的內部系統及監控進行調查後, 有效地發現了涉及迷你債卷銷售的基本問題。 證監會譴責了迷你債卷 co-distributor 新鴻基 SHK Securities Limited 和 凱基證券亞洲有限公司（凱基證券）。
證監會的調查方式迅速有效，不僅僅是保障了公眾利益，還有效地使用了證監會的（人力財力）資源。
2。金管局卻調查伊始就完全排除有銀行系統性錯誤的可能， 將可能出現的的錯誤定性為（個別）銷售人員的“錯誤銷售”。
雷曼破產之後，銀行職員和銀行的錶態都充分顯示了銀行並不清楚迷債的真實特徵和風險，並不清楚迷債的最“精華”部分:抵押品的性質。（當然，不排除有銀行高層是完全明白理解迷債實質但有意隱瞞，這有待於律政司/警察商業犯罪調查科的進一步調查）。
是甚麼原因促使金管局決定不首先對銀行系統做基本調查的呢？ 是甚麼原因促使金管局決定採用需要大量人力耗時且低效益的方式來調查2萬多迷債投訴呢？
3。2009年1月，證監會就新鴻基金融的迷債銷售提出的關註包括：
［ 一、對產品進行的盡職審查是否足夠；二、對前線人員提供的培訓是否足夠，從而確保投資者理解產品涉及的一切重大風險；三、迷債系列的風險水平；向零售銷售人員傳達迷債風險評級的信息；及採取理應採取的措施，確保銷售人員提供合理適當意見；等等］
新鴻基金融曾為許多銀行提供了關於跟迷債相關的培訓。事實上，許多銀行（如：永亨銀行等）的迷債銷售是直接跟新鴻基金融合作，而不是直接跟雷曼亞洲合作的。
這就再次提出一個基本問題：
是甚麼原因造成金管局（一再）堅持決定不做基本的調查，為甚麼金管局這麼確信銀行沒有系統性失誤呢？ 竊鈎者誅，竊國者侯？
4。 金管局的調查方式是：假定銀行沒有系統性失誤（可意會不可言傳），對每一個投訴案例，按金管局預先設定的問題，逐個詢問。金管局收到超過2萬多關於迷你債卷的投訴。至今處理了400多個個案。
金管局調查人員跟我進行電話詢問的時候，連我的投訴信都沒有看過，根本都不知道我的投訴內容是甚麼，只知道是迷債。只字不問我的投訴信裡到底具體投訴了些甚麼。就根據金管局的預定問題，包括年齡，收入，是否由職員介紹買入迷債，買迷債的資金是否由定期而來，等等。卻只字不詢問買入的時候，我對於對於 迷債的理解，以及 銀行是如何解釋 迷債的真實特徵和相關風險的。
如果，根本不過問投訴人的具體投訴，只是根據金管局預定的詢問問題進行問答，那麼，會有個甚麼結果呢？ 應該是根據金管局預定問題的方曏而得出的期待的結果？
儘管客戶就迷債的真實特徵和相關風險投訴被誤導。金管局的調查方式幾乎是假定了一個默認的調查邏輯：如果是投訴迷債的，那麼就是跟“錯誤銷售”有關。這也是金管局人員不主動詢問投訴人具體的是投訴和因由。這大概也是金管局人員不詢問關於迷債的真實特徵和相關風險的問題。
5。對於2萬多人的關於同一個產品（迷你債卷）的投訴，通常應該是首先清除有沒有系統性失誤。而迷債之謎的關鍵是其真實特徵和相關風險。通常的 bottom-up 邏輯應該是：
《首先》：銀行職員「透徹理解」投資產品；
《其次》 銀行職員曏客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的真實特徵及風險；
《其它》瞭解客戶。。。。。。
〈最後》銷售迷债。
銀行職員有沒有 ‘解釋產品的真實特徵及風險’ 以及職員對投資產品的「透徹理解」，應該是調查迷你債卷投訴的基本問題吧。
6。金管局選擇的調查方式是否更有效地調查和找出事件的主要原因？或則只是更有效地需求更多人力／財力和時間來完成調查？ 對於2萬多投訴，這是最佳方式呢還是最低效益方式之一呢？
金管局這麼多高薪專業人才，好像非常善於選擇 "只看枝節，不看問題的基本關鍵"，" 只見樹枝 ，不見森林 "（恐怕連樹都沒看見）的調查方式。其結果是勞民傷財，且效益低下。不能夠象證監會一樣地迅速查出和糾正銀行的系統性錯誤。造成金管局以浪費公款來縱容和庇護銀行的錯誤的局面，既損害公眾利益，也損害了香港政府和香港金融界的公信力。
如果將來事實證明金管局的調查邏輯和方式只是有效地將主要問題和次要枝節問題混淆，從而造成需要更長地時間和浪費公款（納稅人的錢）去調查(關於迷你債卷的)投訴。那麼，有沒有‘問責’的人？
7。不要讓“迷債之都”變成“金融中心”的代名詞
公眾利益不僅僅是銀行和銀行家的利益。銀行和金管局聯手掩蓋事實的企圖只能達到欲蓋彌張 的效果。或許可能會短期保護了銀行家的既得利益。長遠終究會進一步地損害銀行的聲譽，讓香港作為金融中心的聲譽徹底地跟“老千”掛鈎。 當然，這些恐怕是不在銀行家的考慮之中的了。諸多的銀行家們看來是非常精於“厚黑學” （李宗吾： 「厚」是厚臉皮，「黑」是黑心腸））。
2009年5月18日 星期一
血 染 的 迷 債
------------------
也許我告別 將不再 信任你，
你是否羞愧？
你是否難眠？
也許我倒下 將不再 起來 ，
你是否還要永久的欺騙 ？
你們的靈魂
已出賣給魔鬼
都是為了
銀行的收入傭金和花紅。
如果是這樣
你無法否認，
你們揮霍的傭金裡
有我們血染的迷債。
也許我的眼睛再不能睜開
你是否理解我沉默的蔑視。
也許我長眠再不能醒來
你是否相信我化作了雷霆。
你們的靈魂
已出賣給魔鬼
你們揮霍的傭金是，
欺騙市民而得到，
－－－－－－－－－－－
如果是這樣
你不要忘記，
銀行界的歷史上
會永遠記得這迷債。
如果是這樣
你不要忘記，
銀行家的傭金裡，
有我們血染的迷債
如果是這樣
你不要忘記，
銀行界的歷史上
會有我們血染的迷債。
血染的迷債
< 求助：請哪位歌手給幫忙錄唱？ 謝謝.
如果您有興趣，可以聯繫: minibondvictim@gmail.com>
也許我告別 將不再 信任你，
你是否羞愧？
你是否難眠？
也許我倒下 將不再 起來 ，
你是否還要永久的欺騙 ？
你們的靈魂
已出賣給魔鬼
都是為了
銀行的收入傭金和花紅。
如果是這樣
你無法否認，
你們揮霍的傭金裡
有我們血染的迷債。
也許我的眼睛再不能睜開
你是否理解我沉默的蔑視。
也許我長眠再不能醒來
你是否相信我化作了雷霆。
你們的靈魂
已出賣給魔鬼
你們揮霍的傭金是，
欺騙市民而得到，
－－－－－－－－－－－
如果是這樣
你不要忘記，
銀行界的歷史上
會永遠記得這迷債。
如果是這樣
你不要忘記，
銀行家的傭金裡，
有我們血染的迷債
如果是這樣
你不要忘記，
銀行界的歷史上
會有我們血染的迷債。
血染的迷債
< 求助：請哪位歌手給幫忙錄唱？ 謝謝.
如果您有興趣，可以聯繫: minibondvictim@gmail.com>
2009年5月1日 星期五
True Features and Associated Risks of Minibond
Wing Hang Bank (永亨) had been selling Minibond over a few years. Most minibond series were rated as "Medium Risk Investments". Minibond was promoted and explained to clients as "Credit-Linked to 7 well-known companies" as the key features and risks. The fact that the CDO Colalteral was credit-linked to over 100 companies had never been discussed to clients.
1. Downplayed Risk Rating ?
The Minibond’s only asset was collateral and Swaps. The CDO collateral in fact was comprised of CDS referencing to credit risk of over 100 entities and could be credit-linked to entities at sub-investment grade. The CDS in the CDO collateral synthetically transferred the credit risk of over 100 reference entities to Minibond holders. Therefore, the value of minibond was not only affected by the credit-event with the 7 well-known companies, but also was greatly affected by the credit events related to the 100+ reference entities in the (synthetic) CDO collateral.
Did the "Medium Risk Investments" rating significantly downplay the true risk of minibond ?
Maybe, the “Medium Risk” rating on the Minibond is a strong evidence to suggest that the BBanKK either intentionally downplayed the true risk of the minibond, or the BBanKK proceeded with the Minibond sale without thorough understanding of the true risks related to the Minibond, all for the purpose of maximizing the sale of the Minibond ?
2. Omission of Material Information ?
the BBanKK passed Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus to their clients. The prospectus dedicated many pages on the “credit-linked to 7 well-reference entities”, the 7 reference entities’ ratings, and the impact of any default event related to the 7 well-known reference entities.
The CDO collateral of Series 27 in fact had 155 CDS with 25 entities at sub-investment grade. The CDS in the minibond’s CDO collateral synthetically transferred the credit risk of the reference portfolio to Minibond holders. The risks of the Minibond greatly depended on the information regarding number / name / rating of the reference entities & reference obligations in the (synthetic) CDO collateral and the rules regarding their default event. No professional intermediary could have valued the Minibond using only the information provided in Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus & marketing material.
SFC Code of Conduct requires that "Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information".
Let's take a look at now disclosed Minibond structure:
(i) Minibond had CDS with 7 well-known reference entities;
and:
(ii) Minibond CDO Colalteral had CDS with over 100 reference entities (some were at sub-investment grade).
What ware the reasons for the BBanKK to decide that only informaiton of (i) was material information and information of (ii) was not relevant material information to clients ?
What were the reasons for the BBanKK to decide that information of (i) reprensented the true features and associated risks of minibond?
What were the reasons for the BBanKK to decide not mentioning a word on information of(ii), and disclose all the information of (i) only?
The interest rate of Minibond (on average) was about 1% - 1.5% higher than the libor rate at the purchase time, for the long 4-7 year lock up period (due to no liquidity). Imagine what kind of people would be attracted to a long 4-7 year lock up period with such a return.
7 versus 100+ (or 7 versus 155), CDO Collateral information and the 100+ reference entities' information should be the more relevant material information to the true risk of the Minibond than the 7 well-known companies' information.
- was there any staff from the BBanKK ever discuss with their clients about the CDO collateral?
- was there any staff from the BBanKK offer their clients any collateral information (document) ?
3. Explanations givens by the BBanKK's staff
Some BBanKK staff explained the product feature and associated risk as following:
- Credit Event of the 7 reference entities;
- No liquidity and had to hold till maturity;
- Get 100% principal back on maturity if no credit event happens.
BBanKK staff seemed to only aware of the information about “credit-linked to 7 reference entities”, because they never discussed with their clients about the reference entities in the CDO collateral.
4. Misprepresenation of the True Nature of the Minibond ?
The Minibond was presented and explained as "Credit Linked to 7 Reference Entities”. The CDS in the minibond’s CDO collateral synthetically transferred the credit risk of the reference portfolio to Minibond holders. The Minibond was in fact credit-linked to “7+over100” reference entities.
Is it possible that the BBanKK negligently, or worse, intentionally, misrepresented the true nature and characteristics of the Minibond, omitted the material risk associated with the minibond either because the BBanKK did not understand the true nature and risk of the Minibond or because the BBanKK worried that truthful and transparent information would hurt the Minibond sale.
Further, clients were never told exactly how the proceeds of the Minibond sale would be used and were not told that such proceeds were in fact not invested into any real debt/loans of the reference companies.
5. Inadequate and Faulty Due Diligence ?
the BBanKK's due diligence was inadequate and faulty, on the contrary of their own claim “product due diligence was properly conducted by our Bank” (Dec2008). Evidence is as follows:
a) the BBanKK rated the Minibond as Medium Risk Investment, considerably downplaying the product's true risk level.
b) It was never mentioned to clients that the Minibond was not invested into any debt / loans / bonds issued by any of the 7 reference entities. It was never explained to clients that the Minibond CDO collateral was referencing to the credit risk of many (over 100) entities.
c) It was never mentioned to clints that a "AAA-rated CDO" may not invest into any debt/loan/bond at all, and that "AAA-rated CDO" was not the same as a "AAA-rated" bond.
d) It was never explained to clients about the risk related to CDO or Synthetic CDO.
e) And clients was never told to be aware that the Minibond was, in fact, not only credit-linked to the 7 reference entities, but also credit-linked to over 100 entities in the CDO collateral portfolio.
Could it be that, instead of exercising reasonable due diligence, the BBanKK in fact collaborated (possible fraudulently), with the Minibond issuer, hiding the risk of the synthetic CDO from their retail clients, with the objective of increasing the sale of the Minibonds.
6. "香港銀行業向來依據最高的專業守則經營".
Can we ask Wing Hang Bank to give us a brief description about the key feature and associate risks of the Minibond? Wing Hang Bank's staffs were not shy of explaning the features and associated of risks in the past few years' minibond sales period.
All the relevant training procedure and sales guidence would show public that the Wing Hang Bank in deed 依據專業守則經營.
"You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the people all of the time."
1. Downplayed Risk Rating ?
The Minibond’s only asset was collateral and Swaps. The CDO collateral in fact was comprised of CDS referencing to credit risk of over 100 entities and could be credit-linked to entities at sub-investment grade. The CDS in the CDO collateral synthetically transferred the credit risk of over 100 reference entities to Minibond holders. Therefore, the value of minibond was not only affected by the credit-event with the 7 well-known companies, but also was greatly affected by the credit events related to the 100+ reference entities in the (synthetic) CDO collateral.
Did the "Medium Risk Investments" rating significantly downplay the true risk of minibond ?
Maybe, the “Medium Risk” rating on the Minibond is a strong evidence to suggest that the BBanKK either intentionally downplayed the true risk of the minibond, or the BBanKK proceeded with the Minibond sale without thorough understanding of the true risks related to the Minibond, all for the purpose of maximizing the sale of the Minibond ?
2. Omission of Material Information ?
the BBanKK passed Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus to their clients. The prospectus dedicated many pages on the “credit-linked to 7 well-reference entities”, the 7 reference entities’ ratings, and the impact of any default event related to the 7 well-known reference entities.
The CDO collateral of Series 27 in fact had 155 CDS with 25 entities at sub-investment grade. The CDS in the minibond’s CDO collateral synthetically transferred the credit risk of the reference portfolio to Minibond holders. The risks of the Minibond greatly depended on the information regarding number / name / rating of the reference entities & reference obligations in the (synthetic) CDO collateral and the rules regarding their default event. No professional intermediary could have valued the Minibond using only the information provided in Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus & marketing material.
SFC Code of Conduct requires that "Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information".
Let's take a look at now disclosed Minibond structure:
(i) Minibond had CDS with 7 well-known reference entities;
and:
(ii) Minibond CDO Colalteral had CDS with over 100 reference entities (some were at sub-investment grade).
What ware the reasons for the BBanKK to decide that only informaiton of (i) was material information and information of (ii) was not relevant material information to clients ?
What were the reasons for the BBanKK to decide that information of (i) reprensented the true features and associated risks of minibond?
What were the reasons for the BBanKK to decide not mentioning a word on information of(ii), and disclose all the information of (i) only?
The interest rate of Minibond (on average) was about 1% - 1.5% higher than the libor rate at the purchase time, for the long 4-7 year lock up period (due to no liquidity). Imagine what kind of people would be attracted to a long 4-7 year lock up period with such a return.
7 versus 100+ (or 7 versus 155), CDO Collateral information and the 100+ reference entities' information should be the more relevant material information to the true risk of the Minibond than the 7 well-known companies' information.
- was there any staff from the BBanKK ever discuss with their clients about the CDO collateral?
- was there any staff from the BBanKK offer their clients any collateral information (document) ?
3. Explanations givens by the BBanKK's staff
Some BBanKK staff explained the product feature and associated risk as following:
- Credit Event of the 7 reference entities;
- No liquidity and had to hold till maturity;
- Get 100% principal back on maturity if no credit event happens.
BBanKK staff seemed to only aware of the information about “credit-linked to 7 reference entities”, because they never discussed with their clients about the reference entities in the CDO collateral.
4. Misprepresenation of the True Nature of the Minibond ?
The Minibond was presented and explained as "Credit Linked to 7 Reference Entities”. The CDS in the minibond’s CDO collateral synthetically transferred the credit risk of the reference portfolio to Minibond holders. The Minibond was in fact credit-linked to “7+over100” reference entities.
Is it possible that the BBanKK negligently, or worse, intentionally, misrepresented the true nature and characteristics of the Minibond, omitted the material risk associated with the minibond either because the BBanKK did not understand the true nature and risk of the Minibond or because the BBanKK worried that truthful and transparent information would hurt the Minibond sale.
Further, clients were never told exactly how the proceeds of the Minibond sale would be used and were not told that such proceeds were in fact not invested into any real debt/loans of the reference companies.
5. Inadequate and Faulty Due Diligence ?
the BBanKK's due diligence was inadequate and faulty, on the contrary of their own claim “product due diligence was properly conducted by our Bank” (Dec2008). Evidence is as follows:
a) the BBanKK rated the Minibond as Medium Risk Investment, considerably downplaying the product's true risk level.
b) It was never mentioned to clients that the Minibond was not invested into any debt / loans / bonds issued by any of the 7 reference entities. It was never explained to clients that the Minibond CDO collateral was referencing to the credit risk of many (over 100) entities.
c) It was never mentioned to clints that a "AAA-rated CDO" may not invest into any debt/loan/bond at all, and that "AAA-rated CDO" was not the same as a "AAA-rated" bond.
d) It was never explained to clients about the risk related to CDO or Synthetic CDO.
e) And clients was never told to be aware that the Minibond was, in fact, not only credit-linked to the 7 reference entities, but also credit-linked to over 100 entities in the CDO collateral portfolio.
Could it be that, instead of exercising reasonable due diligence, the BBanKK in fact collaborated (possible fraudulently), with the Minibond issuer, hiding the risk of the synthetic CDO from their retail clients, with the objective of increasing the sale of the Minibonds.
6. "香港銀行業向來依據最高的專業守則經營".
Can we ask Wing Hang Bank to give us a brief description about the key feature and associate risks of the Minibond? Wing Hang Bank's staffs were not shy of explaning the features and associated of risks in the past few years' minibond sales period.
All the relevant training procedure and sales guidence would show public that the Wing Hang Bank in deed 依據專業守則經營.
"You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the people all of the time."
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