2009年7月25日 星期六

Judicial Review of SFC decision?

This was raised by a Mr. Fat Low Won from http://chukwokhung.mysinablog.com/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=1844449.

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I hope the minibond holders can rise a judicial Review of SFC decision and finish within two months, just like PCCW case on including the following points.

1) why have to stop all investigation by SFC and HKMA and law suit vs banks?

2) why not 100% instead of 60%+X ?

Why SHK and KGE 100%?

What were the reasons for banks being treated differently?

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Your opinions are...?

2009年7月24日 星期五

(轉載) 「失實陳述」在雷曼事件的應用-By 王岸然

雷曼迷債事件發展到今天,可謂完全背離一個法治社會應有的做法。筆者其實只想問一個簡單得無法再簡單的問題,銀行當初的銷售手法是否違法,若然是,是銀行錯了,買賣合約無效了,銀行就應當全數賠償,但若然銀行沒有錯,一切已經做足手續,解釋的清清楚楚,那就是雷曼小投資者自己的錯,是自己投資失誤,猶如我們購買一件商品之時自己沒有看清楚商品的品質及性能就買下來,這自然是自己的責任。

但雷曼迷債最終的解決建議,卻明顯只是強權,沒有公義。 早幾個星期香港的證監會才清楚表明立場,除小數專業投資者外,雷曼苦主應可獲十足回購,而事實上證監在自己的權限所及已經成功迫令多家證券商全數回購雷曼迷債,但今天在政府的壓力之下,證監會、金管局及16家迷債分銷銀行達成和解協議,同意銀行可以以「六成」之低的價錢回購投資者手上的迷債。

只有六成的回購價,道理何在?選擇接納和解的苦主,將不可再追究銀行,理由又何在?對無權無勢的小投資者而言,就算明知道理與法律百分之一百在自己一邊,又可以如何?他們對銀行還有信心嗎?對政府還有信心嗎?

筆者在三份報紙的專欄不下十數篇文章批評事件,皆只在法律的角度出發,文章皆放上網誌,有不少苦主留意及回應,亦直接收到不少報章轉寄而來的讀者來信。到這一刻,實有欲語無言之感。我無法對苦主提出簡單有力的建議,是接受還是不接受六成和解,筆者只知道,對大多數苦主而言,這是一項不平等條約,可憐的是你們求助無門,政客都已經放假去了。

筆者這裡簡單介紹在合約法之中,所謂失實陳述(Misrepresentation)的定義。所謂失實陳述,是合約的一方提出並非事實(facts)的資料,目的是誘導(induce)另一方接受合約的訂立。在合約訂定過程之中若然有一方有]失實陳述,法律的後果是另一方(被誤導的一方)有權選擇視合約無效(Voidable at the election of the party being induced)。

受誤導的一方只需證明:

(一) 有失實事實的表達過程(a representation of facts)。放到雷曼的事件中,就是銀行介紹有關迷債的情況是否皆是事實?例如曾經形容迷債非常安全,其性質是一種收息的「債權」,有沒有收藏這是一類高風險衍生工具的事實?

(二) 這是有關事實的陳述,而不是對產品的形容詞,因為一般而言,形容詞無法下定義,例如我形容一隻股票或基金的回報理想,理想就只是形容詞,但我說不會少於百分之五的回報,則是一項事實。

(三) 有關的事實是否對被誤導者決定訂約是重要的事實考慮。

(四) 受害人合理地依賴這些陳述。

亦所以,專業投資者不應依賴銀行單方面的陳述,合約有效。小投資者欠缺專業知識,會完全依賴銀行的職員的解說,只要這些解說之中重要的地方有失實的資料,合約會失去效力,結果就是小投資者有權取回十足的合約本金。法例是這樣的清楚,但現在見到的結果,何其荒謬?◇

(轉載)
「失實陳述」在雷曼事件的應用-By 王岸然

2009年7月21日 星期二

<轉載>迷債回購方案中投資者和銀行損益計算表-對銀行不但無懲罰性,反而有得賺 ?


以下為 J.Y.先生 從新聞中收集相關的迷債回購方案,加上整理得到一的列表,歸納而成的迷債回購方案中投資者和銀行損益計算表.


大家細看一下以下整理得到一的列表,便會發覺在某些情况下銀行的損失居然比投資者為少,甚致有得賺,剩餘價愈高和投資者在抵押品出售後剩餘價值餘的攤分比率愈低,銀行有得賺機會愈高及賺得愈多,

證監會表示考慮和解方案時,會根據3項原則,
一是能否補償投資者損失、
二是有關機構能否確保日後避免再犯及改善錯失、
三是要反映若干懲罰性。

現在的迷債回購方案, 對銀行不但無懲罰性,反而有得賺 ?
和解方案究竟主要是在懲罰誰?懲罰錯誤地信任了銀行的香港市民們?

以下計算未包括
- 銀行銷售迷債所收到的傭金,(對於一個4年期的迷債系列,在4年內,銀行通常是每年都收到相應之傭金);
- 投資者己收取的利息(傳有銀行要求扣除相關利息);
- 以及銀行的手續費(傳銀行傾向免收手續費),


================================================

<列表-1> ' 60%+10% ' 回購方案中投資者和銀行損益計算表.
[ 銀行按投資本金之 60% 回購,
抵押品出售後的餘價值的首 10% 歸還投資者,
若還有餘款,首 60% 屬銀行,
若再有餘款,會全屬投資者。 ]

[抵押品售後價值] 投資者實收 投資者(損失) 銀行損/賺
-----------------------------------------------
5% 65.00% (35.00%) (60.00%)
10% 70.00% (30.00%) (60.00%)
15% 70.00% (30.00%) (55.00%)
20% 70.00% (30.00%) (50.00%)
25% 70.00% (30.00%) (45.00%)
30% 70.00% (30.00%) (40.00%)
35% 70.00% (30.00%) (35.00%)
40% 70.00% (30.00%) (30.00%)
45% 70.00% (30.00%) (25.00%)
50% 70.00% (30.00%) (20.00%)
55% 70.00% (30.00%) (15.00%)
60% 70.00% (30.00%) (10.00%)
65% 70.00% (30.00%) (5.00%)
70% 70.00% (30.00%) 0.00%
75% 75.00% (25.00%) 0.00%
80% 80.00% (20.00%) 0.00%
85% 85.00% (15.00%) 0.00%
90% 90.00% (10.00%) 0.00%
95% 95.00% (5.00%) 0.00%
100% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%

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<列表-2> 根據傳聞之迷債回購方案 :
按投資本金之 60% 回購, 再加相當於抵押品出售後總值的某個百分比.

[ 抵押品出售後價值 ] 預期投資者在抵押品出售後剩餘價值餘的攤分比率
40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5%
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[5% | 投資者實收 ] 62.00% 61.75% 61.50% 61.25% 61.00% 60.75% 60.50% 60.25%
| 投資者((損失)](38.00%) (38.25%) (38.50%) (38.75%) (39.00%) (39.25%) (39.50%) (39.75%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (57.00%) (56.75%) (56.50%) (56.25%) (56.00%) (55.75%) (55.50%) (55.25%)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[10% | 投資者實收 ] 64.00% 63.50% 63.00% 62.50% 62.00% 61.50% 61.00% 60.50%
| 投資者(損失)] (36.00%) (36.50%) (37.00%) (37.50%) (38.00%) (38.50%) (39.00%) (39.50%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (54.00%) (53.50%) (53.00%) (52.50%) (52.00%) (51.50%) (51.00%) (50.50%)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[15%| 投資者實收 ] 66.00% 65.25% 64.50% 63.75% 63.00% 62.25% 61.50% 60.75%
| 投資者(損失) ] (34.00%) (34.75%) (35.50%) (36.25%) (37.00%) (37.75%) (38.50%) (39.25%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (51.00%) (50.25%) (49.50%) (48.75%) (48.00%) (47.25%) (46.50%) (45.75%)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[20%| 投資者實收 ] 68.00% 67.00% 66.00% 65.00% 64.00% 63.00% 62.00% 61.00%
| 投資者(損失) ](32.00%) (33.00%) (34.00%) (35.00%) (36.00%) (37.00%) (38.00%) (39.00%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (48.00%) (47.00%) (46.00%) (45.00%) (44.00%) (43.00%) (42.00%) (41.00%)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[25%| 投資者實收 ] 70.00% 68.75% 67.50% 66.25% 65.00% 63.75% 62.50% 61.25%
| 投資者(損失) ] (30.00%) (31.25%) (32.50%) (33.75%) (35.00%) (36.25%) (37.50%) (38.75%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (45.00%) (43.75%) (42.50%) (41.25%) (40.00%) (38.75%) (37.50%) (36.25%)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[30%| 投資者實收 ] 72.00% 70.50% 69.00% 67.50% 66.00% 64.50% 63.00% 61.50%
| 投資者(損失) ] (28.00%) (29.50%) (31.00%) (32.50%) (34.00%) (35.50%) (37.00%) (38.50%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (42.00%) (40.50%) (39.00%) (37.50%) (36.00%) (34.50%) (33.00%) (31.50%)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[35%| 投資者實收 ] 74.00% 72.25% 70.50% 68.75% 67.00% 65.25% 63.50% 61.75%
| 投資者(損失) ](26.00%) (27.75%) (29.50%) (31.25%) (33.00%) (34.75%) (36.50%) (38.25%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ](39.00%) (37.25%) (35.50%) (33.75%) (32.00%) (30.25%) (28.50%) (26.75%)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[40%| 投資者實收 ] 76.00% 74.00% 72.00% 70.00% 68.00% 66.00% 64.00% 62.00%
| 投資者(損失) ](24.00%) (26.00%) (28.00%) (30.00%) (32.00%) (34.00%) (36.00%) (38.00%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ](36.00%) (34.00%) (32.00%) (30.00%) (28.00%) (26.00%) (24.00%) (22.00%) ————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[45%| 投資者實收 ] 78.00% 75.75% 73.50% 71.25% 69.00% 66.75% 64.50% 62.25%
| 投資者(損失) ] (22.00%) (24.25%) (26.50%) (28.75%) (31.00%) (33.25%) (35.50%) (37.75%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ](33.00%) (30.75%) (28.50%) (26.25%) (24.00%) (21.75%) (19.50%) (17.25%)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[50%| 投資者實收 ] 80.00% 77.50% 75.00% 72.50% 70.00% 67.50% 65.00% 62.50%
| 投資者(損失) ](20.00%) (22.50%) (25.00%) (27.50%) (30.00%) (32.50%) (35.00%) (37.50%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ](30.00%) (27.50%) (25.00%) (22.50%) (20.00%) (17.50%) (15.00%) (12.50%)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[55%| 投資者實收 ] 82.00% 79.25% 76.50% 73.75% 71.00% 68.25% 65.50% 62.75%
| 投資者(損失) ](18.00%) (20.75%) (23.50%) (26.25%) (29.00%) (31.75%) (34.50%) (37.25%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ](27.00%) (24.25%) (21.50%) (18.75%) (16.00%) (13.25%) (10.50%) 7.75%)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[60%| 投資者實收 ] 84.00% 81.00% 78.00% 75.00% 72.00% 69.00% 66.00% 63.00%
| 投資者(損失) ](16.00%) (19.00%) (22.00%) (25.00%) (28.00%) (31.00%) (34.00%) (37.00%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ](24.00%) (21.00%) (18.00%) (15.00%) (12.00%) (9.00%) (6.00%) (3.00%)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[65%| 投資者實收 ] 86.00% 82.75% 79.50% 76.25% 73.00% 69.75% 66.50% 63.25%
| 投資者(損失) ] (14.00%) (17.25%) (20.50%) (23.75%) (27.00%) (30.25%) (33.50%) (36.75%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (21.00%) (17.75%) (14.50%) (11.25%) (8.00%) (4.75%) (1.50%) 1.75%
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[70%| 投資者實收 ] 88.00% 84.50% 81.00% 77.50% 74.00% 70.50% 67.00% 63.50%
| 投資者(損失) ](12.00%) (15.50%) (19.00%) (22.50%) (26.00%) (29.50%) (33.00%) (36.50%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (18.00%) (14.50% ) (11.00%) (7.50%) (4.00%) (0.50%) 3.00% 6.50%
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[75%| 投資者實收 ] 90.00% 86.25% 82.50% 78.75% 75.00% 71.25% 67.50% 63.75%
| 投資者(損失) ] (10.00%) (13.75%) (17.50%) (21.25%) (25.00%) (28.75%) (32.50%) (36.25%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (15.00%) (11.25%) (7.50%) ( 3.75%) 0.00% 3.75% 7.50% 11.25%
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[80%| 投資者實收 ] 92.00% 88.00% 84.00% 80.00% 76.00% 72.00% 68.00% 64.00%
| 投資者(損失) ](8.00%) (12.00%) (16.00%) (20.00%) (24.00%) (28.00%) (32.00%) (36.00%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (12.00%) (8.00%) (4.00%) 0.00% 4.00% 8.00% 12.00% 16.00%
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[85%| 投資者實收 ] 94.00% 89.75% 85.50% 81.25% 77.00% 72.75% 68.50% 64.25%
| 投資者(損失) ] (6.00%) (10.25%) (14.50%) (18.75%) (23.00%) (27.25%) (31.50%) (35.75%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (9.00%) ( 4.75%) (0.50%) 3.75% 8.00% 12.25% 16.50% 20.75%
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[90%| 投資者實收 ] 96.00% 91.50% 87.00% 82.50% 78.00% 73.50% 69.00% 64.50%
| 投資者(損失) ](4.00%) 8.50%) (13.00%) (17.50%) (22.00%) (26.50%) (31.00%) (35.50%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (6.00%) (1.50%) 3.00% 7.50% 12.00% 16.50% 21.00% 25.50%
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[95%| 投資者實收 ] 98.00% 93.25% 88.50% 83.75% 79.00% 74.25% 69.50% 64.75%
| 投資者(損失) ](2.00%) 6.75%) (11.50%) (16.25%) (21.00%) (25.75%) (30.50%) (35.25%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] (3.00%) 1.75% 6.50% 11.25% 16.00% 20.75% 25.50% 30.25%
————————————————————————————————————————————————————
[100% | 投資者實收 ] 100.00% 95.00% 90.00% 85.00% 80.00% 75.00% 70.00% 65.00%
| 投資者(損失) ] 0.00% 5.00%) (10.00%) (15.00%) (20.00%) (25.00%) (30.00%) (35.00%)
| 銀行(損)/賺 ] 0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00%
=====================================================
   

計算方程式:

投資者實收 = 按投資本金之 60% 回購 + 投資者在抵押品出售後剩餘價值餘的攤分比率
投資者損失 = 投資本金之100% - 投資者實收
銀行損/賺 = 投資者損失 - 銀行在抵押品出售後剩餘價值餘的攤分比率

Banks' Rule?



讀有關銀行跟證監會關於迷債談判之報道有感.

Banks' Rule:
Head: Banks Win;
Tail: Minibond Holders Lose!

銀行行騙和庶民行騙不同罪???????
我們的政府/議員/法律機構等, 對於倫敦金或祈福黨/跌錢黨等欺騙市民的集團,
是否會施以同樣的寬容, 並以現在為銀行辯解的理由 來為這些集團之欺騙行為辯護?

當受監管的金融機構銀行欺騙市民們的時候, 就不是欺騙了?
就可以對銀行網開一面,不受懲罰, 而要求受騙人來承擔責任?

千古奇冤,香港迷債,
銀行行騙,市民蒙冤。
銀行抵賴,市民無奈。
銀行欺詐,無須受罰。

銀行行騙和庶民行騙不同罪?!

或者說:雷曼迷債揭示了香港的銀行跟‘老千’掛鈎之真實面目?!

2009年7月15日 星期三

Why banks can't answer queries regarding the "Fund" (Minibond collateral)?



作為受過良好教育,有包括CDS/CDO和各類信貸掛鈎產品在內的投資經驗的專業人員和管理層的銀行,作為銷售了迷債4-6年的迷債分銷商,
- 銀行為甚麼不能回答以下關於關於抵押品之疑問?
- 銀行的協約精神和對客戶的Duty of Care 職責去了哪裡了呢?

Enquiry on the"NOTICE OF REIVESTMENT OF COLLATERAL FOR UNDERLYING SECURITIES” (letter from HSBC USA and Bank of New York). The following questions are addressed to BANKS who sold minibond to us.

The "Fund" below refers to the Fund mentioned in the "NOTICE OF REIVESTMENT OF COLLATERAL FOR UNDERLYING SECURITIES” (dated 18 March 2009). Use Minibond Series #27 as an example:

(a) Where can I find out the role and functions of Bank of New York in respect of the Minibond Series 27?

(b) Can BANKS please clarify the relationship between the Series 27 and the Fund ?
Because I have looked at the prospectuses but could not find any mention of the Fund. (c) Can you please advise where in the prospectuses for Series 27 the Fund is mentioned?

(c) Can BANKS please advise where in the prospectuses for Series 27 the Fund is mentioned?

Banks are regulated financial institutions. Banks' responsibility as minibond-distributors is NOT confined to passing on the enquiries from the note-holders to the trustee and replies from the trustee to the note-holders, regardless if the enquiries concern matter within banks' knowledge or the replies given by the trustee do not really answers the queries raised. Banks are not no-asking & no-telling & commission-collection middle-man only. Banks are bound by SFC Code of Conduct!

2009年7月13日 星期一

"well-educated", disclosure of Minibond risks, and banks' Duty of Care



One of banks’ excuses on dismissing Minibond complaints is that some Minibond victims are reasonably well-educated and should have been alerted by the ‘red flag’ scattered around in the prospectuses.

Understandably, the Minibond designers & promoters would argue (in their heart) that: the ‘ref flag’ is indicative of the real nature of the products and has been well hidden, notwithstanding the reassuring façade ("credit-linked to 7 well-known companies") and the message of safe and diversification that it is designed to convey.


No professional intermediary could have valued the Minibond using only the information provided in marketing material (including Prospectus).

"Minibond Structure and Pricing Report" by Ernest & Young to Hong Kong Bank Associations (Dec.2008) reveals the material information and risk disclosure that are missing from Minibond prospectus.

Banks are blaming SFC for the minibond approval, in additaional to banks' claim that well-educated clients should have known the true feature and risks of Minibond. Can banks repeat their view on the material risks of Minibond today, after over 4-6 years' minibond sale?

Banks seemed to behave like a no-asking & no-telling commission-collecting only middle-man. What happened to banks' duty of care to its clients?

Did banks' well-educated professional & management who have expertise in CDS / CDO / CDS / credit derivative /other investments products forget that they are bound by "Code of Conduct" (knowing the product, explain the true nature and risks to clients, make adequate disclosure of relevant material information)?

Financial institutions engage in improper conduct for financial gain. As in the case of those who evade tax, penalties must have a deterrent effect. Like tax evaders, the financial institutions should have faced penalties of up to three times the fees and commissions they earned as a result of their misconduct. Regulators in other jurisdictions have found that removing the financial gain is an effective deterrent.

In other jurisdictions, when misconduct by financial institutions has been shown, compensating all affected investors is the norm. The onus is on the financial institution to demonstrate why an investor should not be compensated. Our process of putting the onus on the investor to prove his claim puts many ordinary investors at a disadvantage.

The outcome of this saga does not appear to be just and does not augur well for consumer protection in thefinancial service sector.

2009年7月9日 星期四

我为什么要求100%赔偿 ?



Dear Legco Members,

首先,我非常感謝您們給與迷債受害人的幫助和支持,非常感謝您們為了調查出迷債之謎和造成迷債之災的原因而做出的不懈努力。

其次,我想簡述我要求銀行100%賠償本金之理由。

讀信報7月6日迷宗一文〝銀行理虧 應全數回購迷債〞 後,讀者們(不需是金融專才) 也應明白迷債此等產品由發行到銀行內部審查,中間無不涉及隱瞞(實質是欺騙) 及對投資者失責,……. 如果在解决方案上讓銀行以六或七成回購草草了事,在港經營的銀行業對客戶之Duty of Care 之要求的確是十分低,其結果受罪的只是一群小存戶。那麽,在香港公義何存?

或者說: 當銀行欺騙的時候,就不是欺騙了????? 銀行行騙與庶民不同罪???????

銀行是具備了一切所需之教育程度 和 CDS / CDO / 合成 CDO /信貸掛鈎產品等信貸衍生工具的投資知識和經驗。如果銀行沒有能夠給客戶解釋產品之真是特徵和相關風險,沒有能夠把充分的資料給客戶的話,原因何在呢?

和廣北先生在銀行銷售了4-5年 (2003-2008) 共 36 個迷你債券系列之後,於2008年9月27日,公開承認:“現時本港銀行作為雷曼迷你債的包銷商或分銷商,掌握的信息十分有限。這些債券狀況如何﹖債券抵押品的性質是什麼﹖。。。目前包銷商都不掌握確切信息。”

如果銀行理解產品之真實特徵和風險,為什么和廣北先生說“銀行”對於“債券抵押品的性質”不確切瞭解 ? (和先生用”債券“來簡稱”迷債)。為甚麼銀行在銷售了4-5年 迷你債券系列之後卻半各字都不敢提迷債這個“債券”之真實特徵和風險?銀行怕甚麼?銀行心虛了嗎?

Regulated financial institutions are obligated to explain and disclose true features and risks of products that they are selling, according to SFC Code of Conduct.

Financial institutions engage in improper conduct for financial gain. As in the case of those who evade tax, penalties must have a deterrent effect. Like tax evaders, the financial institutions should have faced penalties of up to three times the fees and commissions they earned as a result of their misconduct. Regulators in other jurisdictions have found that removing the financial gain is an effective deterrent.

In other jurisdictions, when misconduct by financial institutions has been shown, compensating all affected investors is the norm. The onus is on the financial institution to demonstrate why an investor should not be compensated. Our process of putting the onus on the investor to prove his claim puts many ordinary investors at a disadvantage.

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮出席研訊時再次重申,雷曼事件解決方案必須符合三大原則,包括降低客戶損失,用行動糾正再發生違規問題之可能,方案並且要有懲罰性及阻嚇性.

The SFC's 3 principal is norm & inline with other jurisdictions (e.g. world financial center New York, etc.).

The 60%-settlement proposal does not appear to be just and does not augur well for consumer protection in the financial service sector.

Would you please work out a settlement with banks that meet above 3 principals?

Thank you again and appreciate your support and help to Minibond victims.

2008-News: US Regulators alleged that brokerages misled investors into believing that auction rate securities were safe, cash-equivalent products, when in fact they faced increasing liquidity risk. Major financial companies Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia Corp.,and others that sold auction-rate securities have reached 100% buy-back settlements.

Best Regards


A Victim of Minibond sold by Wing Hang Bank

P.S. Quote from
[《銀行理虧 應全數回購迷債》-迷宗-信報7月6日


[從一開始,整個銷售安排都是隱瞞着迷債的真正結構,怪不得到現在,還有很多人包括財金官員都認為,如雷曼不倒,天下就無事,況且雷曼當日還是A+評級的。先讓筆者再簡單的解說這批迷債來糾正誤解。

轉移視線刻意隱瞞
只看上面,你會買迷債嗎?一般人都不認識CDO,每年回報又只有五厘,根本不合風險回報比例,當然不會買!雷曼就來一招轉移視線,把產品來個包裝,就是跟小投資者們買個credit default swap(CDS)。在36系列中,他先選了七間本地大銀行、大藍籌,說如任何一家出事,我雷曼就充公你們小投資者在 Pacific Finance 的債權,你就從我雷曼手上接過那家出事公司的債務。
這招真管用,使人覺得是在冒大藍籌的風險而收五厘息,頗吸引!其實,CDO 的風險從沒轉移,還是在小投資者頭上。但大家知否那些CDO的回報又怎會只得五厘?雷曼成功把高風險的CDO賣予小投資者,就只付那可憐的五厘息,而CDO的高回報就保留給自己,奸狡吧?但這是商業社會,你情我願。要害之處是他們隱瞞了上面的安排。怎隱瞞呢?
在宣傳單張上,只有三個重點大字標題:3年期,5厘息,本金與7大公司掛鈎;再加大備注:不保本,就是這樣。對於CDO的交代,真是小之又小,更在小標題上把它變為空殼公司給你的抵押品之一,只在那些小字(fine-print)中才短短說出替投資者買CDO和CDO也是風險所在的事實。
就算在正式的銷售檔, Issue Prospectus 中開始的十多頁,都只是大篇幅談那七間大公司的背景、評級如何,七間大公司出事時小投資者會有什麼損失。對CDO的敘述,全在文件的中後半部,篇幅也小得可憐。這樣,你就先入為主以為迷債只跟七大藍籌掛鈎了。
又且看正式的銷售檔怎樣作最後的推薦,說迷債適合哪類型投資者(第11頁):
1. 滿足收定息者(講了等於沒講);
2. 對七大藍籌充滿信心者 (轉移視線);
3. 不介意未到期空殼公司也有權提早贖回迷債者;
4. 願意承受虧本風險者,而在七大藍籌出事或迷債被提早贖回時就最易虧本。

......
筆者初看檔時,也不知CDO的風險並非賣回給雷曼,要一直看下去,看到放在附件中的CDS合約本身才知道,此風險還是留在小投資者身上。此合約又真是非常「專業」,即是全部艱澀英文,要行內人細心閱讀才能明白。筆者有一次跟David Webb 討論此點,連他也看錯了。
銀行本身又怎去推銷?筆者一直從事企業融資,但多年前在上一間銀行工作時,也應零售部老總要求,幫他們向大孖沙們推銷類似產品。生意人重利錢,沒有兩三個開的,都不會冒險;迷債只有五厘,我說不可能的。零售部只一路說這是藍籌低風險,正就是上面那幾個重點,還有叫我們打人情牌。我們不久就停止銷售,只因回報不吸引,無人問津。

銀行有責任作盡職審查
不過,就從無人向我們解釋過背後有CDO的安排。銀行有市務發展部和法律合規部,應是來支援作前線的營銷營業隊。為何當時無人能解讀迷債?是雷曼在刻意隱瞞?是銀行零售管理層只追求佣金而不盡職審查和瞭解產品?還是一般商業銀行,特別是零售部,根本就沒有經驗和專業知識去理解日新月異的財資產品?銀行 實在不應單單提供一個零售網絡予投資銀行向公眾行銷。
在資訊永遠分配不均的現實下,銀行有責任作盡職審查,提供公正分析予一眾缺乏這方面知識的小投資者。今次迷債事件正正暴露了這結構性問題。求佣金利潤,沒錯,但卻沒有足夠專業知識和監管去制衡。銀行與客戶之間的互信已全部消失了。雖然筆者也是從業員,但幫理不幫親,銀行不全數回購,說不過去。
...... ]