2010年2月25日 星期四

From Lehman Minibond To Oracle Capital Limited

The Lehman Minibonds were single handedly created and arranged by Lehman Brothers Asia Pacific. The main contributor was the CDO & Structured Credit Group headed by Leon Hindle.

Oracle Capital Limited was described in the "The other side of structured credit of The Asset October 2009 by Chito Santiago (http://www.theasset.com/article/17587.html)" as follows:

[
When the saga of Lehman Brothers started to unravel and eventually led to its spectacular demise in September last year, two of its senior bankers, Leon Hindle and Fredric Teng, were already contemplating lives outside of the firm – and outside of investment banking for that matter. After all, the sellside was gone as the investor base was shattered at that point in time. Perhaps it was opportune to move to the other side of the fence – into the buyside.

Hindle used to be managing director and head of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and structured credit trading group for the Asia-Pacific region at Lehman Brothers. He was also a member of Lehman’s Asia-Pacific fixed income management committee and the global credit products management team.

(...)

Together, they formed Oracle Capital Limited, the Hong Kong-based sub-investment advisor of Oracle Investment Fund SPC focussing on structured credit asset class . Their motivation came at a time when investment banking was changing significantly. In every asset class, it looks as though there is a huge opportunity to move to the buyside. Teng says they have already obtained an asset management licence from the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, and are currently applying for an advisory licence and expect the process to be concluded soon.

In setting up Oracle, Hindle and Teng followed the footsteps of fellow investment bankers who have decided to leave the industry and strike it on their own so as to take advantage of the market dislocation. For instance, Jeremy Amias, a 23-year veteran at Citi who left the US firm as head of fixed income, currencies and commodities for Asia-Pacific, has joined hands with another former Citi banker Charlie Berman to set up Amias Berman and Company, a fixed income advisory, origination and brokerage firm.

(...)

While markets in other asset classes have witnessed rallies, this seems to be less the case for structured credit and according to Hindle, this situation may last for another four to five years. Structured credit is pretty much the whole gamut of products, ranging from single name credit linked notes to balance sheet collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and synthetic CDOs. “These assets are not straight-forward,” notes Teng. “There is a lot of work to be done before you can understand what is going on. And the barrier to entry is high, you need a team of credit derivatives specialists and also a lot of investment in technology. We think we are the only outfit wholly dedicated to this asset class in Asia. We see a lot of opportunities.”

Hindle adds: “Asian investors are really in a difficult position, if you like, to make decisions about how to manage these things going forward given the overall environment now. It is probably less the case for the European or US investors because they do have a greater sense of the underlying risks in these products. That is why I think the opportunity in Asia is present for us. There are people who are running similar funds in the US and Europe, but there is not really anyone on the ground in this region with the same focus.”

(...)

Unlike CLOs, which have rallied and boast a deeper liquidity now, synthetic CDOs did not have a chance to rally to the same extent, because there are not that many pure-end buyers and because, in some cases, the risks of the transactions are tied up to the riskiest names in the former investment grade universe such as the monolines. “The kind of valuation for certain deals at this point in time, if they are managed right, should be able to generate a pretty healthy return despite the lack of liquidity in that area,” Hindle points out.

(...)

]

According to its website, Oracle Captial Limited is located on the 20th Floor, Central Tower of Central, and its Chief Investment Officer is Leon Hindle.

Leon Hindle and his CDO & Structured Credit Group surely have done an excellent jobs for boosting Lehman Brothers revenue and his own bonus in selling synthetic CDO/CDS at the cost of Hong Kong retail banks' clients with the innovation product "Lehman Minibond".


Lehman Brothers sold CDO to their clients by taking advantages of the CDO boom. Lehman Brothers also sold synthetic CDO / CDS to the clients to provide insurance for the event of CDOs bust. However, Lehman Brothers did not want to be the insurance-provider on the related CDOs.

What did Lehman Brothers do? One of the solution is the Lehman Minibond.

Lehman Brothers Asia-Pacific region created the Lehman Minibond which was essentially providing credit default insurances for a basket of reference entities. According to "Derivatives Week" (Dec.8,2008), Leon Hindle oversaw Lehman's origination and distribution of all structured credit in the Asia-Pacific, including the strucuring of CDOS linked to its controversial minibond series.
In 2003, from the poor sales results of Minibond Series 6, the Minibond creator realized that Hong Kong retail banks' clients are not keen in a product that is credit linked to 150 reference entities. The Minibond creator quickly switched to a smoother strategy. They added a facade to the Minibond and prominently promoted the Minibond as "Credite Linked with 7 well-known Companies". While Hong Kong retail banks' clients thought that they bought into a Lehman Minibond which was credited linked to 7 well-known companies, they did not realize that they have actually become the ultimate synthetic CDO /CDS insurance provider, to provide insurance on the default event of a basket of undisclosed 125-194 reference entities. It's the insurance premium for the undisclosed 125-194 reference entities (Synthetic CDO) that pays the Minibond interest.

With all the experience and in-depth knowledge on CDO / Synthetic CDO / CDS, knowing how little that people understand and can be fooled by financial experts on such innovation products, Leon Hindle and his company Oracle Capital Limited surely would provide excellent service to their clients.

Related blogs on Leon Hindle: " Why did Lehman Asia head of structure division Leon Hindle Lie "
(http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/06/lehman-asia-head-of-structure-division.html)

Watch out, if you are considering to buy a product from the experts of CDO / CLO / Synthetic CDO. The product may have a conservative branding name and a beautiful facade, but the true features & risks of the product probably can be anything that is totally different from the branding name & the prominent facade.

2010年2月24日 星期三

The former Lehman Asia Pacific CDO & Structured Credit Team

Who was the creator of the Minibond ?
The product was created by the CDO & Structured Credit Asia Pacific of Lehman Brothers.

Who is Leon Hindle ?
Loen Hindle was Managing Director and Head of CDO & Structured Credit, Asia Pacific, Lehman Brothers.
According to "Derivatives Week" (Dec.8,2008), Leon Hindle oversaw Lehman's origination and distribution of all structured credit in the Asia-Pacific, including the strucuring of CDOS linked to its controversial minibond series.

Related blogs on Leon Hindle: "Why did Lehman Asia head of structure division Leon Hindle Lie"
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/06/lehman-asia-head-of-structure-division.html

Other Senior members in the Lehman Brothers Asia Pacific for CDO & Structured Credit products related may include:

George Sun: is Managing Director and Head of Global Credit Products Sales for Lehman Brothers in Asia ex-Japan. Mr. Sun heads up a team that is responsible for the distribution of all credit products including money markets, high grade credit, high yield credit, loans, private placements, structured credit, CDOs, and emerging market assets.

Ian Croft: is a senior vice president and is responsible for corporate credit securitisation opportunities in Asia ex-Japan, as well marketing and distribution of structured credit products in Singapore and South East Asia.

Patrick Kaye is a Senior Vice President, responsible for Lehman Brothers’ Principal and Structured Finance practice in non-Japan Asia. He and the group arrange securitization financings on behalf of clients as well as asset-based principal investments on behalf of the Firm.

Tay Teck How is a Vice President, in the CDO & Structured Credit, Asia Pacific, Lehman Brothers.

Steve Baker is a Senior Vice President in the CLO Banking group at Lehman Brothers US. Steve is focused on origination, structuring and placement of corporate credit securitizations, CLOs and related products.

2010年2月17日 星期三

銀行 = 金融老千 ?

虎年来临,回首上年之签:

"君不須防人不肖,
眼前鬼卒皆為妖,“


銀行伙同投行以骗术来包装和推銷雷曼迷你債券、大摩精明债券,星展星债(Constellation) , ELN、。。。等等。

政府为了quick-qin, 则不惜杀鸡取蛋,全力支持銀行和投行们面向市民们的金融骗局和骗术。

一不小心,信任银行的市民们都會被骗入到经过金融精英们精心包装过的金融骗局之中,而市民们的身邊的儲蓄都會最终随着骗局的破灭而化為烏有,

骗局暴露之后,政府为了保护銀行和投资银行,全力为银行和投资银行们的金融骗局和骗术辩护,混淆视听。
我們的政府/議員/法律機構等, 對於倫敦金或祈福黨/跌錢黨等欺騙市民的集團,是否會施以同樣的寬容, 並以現在為銀行辯解的理由 來為這些集團之欺騙行為辯護?

” 秦王徒把長城築,
禍去禍來因自招"



金融老千真係無處不在,今次银行在政府的护航之下得以安全地全身而退,他們會因此而變得重視誠信,對客戶盡責麼?或者是變得更加有恃無恐?
市民們:小心銀行和投資銀行錶面的道貌岸然和花言巧語,小心再次被銀行和投資銀行欺騙啊!


千古奇冤,香港迷債,
銀行行騙,市民蒙冤。
銀行抵賴,市民無奈。
銀行欺詐,無須受罰。
!!!!!!!!!!!!!

2010年2月12日 星期五

(轉載)雷曼苦主若肯堅持 可追回餘下四成損失 《新報》

by 王岸然
11 Feb 2010

早於一年多前,筆者在本欄多次提議應以調解制度解決雷曼事件,當時對事件的認識,不如今天的深入;今天可以斷言,新的調解制度不適用於雷曼的苦主,事實上部份苦主於無奈接受六成和解的方案,等同迫苦主完全承擔迷債的苦果,而銀行不須負上責任,亦不須負擔任何補償費用,這是無以言公平的。 筆者認為苦主有權追究到底,就算已經接受了六成賠償的苦主,亦不等於無權再追究下去。正好相反,在前證監的「陶淵明」高秉忠先生作供之後,事實證明了事件是人禍,不是天災,苦主只要肯團結,可以合情合理合法地追回餘下四成損失,問題只是由銀行或證監會負責,還是兩者共同分擔。
人才難敵港府人治作風

上星期四文章結尾之時,提及筆者曾經查問高秉忠,有否願意將一己的寶貴證監經驗,貢獻給中國的證監機構,他的反應是哈哈大笑,有朋友問筆者,「哈哈大笑,盡在不言之中」是甚麼意思?上星期由於篇幅所限,沒有解釋,其實也不難明白,在一個人治的社會,要獨立專業地依法律的授權,不受干擾地履行職責,研究審批投資產品,談何容易?香港受英國人管治一百五十年,自由法治的觀念深入腦海,但回歸之後,內地人治的一套日漸入侵,高秉忠的證供,足以證明一切,高先生若只圖高薪職位,在證監已過二百萬年薪,尚且因為難忍證監內的人治作風要請辭,中國證監份屬行家,知己知彼,人治作風只會比香港的嚴重,不會比香港的輕

香港證監會職員的人工,特別是高薪一族,是比國外的行家高出兩三倍之多。論證監經驗的先進,美國、加拿大、澳洲及英國都比香港先進,香港有條件請一流的人才,但人才當奴才用,上述四處地方的銀行都沒有將迷債放在櫃出售,就是最佳證明。

銀行主事職員應被起訴

新加坡的證監專家不及香港多,「中招」猶有可說,香港的證監專家來自外國先進經驗,並不是欠缺能力,而是難敵港府的人治作風,有原則的人早就離去。

筆者有責任提醒各方面有權者必須注意的,是無論如何也不能讓事件不了了之。作為一個負責任的政府,不能任由社會上幾萬無辜市民,在自己沒有錯誤的情況下,蒙受不明不白的損失,而讓事件不了了之。事情已經很明白,銀行被查明有違規銷售的個案,按法律有刑事責任(不誠實的詐騙),主持其事的銀行職員應被刑事起訴,世上並無因為要打工搵食而隨便犯法的道理, 只要苦主肯堅持,事件終可解決。

時事評論員

wongonyin@yahoo.com

2010年2月4日 星期四

(轉載)致立法會雷曼小組主席何鍾泰議員的公開信

致立法會雷曼小組主席何鍾泰議員:

我們一眾雷曼苦主對閣下處理證監會前職員高秉忠先生在立法會雷曼小組中作供一事, 實不理解。

作為雷曼小組主席, 閣下特別地在會議上不斷及主動引導各議員, 除非高秉忠先生提交證據及文件, 以支持他對證監會言論及指摘, 否則可不考慮其供詞內容. 而閣下在接受電台訪問中, 亦重覆地重申相同腔調。

我們在此不揣測 閣下作出此等動作的意圖, 但這些特別的動作, 閣下實無可否認地限制了高先生抖出證監會在處理審批雷曼事件中失職的真相。

我們翻看年內 閣下主持雷曼小組會議, 在傳召證人方面, 包括金管局任志剛, 蔡耀君; 證監會韋奕禮, 何賢通; 財經事務及庫務局陳家強等人士, 均沒有特別主動提醒各小組議員要上述證人提交文件及證據, 以支持他們的供詞, 我們請 閣下詳細解釋為何在處理證人供詞上出現如此雙重標準。

雷曼小組在往後傳召其他證人時, 包括銀行負責人, 閣下會否同樣地主動提醒各議員, 除非銀行代表提供文件及證據, 否則應不理會其供詞及答辯。

我們覺得高秉忠先生是為彰顯公義而來, 各議員亦應本著社會公義去聆聽作供的內容, 為真相窮追猛打, 主持公道, 才不辜負全港市民的期望。 可是我們卻在電視上看到某些議員在聆訊中保持沈默, 似乎在擔心提問會對證監會不利, 暴露他們處事不當, 更甚者, 我們在電視竟看到某些議員在議會上呼呼大睡, 這成何體統 !

我們全港5萬名雷曼苦主, 每天注意著事態的發展, 所有單位及人士的表現, 也都一一存檔, 並銘記於心, 尤其是議員處理雷曼事件上的公正問題。 希望何鍾泰議員與全港苦主互勉之 !

祝政安!

雷曼苦主大聯盟
二零一零年二月二日

转载自: “致立法會雷曼小組主席何鍾泰議員的公開信”
http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/E887B4E7AB8BE6B395E69C83E99BB7E69BBCE5B08FE7B584E4B8BBE5B8ADE4BD95E98DBEE6B3B0E8ADB0E593A1E79A84E585ACE9968BE4BFA1--E99BB7E69BBCE88BA6E4B8BBE5A4A7E881AFE79B9F6887.php

2010年2月2日 星期二

(信報轉載) 誰要為雷曼事件負責- 王岸然

信報 - 2010年2月3日


經過高秉忠兩天的公開聆訊,相信一直有研究、留意雷曼迷債事件的人,不難明白事件的來龍去脈。簡單地說,這是前朝弄出來的禍,是人禍而不是天災,就算不是有百年一遇的金融海嘯,這件事情同樣會出現,只是遲早的問題。

由於事件的遠因比筆者原先估計的為早,現在的曾蔭權政府財經班子完全未上位,二○○一年時陳家強還在大學教書,曾俊華在海關工作,負責打擊翻版碟,而曾蔭權當時失勢,行行企企之餘就只是負責城市清潔的工作。作為行政會議成員,他理應知情,但談不上要負責,除非有證據顯示他二○○五年掌權之後,有人提議他要正視證監會一會兩管可能出現的問題,而他不理,這就另當別論。

在兩天的聆訊中,泛民議員最有興趣追問,是高秉忠證供之中提及在二○○一年時,當時的證監主席一反證監會十多年的工作常規,直接與前線的監管者開會,要求提供一些快贏方法(Quick Wins),以期盡快搞活經濟。這位沈聯濤主席的做法絕對可笑,這類超級施壓的結果,無異是希望負責審批投資產品的專家放寬他們一貫的標準,以便更多的新投資產品可以推出市場,而類似雷曼迷債這類新的衍生工具投資產品,正是在當時開始出現。

聆訊中泛民議員一再追問,無非想由高秉忠的口中,得知事件的真正負責人,是「董建華」三個字。這是不合理的,因為以高秉忠的位置,就算知道,也只是從沈聯濤或其他高層口中得知,在法律上只屬傳聞證據(Hearsay),不足以證明事實的存在,但作為線索,作為引申的依據,則是十分充足。

「快贏」方法

雷曼特權小組下一步應做的,是以高秉忠的作證為依據,傳召相關人物作供,而這四人,明顯要為雷曼迷債事件的出現,負上終極的責任。這四人分別是證監會前主席沈聯濤、前金融專員任志剛、前財政司梁錦松,自然還有前特首董建華。當然,如果可以的話,應傳訊數個證監會前副總監,特別是「公司財務部」的主管,只是這些外國人早已離任,是否願意到港協助調查,頓成疑問。(順帶一提,議員其實可以親身到外國找這些前證監高層詢問,媒介也可以這樣做,要找尋事件的真相,非不能,是不為也。)

二○○一年港府推行高官問責制,梁錦松上任財政司,若大家還記得,他希望香港的經濟曼克頓化,他是沈聯濤的直屬上司,他曾經對沈聯濤給予指示,是極有可能的,而這就成為沈聯濤逼下屬提供「快贏」方法去搞活經濟的最大原因。

為何又關任志剛事?筆者似乎一直在本欄「追殺」任專員,但事實上整件事件與他有脫不開的關係。沈聯濤在出任證監主席之前,是金融管理局的副總裁,是任志剛的得力助手,二人關係密切,沈聯濤被調去主管證監,是任專員當時勢力擴張的結果,而當時銀行界取消統一存款利息後,需要增加其他類別的業務,任專員本來就是以保護銀行家的利益為己任,他聯同梁錦松,要求沈聯濤主持下的證監會拆牆鬆縛,結果弄出後來的災難,是正常不過的推論,是否如此,若不是,「快贏」之說從何而來?有待特權小組的調查了。

人為悲劇

還有是在二○○五、○六年,本來證監會之內已經花了一年的時間,準備了一套監管中介人不良銷售手法(Mis-Selling)的守則,準備供銀行業使用,但不知為何沒有了下文。證監本來就有守則(經發牌制度)規管證券業界,這是為何證監去年可以逼「新鴻基」及另一證券行百分之一百賠償給雷曼苦主,但銀行的監管完全是金管局的責任,任志剛曾否背後施加影響力,阻攔新守則的通過,不是他又是誰人,正是特權小組的調查要點所在。

無論如何,在高秉忠作證之後,雷曼迷債事件之所以會在香港發生的謎底,基本上已被解開。證監會沒有在適當的時間,做好適當的預防措施,是悲劇的所以發生原因,而悲劇原本是完全可以避免, 背後阻礙證監會工作的原因,是當時的政府金融高官自私地考慮個人利益,要求任內有「快贏」的政績的結果。一想到兩位前朝人物梁錦松與任志剛今天還有為祖國的金融業貢獻經驗,只能祝祖國的投資者好運。

無論對苦主、對社會大眾而言,一句悲劇與不幸,並不是結果。 有兩點法律上及制度上可以解決事件的責任及令到事件有較令人滿意的結果。 大概香港市民不以為要用納稅人的金錢補償雷曼苦主是合理,但證監會在二○○四年起設立了一個「投資者賠償基金」,在弄清責任之後,這基金足以賠償給苦主。另外,只要證明銀行確有詐騙的行為,當局可以刑事起訴銀行的高層,有這一權力,逼銀行出資負擔部分的賠償自然可能。

就這兩點,筆者會另外專文討論,筆者一直認定雷曼苦主有理由亦應有權得到百分百賠償,並非是一個意見咁簡單。

2010年2月1日 星期一

[信報] 加拿大銀行業的Good and Boring - Paul Krugman

2010年2月2日 Paul Krugman

在危機時期,好新聞不是新聞。冰島財政危機成為頭條;加拿大銀行業極其穩健則沒什麼人報道。

然而,隨着全球焦點從拯救金融業轉到改革金融業,那些低調的成功故事至少應該如大型倒閉個案般得到那麼多注視。我們需要從那些顯然是做對了的國家學習,而領頭的是美國的北部鄰居。加拿大現在是個非常重要的榜樣。

是的,我知道,加拿大應該是枯燥無味的。《新共和國雜誌》(The New Republic)曾揚言「有價值的加拿大推廣計劃」(Worthwhile Canadian Initiative)是世上最沉悶的標題(譯注:這是已故美國記者Flora Lewis上世紀八十年代在《紐約時報》一個專欄的名字)。但我一直認為加拿大很有吸引力,主要因為它與美國有很多地方很相似,但又不完全一樣;當加拿大和美國走着不同方向時,很多時候都是因為政策的不同,而不是因為文化或經濟架構不一樣。

無論如何,當談到銀行業時,沉悶是件好事。

首先來一些背景資料。過去十年,美國和加拿大面對同樣的全球環境:兩者都面對大量廉價產品和廉價資金流入;兩國的經濟分析員興奮地宣告,不斷出現嚴重衰退的年代已經過去。

楓葉國的成功經驗

但當問題出現時,加拿大和美國面對的後果很不相同。在美國,按揭拖債大升,一些大金融機構倒閉,其他可以存活的主要是靠政府救助。在加拿大,這一切都沒有發生。加拿大人到底做了什麼不一樣的事?

這與利率政策無關。很多評論員指摘聯儲局是金融危機的罪魁禍首,指它把利率維持在極低水平一段長時間,製造了一個災難性的泡沫。但加拿大利率緊隨美國利率,因此低利率似乎不足以成為造成金融危機的唯一原因。

令人敬畏的前聯儲局主席伏爾克(Paul Volcker)曾大力主張,美國的危機主要來自金融機構規模太大及業務範圍太廣──即「大得不能倒閉」(too big to fail)的銀行的存在。但加拿大的經驗也反駁了這個看法,因為在加拿大,幾乎所有銀行都是「大得不能倒閉」的:佔據加拿大金融業的只有五個銀行集團。

另一方面,加拿大的經驗似乎也支持了美國部分人的看法,其中包括國會負責監管銀行拯救行動的小組主席瓦倫(Elizabeth Warren)。

他們認為,之所以發生金融危機是因為美國未能保護消費者免受誤導性的信貸所害。加拿大有一個獨立的金融消費者機構(Financial Consumer Agency),而且對類似次按的貸款有非常嚴格的限制。

最重要的是,加拿大的經驗似乎支持了那些主張讓銀行業保持沉悶的人的看法,也就是限制銀行的風險承擔活動。美國銀行業本來是沉悶的,但列根時代的撤銷管制措施令銀行業變得有趣但危險。相比之下,加拿大銀行業一直處於愜意的沉悶狀態中。

更具體地說, 加拿大對銀行信貸的限制一直比美國嚴格得多,令銀行可以倚靠借來的資金。加拿大對證券化過程也有限制。證券化是把銀行貸款包裝再出售的過程,原意是協助銀行降低風險,但最後令銀行利用其他人的資金來進行更大的賭博。

美金融改革陷兩難

這些限制在近年無疑是限制了加拿大銀行家推出創新主意的機會,如果加拿大仿效美國撤銷管制,這種機會會多很多。但最後證明這個限制是好事。

那麼,美國從加拿大的成功中吸取經驗的機會有多大?

事實上,美國眾議院去年11月通過的金融改革方案將大大地把美國金融系統加拿大化。根據有關方案,美國將成立一個獨立的消費者金融保護機構,對信貸實施限制,並要求銀行繼續持有部分貸款,作為對證券化的限制。

但類似的方案要在參議院得到通過所需的六十票機會不大。共和黨人表明反對任何重大的金融改革──沒有任何一個共和黨人投票支持眾議院的方案──部分民主黨人也猶豫不決。

因此,在防止金融危機再發生的問題上,美國有很大機會什麼都不做,或做的不多,但這將不是因為美國不知道要做什麼:美國毗鄰就有一個好例子告訴我們如何維持銀行業安全。

Original: "Good and Boring"
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/opinion/01krugman.html

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博客主评论:

在如何防范对消费者的金融骗局方面,香港可以做的是否就是:
(1)坚持为标有“此产品不保本”的所谓“风险披露”辩护,
(2)為欺騙和誤導消費者們(以及銀行的普通員工們)的銀行和銀行家們辯護。
???