解读迷债系列6，
因为系列6是2003－2004两年间提供最高利息的迷债系列（跟系列5 或系列7－10相比），却是销售量最低的系列（低于5百万美金），其表面挂钩公司也跟其它系列不同：跟多达150个公司信贷挂钩。
Series 6 was issued in Sep.2003, and matured in Sep.2005, but was extended (by issuer) to Mar.2009.
Why Series 6?
It would be interesting to learn how the early Minibond Series was introduced. For Series 6, there was only a "PROSPECTUS". For Series 10 and later, Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus are offered.
Because Series 6 showed us how Minibond's upfront facade / marketing selling point had been evolved over years, It also showed us how the disclosure level of Underlying Securities related information had gone from LESS to the LEAST, while the prospectus was expanded into Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus . Similar reduction in disclosure is also observed in the DBS Constellation Notes, if one compares the much polished prospectus for Constellation Series 59 versus the Constellation Series 34-37. The Prospectus for Minibond Series 6 also showed us what banks knew at the early stage about the true features and material risks of Minibond.
Summary of Minibond Series 6.
1. Maturity Term.
Series 6 was issued in Sep.2003, with initial Maturity date in Sep.2005.
Upon maturity, the issuer has the right to extend the maturity date to Mar.2009.
2. It is credit-linked to 150 reference companies ("referecne portfolio") .
The Prospectus listed the 150 reference companies name, and their rating.
3. Prospectus listed the impact to the interest-rate with the number of default event of the 150 reference entities.
- For Sep.2003 - Sep.2005:
0 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 5%:
1 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 4.15%: ........
5 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 0.80%:
6 or more default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 0:
- For extended Sep.2005 - Mar.2009:
0 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 8 %:
1 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 6.65%: ........
5 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 1.30%:
6 or more default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 0:
4. Where did the Minibond Money go?
According to Prospectus, it would be used on purchasing "Underlying Securities" with maturity date at Mar.2009.
The Underlying Securities in fact was another structured products.
My Comments:
Prospectus did not use the term 'collateral', the document used 'Underlying Securities'.
5. It claimed to be principal protected. but it also said that if something happened to the Underlying Securities, the principal will be at loss (or total loss).
6. Procedures and Information related to the 'underlying securities' in the Prospectus.
(a) page 53: "APPLICATION PROCEDURES"
(...)
Relevant Dealers will inform prospective investors that copies of the documents listed under paragraph 10 in the section headed "General Information" are available for inspection at the office of the Arranger specified herein ."
(b) in Page 95, "General Information" ,
"10. (...) copies of the following documents will be available .....and the Initial Dealers " (i.e. the distributing banks).
(c) page 96: "(xii): Information Memorandum and all other relevant programme documentation relating to the Underlying Securities Issuer's US $18,000,000,000 EUR Medium-Term Notes Program guaranteed (...)"
(d) page 96: "(xiii) Pricing Supplement relating to the Underlying Securities which supplements the master terms and conditions of the Underlying Securrities set out in the Information Memorandum referered to in (xii) above to form the terms and conditiosn of the Underlying Securities"
My comment:
- The "(xiii)" , i.e. (d) above, refers to the crucial Underlying Securities information document.
- The Underlying Securities Information Documents were available at selling agent (distributor banks) office.
- The "APPLICATION PROCEDDURE" and "General Information" were in fact requiring selling-agent /distributors
(i) to inform clients/potential minibond-buyers all the document information including Underlying Securities Information Document,
(ii) to let clients/potential minibond-buyers inspect all the document information including Underlying Securities Information Document, at selling-agent's office (i.e. at banks if the distributor is a bank). => Both Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus for later Minibond Series never invited clients to inspect such information/documents at selling agents / distributors office any more.
- Similar requirements for inviting clients to inspect the Underlying Securities Information Documents were also found in the prospectus of Constellation Series 34-37 (in the name of "Charged Asset Information" ), but NOT in the prospectus of Constellation Series 59.
- Did selling agents/distributors inform and give clients Underlying Securities Information Document?
- Did selling agents/distributors read through Underlying Securities Information Document which were available at their site?
* What did they learn about the Underlying Securities' true feature and risks?
* How did the Underlying Securities Information affect Banks' understanding on the Minibond's true features and risks?
* How did the Underlying Securities Information affect Banks' understanding on the Minibond's material risk and material information?
- Is there a connection between such information with the Questions regarding to disclaimers in Wing Hang Bank's Minibond Purchaser Confirmation Form?
Questions: in http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/question-regarding-wing-hang-banks.html
(e) page 96: "Copies of the (...) refered to in (...) (xii), (xiii) and (xiv), will be avialable for inspection as aforesaid with effect from the Issue Date. (...)"
My Comment:
- The Prospectus disclosed that some information (e.g. Underlying Securities Information Document) will be available from the Issue Date, i.e. not available before the Sale-offer closed.
- Similar information on the availability of "Charged Asset Information" (i.e. Underlying Securities equivalent) was also found in the Constellation Series 34-37, but was not found in the prospectus for later Constellation Series (e.g. Constellation Series 59).
- Similar information (disclosure) was dropped forever in the Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus for Minibond series 10 and later. The Program Prospectus and Issue Prospects never mentioned about the availability of Underlying Securities Information Document.
In the later series (of Minibond and Constellation notes), not only there was no mentioning of the availability of Underlying Securities (collateral) Information document, the well polished Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus never invited clients to inspect such information/documents at selling-agents/distributors office any more.
WHY?
Because such information did not carry material information and was not relevant material information for understanding the true features and risks of Minibond / Constellation notes ?
7. Distributors of Minibond Series 6:
Dah Sing Bank,
ICBC (Asia),
Mervas Bank,
Shanghai Commercial Bank,
Sun Hung Kai Investment Services Limited,
Wing Hang Bank,
WIng Lung Bank;
8. Sales of Early Minibond Series (based on data from HSBC USA Trustee).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 5: $10.6 million USD; Reference Entities: 1 ; Interest Rate at 3.8%; Jun.2003- Jul.2010;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 6: $4.75 million USD; Reference Entities: 150 ; Interest Rate at 5% for year 1-2, 8% from 3rd year-maturity, pending on number of default event; Sep.2003 - Mar.2009;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 7A: $15.2 million USD; Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 4.2%: Nov.2003 - Dec.2008;
Series 7B: $32 million USD ($250 million HKD); Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 4.2%:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 9A: $22 million USD; Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 3.7% year 1-3, 4.3% year 4-maturity: Mar.2004 - Sep.2009;
Series 9B: $353 million USD; Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 3.5% year 1-3, 4.1% year 4-maturity:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 10: $44.6 million USD; Reference Entities: 7 + Additional 125 undisclosed reference entities hidden in CDO Collateral ; USD Interest Rate at 4.25% year 1-3, 4.75% year 4-maturity: May 2004 - Nov.2009;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 11: $42 million USD; Reference Entities: 1 + Additional 125 undisclosed reference entities hidden in CDO Collateral ; fixed + Libor linked float Interest Rate: Jun.2004 - Jun.2010;
------------------------------------------------------------
My Comment:
- Series 6 was offering a higher interest rate comparing to other series because Series 6 has 150 reference entities at up front.
- Series 6 Sales was the lowest amongst all the Minibond Series.
- Comparing the Interest Rate (and sales results) offered for Series 6 versus Series 10:
Both are credit linked to over 100 reference entities. But Series 6 listed 150 reference entities at up front, Series 10 listed 1 reference entities at up front and addded another 125 reference entities in the never disclosed CDO.
参考1: Series 6 Prospectus:
http://www.sfc.hk/sfcCOPro/EN/displayFileServlet?refno=0550&fname=Minibond%20Series%206_Prospectus_ENG2.pdf
参考2: 從 迷債系列 6 看 雷曼迷你債券騙局手段之 完美完善過程
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/09/6_4956.html
.
.
2009年8月29日 星期六
2009年8月25日 星期二
美國聯邦法官拒絕在證券委和美銀和解書上簽字－起時
轉載“起時”博客：(link: http://blog.wenxuecity.com/blogview.php?date=200908&postID=31745)
金融危機發生近一年，雖然金融系統幾乎崩潰， 經濟遭巨大創傷，失業率高昇，人心惶惶，政府用納稅人的錢救助了那些“太大”的金融機構。奧巴馬，布什及所有華盛頓的官員都在譴責華爾街的“貪婪”，但迄今為止，沒有一個人，無論是華爾街，或華盛頓公開站出來，為他們的行為向納稅人道歉。迄今為止，沒有一個主要負責人人因此受到司法的追究。華爾街的銀行盈利照舊，金融衍生品照賣，華盛頓的“國會代表”們只會在無任何法律效力的聽證會上，裝模作樣痛斥華爾街的執行長，企圖換取選民的支持。但金融危機到底如何造成的，誰造成的，為甚麼會造成那麼大的損失，難道只是簡單的“貪婪”？和“投機”？ 這裡邊隱藏的巨大欺騙，和黑幕，不知那天才能暴露於天下。
今天的一個新聞讓我分外注意，就是證券委(SEC) 再次試圖和美銀( Bank of America)和解，美銀同意支付三千三百萬的罰款，為去年美林（Merrill Lynch）的年終分紅接受罰款，與證券委和解，並要求聯邦法官傑德· 瑞考夫 （Jed S. Rakoff）在和解書上簽字。美銀去年9月在保森和美林前執行長約翰·贊 (John Thain) 的“欺騙”下，先與美林“訂婚”，12月又在保森和博南克的“槍口下”，被迫“完婚”。而美林隱瞞第四季高達140億的損失，在公佈季報之前，悄悄發了近四十億的奬金。
這是證券委和美銀第二次的企圖了。上次就被瑞考夫駁回，要求提供更多的證據，解釋為甚麼要和解。今天，瑞考夫再次質問證券委和解的原因，如果美銀的管理層撒了謊，證券委為甚麼不起訴，而只要求和解。
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125123100930658077.html
證券委申訴了理由，但被法官駁回。 法官瑞考夫認為證券委的解釋是“不符常理“。
法官瑞考夫強調有義務使“和解”公平和符合公眾的利益。
我在另一篇博文中講到，美國的司法近乎癱瘓，尤其是“白領犯罪”，無法可循，無理可證，用諾貝爾得奬克魯格曼的話說“華爾街的所有手法都是合法”。奧巴馬政府天天嚷著要金融改革，但卻不做改革，不追究危機發生的責任，這樣做，只會掩蓋事實，反而使下次危機發生的可能性更高。而財長蓋特納也在多次場合表示，是錯誤（mistake） 造成了危機的發生。這麼大的錯誤，可能只有“華盛頓”和“華爾街”能犯吧？
這個案子，就是另一例奧巴馬政府企圖用“和解”掩蓋欺騙，掩蓋犯罪，試圖用納稅人的人為犯罪買單。別忘了，我們納稅人已經為美銀投資了450億了。這三千三百萬的罰款是納稅人的錢，我不知道證券委會拿多少分成，納稅人養著他們，而他們卻連一個麥道夫都抓不到。
但願瑞考夫法官能主持正義，讓納稅人給回一點對司法的信心。請繼續關注。
金融危機發生近一年，雖然金融系統幾乎崩潰， 經濟遭巨大創傷，失業率高昇，人心惶惶，政府用納稅人的錢救助了那些“太大”的金融機構。奧巴馬，布什及所有華盛頓的官員都在譴責華爾街的“貪婪”，但迄今為止，沒有一個人，無論是華爾街，或華盛頓公開站出來，為他們的行為向納稅人道歉。迄今為止，沒有一個主要負責人人因此受到司法的追究。華爾街的銀行盈利照舊，金融衍生品照賣，華盛頓的“國會代表”們只會在無任何法律效力的聽證會上，裝模作樣痛斥華爾街的執行長，企圖換取選民的支持。但金融危機到底如何造成的，誰造成的，為甚麼會造成那麼大的損失，難道只是簡單的“貪婪”？和“投機”？ 這裡邊隱藏的巨大欺騙，和黑幕，不知那天才能暴露於天下。
今天的一個新聞讓我分外注意，就是證券委(SEC) 再次試圖和美銀( Bank of America)和解，美銀同意支付三千三百萬的罰款，為去年美林（Merrill Lynch）的年終分紅接受罰款，與證券委和解，並要求聯邦法官傑德· 瑞考夫 （Jed S. Rakoff）在和解書上簽字。美銀去年9月在保森和美林前執行長約翰·贊 (John Thain) 的“欺騙”下，先與美林“訂婚”，12月又在保森和博南克的“槍口下”，被迫“完婚”。而美林隱瞞第四季高達140億的損失，在公佈季報之前，悄悄發了近四十億的奬金。
這是證券委和美銀第二次的企圖了。上次就被瑞考夫駁回，要求提供更多的證據，解釋為甚麼要和解。今天，瑞考夫再次質問證券委和解的原因，如果美銀的管理層撒了謊，證券委為甚麼不起訴，而只要求和解。
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125123100930658077.html
證券委申訴了理由，但被法官駁回。 法官瑞考夫認為證券委的解釋是“不符常理“。
法官瑞考夫強調有義務使“和解”公平和符合公眾的利益。
我在另一篇博文中講到，美國的司法近乎癱瘓，尤其是“白領犯罪”，無法可循，無理可證，用諾貝爾得奬克魯格曼的話說“華爾街的所有手法都是合法”。奧巴馬政府天天嚷著要金融改革，但卻不做改革，不追究危機發生的責任，這樣做，只會掩蓋事實，反而使下次危機發生的可能性更高。而財長蓋特納也在多次場合表示，是錯誤（mistake） 造成了危機的發生。這麼大的錯誤，可能只有“華盛頓”和“華爾街”能犯吧？
這個案子，就是另一例奧巴馬政府企圖用“和解”掩蓋欺騙，掩蓋犯罪，試圖用納稅人的人為犯罪買單。別忘了，我們納稅人已經為美銀投資了450億了。這三千三百萬的罰款是納稅人的錢，我不知道證券委會拿多少分成，納稅人養著他們，而他們卻連一個麥道夫都抓不到。
但願瑞考夫法官能主持正義，讓納稅人給回一點對司法的信心。請繼續關注。
2009年8月22日 星期六
王子犯法：無罪？有罪的是抗議王子犯法的庶民們?
（據8月23日太陽報）“警方證實，由今年一月至本月二十日，中區警區共接獲十九宗與雷曼事主示威活動有關的報案，當中涉及傷人、恐嚇及於公眾地方行為不檢等。現時共有十六人被捕，當中八人因證據不足獲釋，其餘八人保釋候查。
法律界人士梁永鏗指出，任何人在示威過程中作出過激行為，例如刑事毀壞及傷人等，社會絕不會接受，但如果苦主只是透過帶有激烈性字眼的口號，藉以宣洩不滿情緒，梁則認為是情有可原。另一方面，他促請證監會及金管局做好自己的角色，搜集足夠證據，向涉嫌違規的銀行作出處分。”
現實是：
－ 在近日已經有兩個苦主突然被警察就未有確實的證據、而且非常輕微的事故帶返警局調查。
－ 2008年9月至今以來，由受害人個人（不是有錢勢的金融機構或財團）給警方提出的數千宗對金融機構及其職員之金融欺騙的相關報案，警方對於相關金融機構和職員做出過甚麼相關調查呢？
警方連續對2至3個月前在某一大銀行示威的苦主採取行動， 但卻對銀行銷售產品過程中偽造罪行的報案置之不理，明顯是有強烈的政治意圖。難道說：當金融機構行騙的時候，司法機關就可以一拖再拖（以冠冕堂皇的理由）而最終不了了之了？
當金融機構對一些參與抗議的苦主們有投訴的時候，警方就會迅速採取相應的行動。對無權勢無商業巨頭機構做背景的普通百姓極盡威嚇恐赫之能。參見“關於警察濫用職權，給警察局的一封公開信”。這簡直是黑色恐怖!
深受金融詐騙的苦主們的相關投訴呢？警方一定是在“認真”處理的過程之中吧？這麼複雜的產品，警方大概是看不明白的? 銀行大概也是被雷曼欺騙了，銀行可能是只理解傭金而不理解產品的真實特徵和風險，而蒙查查地做了幾年的產品銷售。誠如一個藥品銷售商給學生們賣了幾年毒品，可是毒品並不是該藥品銷售商製造的呀。要抓，也要抓毒品製造商和買毒品的學生們呀。怎麼可以怪到藥品銷售商的頭上來了呢？
金管局象保護心愛王子一樣地庇護銀行。 證監會,也只有在回購談判的最後關頭跟銀行家們叩頭投降，最後的回購建議不僅僅連究竟誰錯，證監會對於銀行有甚麼錯／或有甚麼關注等根本不提，乾脆連“錯”和“關注”都不敢寫入。監管機構和政府的態度這讓警方怎麼能夠因為有幾千名苦主報案就因此去調查銀行了呢？ 警察要向政府／特首負責。而特首的主要責任之一是對銀行和銀行家負責，對吧？特首是來自警察之家，當然理解警察向政府／特首負責的心態和制度。還是束之高閣慢慢地調查調查吧，“一萬年不久”。過了今生還有來世... 特首不是來自雷曼苦主之家，自然不能理解苦主們信任“銀行理財”的後果是：過去的存定期時的“悠閒生活” 變成了現在的“遊行生活”。。。
與此同期間，關於金融欺騙， 紐約的 檢察官 和 FBI 們做了些甚麼呢？ 請按此連接：
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/while-hk-police-have-busy-with.html
法律界人士梁永鏗指出，任何人在示威過程中作出過激行為，例如刑事毀壞及傷人等，社會絕不會接受，但如果苦主只是透過帶有激烈性字眼的口號，藉以宣洩不滿情緒，梁則認為是情有可原。另一方面，他促請證監會及金管局做好自己的角色，搜集足夠證據，向涉嫌違規的銀行作出處分。”
現實是：
－ 在近日已經有兩個苦主突然被警察就未有確實的證據、而且非常輕微的事故帶返警局調查。
－ 2008年9月至今以來，由受害人個人（不是有錢勢的金融機構或財團）給警方提出的數千宗對金融機構及其職員之金融欺騙的相關報案，警方對於相關金融機構和職員做出過甚麼相關調查呢？
警方連續對2至3個月前在某一大銀行示威的苦主採取行動， 但卻對銀行銷售產品過程中偽造罪行的報案置之不理，明顯是有強烈的政治意圖。難道說：當金融機構行騙的時候，司法機關就可以一拖再拖（以冠冕堂皇的理由）而最終不了了之了？
當金融機構對一些參與抗議的苦主們有投訴的時候，警方就會迅速採取相應的行動。對無權勢無商業巨頭機構做背景的普通百姓極盡威嚇恐赫之能。參見“關於警察濫用職權，給警察局的一封公開信”。這簡直是黑色恐怖!
深受金融詐騙的苦主們的相關投訴呢？警方一定是在“認真”處理的過程之中吧？這麼複雜的產品，警方大概是看不明白的? 銀行大概也是被雷曼欺騙了，銀行可能是只理解傭金而不理解產品的真實特徵和風險，而蒙查查地做了幾年的產品銷售。誠如一個藥品銷售商給學生們賣了幾年毒品，可是毒品並不是該藥品銷售商製造的呀。要抓，也要抓毒品製造商和買毒品的學生們呀。怎麼可以怪到藥品銷售商的頭上來了呢？
金管局象保護心愛王子一樣地庇護銀行。 證監會,也只有在回購談判的最後關頭跟銀行家們叩頭投降，最後的回購建議不僅僅連究竟誰錯，證監會對於銀行有甚麼錯／或有甚麼關注等根本不提，乾脆連“錯”和“關注”都不敢寫入。監管機構和政府的態度這讓警方怎麼能夠因為有幾千名苦主報案就因此去調查銀行了呢？ 警察要向政府／特首負責。而特首的主要責任之一是對銀行和銀行家負責，對吧？特首是來自警察之家，當然理解警察向政府／特首負責的心態和制度。還是束之高閣慢慢地調查調查吧，“一萬年不久”。過了今生還有來世... 特首不是來自雷曼苦主之家，自然不能理解苦主們信任“銀行理財”的後果是：過去的存定期時的“悠閒生活” 變成了現在的“遊行生活”。。。
與此同期間，關於金融欺騙， 紐約的 檢察官 和 FBI 們做了些甚麼呢？ 請按此連接：
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/while-hk-police-have-busy-with.html
2009年8月20日 星期四
Open Letter to Commissioner of Police Regarding to Police Abuse of Powers
（轉載）
An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of Police Abuse of Powers
Mr. TANG King Shing
Commissioner of Police , Police Headquarters,
Sirs,
I write on behalf of Ms. Tracy Ho as well as the Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims in Hong Kong to complain against your officers who authorise the ‘dawn raid’ against Ms. Ho for reason that she is suspected of having committed an act of common assault.
The alleged assault takes place at about 1625 hours on 21st May 2009 outside the Bank of China Building, which is situate at no. 1 Garden Road, Central. In addition to the gross disproportion between police action and the nature of the allegation, there are numerous dubious acts on the part of your officers during the process that could only be explained as intending to maximize the harassment and distress inflicted on Ms. Ho and her family.
The Dawn Raid
2. At about 07:30 hours on 19th August 2009 five detectives (three male and two female) in plain clothes claiming to be attached to the Central Police District or Division knocked on the door of Ms. Ho’s Residence in Choi Hung. The visit is a total surprise and when Ms. Ho answered the door your officers insisted that they wanted to enter the premises before they would reveal the purpose of their visit.
3. With utmost reluctance and distress of her family, Ms. allowed the officers into her home. One of the officers then produced a photograph to Ms. Ho and asked if she is the person in it. Although the photograph does not show her face, Ms. Ho recalled the scene which is the protest outside the Bank of China Building mentioned above.
4. When Ms. Ho was about to admit that she is the lady on the photograph, one of the officer threatened her to immediately produce the clothes and shoes she worn that day or else they would search for the items themselves. Perplexed by the sudden police interest in the event that happened months ago and pressured by the threatening language, Ms. Ho complied with the demand and produced the items accordingly. She was then asked to follow the officers to the police station for further enquiries but before leaving the premises she was asked to sign on the notebook of one of the officers that it was not an arrest and she was not therefore handcuffed.
A Trivial Offence
5. Ms. Ho arrived at the Central Police Station at Arsenal Street at about 0930 hours after having been taken to and asked to wait at the Ngau Tau Kok Police Station for some time during which your officers were presumably completing some formalities to record their action in another police area.
6. In the Central Police Station, Ms. Ho was shown a video footage lasting for about 10 to 15 seconds in which her right foot seemed to have a momentary contact with the buttock of a bank staff. Apparently the footage was shot in a commotion where attempt was made by the bank staff to forcibly remove the protesters. It is understandable that in such circumstances people were jostling against each another and what Ms. Ho was doing then is crucial in establishing the plausibility of the allegation against her.
7. Ms. Ho has a flair for electronic video and audio devices and she has been responsible for filming the public activities of the Alliance almost since the creation of it. When the assault was allegedly taken place, Ms. Ho was actually holding her video device filming the forcible removal of the protesters by the bank staff. Her attention was on the action in front of her and the display screen of her video. It is, to say the least, very unlikely that a person would in the circumstances feel like joining the fray.
8. There is another factor that discounts the truthfulness of the allegation. Ms. Ho is a small, slim young lady whose weight would not be much more than 90 lbs. Could a person with that physique be inclined to provoke a fight? And could a lady like Ms. Ho who has taken part in so many protests relating to the fraud of Lehman Brothers and has always behaved properly, suddenly and without any provocation whatsoever, acted contrary to her personality and disposition? The allegation is so preposterous that no person in his right mind would seriously entertain it. Yet your officers have concluded that the offence is so grave that it justifies a deployment of five officers to carry out a dawn raid for an allegation of common assault where the supposed victim does not seem to have suffered any visible or detectable injury and does not complain for months after the event.
Assault on Law by Abuses of Powers
9. How should the public comprehend a dawn raid by five detectives against a young lady suspected of common assault? Does it not indicate the new low of the state of policing in this city under your watch?
But that is not all in so far as the outrageous police conduct is concerned. For almost one year now Ms. Ho has been the contact person between the police and the Alliance on many occasions especially in respect of application for approval to assemble and conduct procession. Your officers at the Police Community Relations Office in Central District know Ms. Ho well and it would take only a phone call to get Ms. Ho to the Central Police Station to view the video footage and to assist police investigation into the allegation. The differences between asking Ms. Ho to the police station and the dawn raid are that only the latter could inflict the distress, sudden sense of fear, and helplessness on Ms. Ho and her family.
10. The connection between the decision to harass Ms. Ho and another assault complaint against the bank staff at the scene of protest is clear. As mentioned above, the moment when Ms. Ho was accused of committing assault on the anonymous bank staff, she was filming an assault in progress by the bank staff against a protester.
It is hardly surprising that the protester would sustain injury given the way she was man-handled by the bank staff. As it was, she was taken to hospital, and stayed there for days for medical treatment. We also learn that a complaint of assault was lodged with the police by her or subsequently with the medical findings of the injury she sustained. Despite the evidence, no action has been taken against the bank or the assailant by the police, just like other crimes related to the Lehman Brothers fraud.
11. In the circumstances, it is an irresistible inference that the police harassment against Ms. Ho is motivated by the desire to please certain influential individuals affiliated with the bank.
12. The allegation against Ms. Ho is so trivial that she is granted a police bail of HKD100. Against an allegation of common assault that could, technically speaking, be committed by everyone in this crowded community, the police deployed five detectives to conduct a dawn raid on the basis of the flimsiest evidence which comes into being in a commotion caused largely by the bank itself. The commotion would not have happened had the police had the courage and sense of decency to enforce the law. Against the banks for fraud that is proven by documentary evidence that no government official would dare to dispute, not a single officer of yours has the courage to follow your own orders to classify the complaints after almost one year of their lodgments with the Commercial Crime Bureau. Insofar as the Lehman Brothers fraud is concerned, the victims have been deprived of any legal rights and remedies. Would any of the government officials to whom this complaint is addressed care to respond to this latest episode of police abuse of powers?
c.c.
Mr. TANG Ying Yen, Henry, Chief Secretary for Administration
Mr. Wong Yan Lung, Secretary for Justice
Mr. Ian Grenville Cross, Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Ian McWalters, Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Lee Ka Chiu, Director of Crime & Security, HKP
======================================================
From: An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of police abuse of powers
An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of Police Abuse of Powers
Mr. TANG King Shing
Commissioner of Police , Police Headquarters,
Sirs,
I write on behalf of Ms. Tracy Ho as well as the Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims in Hong Kong to complain against your officers who authorise the ‘dawn raid’ against Ms. Ho for reason that she is suspected of having committed an act of common assault.
The alleged assault takes place at about 1625 hours on 21st May 2009 outside the Bank of China Building, which is situate at no. 1 Garden Road, Central. In addition to the gross disproportion between police action and the nature of the allegation, there are numerous dubious acts on the part of your officers during the process that could only be explained as intending to maximize the harassment and distress inflicted on Ms. Ho and her family.
The Dawn Raid
2. At about 07:30 hours on 19th August 2009 five detectives (three male and two female) in plain clothes claiming to be attached to the Central Police District or Division knocked on the door of Ms. Ho’s Residence in Choi Hung. The visit is a total surprise and when Ms. Ho answered the door your officers insisted that they wanted to enter the premises before they would reveal the purpose of their visit.
3. With utmost reluctance and distress of her family, Ms. allowed the officers into her home. One of the officers then produced a photograph to Ms. Ho and asked if she is the person in it. Although the photograph does not show her face, Ms. Ho recalled the scene which is the protest outside the Bank of China Building mentioned above.
4. When Ms. Ho was about to admit that she is the lady on the photograph, one of the officer threatened her to immediately produce the clothes and shoes she worn that day or else they would search for the items themselves. Perplexed by the sudden police interest in the event that happened months ago and pressured by the threatening language, Ms. Ho complied with the demand and produced the items accordingly. She was then asked to follow the officers to the police station for further enquiries but before leaving the premises she was asked to sign on the notebook of one of the officers that it was not an arrest and she was not therefore handcuffed.
A Trivial Offence
5. Ms. Ho arrived at the Central Police Station at Arsenal Street at about 0930 hours after having been taken to and asked to wait at the Ngau Tau Kok Police Station for some time during which your officers were presumably completing some formalities to record their action in another police area.
6. In the Central Police Station, Ms. Ho was shown a video footage lasting for about 10 to 15 seconds in which her right foot seemed to have a momentary contact with the buttock of a bank staff. Apparently the footage was shot in a commotion where attempt was made by the bank staff to forcibly remove the protesters. It is understandable that in such circumstances people were jostling against each another and what Ms. Ho was doing then is crucial in establishing the plausibility of the allegation against her.
7. Ms. Ho has a flair for electronic video and audio devices and she has been responsible for filming the public activities of the Alliance almost since the creation of it. When the assault was allegedly taken place, Ms. Ho was actually holding her video device filming the forcible removal of the protesters by the bank staff. Her attention was on the action in front of her and the display screen of her video. It is, to say the least, very unlikely that a person would in the circumstances feel like joining the fray.
8. There is another factor that discounts the truthfulness of the allegation. Ms. Ho is a small, slim young lady whose weight would not be much more than 90 lbs. Could a person with that physique be inclined to provoke a fight? And could a lady like Ms. Ho who has taken part in so many protests relating to the fraud of Lehman Brothers and has always behaved properly, suddenly and without any provocation whatsoever, acted contrary to her personality and disposition? The allegation is so preposterous that no person in his right mind would seriously entertain it. Yet your officers have concluded that the offence is so grave that it justifies a deployment of five officers to carry out a dawn raid for an allegation of common assault where the supposed victim does not seem to have suffered any visible or detectable injury and does not complain for months after the event.
Assault on Law by Abuses of Powers
9. How should the public comprehend a dawn raid by five detectives against a young lady suspected of common assault? Does it not indicate the new low of the state of policing in this city under your watch?
But that is not all in so far as the outrageous police conduct is concerned. For almost one year now Ms. Ho has been the contact person between the police and the Alliance on many occasions especially in respect of application for approval to assemble and conduct procession. Your officers at the Police Community Relations Office in Central District know Ms. Ho well and it would take only a phone call to get Ms. Ho to the Central Police Station to view the video footage and to assist police investigation into the allegation. The differences between asking Ms. Ho to the police station and the dawn raid are that only the latter could inflict the distress, sudden sense of fear, and helplessness on Ms. Ho and her family.
10. The connection between the decision to harass Ms. Ho and another assault complaint against the bank staff at the scene of protest is clear. As mentioned above, the moment when Ms. Ho was accused of committing assault on the anonymous bank staff, she was filming an assault in progress by the bank staff against a protester.
It is hardly surprising that the protester would sustain injury given the way she was man-handled by the bank staff. As it was, she was taken to hospital, and stayed there for days for medical treatment. We also learn that a complaint of assault was lodged with the police by her or subsequently with the medical findings of the injury she sustained. Despite the evidence, no action has been taken against the bank or the assailant by the police, just like other crimes related to the Lehman Brothers fraud.
11. In the circumstances, it is an irresistible inference that the police harassment against Ms. Ho is motivated by the desire to please certain influential individuals affiliated with the bank.
12. The allegation against Ms. Ho is so trivial that she is granted a police bail of HKD100. Against an allegation of common assault that could, technically speaking, be committed by everyone in this crowded community, the police deployed five detectives to conduct a dawn raid on the basis of the flimsiest evidence which comes into being in a commotion caused largely by the bank itself. The commotion would not have happened had the police had the courage and sense of decency to enforce the law. Against the banks for fraud that is proven by documentary evidence that no government official would dare to dispute, not a single officer of yours has the courage to follow your own orders to classify the complaints after almost one year of their lodgments with the Commercial Crime Bureau. Insofar as the Lehman Brothers fraud is concerned, the victims have been deprived of any legal rights and remedies. Would any of the government officials to whom this complaint is addressed care to respond to this latest episode of police abuse of powers?
c.c.
Mr. TANG Ying Yen, Henry, Chief Secretary for Administration
Mr. Wong Yan Lung, Secretary for Justice
Mr. Ian Grenville Cross, Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Ian McWalters, Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Lee Ka Chiu, Director of Crime & Security, HKP
======================================================
From: An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of police abuse of powers
2009年8月19日 星期三
Is HK now a Heaven for Banking Crooks ?
What have HK Police / Justice department done regarding all the financial fraud related complaints by Minibond / Constellation / Octave victims /other-products, since 15 sept. 2008?
(a) act upon banks' request & demand: Arrested and raided some minibond / constellation victims who participated in protesting banks' over 5 years' fraudulent act;
(b) Taking photos of those who participated in the demonstrations ...
(c) What ELSE ????????
While HK Police have been busy with responding to banks' request & demand: searching & raiding Minibond/Constellation victims because of their involvement in protest against Banks' cheating behavior on Minibond / Constellation / Octave,
What have the financial center New York's legal system done so far?
In the recent news:
1. "New York Attorney General sues Charles Schwab over securities sales" (Aug.17)
NEW YORK - New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo filed a lawsuit Monday against the brokerage unit of Charles Schwab Corp., claiming the firm misled customers about the safety of auction-rate securities.
Cuomo's office has been at the forefront of pushing brokers and underwriters of auction-rate securities to repurchase them from investors who were left with steep losses after the market for the investments collapsed in early 2008.
The suit against Schwab is aimed at forcing the retail brokerage firm to repurchase the securities at face value from investors.
...
Last month, Cuomo's office notified San Francisco-based Charles Schwab that it was planning to file the suit against the retail brokerage firm for claiming the securities were safe investments while selling them to customers.
In a statement Monday, Cuomo said: "Charles Schwab owed its customers a duty to properly understand and make accurate representations concerning auction-rate securities. Today we commenced a lawsuit to remedy Schwab's repeated breach of that duty."
...
related link: http://www.cnbc.com/id/32447041
2. "Credit Suisse broker convicted of fraud" (Aug.17)
A former Credit Suisse broker was on Monday convicted by a jury of fraudulently selling risky auction-rate securities in one of the first criminal prosecutions to emerge from the two-year-long credit crisis.
The guilty verdict against Eric Butler, 36, comes after a three-week trial in which prosecutors accused him and his former colleague, Julian Tzolov, of scheming to generate higher sales commissions by lying to clients about what kind of securities they were being sold.
“The defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations saddled investors with unknown risks they did not bargain for,” said Benton Campbell, US attorney for the eastern district of New York.
“This case shows that those who engage in such schemes will be held to account for their criminal activity.”
related links:
- http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE57G4HK20090817?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticNews (reuters)
- http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/nyfo081709a.htm (FBI press release)
3. 2008-News:
US Regulators alleged that brokerages misled investors into believing that auction rate securities were safe, cash-equivalent products, when in fact they faced increasing liquidity risk. Major financial companies Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia Corp.,and others that sold auction-rate securities have reached 100% buy-back settlements.
2009年8月10日 星期一
Questions Regarding Wing Hang Bank's Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form
In the Wing Hang Bank's Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form, for Minibond Series 30 (January 2007),
the "Declaration " has Clause 11 as the following：
"11. I/We understand that I/we can read copies of the display documents as listed in the Programme Prospectus at the offices of the arranger as set out in the Programme Prospectus;"
However, the 'Clause 11' does not detail what the ‘display documents’ are.
By contrast, the same provision about ‘display documents’ is not available in the Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form for Series 27 (August 2006).
The Question is:
What are the 'display documents' referring to in the 'Clause 11' ?
Wing Hang Bank has been an experienced Minibond distributor since 2003. Why can't Wing Hang Bank clarify this?
關於永亨銀行迷債“購買者確認及指示表格”之疑問
永亨銀行於2007年1月銷售的迷債系列30之“購買者確認及指示表格” 的 “聲明" 之第11條有如下內容:
“11。我／我們明白我／我們可親臨安排人於計劃章程所述的辦事處，查閱計劃章程內列為可供查閱的文件；”
可是，這第11條並沒有指出這些“可供查閱的文件”究竟具體是指哪些文件。
－ 永亨銀行為甚麼不明確指出這些“可供查閱的文件”究竟具體是指哪些文件呢？給銀行的詢問也沒有回答。
－ 另一令人疑惑之處是，在2006年銷售的迷債（如8月銷售的系列27）之“購買者確認及指示表格“，並無此第11條的內容。
為甚麼2007年開始有這第11條，而2006年的就沒有呢？
永亨銀行自從2003年開始就銷售迷債了（包括系列2003年9月的迷債系列6以及更為早期的迷債系列），直至2007年7月的系列33。 儘管並沒有參與系列34－36的銷售。永亨銀行也可算是迷債的經驗分銷商了。為甚麼永亨銀行不可以 回答關於銀行自身的“購買者確認及指示表格”的問題呢？
？？？？？？
？？？？？？
the "Declaration " has Clause 11 as the following：
"11. I/We understand that I/we can read copies of the display documents as listed in the Programme Prospectus at the offices of the arranger as set out in the Programme Prospectus;"
However, the 'Clause 11' does not detail what the ‘display documents’ are.
By contrast, the same provision about ‘display documents’ is not available in the Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form for Series 27 (August 2006).
The Question is:
What are the 'display documents' referring to in the 'Clause 11' ?
Wing Hang Bank has been an experienced Minibond distributor since 2003. Why can't Wing Hang Bank clarify this?
關於永亨銀行迷債“購買者確認及指示表格”之疑問
永亨銀行於2007年1月銷售的迷債系列30之“購買者確認及指示表格” 的 “聲明" 之第11條有如下內容:
“11。我／我們明白我／我們可親臨安排人於計劃章程所述的辦事處，查閱計劃章程內列為可供查閱的文件；”
可是，這第11條並沒有指出這些“可供查閱的文件”究竟具體是指哪些文件。
－ 永亨銀行為甚麼不明確指出這些“可供查閱的文件”究竟具體是指哪些文件呢？給銀行的詢問也沒有回答。
－ 另一令人疑惑之處是，在2006年銷售的迷債（如8月銷售的系列27）之“購買者確認及指示表格“，並無此第11條的內容。
為甚麼2007年開始有這第11條，而2006年的就沒有呢？
永亨銀行自從2003年開始就銷售迷債了（包括系列2003年9月的迷債系列6以及更為早期的迷債系列），直至2007年7月的系列33。 儘管並沒有參與系列34－36的銷售。永亨銀行也可算是迷債的經驗分銷商了。為甚麼永亨銀行不可以 回答關於銀行自身的“購買者確認及指示表格”的問題呢？
？？？？？？
？？？？？？
2009年8月9日 星期日
香港 的銀行，金融監管機構和政府還有信用可言麼？
對於銀行家而言：
客戶不可貴，誠信價更低，若為傭金故，一切皆可拋。
對於金管局和政府而言：
市民不可貴，公眾價更低，若為銀行故，一切皆可拋。
香港到底是金融中心呢？ 還是縱容金融騙局的金融詐騙中心呢？
銀行行騙和庶民行騙不同罪？
我們的政府／議員／法律機構等, 對於倫敦金或祈福黨／跌錢黨等欺騙市民的集團，
是否會施以同樣的寬容， 並以現在為銀行辯解的理由 來為這些集團之欺騙行為辯護？
當受監管的金融機構銀行欺騙市民們的時候， 就不是欺騙了？
就可以對銀行網開一面，不受懲罰， 而要求受騙人來承擔責任？
Cheat me once, Shame on You.
Cheat me twice, Shame on me.
看了迷你債券之銷售和現在銀行+監管+政府之態度，香港的市民會有甚麼體會呢？
大概都意識到了銀行跟老千的關係，意識到政府跟銀行家的關係，
明白自己是萬萬不可以再信任銀行的了！
香港的銀行和銀行家們對普通市民而言還有信用嗎？
香港的監管機構（金管局和證監會）對普通市民而言還有信用嗎？
香港政府對普通市民而言還有信用嗎？
請聽一位苦主的肺腑之言：
［ ...... 然而銀行/金管/証監/特首/議員真的不知答案嗎?
只是他們都認同了香港是一個不需要講道理的地方! 是講權勢,是講錢財.........
我真的無語問蒼天, ... 因為銀行同政府的信用對我來說是全無價值!
.....只見滿目是不義的事,只見遍地是無望的眼神,怎也是無法接受,
但轉眼間郤見自己的影子在其中
］
客戶不可貴，誠信價更低，若為傭金故，一切皆可拋。
對於金管局和政府而言：
市民不可貴，公眾價更低，若為銀行故，一切皆可拋。
香港到底是金融中心呢？ 還是縱容金融騙局的金融詐騙中心呢？
銀行行騙和庶民行騙不同罪？
我們的政府／議員／法律機構等, 對於倫敦金或祈福黨／跌錢黨等欺騙市民的集團，
是否會施以同樣的寬容， 並以現在為銀行辯解的理由 來為這些集團之欺騙行為辯護？
當受監管的金融機構銀行欺騙市民們的時候， 就不是欺騙了？
就可以對銀行網開一面，不受懲罰， 而要求受騙人來承擔責任？
Cheat me once, Shame on You.
Cheat me twice, Shame on me.
看了迷你債券之銷售和現在銀行+監管+政府之態度，香港的市民會有甚麼體會呢？
大概都意識到了銀行跟老千的關係，意識到政府跟銀行家的關係，
明白自己是萬萬不可以再信任銀行的了！
香港的銀行和銀行家們對普通市民而言還有信用嗎？
香港的監管機構（金管局和證監會）對普通市民而言還有信用嗎？
香港政府對普通市民而言還有信用嗎？
請聽一位苦主的肺腑之言：
［ ...... 然而銀行/金管/証監/特首/議員真的不知答案嗎?
只是他們都認同了香港是一個不需要講道理的地方! 是講權勢,是講錢財.........
我真的無語問蒼天, ... 因為銀行同政府的信用對我來說是全無價值!
.....只見滿目是不義的事,只見遍地是無望的眼神,怎也是無法接受,
但轉眼間郤見自己的影子在其中
］
2009年8月7日 星期五
《转载》有感於 銀行家 之 霸道
十月奔走討商奸
官商勾結暗往還
六折換得假公義
半生積蓄血淚斑
轉載自：作者 "adam100w", http://www29.discuss.com.hk/viewthread.php?tid=10193929&extra=&page=14
官商勾結暗往還
六折換得假公義
半生積蓄血淚斑
轉載自：作者 "adam100w", http://www29.discuss.com.hk/viewthread.php?tid=10193929&extra=&page=14
2009年8月4日 星期二
SCMP:Watchdog accused over Lehman probe decision
4 August 2009
Lawmakers criticised the financial regulator for suspending an investigation over the selling of non-minibond products after banks agreed a HK$6.3 billion deal to repay Lehman Brothers minibonds buyers.
Securities and Futures Commission chief executive Martin Wheatley said the commission had not only ended its top-down inquiry into minibonds, but also suspended investigation of other products from the 16 banks under the agreement.
He was speaking at a hearing of the subcommittee on the debacle surrounding the sale of Lehman Brothers financial products.
Democrat James To Kun-sun told the five-hour meeting: "It's about the minibonds agreement with the banks, but you {hellip} voluntarily suspended your statutory duty to investigate the systematic failure [over the selling] of non-minibonds products."
Another democrat, Kam Nai-wai, asked Mr Wheatley if he thought the interests of other buyers who bought Constellation Notes, a derivative similar to minibonds also issued by Lehman Brothers, or equity-linked notes had been sacrificed.
Lehman Brothers minibonds holders will receive letters before Monday from the banks who will repay them at least 60 per cent of the value of their initial investment.
Mr Wheatley said the investigation into non-minibonds products, involving about 500 cases, had been suspended because the latest deal required the banks to immediately implement improved complaints-handling procedures to resolve all complaints they received.
He said the investigation of three other banks, which were not included in the payout deal because they sold Lehman-related products apart from minibonds, continued. Investors should first turn to banks if they had complaints, and then the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
Subcommittee chairman Raymond Ho Chung-tai said it would ask the commission to submit an original copy of the agreement, investigation findings of the 16 minibond-selling banks, as well as e-mail exchanges the commission had with the Monetary Authority and financial officials before it reached the deal.
Minibonds are not corporate bonds, but consist of high-risk credit-linked derivatives, and are marketed as a proxy investment in well-known companies. Hong Kong investors lost billions of dollars on minibonds guaranteed by Lehman Brothers when the US investment bank went bankrupt last September
From SCMP:Watchdog accused over Lehman probe decision
Lawmakers criticised the financial regulator for suspending an investigation over the selling of non-minibond products after banks agreed a HK$6.3 billion deal to repay Lehman Brothers minibonds buyers.
Securities and Futures Commission chief executive Martin Wheatley said the commission had not only ended its top-down inquiry into minibonds, but also suspended investigation of other products from the 16 banks under the agreement.
He was speaking at a hearing of the subcommittee on the debacle surrounding the sale of Lehman Brothers financial products.
Democrat James To Kun-sun told the five-hour meeting: "It's about the minibonds agreement with the banks, but you {hellip} voluntarily suspended your statutory duty to investigate the systematic failure [over the selling] of non-minibonds products."
Another democrat, Kam Nai-wai, asked Mr Wheatley if he thought the interests of other buyers who bought Constellation Notes, a derivative similar to minibonds also issued by Lehman Brothers, or equity-linked notes had been sacrificed.
Lehman Brothers minibonds holders will receive letters before Monday from the banks who will repay them at least 60 per cent of the value of their initial investment.
Mr Wheatley said the investigation into non-minibonds products, involving about 500 cases, had been suspended because the latest deal required the banks to immediately implement improved complaints-handling procedures to resolve all complaints they received.
He said the investigation of three other banks, which were not included in the payout deal because they sold Lehman-related products apart from minibonds, continued. Investors should first turn to banks if they had complaints, and then the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
Subcommittee chairman Raymond Ho Chung-tai said it would ask the commission to submit an original copy of the agreement, investigation findings of the 16 minibond-selling banks, as well as e-mail exchanges the commission had with the Monetary Authority and financial officials before it reached the deal.
Minibonds are not corporate bonds, but consist of high-risk credit-linked derivatives, and are marketed as a proxy investment in well-known companies. Hong Kong investors lost billions of dollars on minibonds guaranteed by Lehman Brothers when the US investment bank went bankrupt last September
From SCMP:Watchdog accused over Lehman probe decision
2009年8月2日 星期日
[60%+X%]回購計劃 之［X%］ "進一步付款" 的陷阱
儘管對新鴻基及凱基證券的100％本金回購方案，證監會考慮了“符合投資者的最佳利益”和“客戶目前蒙受的損失得到補償”。
銀行回購方案卻是不需要如新鴻基般去考虑符合银行客戶之“最佳利益”，而銀行客戶目前蒙受之損失也不需要如新鴻基客戶般“得到補償”，
這個［60％＋X%］ 回購計劃之［X％］"進一步付款"計劃，顯然是符合銀行和銀行家們之“最佳利益”
因為，如果真是執行這個回購計劃，其實是沒有任何具體措施來保障客戶可得知抵押品 之真實價格並得到應該得到的回購價格。
目前的［60％＋X%］回購計劃看似跟抵押品價格掛鈎，[X%} "進一步付款" 計劃之具體執行操作（價格，費用，時間，。。。）等完全不提，一旦迷債持有者將迷債權益轉給銀行，銀行會公平公正地告知我們不在公開市場上流通的抵押品之真實價格以及相關信息麼？
- 回購計劃毫無保障迷債受害人得到這[X%}相關的權益和條款，
- 回購計劃同時卻無條件地要求和明確指出：［迷債受害人就必須撤回及永久終止因迷你債券引起或與迷你債券相關而正在進行的法律訴訟或調解。］，和 ［證監會將會停止就迷你債券的銷售對分銷銀行進行調查］。
- 新鴻基客戶尚可以同意以上兩個條款，畢竟新鴻基作出100％本金賠償。 回購計劃卻讓銀行以「六成」本金之購迷債.
[60%+X%} 回購計劃 之［X%］ "進一步付款" 計劃 令人感覺就好像當初買迷債一樣，‘如果相信這7個公司不會破產，可以買入迷債“。。。看似只需知道7個掛鈎公司的信息。
－ 從2003年至今為至，銀行還從未給過迷債受害人任何關於抵押品內容或價格之信息。
－ 銀行在4－6年間的迷債銷售中完全是只重傭金，不顧客戶，毫無誠信可言。
－ 在迷債真相暴露之後又百般抵賴，毫無誠意。
－ 整個回購計劃之暴光過程和最後方案，再次顯示銀行為達其目的而機關算盡和神通廣大之本領, 毫無公平合理可言。
以銀行至今之表現，尤其當客戶們將迷債所有權轉讓給銀行，而且必須根據銀行和證監會指示，撤回及永久終止一切迷你債券相關的訴訟， 加上‘證監會將會停止就迷你債券的銷售對分銷銀行進行調查’，
- 如何令人相信銀行不會利用回購計劃，用合法的名義，在抵押品價格上為銀行牟取 最佳利益，而再次罔顧客戶之利益？？ 如何做到，我們現在是不會知的，也是想像不到的。誠如當初不知道迷債抵押品其實是跟百多個公司信貸掛鈎一樣，誠如當初不知道迷債之價格和風險極大地取決於迷債抵押品內百多個掛鈎公司一樣。
- 如何令人相信銀行會有誠信，去公平合理地執行這個回購計劃的全部內容？
或者說：我們只能是祈禱上蒼，希望僅僅這一次，銀行和銀行家們會有一些良心，表現出一些對客戶的誠信和 Duty of Care, 顧及一下迷債受害人的利益？
这就是所谓的”建議合理，而且符合公眾利益“？
－ 因為是銀行和 銀行家們提出的“ 建議 ”，所以 證監會認為 是 “ 合理 ”？！
－ 因為銀行 和 銀行家們的利益是’公眾利益‘ 之主體，所以 證監會認為 是“符合公眾利益”？！
銀行回購方案卻是不需要如新鴻基般去考虑符合银行客戶之“最佳利益”，而銀行客戶目前蒙受之損失也不需要如新鴻基客戶般“得到補償”，
這個［60％＋X%］ 回購計劃之［X％］"進一步付款"計劃，顯然是符合銀行和銀行家們之“最佳利益”
因為，如果真是執行這個回購計劃，其實是沒有任何具體措施來保障客戶可得知抵押品 之真實價格並得到應該得到的回購價格。
目前的［60％＋X%］回購計劃看似跟抵押品價格掛鈎，[X%} "進一步付款" 計劃之具體執行操作（價格，費用，時間，。。。）等完全不提，一旦迷債持有者將迷債權益轉給銀行，銀行會公平公正地告知我們不在公開市場上流通的抵押品之真實價格以及相關信息麼？
- 回購計劃毫無保障迷債受害人得到這[X%}相關的權益和條款，
- 回購計劃同時卻無條件地要求和明確指出：［迷債受害人就必須撤回及永久終止因迷你債券引起或與迷你債券相關而正在進行的法律訴訟或調解。］，和 ［證監會將會停止就迷你債券的銷售對分銷銀行進行調查］。
- 新鴻基客戶尚可以同意以上兩個條款，畢竟新鴻基作出100％本金賠償。 回購計劃卻讓銀行以「六成」本金之購迷債.
[60%+X%} 回購計劃 之［X%］ "進一步付款" 計劃 令人感覺就好像當初買迷債一樣，‘如果相信這7個公司不會破產，可以買入迷債“。。。看似只需知道7個掛鈎公司的信息。
－ 從2003年至今為至，銀行還從未給過迷債受害人任何關於抵押品內容或價格之信息。
－ 銀行在4－6年間的迷債銷售中完全是只重傭金，不顧客戶，毫無誠信可言。
－ 在迷債真相暴露之後又百般抵賴，毫無誠意。
－ 整個回購計劃之暴光過程和最後方案，再次顯示銀行為達其目的而機關算盡和神通廣大之本領, 毫無公平合理可言。
以銀行至今之表現，尤其當客戶們將迷債所有權轉讓給銀行，而且必須根據銀行和證監會指示，撤回及永久終止一切迷你債券相關的訴訟， 加上‘證監會將會停止就迷你債券的銷售對分銷銀行進行調查’，
- 如何令人相信銀行不會利用回購計劃，用合法的名義，在抵押品價格上為銀行牟取 最佳利益，而再次罔顧客戶之利益？？ 如何做到，我們現在是不會知的，也是想像不到的。誠如當初不知道迷債抵押品其實是跟百多個公司信貸掛鈎一樣，誠如當初不知道迷債之價格和風險極大地取決於迷債抵押品內百多個掛鈎公司一樣。
- 如何令人相信銀行會有誠信，去公平合理地執行這個回購計劃的全部內容？
或者說：我們只能是祈禱上蒼，希望僅僅這一次，銀行和銀行家們會有一些良心，表現出一些對客戶的誠信和 Duty of Care, 顧及一下迷債受害人的利益？
这就是所谓的”建議合理，而且符合公眾利益“？
－ 因為是銀行和 銀行家們提出的“ 建議 ”，所以 證監會認為 是 “ 合理 ”？！
－ 因為銀行 和 銀行家們的利益是’公眾利益‘ 之主體，所以 證監會認為 是“符合公眾利益”？！
2009年8月1日 星期六
為甚麼證監會對銀行網開一面，不要求100％回購, 卻強求受害人必須永久放棄一切相關訴訟？
The Minibond Repurchase Agreement by SFC-HKMA-Banks showed us how Powerful & Irresponsible & Greedy & Shameless (PIGS) that banks and bankers are. Most Minibond victims can't go through legal channel to defend themself and can only rely on Government/ Regulators. I am deeply saddened by the fact that SFC and our Legco members were willing to bend to banks & bankers' demand in the name of distressed victims who felt hopeless & helpless under the current HK system. It is such a shame to see that SFC and government bent to banks & bankers' demand in the name of public interest.
證監會跟銀行达成的回購方案，是基於甚麼原因或關注而達成的呢？為甚麼證監會對於新鴻基投資和凱基的懲罰是100％本金回購，而對銀行卻是網開一面, 不要求銀行做出100％本金回購？銀行的迷債銷售是否有錯? 證監會為甚麼選擇性執法？
新鴻基為諸多銀行提供迷債相關的培訓，許多銀行的迷債銷售都是直接跟新鴻基合作而沒有跟雷曼亞洲直接打交道。現在，新鴻基做出100%賠償。銀行卻可以得到寬待處理，不必對迷債投資者做出100％回購？ 原因何在？
更有甚者，回購建議不僅 讓銀行以「六成」之低價回購投資者手上的迷債並以強權的方式要求迷債受害人必須永久放棄一切相關訴訟，令人以為證監會是銀行公會的一個分枝部門。
在銷售迷債問題上，銀行的錯誤跟新鴻基投資的錯誤有甚麼不同而受到證監會的寬待呢 ？
1。 為甚麼證監會對銀行的六至七成回購方案認為：”建議合理，而且符合公眾利益“？
但對新鴻基及凱基證券的100％本金回購方案，證監會認為是“符合投資者的最佳利益”、“客戶目前蒙受的損失得到補償”。
換言之，
(a) 銀行回購方案不需要如新鴻基般符合客戶之“最佳利益”， 銀行客戶目前蒙受之損失也不需要如新鴻基客戶般“得到補償”，原因何在？
(b) 銀行的迷債銷售是否有錯?
(c) “建議合理 ” 之 "合理 ” 的 參考原則和標準是甚麼？ 因為是銀行提出的“ 建議 ”，所以 證監會認為 是“ 合理 ”的，對嗎？
(d) “符合 公眾利益 ”之 “符合"的 參考原則和標準是甚麼？
何為 “公眾利益 ”？ 銀行 和 銀行家們的利益是’公眾利益‘ 之主體？
因為是銀行提出的“ 建議 ”，所以 證監會認為 是“ 符合公眾利益 ” 嗎？
2。 證監會表示考慮和解方案時，會根據 3 項原則，
（一），是能否補償投資者損失、
（二），是有關機構能否確保日後避免再犯及改善錯失、
（三），是要反映若干懲罰性。
目前的回購建議到底是遵守還是違背了以上3項原則呢？
根據證監會引用的安永會計師為銀行公會提供的“迷債結構和定價”報告（2008年12月)和目前報章所登載之迷債信息，諸多系列之抵押品價格在60％－70％之間。按照回購建議，即為：
－ 對於多數65歲以下之迷債受害人來說，极有可能必須承受30％之損失（得到：60％＋10％）作為信任銀行買入迷債之懲罰，
－ 而銀行之損失則极有可能處於 0％至10％之間，反映作為對銀行之‘若干懲罰性’？
這變相解釋了為甚麼銀行同意60％回購?
[迷債回購方案中投資者和銀行損益計算表2]
3。以下為證監會對於新鴻基投資的四項關注, 銀行在這四個方面是否有證據證明 做得好呢？
（一）、新鴻基在分銷雷曼迷債前，對產品進行的盡職審查是否足夠；
（二）、對前線人員提供的培訓是否足夠，從而確保投資者理解產品涉及的一切重大風險；
（三）、評估新鴻基在以下三方面的工作——迷債系列的風險水平；向零售銷售人員傳達迷債風險評級的信息；及採取理應採取的措施，確保銷售人員會因應迷債風險回報情況，與客戶的個人情況進行配對，提供合理適當意見；
（四）、就給予合資格客戶的投資意見，及客戶提出的疑問備存紀錄。
銀行是否有證據證明銀行沒有錯，一切培訓銷售指引等已經做足手續，解釋得清清楚楚 ?
4。證監會跟銀行的回購建議要求：迷債受害人一旦同意此回購建議，
－證監會將會停止就迷你債券的銷售對分銷銀行進行調查；
－迷債受害人就必須撤回及永久終止因迷你債券引起或與迷你債券相關而正在進行的法律訴訟或調解。
這不是強權式的不平等條約是甚麼？！
’銀行＋證監會＋金管局‘ 聯手欺壓無權無勢又無銀行之財力的香港普通市民。
新鴻基客戶尚可以同意以上兩個條款，畢竟新鴻基作出100％本金賠償。
迷債受害人仍然面臨這多達30％－40％損失之可能，卻要不得不放棄跟迷債相關的一切權益，
而犯了錯的銀行和銀行家們卻仍然可以逍遙法外，以60％之價格去把迷債之100％權益買下，並且不用擔心迷債受害人的任何投訴。
可以理解，這是銀行和銀行家們所期待的。
可是，證監會根據甚麼法規去俯首聽從銀行和銀行家的指令呢？ 銀行包庇法？
證監會根據甚麼原則去決定同意這麼個不顧迷債受害人利益，旨在保護銀行和銀行家利益之決定的呢？
5。 是否因為銀行屬於財大勢大之強權集團，是需要證監會和政府全力維護的，所以證監會必須聽從銀行之要求，對銀行盡量網開一面？
證監會和政府是否認為：香港为成為金融中心就必须得聽銀行和銀行家的話，必须以銀行和銀行家的利益為第一利益？
6。 回購建議除了規定60％回購價和永久放棄相關訴訟以外，其它就只給出一個看似跟抵押品價格掛鈎，貌似簡單，並無任何實質執行措施的‘’"進一步付款"。
如果真是執行這個回購計劃，有甚麼具體措施來保障客戶可以得知抵押品 之真實價格並得到應該得到的回購價格？
目前的回購計劃看似跟抵押品價格掛鈎，，"進一步付款"之具體執行操作（價格，費用，時間，。。。）等完全不提，一旦迷債持有者將迷債權益轉給銀行，銀行會公平公正地告知我們不是在公開市場上流通的抵押品之真實價格以及相關信息麼？
從2003年至今為至，銀行從未給過迷債受害人任何關於抵押品內容或價格之信息。（按照前銀行公會主席和廣北先生於2008年9月27日之相關評論，直至2008年9月之前，對於所有迷債系列之抵押品之性質，銀行好像都是不確切瞭解。）。
這個回購計劃令人感覺就好像當初買迷債一樣，‘如果相信這7個公司不會破產，可以買入迷債“。。。看似只需知道7個掛鈎公司的信息。可真到了評估迷債價格的時候，就必須看其它百多個掛鈎主體，就必須對抵押品的百多個掛鈎公司名稱評級及破產事件條款等等有詳細瞭解之後才可以估價，原來抵押品之具體掛鈎內容對於迷債之價格有著非常重大的影響，是評估迷債之不可缺少的重大因數。
銀行在4－6年間的迷債銷售中完全是只重傭金，不顧客戶，毫無誠信可言。
在迷債真相暴露之後又百般抵賴，毫無誠意。
整個回購計劃之暴光過程和最後方案，再次顯示銀行為達其目的而機關算盡和神通廣大之本領, 毫無公平合理可言。
現在，如何令人相信銀行會有誠信，去公平合理地執行這個回購計劃的全部內容，讓客戶得到應該得到之最佳利益呢？
以銀行至今之表現，尤其當客戶們已經將迷債所有權轉讓給銀行，而且不得不根據銀行和證監會之指示，為此回購計劃而必須撤回及永久終止因迷你債券引起或與迷你債券相關而正在進行的法律訴訟或調，只能令人覺得銀行會利用這個回購計劃，用合法的名義，在抵押品價格上去為銀行牟取 最佳利益，而再次罔顧客戶之利益。
這個"進一步付款"計劃，顯然是於銀行有利，而不利於迷債受害人之“最佳利益”。
請證監會解釋：為甚麼證監會認為這個“進一步付款”建議是“合理”且““符合 公眾利益 ”？
證監會認為這個“進一步付款”建議是有利於迷債受害人之“最佳利益”麼？
證監會的參考原則和標準是甚麼？
7。 銀行一直強調客戶之文化教育水平和投資經驗。
（a) 是否因為銀行比新鴻基投資／凱基 在投資方面經驗少一些，於是，銀行有了錯誤證監會可以多諒解一些？
(b) 是否因為銀行相關產品部門管理以及銀行職員之文化教育水平和投資經驗知識，都低於新鴻基投資／凱基之職員的素質，於是，銀行有了錯誤證監會可以多諒解一些？
(c) 是否因為銀行客戶之文化教育水平和投資經驗都高於新鴻基投資客戶之文化教育水平和投資經驗，於是，銀行有了錯誤就主要是客戶的責任，而新鴻基投資有了錯誤就主要是新鴻基投資之責任？證監會可以多諒解銀行之錯誤？
8。回購建議把專業投資者或經驗投資者給除外。原因何在呢？
暫且不談何謂專業投資者或經驗投資者之定義。
銀行本身應該是CDS/CDO信貸衍生市場上最為專業最有經驗的專家級別的經驗/專業經驗投資者 。
如果銀行都可以持續幾年如一日地犯同樣的錯誤，誤導客戶，
那麼，銀行有甚麼理由認為“專業投資者”/"經驗投資者"客戶會比銀行自己這麼個信貸衍生市場上最為專業的專家級別的專業+經驗投資者還要瞭解迷債之從未披露的真實風險和特徵呢？
當然，如果某些銀行的“專業投資者”/"經驗投資者"客戶是從事於CDO/CDS 相關的專業／職業人士的話，那就是另當別論了。
9。諸多迷債受害人由於對政府和監管機構／法律系統已經非常失望，認為銀行可以達到一手遮天， 而願意接受銀行給與的不平等條約。
證監會是否因為看到受害人的心態 而乘虛而入，決定給與銀行一個優惠待遇？因為受害人已經是身心疲憊和極度失望了。
請聽一位願意接受 ’60％＋X ‘ 建議的 苦主的悲憤肺腑之言：
［ 然而誰没想過妳提的問題嗎?
誰不為此氣憤嗎?
然而銀行/金管/証監/特首/議員真的不知答案嗎?
只是他們都認同了香港是一個不需要講道理的地方! 是講權勢,是講錢財.........
我真的無語問蒼天, ... 因為銀行同政府的信用對我來說是全無價值!
.....只見滿目是不義的事,只見遍地是無望的眼神,怎也是無法接受, 但轉眼間郤見自己的影子在其中 ］
銀行回購建議，是向全香港市民，向全世界通告：
香港不再是一個有法治、講道理的社會，而是一個有強權、無公理、以強凌弱，保障大財團銀行/銀行家之利益的社會!
令公眾對香港銀行、金融及監管制度 喪失信心！
<轉載>向銀行購買投資產品， 誤導銷售和失實陳述的風險比雷曼破產前無一點減少，客戶保障更減少
[明報 2009年8月1日:
... 曾表示難以接受繁瑣銷售過程的銀行公會主席王冬勝，昨日指出現時客戶多「捨難取易」，甚至透過「銀行體系以外的機構」購買投資產品，影響銀行生意。....]
[轉載 Mr. JY Comments]
現在客戶到「銀行體系以外的機構」購買投資產品，影響銀行生意，這是會直接減少銀行收入。 但並非所有客戶傾向「捨難取易」，投入股市、樓市。而且向「銀行體系以外的機構」購買投資產品所需要受的風險及保障未必比向銀行為高！
以迷債事件為例：向証券商購買同一種產品比向銀行更有保障，更無大石壓死蟹和官商勾結和包備之風險。現在向銀行購買任向投資產品， 誤導銷售和失實陳述的風險比雷曼破產前無任向一點減少，客戶保障更減少。
首先証監會審批標準無大改善，一樣可用虛假名稱，監管大原則亦只是依靠銷售人員作產品特質和風險的全面披露，其他一切不立監管。
金管局主要監管銀行是否正常運作，在有需要情况下提供恊助，保障客戶不受誤導和欺詐並不是其主要工作，只是非常低層次而己！
以迷債事件為例：只是用盡方法設立條件替銀行減少投訴個案，因為以調查事實真相作為唯一依歸的標準，可以肯定是銀行的系統性誤導銷售，並無依足証監會定下銷售程序，這樣銀行便會需要向客戶十足賠賞，短期損失是百多億，但因抵押品有價，最終損失不會太大，此乃非主要考慮；而是銀行的系統性誤導銷售，亦非只是唯一出現迷債，而是所有投資產品都有相同的違規失誤，最後會引發全面性投訴和索賞，銀行到時吾死十足都會死八九成，政府高官到時一定會死傷無數，剩下的和新上任又不能不做嘢，一定大力加強監管銀行銷售程序，銀行吾死吾掂！
所以政府高層一開始便定性為投資者因金融海潚下的投資失誤，証監會表示監管大原則是依靠銷售人員作產品特質和風險的全面披露，不會審查產品和發表意見，即是產品無乜監管，
一切靠自己，証監會講明吾好靠佢監管！而金管局講明是監管銀行是否正常運作，保障客戶不受誤導和欺詐並不是其主要工作，因此為保銀行業，保金融穩定，存戶的合法權益是可犧牲，政府可作吹虛說假騙市民，寶貴的法冶更可暫時放棄！
正是基本法所講５０年不變，以前一樣，現在亦一樣，將來都係一樣，保障大財團銀行的利益，即保障特區金融穩定，
市民的犧牲是理所當然，法冶有需要時亦要讓路！
轉載 From:
http://chukwokhung.mysinablog.com/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=1858107
... 曾表示難以接受繁瑣銷售過程的銀行公會主席王冬勝，昨日指出現時客戶多「捨難取易」，甚至透過「銀行體系以外的機構」購買投資產品，影響銀行生意。....]
[轉載 Mr. JY Comments]
現在客戶到「銀行體系以外的機構」購買投資產品，影響銀行生意，這是會直接減少銀行收入。 但並非所有客戶傾向「捨難取易」，投入股市、樓市。而且向「銀行體系以外的機構」購買投資產品所需要受的風險及保障未必比向銀行為高！
以迷債事件為例：向証券商購買同一種產品比向銀行更有保障，更無大石壓死蟹和官商勾結和包備之風險。現在向銀行購買任向投資產品， 誤導銷售和失實陳述的風險比雷曼破產前無任向一點減少，客戶保障更減少。
首先証監會審批標準無大改善，一樣可用虛假名稱，監管大原則亦只是依靠銷售人員作產品特質和風險的全面披露，其他一切不立監管。
金管局主要監管銀行是否正常運作，在有需要情况下提供恊助，保障客戶不受誤導和欺詐並不是其主要工作，只是非常低層次而己！
以迷債事件為例：只是用盡方法設立條件替銀行減少投訴個案，因為以調查事實真相作為唯一依歸的標準，可以肯定是銀行的系統性誤導銷售，並無依足証監會定下銷售程序，這樣銀行便會需要向客戶十足賠賞，短期損失是百多億，但因抵押品有價，最終損失不會太大，此乃非主要考慮；而是銀行的系統性誤導銷售，亦非只是唯一出現迷債，而是所有投資產品都有相同的違規失誤，最後會引發全面性投訴和索賞，銀行到時吾死十足都會死八九成，政府高官到時一定會死傷無數，剩下的和新上任又不能不做嘢，一定大力加強監管銀行銷售程序，銀行吾死吾掂！
所以政府高層一開始便定性為投資者因金融海潚下的投資失誤，証監會表示監管大原則是依靠銷售人員作產品特質和風險的全面披露，不會審查產品和發表意見，即是產品無乜監管，
一切靠自己，証監會講明吾好靠佢監管！而金管局講明是監管銀行是否正常運作，保障客戶不受誤導和欺詐並不是其主要工作，因此為保銀行業，保金融穩定，存戶的合法權益是可犧牲，政府可作吹虛說假騙市民，寶貴的法冶更可暫時放棄！
正是基本法所講５０年不變，以前一樣，現在亦一樣，將來都係一樣，保障大財團銀行的利益，即保障特區金融穩定，
市民的犧牲是理所當然，法冶有需要時亦要讓路！
轉載 From:
http://chukwokhung.mysinablog.com/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=1858107
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