2009年9月30日 星期三
"警方搜查安永拘一人"相關新聞和評論
彭博新聞報道，安永會計師事務所正協助警方商業罪案調查科，調查一宗涉及雅佳控股清盤的案件，又指警方星期二到過安永的辦公室調查，懷疑涉及一宗偽造文件案，並拘捕一名四十一歲姓鄧的男子，懷疑涉案。
家用電器公司雅佳控股二千年清盤，清盤前由安永做核數，雅佳的清盤人2004年以疏忽的名義，向安永追討賠償。到本月23日，雙方在高等法院達成和解，消息指，安永同意賠償超過十億元。安永是本港四大會計師事務所之一。
(安永同意向雅佳清算人支付巨款：http://www.ftchinese.com/story.php?storyid=001028907).
讀者評論
和解了,只是代表赔偿与苦主.但刑责还在,走着瞧.
誰說投資失利皆因貪財起，怪不了人？
誰不貪財？投資，銀行放款當然是風險自負，
但對家存心欺騙，告之，錢追不了，也要討個公道，把騙子繩之於法， 以正公義，以警效猶。
就如捉殺人犯，捉了，死者也不會番生，唔通咁就唔捉
2009年9月19日 星期六
【明報】證監難拒交報告 顯示銀行有系統性失誤
【明報專訊】2009-9-16.
立法會調查雷曼迷債事件的專責委員會，曾不止一次要求證監會交出銀行銷售迷債的調查報告，遭證監會以妨礙調查為由拒絕。據本報了解，在銀行與大部分事主達成和解協議後，證監會內部研判，繼續拒交報告的法理依據已變得相當薄弱，報告羅列的證據，足以證明大多數銀行銷售迷債確實存在系統性失誤。
銀行或多或少犯下四大錯誤
據悉，證監會的調查報告載有銀行系統性違規銷售的證據，專責委員會看完報告後，可能毋須花太多時間傳召銀行界人士作供也能得出清楚的結論。消息人士解釋，所謂系統性違規銷售，不一定是事主和媒體常說的誤導性銷售，如強調迷債是安全的債券或等同長期定期存款，也包括：
（1）沒有對產品作獨立的盡職審查，研判產品的風險特性；
（2）沒有針對產品的風險特性制訂適切的培訓教材和安排前線銷售人員接受專業的培訓；
（3）沒有制訂專業的測試辦法，準確地評估客戶對結構投資產品的風險承受能力；
（4）沒有針對特別脆弱客戶群，如高齡、低教育程度、殘障、全副身家投入等類別客戶，制訂額外的程序，確保客戶理解和接受產品的風險。
消息指出，銷售迷債的銀行大部分犯了以上一項或多項的錯誤，不管個別銷售個案中有沒有誤導性言論，都已經構成違規銷售。這種違規銷售是系統性的，因為誤導性陳述可能是個別前線人員違規，但培訓材料若未能準確講出產品核心風險，前線銷售人員便不可能解釋清楚給客戶知道，便會令每一宗銷售都出問題，所以是系統性的失誤，深植於銀行內部制度。銀行願意接受證監會提出的六至七成回購建議，或多或少是看到，若被檢控定罪的機會很大。
現公開報告不涉妨礙司法
消息指出，證監會拒絕向立法會專責委員會交出雷曼調查報告，法理依據是調查尚未結束，若銀行拒絕接受證監會為保障投資者提出的和解建議，調查所得將用於檢控銀行違規，向立法會披露調查所得可能會妨礙檢控和審訊，導致議會和媒體公審，有違司法公平原則。不過，現時絕大部分涉及雷曼有關產品投訴的銀行已經向客戶作出和解建議，證監會不會提出檢控，調查工作已經告一段落，原來拒絕交出報告的依據已經不存在。
消息稱，雖然證監會與被調查銀行達成和解協議載有保密條款，不得對外披露調查的內容，但立法會專責委員會若行使法定權力要求閱覽報告，《立法會（權力及特權）條例》的法律約束力將凌駕於證監會與銀行之間的協議，證監會為履行法例所定責任交出調查報告，不算違反保密協議。
至於尚有3間沒銷售迷債但涉及雷曼信用掛鹇票據的銀行，尚未與客戶和解，會否影響證監會交出報告，消息指調查報告可以隱去與這些銀行有關的資料，對和解談判應該沒有實質影響。
立法會調查雷曼迷債事件的專責委員會，曾不止一次要求證監會交出銀行銷售迷債的調查報告，遭證監會以妨礙調查為由拒絕。據本報了解，在銀行與大部分事主達成和解協議後，證監會內部研判，繼續拒交報告的法理依據已變得相當薄弱，報告羅列的證據，足以證明大多數銀行銷售迷債確實存在系統性失誤。
銀行或多或少犯下四大錯誤
據悉，證監會的調查報告載有銀行系統性違規銷售的證據，專責委員會看完報告後，可能毋須花太多時間傳召銀行界人士作供也能得出清楚的結論。消息人士解釋，所謂系統性違規銷售，不一定是事主和媒體常說的誤導性銷售，如強調迷債是安全的債券或等同長期定期存款，也包括：
（1）沒有對產品作獨立的盡職審查，研判產品的風險特性；
（2）沒有針對產品的風險特性制訂適切的培訓教材和安排前線銷售人員接受專業的培訓；
（3）沒有制訂專業的測試辦法，準確地評估客戶對結構投資產品的風險承受能力；
（4）沒有針對特別脆弱客戶群，如高齡、低教育程度、殘障、全副身家投入等類別客戶，制訂額外的程序，確保客戶理解和接受產品的風險。
消息指出，銷售迷債的銀行大部分犯了以上一項或多項的錯誤，不管個別銷售個案中有沒有誤導性言論，都已經構成違規銷售。這種違規銷售是系統性的，因為誤導性陳述可能是個別前線人員違規，但培訓材料若未能準確講出產品核心風險，前線銷售人員便不可能解釋清楚給客戶知道，便會令每一宗銷售都出問題，所以是系統性的失誤，深植於銀行內部制度。銀行願意接受證監會提出的六至七成回購建議，或多或少是看到，若被檢控定罪的機會很大。
現公開報告不涉妨礙司法
消息指出，證監會拒絕向立法會專責委員會交出雷曼調查報告，法理依據是調查尚未結束，若銀行拒絕接受證監會為保障投資者提出的和解建議，調查所得將用於檢控銀行違規，向立法會披露調查所得可能會妨礙檢控和審訊，導致議會和媒體公審，有違司法公平原則。不過，現時絕大部分涉及雷曼有關產品投訴的銀行已經向客戶作出和解建議，證監會不會提出檢控，調查工作已經告一段落，原來拒絕交出報告的依據已經不存在。
消息稱，雖然證監會與被調查銀行達成和解協議載有保密條款，不得對外披露調查的內容，但立法會專責委員會若行使法定權力要求閱覽報告，《立法會（權力及特權）條例》的法律約束力將凌駕於證監會與銀行之間的協議，證監會為履行法例所定責任交出調查報告，不算違反保密協議。
至於尚有3間沒銷售迷債但涉及雷曼信用掛鹇票據的銀行，尚未與客戶和解，會否影響證監會交出報告，消息指調查報告可以隱去與這些銀行有關的資料，對和解談判應該沒有實質影響。
2009年9月13日 星期日
從 迷債系列 6 看 雷曼迷你債券騙局手段之 完美完善過程
2003年9月銷售的迷債 系列 6 的銷售額是迷債系列中最低的，連 5 百萬美金都未達到。 而其5％之年息卻比同期前後幾個系列都高。為甚麼系列6 會 這麼不受銀行客戶們的 青眯 呢？
比較迷你債券系列6及其前後系列， 可以看到迷債產品表面結構的“進化”和產品宣傳的“神話”過程，看到產品披露的“精化” 和 “簡化”過程，
可以看到金融精英們是如何在政府監管部門的縱容和庇護下逐步地把迷債債券精心包裝成安全形象的產品，以達到大量向銀行客戶們銷售的目的。
1。2003年9月銷售的系列6 之銷售結果是最差的。
系列 6 的總 銷售額僅為 4百75 萬美金。
於同年6月發行的系列 5 之 銷售總額 是 過了 1千萬 美金。
於同年11 月發行的系列 7 的 銷售總額則 是多達 4千 6百 多萬 美金。
於次年2004年5月發行的系列10 的 銷售總額也是多達 是 4千4百多萬美金。
2。 系列6 之年息卻是最高的。
系列 6 之利息為 5％。兩年期，2005年9月到期。
到期時，發行商有權把期限延長至2009年3月，延期後的利息預定為 8％ 。 發行商 行使了這個延期權，
而系列5 的 利息僅是 3。8％，
系列 7 的利息只是 4。2％，
系列 10 的美元系列利息也是： 4。25％，
系列 5 ， 7 和 10 的利息 均低於 系列 6 這麼個保本迷債， 鎖定年期也不比系列6 短。
為甚麼銀行客戶們會捨系列6 之高息誘惑而選擇其它低息的迷債系列呢？
3。 系列 6 寫明跟150 個公司信貸掛鈎。
根據銷售章程，系列 6 聲稱是 保本的（條件之一是：如果抵押品不出現完全損失的情形的話）。 可是，這個高息卻是有條件的。
於2003年9月－2005年9月間, 這150 個公司信貸掛鈎中如果出現：
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
0 個信貸事件：利息為 4。2％；
1 個信貸事件：利息為 4。15％；。。。。。。
5 個信貸事件：利息為 0。8％；
6 個或以上信貸事件：利息為 0；
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
於2005年9月－2009年3月間, 這150 個公司信貸掛鈎中如果出現：
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
0 個信貸事件：利息為 8％；
1 個信貸事件：利息為 6。65％；。。。。。。
5 個信貸事件：利息為 1。3％；
6 個或以上信貸事件：利息為 0；
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
看來可以鎖定2－6年的喜歡穩定高息的銀行客戶們多數並不喜歡這個跟150公司信貸事件掛鈎的條件？
4。迷債表面之信貸掛鈎主體.
系列 6 寫明跟 150 個 公司 信貸掛鈎。銷售章程列出了 這 150 家公司的 名稱 和信貸評級。
系列 5 寫明跟 1個參考主體信貸掛鈎， 銷售章程列出了 這 1 家公司的 名稱 和信貸評級 (Hutchison Whampoa )。
系列 7 寫明跟 6 個 公司信貸掛鈎。銷售章程列出了 這 6 家公司的 名稱 和信貸評級 (Citigroup, DBS, HSBC, Hutchison Whampoa, Standard Chartered Bank, Wing Hang bank; )。
系列 10 寫明跟 7 個 公司信貸掛鈎，銷售章程列出了 這 7 家公司的 名稱 和信貸評級 (Coca-Cola, IBM, McDonald, BMW, Hutchison Whampoa, SBC, MTR; )。
從表面上看，跟150 個公司信貸掛鈎之 系列 6 令銀行客戶們缺乏安全感，儘管高息，依然令眾人卻步。
而跟1 ／6 ／7 個 公司信貸掛鈎之其它系列，儘管利息比系列6 的低，卻給人以“穩陣”的感覺。
而選為表面掛鈎主體的公司“質素”也愈來愈高，尤其是後期系列之表面信貸掛鈎主體均選用著名企業，迷債最為大肆宣揚的賣點就是跟幾家著名企業掛鈎，更與人以“安全”的錯覺。
5。 迷債抵押品之實質均為信貸掛鈎產品。
所有的迷債系列均未有提供抵押品的具體內容和詳情。儘管系列 6 / 5 / 7 / 10 的 抵押品其實都是投入於信貸掛鈎票據。
系列 5 / 6 / 7 之抵押品是由雷曼發行的跟多達150 個主體掛鈎的信貸掛鈎票據。
而系列10 之抵押品則是由雷曼 SPV 發行的 跟125 個主體信貸掛鈎的 信貸掛鈎票據（合成 CDO）。
由此可見，儘管表面之信貸掛鈎公司數目不盡相同，迷債系列 5 ／ 6 ／ 7 ／ 10 之抵押品實質其實是大同小異，均為跟多至125－150個主體信貸掛鈎產品。 換言之，
系列6 實質是 跟 ［ 150 （表面 ） ＋ 多達 150 個（抵押品）］信貸掛鈎的產品；
系列 5 實質是 跟 ［ 1 （表面 ） ＋ 多達 150 個（抵押品）］信貸掛鈎的產品；
系列 7 實質是 跟 ［ 6 （表面 ） ＋ 多達 150 個（抵押品）］信貸掛鈎的產品；
系列 10 實質是 跟 ［ 7 （表面 ） ＋ 多達 150 個（抵押品）］信貸掛鈎的產品；
但是銀行客戶們並不知道這些抵押品的實質，銀行客戶們並不知道隱藏於抵押品之中的第二層跟多至125－150個主體信貸掛鈎之重大信息和對於迷債的重大風險。銀行客戶們只看見和聽見了表面的幾個掛鈎公司之介紹。
6。 銷售章程實質內容之簡化
迷債 系列 6 只有 一本 銷售章程 ， "Prospectus".
而由 迷債 系列 9 （2004年3月） 開始，發行商提供 兩本章程： Program Prospectus 和 Issue Prospectus .
那麼系列 10 的 兩本章程 是否提供多一些 關於迷債之重大內容和重大相關風險所介紹的內容呢？
系列 6 銷售章程：
(i) 明確要求分銷商給客戶介紹包括抵押品文件在內的所有相關文件，
(ii) 明確指出會提供包括抵押品在內的一些通常文件於分銷商處。
(iii) 明確指出 會於迷債發行日起，抵押品相關文件可供於分銷商處查看。
系列10 以及之后的所有迷债系列的洋洋洒洒之两大本Program Prospectus 和 Issue Prospectus :
再也没有明确写出以上之3点。只是用”可以到雷曼公司去查阅所有文件“一语带过， Issue Prospectus 发行章程 详细地 提供了许多页的关于表面6－7个信贷挂钩公司之相关评级 和信息，并大谈“如果你相信这7个挂钩公司不会有破产事件的话。。。”， 发行章程还提供了关于“债券”等诸多产品之定义和解释，却没有解释何谓合成CDO 及其主要特征。
系列6 之分銷商們 ：
按照系列 6 之銷售章程，分銷商們都應該於發行日起收到迷債抵押品之詳細文件。 分銷商們應該是看過並清楚地瞭解迷債抵押品之詳情。 至於分銷商們有沒有跟客戶介紹迷債抵押品文件並讓客戶查看迷債抵押品之詳細文件就是另當別論了。
7。包裝迷債騙局的手段之進一步升華和完善
經過系列 6 失敗銷售一役，以及之後的系列 7－10 之成功銷售，金融精英們明白了以下真諦, 進一步完善了包裝迷債騙局的手段：：
要提高銷售額，必須打造出有漂亮表面的迷債產品。告知客戶的掛鈎產品是越少越好，告知客戶的掛鈎主體是越少越好，告知客戶的掛鈎主體之信貸評級是越高越好，抵押品之內容則萬萬不可以告知客戶，那會嚇跑客戶的。
於是，表面掛鈎的公司的數量只是6－7個，而選用的掛鈎主體的質素則越來越高，
“如果你相信 China Mobile （等7個）不會破產的話。。”。 讓人覺得出現破產事件的機會是零的假象，讓人產生迷債是個非常“安全”的產品之錯覺，
把真實的重大風險和真正可以帶來收入的信貸掛鈎內容全部隱藏到抵押品之中，對於抵押品的內容和風險從不明確解釋，至於抵押品之實質為信貸掛鈎產品之事實更是隱晦不談。
讀者若非具有 CDS/CDO 之專業知識，就萬萬想不到這抵押品其實是第二層信貸掛鈎產品，
銀行客戶們萬萬想不到的是：迷債除了有著跟表面6－7個公司信貸掛鈎之風險，迷債還同樣承受著 跟這從未披露 的 100－190多個 主體信貸掛鈎之重大風險, 而且抵押品出現信貸事件的概率是遠高於那表面幾個掛鈎公司的，因為抵押品內是跟 包括了低於投資評級（BB / B / CCC）在內的 100-190多個一籃子 主體信貸掛鈎的。換言之，把評級差一些的的信貸掛鈎主體全部藏入抵押品的信貸掛鈎條款。以7個著名公司的表面假象來吸引銀行客戶 。。。
而星債，精明債券等各類假債券，也紛紛以漂亮的表面掛鈎公司做招牌來推銷， 而把產品實質和風險深藏於避而不談的抵押品之中。
8。迷債騙局之辯護士們:
在這［ 7 個掛鈎公司 之風險］ ＋ ［ 100-190 個公司 部分破產之風險］ 的 2 個風險 中，
最最不可能發生的破產事件應該是那7個掛鈎公司。
金融精英們和政府监管机构的精英们在為無須披露抵押品內容而辯護的時候，可否請解釋一下：
如果廣告和章程可以大肆張揚解釋這發生可能性最小的風險，為甚麼不明確解釋另外發生可能性更高一些的風險呢 （即: ［ 100-194 個公司 部分破產之風險］）？ 这是什么样的有选择性的风险披露呢？
或者拿出專業機構投資者們買入類似產品，而始終從未收到過合成CDO（信貸掛鈎產品）之詳細文件之例子？
参考1： "Lehman Minibond Series 6 解读迷债系列6"
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/lehman-minibond-series-6.html
参考2： Lehman Minibond Series 6 Prospectus::
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/lehman-minibond-series-6.html
比較迷你債券系列6及其前後系列， 可以看到迷債產品表面結構的“進化”和產品宣傳的“神話”過程，看到產品披露的“精化” 和 “簡化”過程，
可以看到金融精英們是如何在政府監管部門的縱容和庇護下逐步地把迷債債券精心包裝成安全形象的產品，以達到大量向銀行客戶們銷售的目的。
1。2003年9月銷售的系列6 之銷售結果是最差的。
系列 6 的總 銷售額僅為 4百75 萬美金。
於同年6月發行的系列 5 之 銷售總額 是 過了 1千萬 美金。
於同年11 月發行的系列 7 的 銷售總額則 是多達 4千 6百 多萬 美金。
於次年2004年5月發行的系列10 的 銷售總額也是多達 是 4千4百多萬美金。
2。 系列6 之年息卻是最高的。
系列 6 之利息為 5％。兩年期，2005年9月到期。
到期時，發行商有權把期限延長至2009年3月，延期後的利息預定為 8％ 。 發行商 行使了這個延期權，
而系列5 的 利息僅是 3。8％，
系列 7 的利息只是 4。2％，
系列 10 的美元系列利息也是： 4。25％，
系列 5 ， 7 和 10 的利息 均低於 系列 6 這麼個保本迷債， 鎖定年期也不比系列6 短。
為甚麼銀行客戶們會捨系列6 之高息誘惑而選擇其它低息的迷債系列呢？
3。 系列 6 寫明跟150 個公司信貸掛鈎。
根據銷售章程，系列 6 聲稱是 保本的（條件之一是：如果抵押品不出現完全損失的情形的話）。 可是，這個高息卻是有條件的。
於2003年9月－2005年9月間, 這150 個公司信貸掛鈎中如果出現：
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
0 個信貸事件：利息為 4。2％；
1 個信貸事件：利息為 4。15％；。。。。。。
5 個信貸事件：利息為 0。8％；
6 個或以上信貸事件：利息為 0；
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
於2005年9月－2009年3月間, 這150 個公司信貸掛鈎中如果出現：
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
0 個信貸事件：利息為 8％；
1 個信貸事件：利息為 6。65％；。。。。。。
5 個信貸事件：利息為 1。3％；
6 個或以上信貸事件：利息為 0；
－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－
看來可以鎖定2－6年的喜歡穩定高息的銀行客戶們多數並不喜歡這個跟150公司信貸事件掛鈎的條件？
4。迷債表面之信貸掛鈎主體.
系列 6 寫明跟 150 個 公司 信貸掛鈎。銷售章程列出了 這 150 家公司的 名稱 和信貸評級。
系列 5 寫明跟 1個參考主體信貸掛鈎， 銷售章程列出了 這 1 家公司的 名稱 和信貸評級 (Hutchison Whampoa )。
系列 7 寫明跟 6 個 公司信貸掛鈎。銷售章程列出了 這 6 家公司的 名稱 和信貸評級 (Citigroup, DBS, HSBC, Hutchison Whampoa, Standard Chartered Bank, Wing Hang bank; )。
系列 10 寫明跟 7 個 公司信貸掛鈎，銷售章程列出了 這 7 家公司的 名稱 和信貸評級 (Coca-Cola, IBM, McDonald, BMW, Hutchison Whampoa, SBC, MTR; )。
從表面上看，跟150 個公司信貸掛鈎之 系列 6 令銀行客戶們缺乏安全感，儘管高息，依然令眾人卻步。
而跟1 ／6 ／7 個 公司信貸掛鈎之其它系列，儘管利息比系列6 的低，卻給人以“穩陣”的感覺。
而選為表面掛鈎主體的公司“質素”也愈來愈高，尤其是後期系列之表面信貸掛鈎主體均選用著名企業，迷債最為大肆宣揚的賣點就是跟幾家著名企業掛鈎，更與人以“安全”的錯覺。
5。 迷債抵押品之實質均為信貸掛鈎產品。
所有的迷債系列均未有提供抵押品的具體內容和詳情。儘管系列 6 / 5 / 7 / 10 的 抵押品其實都是投入於信貸掛鈎票據。
系列 5 / 6 / 7 之抵押品是由雷曼發行的跟多達150 個主體掛鈎的信貸掛鈎票據。
而系列10 之抵押品則是由雷曼 SPV 發行的 跟125 個主體信貸掛鈎的 信貸掛鈎票據（合成 CDO）。
由此可見，儘管表面之信貸掛鈎公司數目不盡相同，迷債系列 5 ／ 6 ／ 7 ／ 10 之抵押品實質其實是大同小異，均為跟多至125－150個主體信貸掛鈎產品。 換言之，
系列6 實質是 跟 ［ 150 （表面 ） ＋ 多達 150 個（抵押品）］信貸掛鈎的產品；
系列 5 實質是 跟 ［ 1 （表面 ） ＋ 多達 150 個（抵押品）］信貸掛鈎的產品；
系列 7 實質是 跟 ［ 6 （表面 ） ＋ 多達 150 個（抵押品）］信貸掛鈎的產品；
系列 10 實質是 跟 ［ 7 （表面 ） ＋ 多達 150 個（抵押品）］信貸掛鈎的產品；
但是銀行客戶們並不知道這些抵押品的實質，銀行客戶們並不知道隱藏於抵押品之中的第二層跟多至125－150個主體信貸掛鈎之重大信息和對於迷債的重大風險。銀行客戶們只看見和聽見了表面的幾個掛鈎公司之介紹。
6。 銷售章程實質內容之簡化
迷債 系列 6 只有 一本 銷售章程 ， "Prospectus".
而由 迷債 系列 9 （2004年3月） 開始，發行商提供 兩本章程： Program Prospectus 和 Issue Prospectus .
那麼系列 10 的 兩本章程 是否提供多一些 關於迷債之重大內容和重大相關風險所介紹的內容呢？
系列 6 銷售章程：
(i) 明確要求分銷商給客戶介紹包括抵押品文件在內的所有相關文件，
(ii) 明確指出會提供包括抵押品在內的一些通常文件於分銷商處。
(iii) 明確指出 會於迷債發行日起，抵押品相關文件可供於分銷商處查看。
系列10 以及之后的所有迷债系列的洋洋洒洒之两大本Program Prospectus 和 Issue Prospectus :
再也没有明确写出以上之3点。只是用”可以到雷曼公司去查阅所有文件“一语带过， Issue Prospectus 发行章程 详细地 提供了许多页的关于表面6－7个信贷挂钩公司之相关评级 和信息，并大谈“如果你相信这7个挂钩公司不会有破产事件的话。。。”， 发行章程还提供了关于“债券”等诸多产品之定义和解释，却没有解释何谓合成CDO 及其主要特征。
系列6 之分銷商們 ：
按照系列 6 之銷售章程，分銷商們都應該於發行日起收到迷債抵押品之詳細文件。 分銷商們應該是看過並清楚地瞭解迷債抵押品之詳情。 至於分銷商們有沒有跟客戶介紹迷債抵押品文件並讓客戶查看迷債抵押品之詳細文件就是另當別論了。
7。包裝迷債騙局的手段之進一步升華和完善
經過系列 6 失敗銷售一役，以及之後的系列 7－10 之成功銷售，金融精英們明白了以下真諦, 進一步完善了包裝迷債騙局的手段：：
要提高銷售額，必須打造出有漂亮表面的迷債產品。告知客戶的掛鈎產品是越少越好，告知客戶的掛鈎主體是越少越好，告知客戶的掛鈎主體之信貸評級是越高越好，抵押品之內容則萬萬不可以告知客戶，那會嚇跑客戶的。
於是，表面掛鈎的公司的數量只是6－7個，而選用的掛鈎主體的質素則越來越高，
“如果你相信 China Mobile （等7個）不會破產的話。。”。 讓人覺得出現破產事件的機會是零的假象，讓人產生迷債是個非常“安全”的產品之錯覺，
把真實的重大風險和真正可以帶來收入的信貸掛鈎內容全部隱藏到抵押品之中，對於抵押品的內容和風險從不明確解釋，至於抵押品之實質為信貸掛鈎產品之事實更是隱晦不談。
讀者若非具有 CDS/CDO 之專業知識，就萬萬想不到這抵押品其實是第二層信貸掛鈎產品，
銀行客戶們萬萬想不到的是：迷債除了有著跟表面6－7個公司信貸掛鈎之風險，迷債還同樣承受著 跟這從未披露 的 100－190多個 主體信貸掛鈎之重大風險, 而且抵押品出現信貸事件的概率是遠高於那表面幾個掛鈎公司的，因為抵押品內是跟 包括了低於投資評級（BB / B / CCC）在內的 100-190多個一籃子 主體信貸掛鈎的。換言之，把評級差一些的的信貸掛鈎主體全部藏入抵押品的信貸掛鈎條款。以7個著名公司的表面假象來吸引銀行客戶 。。。
而星債，精明債券等各類假債券，也紛紛以漂亮的表面掛鈎公司做招牌來推銷， 而把產品實質和風險深藏於避而不談的抵押品之中。
8。迷債騙局之辯護士們:
在這［ 7 個掛鈎公司 之風險］ ＋ ［ 100-190 個公司 部分破產之風險］ 的 2 個風險 中，
最最不可能發生的破產事件應該是那7個掛鈎公司。
金融精英們和政府监管机构的精英们在為無須披露抵押品內容而辯護的時候，可否請解釋一下：
如果廣告和章程可以大肆張揚解釋這發生可能性最小的風險，為甚麼不明確解釋另外發生可能性更高一些的風險呢 （即: ［ 100-194 個公司 部分破產之風險］）？ 这是什么样的有选择性的风险披露呢？
或者拿出專業機構投資者們買入類似產品，而始終從未收到過合成CDO（信貸掛鈎產品）之詳細文件之例子？
参考1： "Lehman Minibond Series 6 解读迷债系列6"
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/lehman-minibond-series-6.html
参考2： Lehman Minibond Series 6 Prospectus::
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/lehman-minibond-series-6.html
2009年9月11日 星期五
轉載:證監難拒交報告 顯示銀行有系統性失誤
調查雷曼迷債事件的專責委員會，曾不止一次要求證監會交出銀行銷售迷債的調查報告，遭證監會以妨礙調查為由拒絕。據本報了解，在銀行與大部分事主達成和解協議後，證監會內部研判，繼續拒交報告的法理依據已變得相當薄弱，報告羅列的證據，足以證明大多數銀行銷售迷債確實存在系統性失誤。
銀行或多或少犯下四大錯誤
據悉，證監會的調查報告載有銀行系統性違規銷售的證據，專責委員會看完報告後，可能毋須花太多時間傳召銀行界人士作供也能得出清楚的結論。消息人士解釋，所謂系統性違規銷售，不一定是事主和媒體常說的誤導性銷售，如強調迷債是安全的債券或等同長期定期存款，也包括：
（1）沒有對產品作獨立的盡職審查，研判產品的風險特性；
（2）沒有針對產品的風險特性制訂適切的培訓教材和安排前線銷售人員接受專業的培訓；
（3）沒有制訂專業的測試辦法，準確地評估客戶對結構投資產品的風險承受能力；
（4）沒有針對特別脆弱客戶群，如高齡、低教育程度、殘障、全副身家投入等類別客戶，制訂額外的程序，確保客戶理解和接受產品的風險。
消息指出，銷售迷債的銀行大部分犯了以上一項或多項的錯誤，不管個別銷售個案中有沒有誤導性言論，都已經構成違規銷售。這種違規銷售是系統性的，因為誤導性陳述可能是個別前線人員違規，但培訓材料若未能準確講出產品核心風險，前線銷售人員便不可能解釋清楚給客戶知道，便會令每一宗銷售都出問題，所以是系統性的失誤，深植於銀行內部制度。銀行願意接受證監會提出的六至七成回購建議，或多或少是看到，若被檢控定罪的機會很大。
現公開報告不涉妨礙司法
消息指出，證監會拒絕向立法會專責委員會交出雷曼調查報告，法理依據是調查尚未結束，若銀行拒絕接受證監會為保障投資者提出的和解建議，調查所得將用於檢控銀行違規，向立法會披露調查所得可能會妨礙檢控和審訊，導致議會和媒體公審，有違司法公平原則。不過，現時絕大部分涉及雷曼有關產品投訴的銀行已經向客戶作出和解建議，證監會不會提出檢控，調查工作已經告一段落，原來拒絕交出報告的依據已經不存在。
消息稱，雖然證監會與被調查銀行達成和解協議載有保密條款，不得對外披露調查的內容，但立法會專責委員會若行使法定權力要求閱覽報告，《立法會（權力及特權）條例》的法律約束力將凌駕於證監會與銀行之間的協議，證監會為履行法例所定責任交出調查報告，不算違反保密協議。
至於尚有3間沒銷售迷債但涉及雷曼信用掛鈎票據的銀行，尚未與客戶和解，會否影響證監會交出報告，消息指調查報告可以隱去與這些銀行有關的資料，對和解談判應該沒有實質影響。
轉載自：明報 2009年9月11日(五) A版
銀行或多或少犯下四大錯誤
據悉，證監會的調查報告載有銀行系統性違規銷售的證據，專責委員會看完報告後，可能毋須花太多時間傳召銀行界人士作供也能得出清楚的結論。消息人士解釋，所謂系統性違規銷售，不一定是事主和媒體常說的誤導性銷售，如強調迷債是安全的債券或等同長期定期存款，也包括：
（1）沒有對產品作獨立的盡職審查，研判產品的風險特性；
（2）沒有針對產品的風險特性制訂適切的培訓教材和安排前線銷售人員接受專業的培訓；
（3）沒有制訂專業的測試辦法，準確地評估客戶對結構投資產品的風險承受能力；
（4）沒有針對特別脆弱客戶群，如高齡、低教育程度、殘障、全副身家投入等類別客戶，制訂額外的程序，確保客戶理解和接受產品的風險。
消息指出，銷售迷債的銀行大部分犯了以上一項或多項的錯誤，不管個別銷售個案中有沒有誤導性言論，都已經構成違規銷售。這種違規銷售是系統性的，因為誤導性陳述可能是個別前線人員違規，但培訓材料若未能準確講出產品核心風險，前線銷售人員便不可能解釋清楚給客戶知道，便會令每一宗銷售都出問題，所以是系統性的失誤，深植於銀行內部制度。銀行願意接受證監會提出的六至七成回購建議，或多或少是看到，若被檢控定罪的機會很大。
現公開報告不涉妨礙司法
消息指出，證監會拒絕向立法會專責委員會交出雷曼調查報告，法理依據是調查尚未結束，若銀行拒絕接受證監會為保障投資者提出的和解建議，調查所得將用於檢控銀行違規，向立法會披露調查所得可能會妨礙檢控和審訊，導致議會和媒體公審，有違司法公平原則。不過，現時絕大部分涉及雷曼有關產品投訴的銀行已經向客戶作出和解建議，證監會不會提出檢控，調查工作已經告一段落，原來拒絕交出報告的依據已經不存在。
消息稱，雖然證監會與被調查銀行達成和解協議載有保密條款，不得對外披露調查的內容，但立法會專責委員會若行使法定權力要求閱覽報告，《立法會（權力及特權）條例》的法律約束力將凌駕於證監會與銀行之間的協議，證監會為履行法例所定責任交出調查報告，不算違反保密協議。
至於尚有3間沒銷售迷債但涉及雷曼信用掛鈎票據的銀行，尚未與客戶和解，會否影響證監會交出報告，消息指調查報告可以隱去與這些銀行有關的資料，對和解談判應該沒有實質影響。
轉載自：明報 2009年9月11日(五) A版
2009年9月10日 星期四
Bloomberg: London Suicide Connects Lehman Lesson Missed by Hong Kong Woman
Sept. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Yu Lia Chun, a retired hospital orderly in Hong Kong, never heard of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. before she got a call last September from her banker.
“He said, ‘Did you hear the news? Something has happened to Lehman,’” Yu, 66, recalled in an interview in June. “I didn’t get it.”
Yu, who has a sixth-grade education, said she thought her money was in a savings account. She didn’t know she had lent it to a bankrupt American securities firm. Eventually, she found out that her HK$1.2 million ($155,000) nest egg was gone. Her children lost another HK$3.8 million because Yu had persuaded them to make similar investments.
“There is no way a person like me could understand any of this,” Yu said, dabbing her eyes with a tissue in a coffee shop in Hong Kong’s financial district. “Sometimes I feel like jumping off a building.”
What hit Yu and her family was a tidal wave triggered halfway around the world by the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history. The Sept. 15, 2008, collapse of Lehman, with $613 billion in liabilities, had unforeseen and far-flung consequences that devastated those, like Yu, who didn’t know their fates were tied to the New York-based investment bank.
‘Quicker This Time’
The chief operating officer of a private-equity firm in London jumped in front of a commuter train because he blamed himself for leaving the company’s money in a Lehman account, according to a coroner’s report. The Israeli managers of a hotel construction project on the island of West Caicos, northeast of Cuba, were taken hostage by Chinese workers when an anticipated Lehman loan didn’t materialize and wages weren’t paid. In Hong Kong, Yu and thousands of others who had invested in Lehman products camped out in the rain, thumping drums and chanting, “Give us our money back.”
The realization that a U.S. securities firm so woven into the financial system couldn’t pay its debts radiated out from New York, panicking investors around the world. It was a doomsday scenario that former International Monetary Fund chief economist Simon H. Johnson likened to Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s 1963 novel “Cat’s Cradle,” in which a single crystal of the fictitious substance ice-nine hardens all of the planet’s water.
What differentiated Lehman from previous financial crises was how fast the panic spread, said Richard Sylla, an economic and financial historian at New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business in New York.
“Communications made things happen faster,” Sylla said, describing how it took six months for the 1931 failure of Austria’s Creditanstalt bank to put stress on the British financial system. “The news of everything got spread around much quicker this time.”
Goldman Sachs Debt
The freezing of global credit markets following Lehman’s demise began with professionals who traded commercial paper in New York. They were the first to feel the chill when the Reserve Primary Fund, the oldest money market fund, was inundated with requests for redemptions and seized up hours after the bankruptcy filing. The $785 million that Reserve had lent to Lehman was deemed worthless by 4 p.m. the next day.
Fear that more banks and financial firms might fail meant most investors stopped lending to anyone other than the government. Even New York-based Goldman Sachs Group Inc., which earned $11.6 billion in 2007, more than any U.S. securities firm in history, wasn’t immune. The average annual cost of insuring $10 million of Goldman Sachs debt for five years soared to a record $545,000 from $182,557 in the three days after Lehman failed, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Plummeting Prices
Lehman’s demise triggered a panic. Money fund managers were forced to raise cash to pay off investors. They tried selling what securities they held and couldn’t. The market was flooded, and prices were plummeting -- if prices could be obtained at all. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index suffered its worst decline in six years. Mistrust leaked into the corporate bond market.
The most widely traded 30-year bond of General Electric Capital Corp., the world’s biggest issuer of commercial paper, dropped by as much as 30 cents on the dollar to 62 cents by Sept. 18 because of doubts that GE would be able to persuade money funds to renew its short-term notes.
At that price, the three-day loss for owners of the issue was more than $1.9 billion, according to prices provided by Trace, the bond-trade reporting system of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.
The U.S. responded within a week to guarantee money markets and bank-to-bank lending. Within a month, Congress agreed to spend $700 billion to prop up banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. guaranteed new bank debt, and Federal Reserve lending to financial institutions ballooned by $1 trillion.
Lehman Minibonds
Those programs, which succeeded in stemming the panic, remain in place today. What they didn’t do was save Yu and thousands of other investors in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and elsewhere who had bought equity-linked notes or so-called minibonds connected to Lehman.
Equity-linked notes combine attributes of both bonds and stock by investing part of the proceeds in share options and the remainder in fixed income. Minibonds are custom-made securities linked to the creditworthiness of companies, backed by collateralized-debt obligations and sold in denominations of $5,000. They functioned like credit-default swaps in reverse, where the investor stands to lose his principal when the firm named in the note can’t pay its debts.
‘Information Asymmetry’
Yu, a mother of six who emigrated from mainland China in 1962, didn’t have a chance, according to Joseph Stiglitz, a Columbia University economics professor who won a Nobel Prize for his work on the effect of unequal access to information on buyers and sellers in financial markets.
“As securities got more complex, the opportunities for gaming, to the disadvantage of ordinary people, increased,” Stiglitz said. “Complexity opened up new venues for information asymmetry, which banks exploited.”
Asia became Lehman’s highest growth region in 2007, taking in more than $3.1 billion in revenue, or 16 percent of the firm’s business. Revenue was up more than 41 percent from 2005 in Asia, while it climbed 3 percent in the U.S. in the same period, according to Bloomberg data.
Yu said she went to an export trade show in Hong Kong two years ago and met Chow Chi Chung, a salesman for Amsterdam-based ABN Amro Holding NV. He offered her a better return on her savings if she switched banks, she said. So she did.
Two-thirds of Yu’s money, about $100,000, came from a settlement with her employer after an elevator fell half a floor, injuring her pelvis, according to Yu, who still drags her right leg when she walks.
Didn’t Read Prospectus
A month after their meeting, Yu said Chow called her to say he had a new product that could return as much as 20 percent a year because it was linked to the stock performance of three large Chinese companies -- China Communications Construction Co.,China Merchants Bank Co. and Ping An Insurance Co.
Yu said she didn’t read the fine print, trusting Chow when he told her she couldn’t lose her principal. Had she looked at the prospectus and understood it she would have discovered that she had essentially bought three call options -- contracts that would capture gains if the shares of the three companies rose by a certain amount -- coupled with the equivalent of a Lehman corporate bond. If Lehman defaulted, her money would be gone.
Cash Bonus
ABN Amro, now part of Edinburgh-based Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, also recruited Yu to sell the same product to her family, giving her a cash bonus of about $155 for each person who signed up, she said.
Yuk Min Hui, a Hong Kong-based spokeswoman for RBS, declined to comment about Yu’s case. She said in an e-mail that if the bank determined that “sales processes and guidelines were not properly followed,” it would offer “appropriate remedies.” Only a small number of investors fall in this category, she said.
Chow couldn’t be located.
There are 873 issues of such Lehman equity-linked structured notes outstanding with a combined face value of about $8.7 billion, all now in default, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Bonds were denominated in pounds, Swiss francs and Hungarian forint, as well as Australian and Hong Kong dollars.
Banks also sold $1.8 billion of Lehman minibonds to an estimated 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, where the notes were first marketed in 2003, according to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. The biggest seller was BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd., a unit of Beijing-based Bank of China Ltd.
Financial Dumplings
The minibonds were all issued by a Cayman Islands-based entity called Pacific International Finance Ltd., set up by Lehman with trustees from London-based HSBC Holdings Plc. The notes were financial dumplings -- derivatives contracts tied to the creditworthiness of major companies wrapped inside Lehman corporate bonds. Series 19 notes, for instance, were linked to securities dealers including Citigroup Inc. and Goldman Sachs. If any of those businesses or Lehman defaulted, the investor wouldn’t get paid.
In effect, investors in Series 19 notes bought the losing end of credit-default swaps, or insurance policies pegged to the survival of financial institutions. If any of those companies failed, the noteholders were the ones responsible for paying off the principal on the derivative.
Lehman took payments from investors in exchange for a guaranteed yield, then placed the cash in a Lehman-managed money market fund and issued commercial paper to borrow more money. Those funds were in turn used to invest in CDOs sold by Lehman off-balance-sheet entities in places such as Ireland and the Cayman Islands.
‘Blood and Sweat’
Sun Kwan, a 58-year-old retired parks worker, was among those who bought Lehman minibonds. He stood outside the I.M. Pei-designed Hong Kong headquarters of the Bank of China on June 15, along with Yu and 51 other protesters, banging a chipped red drum with a stick every two seconds. Raindrops beaded on the brim of his blue cap. A sign around his neck, hand-lettered in Chinese characters, read: “The Bank of China is a hooker. Give me back my money earned with blood and sweat.”
Sun, who has a high school education, invested about $285,000 in Lehman Minibond Series 12 notes, sold to him by BOC Hong Kong, which paid about 4 percent interest a year.
He said he thought he was putting his money into a certificate of deposit. Instead, as the prospectus explained, the notes were a bet against the default of the Chinese government and five companies, including Hutchison Whampoa Ltd., which operates ports and telecommunications services, Chinese state-owned oil producer CNOOC Ltd. and Lehman.
As an incentive, he was given $26 in supermarket coupons.
Rhinos, Whales
Sun also purchased $40,000 worth of Octave Series 10 notes, a similarly structured product created by Morgan Stanley, in which the investor would lose all of his money if Lehman or any of six other companies defaulted. He said he never heard of Lehman and thought the notes were backed by the People’s Republic of China because most of the businesses were state- owned.
Nick Footitt, a spokesman for Morgan Stanley in Hong Kong, declined to comment.
Each minibond series was custom-made, so their characteristics differed. Packagers skipped using some numbers, including 4, which is considered unlucky in Chinese culture and would make the bond difficult to market. Investors got prizes, including video cameras and flat-screen televisions, according to newspaper advertisements and fliers handed out at banks. The ads, in both Chinese and English, featured rhinoceroses, whales and other symbols of potency, luck or profit.
‘Rotten Deal’
“It’s all gone,” Sun said in an interview conducted through a Chinese translator at the demonstration. “I almost wanted to kill myself. I’ve been crying for months, even though I am a man.”
He said he hadn’t yet told his 25-year-old son, Sun Chi Yan, what had happened to his nest egg, most of which came from a settlement when the government bought his family’s land.
Sun and Yu were among investors who staged protests almost every business day for nine months, sparking a Hong Kong legislative investigation and calls for more protection for retail customers. The raucous demonstrations in the city’s financial district, including a tent encampment and bullhorns connected to an iPod that blared the looped chant “Rotten Deal -- Money Back,” became an embarrassment to the banks.
In a city of 7 million, where only 30 percent of workers had pensions before 2001, the Lehman protesters struck a chord, according to Audrey Eu, one of 60 members of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council.
Bank Offer
“A lot of them lost their life savings,” Eu said in an interview in June. “They’re all crying. They work as cleaners, and $50,000 is a lot of money to them.”
Angel Yip, a spokeswoman for BOC Hong Kong, said in an e- mail that “we understand and sympathize with customers” who lost money as a result of the Lehman collapse. She said advertisements and prospectuses distributed by the bank “contained a detailed description of the structure and risks” of the investments.
In July, 16 retail banks, including BOC Hong Kong, offered to repay minibond investors at least 60 cents on the dollar, a deal brokered by the city’s securities regulator that would amount to $813 million. About two-thirds of eligible noteholders accepted the offer, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority said in a statement on Sept. 4. Sun said he hadn’t yet made up his mind.
“The compensation offer is totally unfair and based on groundless calculations,” Sun said. “If we have to accept it eventually, it’ll be because we’ve exhausted all other means.”
‘Grotesquely Wrong’
While investors in Hong Kong have the right to sue banks, there are no class-action laws or contingency fees, making it difficult to find lawyers willing to take cases.
Patrick Daniels, a lawyer with Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP in San Diego, has filed a class-action suit against Lehman in federal court in New York on behalf of minibond holders like Sun in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore seeking $1.6 billion from Bank of New York Mellon Corp. The money, mostly shares in Lehman’s Institutional Money Market Fund, is being held by the bank as collateral to secure the minibonds, Daniels said. Other Lehman creditors are trying to get the same funds from the Bank of New York Mellon, which isn’t accused of wrongdoing. The case is pending.
“Something is grotesquely wrong here,” Daniels said in an interview in July. “These people were just flat-out lied to and stolen from.”
Neither the lawsuit nor the settlement applies to Yu or other holders of equity-linked notes from Houston to Singapore.
London Suicide
Hong Kong retirees weren’t the only victims. Even professional investors were stuck with Lehman losses.
The stocks and bonds of Lehman’s London brokerage customers, used as collateral to borrow more money, were frozen on Sept. 15. About 3,500 clients, including 700 hedge funds, couldn’t get access to an estimated $65 billion of assets. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Lehman’s U.K. bankruptcy administrator, is still sorting out who should get paid and how much. Some firms have closed, and others may have to wait as long as a decade to get their assets back, Tony Lomas, the PwC partner in charge of the U.K. administration, said in August.
It took only 10 days for the ice-nine to get to Kirk Stephenson, chief operating officer of Olivant Ltd., a London private-equity firm run by former UBS AG Chairman Luqman Arnold. On Sept. 25, Stephenson, 47, jumped in front of a train going 125 mph at a station in Taplow, 28 miles (45 kilometers) west of London.
The coroner’s office for the county of Buckinghamshire ruled the death a suicide. Stephenson, a native of New Zealand, was despondent about the financial crisis and talked about killing himself one week after Lehman’s demise, according to a statement from his wife read at the coroner’s inquest.
U.K. Lock-Up
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) was Olivant’s prime broker. It held the firm’s 2.78 percent stake in UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank by assets, according to a statement from Olivant on Oct. 1. The shares were worth 1.6 billion francs ($1.44 billion) at the time.
The hedge fund lock-up led the U.K. to reconsider its procedures when firms fail. While Lehman’s broker-dealer in the U.S. stayed out of bankruptcy long enough to process many of its trades, the business seized up in the U.K.
“In the U.S., everything was wrapped in cotton wool for four days,” said PwC’s Lomas. In the U.K., “everything failed come 7:56 a.m. that Monday morning.”
‘Black Hole’
The U.K. had an advantage in attracting hedge fund assets before the Lehman bankruptcy. While U.S. prime brokers face limits on how much they can loan hedge funds, those rules could be circumvented with overseas units like Lehman’s in London. Some U.S. clients didn’t know they were customers of Lehman Brothers International (Europe).
“If you didn’t pay attention to what you were signing, you would have missed it,” said Michael Romanek, principal at Rise Partners Ltd., which arranges financing for funds from London. “It was called enhanced prime brokerage, where they could be more accommodating with more leverage or loans. It just took signing some extra papers in New York. Most people didn’t realize it.”
Some fund managers with frozen assets say they’ve gone from extreme anger to resignation that they’ll have to wait a long time to see any return.
“I still don’t know if I’ll ever get any money back,” said Edward Chin, whose Hong Kong-based Pride Revelation Fund used Lehman as its sole prime broker. “We’re in a black hole.”
$30 Billion Gap
The ice-nine also halted construction projects from Wall Street to the Turks and Caicos Islands.
Lehman borrowed against property investments that couldn’t easily be sold, such as construction loans. So when the property market turned sour and creditors demanded more collateral for the loans or their money back, the investment bank was stuck.
The property portfolio doomed Lehman when a rescue still seemed possible. On Saturday, Sept. 13, 2008, Timothy Geithner, then president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and now U.S. Treasury secretary, asked a team of the world’s top bankers to evaluate Lehman’s real estate holdings as part of an effort to facilitate a sale of the investment bank to London-based Barclays Plc.
The team, including representatives from Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse Group AG, determined that Lehman had overvalued its real estate investments by $20 billion to $30 billion, according to people who attended meetings at the New York Fed last September.
Watergate Hotel
When Barclays pulled out of an agreement to buy the firm, Lehman was forced to file for bankruptcy. Only then did Barclays buy Lehman’s U.S. securities business, including its headquarters in Manhattan’s Times Square.
The bankruptcy deprived the international real estate market of a major source of financing. The bank was known for doing deals nobody else would touch, according to a former Lehman executive.
The Watergate Hotel, made famous by the 1972 break-in that led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon, was sold at auction in August for $25 million after its owner, Washington- based Monument Realty LLC, defaulted on its mortgage. Monument was financed by Lehman.
A condo conversion at 25 Broad St. in Manhattan, two blocks from Goldman Sachs’s headquarters, was suspended by developers. It too was financed by Lehman.
SunCal, Depfa
Irvine, California-based SunCal Cos., a closely held developer, said it had $1.6 billion in financing from Lehman. Since the bank’s failure, 19 projects, all in California, have filed for bankruptcy, SunCal said. Work has stopped on all of them, including the 248-acre Marblehead Coastal community in San Clemente, which was supposed to feature 69 single-family homes, 244 other residences, a movie theater, parks and hiking trails.
Munich-based Hypo Real Estate Holding AG received 102 billion euros ($143 billion) in debt guarantees and credit lines from the German government after its Depfa unit was stuck without short-term funding following Lehman’s bankruptcy. Like Lehman, Hypo funded long-term real estate assets with short-term loans such as commercial paper.
German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck defended the bailout of the lender because the global financial system was just “millimeters from the abyss.”
Molasses Reef
On West Caicos, an otherwise uninhabited island 250 miles northeast of Cuba, work stopped on the Molasses Reef Ritz- Carlton Hotel and Residences, slated to include a cluster of $6.5 million cottages. About 400 Chinese employees of Tel Aviv- based construction firm Ashtrom Properties Ltd. didn’t get paid when Lehman funding dried up, according to Jonathan Siegel, New York-based managing director of Logwood Hotel Development Co.
About 60 electrical workers rebelled, taking a dozen managers hostage and refusing to let them leave the island.
“We had 400 to 500 unhappy men, and we were concerned violence would erupt,” Siegel said. “The Turks and Caicos government was very unhappy with the situation. There was a limited supply of food and water.”
Ashtrom ended the standoff after a week by paying what it considered “a ransom,” Siegel said. The project, about 70 percent completed, is still on hold, said Verona Carter, Ritz- Carlton Hotel Co.’s director of public relations for the Caribbean area.
Financial Leadership
The vulnerability of the global financial system revealed by Lehman’s bankruptcy -- from ordinary investors like Sun and Yu to London hedge funds and German lenders -- makes it all the harder to regulate.
“The difficulty you have in getting control is that you need a global alliance,” said former World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn in an e-mail. “You need all the finance ministers to come together, because if a transaction can’t be done here, it can be done in Lichtenstein or France or the Far East.”
Lehman’s bankruptcy also poses a challenge to America’s financial leadership.
Wall Street profited by arranging financing that allowed other countries to tap global capital markets to build offices, factories, resorts and housing. What’s broken now is the trust the rest of the world had in U.S. banks, said Phillip Yin, a native of Seattle who is managing director of Asia Investors Partners Ltd., a Hong Kong-based research firm.
“All that has happened since -- the job losses, the slump, everything -- is tied to one thing and one event,” Yin said. “And that’s Lehman.”
(Lehman’s Lessons: Next, Too Big to Fail)
To contact the reporters on this story: Mark Pittman in New York at mpittman@bloomberg.net; Bob Ivry in New York at bivry@bloomberg.net.
from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aNFuVRL73wJc
“He said, ‘Did you hear the news? Something has happened to Lehman,’” Yu, 66, recalled in an interview in June. “I didn’t get it.”
Yu, who has a sixth-grade education, said she thought her money was in a savings account. She didn’t know she had lent it to a bankrupt American securities firm. Eventually, she found out that her HK$1.2 million ($155,000) nest egg was gone. Her children lost another HK$3.8 million because Yu had persuaded them to make similar investments.
“There is no way a person like me could understand any of this,” Yu said, dabbing her eyes with a tissue in a coffee shop in Hong Kong’s financial district. “Sometimes I feel like jumping off a building.”
What hit Yu and her family was a tidal wave triggered halfway around the world by the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history. The Sept. 15, 2008, collapse of Lehman, with $613 billion in liabilities, had unforeseen and far-flung consequences that devastated those, like Yu, who didn’t know their fates were tied to the New York-based investment bank.
‘Quicker This Time’
The chief operating officer of a private-equity firm in London jumped in front of a commuter train because he blamed himself for leaving the company’s money in a Lehman account, according to a coroner’s report. The Israeli managers of a hotel construction project on the island of West Caicos, northeast of Cuba, were taken hostage by Chinese workers when an anticipated Lehman loan didn’t materialize and wages weren’t paid. In Hong Kong, Yu and thousands of others who had invested in Lehman products camped out in the rain, thumping drums and chanting, “Give us our money back.”
The realization that a U.S. securities firm so woven into the financial system couldn’t pay its debts radiated out from New York, panicking investors around the world. It was a doomsday scenario that former International Monetary Fund chief economist Simon H. Johnson likened to Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s 1963 novel “Cat’s Cradle,” in which a single crystal of the fictitious substance ice-nine hardens all of the planet’s water.
What differentiated Lehman from previous financial crises was how fast the panic spread, said Richard Sylla, an economic and financial historian at New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business in New York.
“Communications made things happen faster,” Sylla said, describing how it took six months for the 1931 failure of Austria’s Creditanstalt bank to put stress on the British financial system. “The news of everything got spread around much quicker this time.”
Goldman Sachs Debt
The freezing of global credit markets following Lehman’s demise began with professionals who traded commercial paper in New York. They were the first to feel the chill when the Reserve Primary Fund, the oldest money market fund, was inundated with requests for redemptions and seized up hours after the bankruptcy filing. The $785 million that Reserve had lent to Lehman was deemed worthless by 4 p.m. the next day.
Fear that more banks and financial firms might fail meant most investors stopped lending to anyone other than the government. Even New York-based Goldman Sachs Group Inc., which earned $11.6 billion in 2007, more than any U.S. securities firm in history, wasn’t immune. The average annual cost of insuring $10 million of Goldman Sachs debt for five years soared to a record $545,000 from $182,557 in the three days after Lehman failed, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Plummeting Prices
Lehman’s demise triggered a panic. Money fund managers were forced to raise cash to pay off investors. They tried selling what securities they held and couldn’t. The market was flooded, and prices were plummeting -- if prices could be obtained at all. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index suffered its worst decline in six years. Mistrust leaked into the corporate bond market.
The most widely traded 30-year bond of General Electric Capital Corp., the world’s biggest issuer of commercial paper, dropped by as much as 30 cents on the dollar to 62 cents by Sept. 18 because of doubts that GE would be able to persuade money funds to renew its short-term notes.
At that price, the three-day loss for owners of the issue was more than $1.9 billion, according to prices provided by Trace, the bond-trade reporting system of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.
The U.S. responded within a week to guarantee money markets and bank-to-bank lending. Within a month, Congress agreed to spend $700 billion to prop up banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. guaranteed new bank debt, and Federal Reserve lending to financial institutions ballooned by $1 trillion.
Lehman Minibonds
Those programs, which succeeded in stemming the panic, remain in place today. What they didn’t do was save Yu and thousands of other investors in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and elsewhere who had bought equity-linked notes or so-called minibonds connected to Lehman.
Equity-linked notes combine attributes of both bonds and stock by investing part of the proceeds in share options and the remainder in fixed income. Minibonds are custom-made securities linked to the creditworthiness of companies, backed by collateralized-debt obligations and sold in denominations of $5,000. They functioned like credit-default swaps in reverse, where the investor stands to lose his principal when the firm named in the note can’t pay its debts.
‘Information Asymmetry’
Yu, a mother of six who emigrated from mainland China in 1962, didn’t have a chance, according to Joseph Stiglitz, a Columbia University economics professor who won a Nobel Prize for his work on the effect of unequal access to information on buyers and sellers in financial markets.
“As securities got more complex, the opportunities for gaming, to the disadvantage of ordinary people, increased,” Stiglitz said. “Complexity opened up new venues for information asymmetry, which banks exploited.”
Asia became Lehman’s highest growth region in 2007, taking in more than $3.1 billion in revenue, or 16 percent of the firm’s business. Revenue was up more than 41 percent from 2005 in Asia, while it climbed 3 percent in the U.S. in the same period, according to Bloomberg data.
Yu said she went to an export trade show in Hong Kong two years ago and met Chow Chi Chung, a salesman for Amsterdam-based ABN Amro Holding NV. He offered her a better return on her savings if she switched banks, she said. So she did.
Two-thirds of Yu’s money, about $100,000, came from a settlement with her employer after an elevator fell half a floor, injuring her pelvis, according to Yu, who still drags her right leg when she walks.
Didn’t Read Prospectus
A month after their meeting, Yu said Chow called her to say he had a new product that could return as much as 20 percent a year because it was linked to the stock performance of three large Chinese companies -- China Communications Construction Co.,China Merchants Bank Co. and Ping An Insurance Co.
Yu said she didn’t read the fine print, trusting Chow when he told her she couldn’t lose her principal. Had she looked at the prospectus and understood it she would have discovered that she had essentially bought three call options -- contracts that would capture gains if the shares of the three companies rose by a certain amount -- coupled with the equivalent of a Lehman corporate bond. If Lehman defaulted, her money would be gone.
Cash Bonus
ABN Amro, now part of Edinburgh-based Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, also recruited Yu to sell the same product to her family, giving her a cash bonus of about $155 for each person who signed up, she said.
Yuk Min Hui, a Hong Kong-based spokeswoman for RBS, declined to comment about Yu’s case. She said in an e-mail that if the bank determined that “sales processes and guidelines were not properly followed,” it would offer “appropriate remedies.” Only a small number of investors fall in this category, she said.
Chow couldn’t be located.
There are 873 issues of such Lehman equity-linked structured notes outstanding with a combined face value of about $8.7 billion, all now in default, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Bonds were denominated in pounds, Swiss francs and Hungarian forint, as well as Australian and Hong Kong dollars.
Banks also sold $1.8 billion of Lehman minibonds to an estimated 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, where the notes were first marketed in 2003, according to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. The biggest seller was BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd., a unit of Beijing-based Bank of China Ltd.
Financial Dumplings
The minibonds were all issued by a Cayman Islands-based entity called Pacific International Finance Ltd., set up by Lehman with trustees from London-based HSBC Holdings Plc. The notes were financial dumplings -- derivatives contracts tied to the creditworthiness of major companies wrapped inside Lehman corporate bonds. Series 19 notes, for instance, were linked to securities dealers including Citigroup Inc. and Goldman Sachs. If any of those businesses or Lehman defaulted, the investor wouldn’t get paid.
In effect, investors in Series 19 notes bought the losing end of credit-default swaps, or insurance policies pegged to the survival of financial institutions. If any of those companies failed, the noteholders were the ones responsible for paying off the principal on the derivative.
Lehman took payments from investors in exchange for a guaranteed yield, then placed the cash in a Lehman-managed money market fund and issued commercial paper to borrow more money. Those funds were in turn used to invest in CDOs sold by Lehman off-balance-sheet entities in places such as Ireland and the Cayman Islands.
‘Blood and Sweat’
Sun Kwan, a 58-year-old retired parks worker, was among those who bought Lehman minibonds. He stood outside the I.M. Pei-designed Hong Kong headquarters of the Bank of China on June 15, along with Yu and 51 other protesters, banging a chipped red drum with a stick every two seconds. Raindrops beaded on the brim of his blue cap. A sign around his neck, hand-lettered in Chinese characters, read: “The Bank of China is a hooker. Give me back my money earned with blood and sweat.”
Sun, who has a high school education, invested about $285,000 in Lehman Minibond Series 12 notes, sold to him by BOC Hong Kong, which paid about 4 percent interest a year.
He said he thought he was putting his money into a certificate of deposit. Instead, as the prospectus explained, the notes were a bet against the default of the Chinese government and five companies, including Hutchison Whampoa Ltd., which operates ports and telecommunications services, Chinese state-owned oil producer CNOOC Ltd. and Lehman.
As an incentive, he was given $26 in supermarket coupons.
Rhinos, Whales
Sun also purchased $40,000 worth of Octave Series 10 notes, a similarly structured product created by Morgan Stanley, in which the investor would lose all of his money if Lehman or any of six other companies defaulted. He said he never heard of Lehman and thought the notes were backed by the People’s Republic of China because most of the businesses were state- owned.
Nick Footitt, a spokesman for Morgan Stanley in Hong Kong, declined to comment.
Each minibond series was custom-made, so their characteristics differed. Packagers skipped using some numbers, including 4, which is considered unlucky in Chinese culture and would make the bond difficult to market. Investors got prizes, including video cameras and flat-screen televisions, according to newspaper advertisements and fliers handed out at banks. The ads, in both Chinese and English, featured rhinoceroses, whales and other symbols of potency, luck or profit.
‘Rotten Deal’
“It’s all gone,” Sun said in an interview conducted through a Chinese translator at the demonstration. “I almost wanted to kill myself. I’ve been crying for months, even though I am a man.”
He said he hadn’t yet told his 25-year-old son, Sun Chi Yan, what had happened to his nest egg, most of which came from a settlement when the government bought his family’s land.
Sun and Yu were among investors who staged protests almost every business day for nine months, sparking a Hong Kong legislative investigation and calls for more protection for retail customers. The raucous demonstrations in the city’s financial district, including a tent encampment and bullhorns connected to an iPod that blared the looped chant “Rotten Deal -- Money Back,” became an embarrassment to the banks.
In a city of 7 million, where only 30 percent of workers had pensions before 2001, the Lehman protesters struck a chord, according to Audrey Eu, one of 60 members of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council.
Bank Offer
“A lot of them lost their life savings,” Eu said in an interview in June. “They’re all crying. They work as cleaners, and $50,000 is a lot of money to them.”
Angel Yip, a spokeswoman for BOC Hong Kong, said in an e- mail that “we understand and sympathize with customers” who lost money as a result of the Lehman collapse. She said advertisements and prospectuses distributed by the bank “contained a detailed description of the structure and risks” of the investments.
In July, 16 retail banks, including BOC Hong Kong, offered to repay minibond investors at least 60 cents on the dollar, a deal brokered by the city’s securities regulator that would amount to $813 million. About two-thirds of eligible noteholders accepted the offer, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority said in a statement on Sept. 4. Sun said he hadn’t yet made up his mind.
“The compensation offer is totally unfair and based on groundless calculations,” Sun said. “If we have to accept it eventually, it’ll be because we’ve exhausted all other means.”
‘Grotesquely Wrong’
While investors in Hong Kong have the right to sue banks, there are no class-action laws or contingency fees, making it difficult to find lawyers willing to take cases.
Patrick Daniels, a lawyer with Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP in San Diego, has filed a class-action suit against Lehman in federal court in New York on behalf of minibond holders like Sun in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore seeking $1.6 billion from Bank of New York Mellon Corp. The money, mostly shares in Lehman’s Institutional Money Market Fund, is being held by the bank as collateral to secure the minibonds, Daniels said. Other Lehman creditors are trying to get the same funds from the Bank of New York Mellon, which isn’t accused of wrongdoing. The case is pending.
“Something is grotesquely wrong here,” Daniels said in an interview in July. “These people were just flat-out lied to and stolen from.”
Neither the lawsuit nor the settlement applies to Yu or other holders of equity-linked notes from Houston to Singapore.
London Suicide
Hong Kong retirees weren’t the only victims. Even professional investors were stuck with Lehman losses.
The stocks and bonds of Lehman’s London brokerage customers, used as collateral to borrow more money, were frozen on Sept. 15. About 3,500 clients, including 700 hedge funds, couldn’t get access to an estimated $65 billion of assets. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Lehman’s U.K. bankruptcy administrator, is still sorting out who should get paid and how much. Some firms have closed, and others may have to wait as long as a decade to get their assets back, Tony Lomas, the PwC partner in charge of the U.K. administration, said in August.
It took only 10 days for the ice-nine to get to Kirk Stephenson, chief operating officer of Olivant Ltd., a London private-equity firm run by former UBS AG Chairman Luqman Arnold. On Sept. 25, Stephenson, 47, jumped in front of a train going 125 mph at a station in Taplow, 28 miles (45 kilometers) west of London.
The coroner’s office for the county of Buckinghamshire ruled the death a suicide. Stephenson, a native of New Zealand, was despondent about the financial crisis and talked about killing himself one week after Lehman’s demise, according to a statement from his wife read at the coroner’s inquest.
U.K. Lock-Up
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) was Olivant’s prime broker. It held the firm’s 2.78 percent stake in UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank by assets, according to a statement from Olivant on Oct. 1. The shares were worth 1.6 billion francs ($1.44 billion) at the time.
The hedge fund lock-up led the U.K. to reconsider its procedures when firms fail. While Lehman’s broker-dealer in the U.S. stayed out of bankruptcy long enough to process many of its trades, the business seized up in the U.K.
“In the U.S., everything was wrapped in cotton wool for four days,” said PwC’s Lomas. In the U.K., “everything failed come 7:56 a.m. that Monday morning.”
‘Black Hole’
The U.K. had an advantage in attracting hedge fund assets before the Lehman bankruptcy. While U.S. prime brokers face limits on how much they can loan hedge funds, those rules could be circumvented with overseas units like Lehman’s in London. Some U.S. clients didn’t know they were customers of Lehman Brothers International (Europe).
“If you didn’t pay attention to what you were signing, you would have missed it,” said Michael Romanek, principal at Rise Partners Ltd., which arranges financing for funds from London. “It was called enhanced prime brokerage, where they could be more accommodating with more leverage or loans. It just took signing some extra papers in New York. Most people didn’t realize it.”
Some fund managers with frozen assets say they’ve gone from extreme anger to resignation that they’ll have to wait a long time to see any return.
“I still don’t know if I’ll ever get any money back,” said Edward Chin, whose Hong Kong-based Pride Revelation Fund used Lehman as its sole prime broker. “We’re in a black hole.”
$30 Billion Gap
The ice-nine also halted construction projects from Wall Street to the Turks and Caicos Islands.
Lehman borrowed against property investments that couldn’t easily be sold, such as construction loans. So when the property market turned sour and creditors demanded more collateral for the loans or their money back, the investment bank was stuck.
The property portfolio doomed Lehman when a rescue still seemed possible. On Saturday, Sept. 13, 2008, Timothy Geithner, then president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and now U.S. Treasury secretary, asked a team of the world’s top bankers to evaluate Lehman’s real estate holdings as part of an effort to facilitate a sale of the investment bank to London-based Barclays Plc.
The team, including representatives from Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse Group AG, determined that Lehman had overvalued its real estate investments by $20 billion to $30 billion, according to people who attended meetings at the New York Fed last September.
Watergate Hotel
When Barclays pulled out of an agreement to buy the firm, Lehman was forced to file for bankruptcy. Only then did Barclays buy Lehman’s U.S. securities business, including its headquarters in Manhattan’s Times Square.
The bankruptcy deprived the international real estate market of a major source of financing. The bank was known for doing deals nobody else would touch, according to a former Lehman executive.
The Watergate Hotel, made famous by the 1972 break-in that led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon, was sold at auction in August for $25 million after its owner, Washington- based Monument Realty LLC, defaulted on its mortgage. Monument was financed by Lehman.
A condo conversion at 25 Broad St. in Manhattan, two blocks from Goldman Sachs’s headquarters, was suspended by developers. It too was financed by Lehman.
SunCal, Depfa
Irvine, California-based SunCal Cos., a closely held developer, said it had $1.6 billion in financing from Lehman. Since the bank’s failure, 19 projects, all in California, have filed for bankruptcy, SunCal said. Work has stopped on all of them, including the 248-acre Marblehead Coastal community in San Clemente, which was supposed to feature 69 single-family homes, 244 other residences, a movie theater, parks and hiking trails.
Munich-based Hypo Real Estate Holding AG received 102 billion euros ($143 billion) in debt guarantees and credit lines from the German government after its Depfa unit was stuck without short-term funding following Lehman’s bankruptcy. Like Lehman, Hypo funded long-term real estate assets with short-term loans such as commercial paper.
German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck defended the bailout of the lender because the global financial system was just “millimeters from the abyss.”
Molasses Reef
On West Caicos, an otherwise uninhabited island 250 miles northeast of Cuba, work stopped on the Molasses Reef Ritz- Carlton Hotel and Residences, slated to include a cluster of $6.5 million cottages. About 400 Chinese employees of Tel Aviv- based construction firm Ashtrom Properties Ltd. didn’t get paid when Lehman funding dried up, according to Jonathan Siegel, New York-based managing director of Logwood Hotel Development Co.
About 60 electrical workers rebelled, taking a dozen managers hostage and refusing to let them leave the island.
“We had 400 to 500 unhappy men, and we were concerned violence would erupt,” Siegel said. “The Turks and Caicos government was very unhappy with the situation. There was a limited supply of food and water.”
Ashtrom ended the standoff after a week by paying what it considered “a ransom,” Siegel said. The project, about 70 percent completed, is still on hold, said Verona Carter, Ritz- Carlton Hotel Co.’s director of public relations for the Caribbean area.
Financial Leadership
The vulnerability of the global financial system revealed by Lehman’s bankruptcy -- from ordinary investors like Sun and Yu to London hedge funds and German lenders -- makes it all the harder to regulate.
“The difficulty you have in getting control is that you need a global alliance,” said former World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn in an e-mail. “You need all the finance ministers to come together, because if a transaction can’t be done here, it can be done in Lichtenstein or France or the Far East.”
Lehman’s bankruptcy also poses a challenge to America’s financial leadership.
Wall Street profited by arranging financing that allowed other countries to tap global capital markets to build offices, factories, resorts and housing. What’s broken now is the trust the rest of the world had in U.S. banks, said Phillip Yin, a native of Seattle who is managing director of Asia Investors Partners Ltd., a Hong Kong-based research firm.
“All that has happened since -- the job losses, the slump, everything -- is tied to one thing and one event,” Yin said. “And that’s Lehman.”
(Lehman’s Lessons: Next, Too Big to Fail)
To contact the reporters on this story: Mark Pittman in New York at mpittman@bloomberg.net; Bob Ivry in New York at bivry@bloomberg.net.
from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aNFuVRL73wJc
2009年9月6日 星期日
《信報》證監在雷曼事件應負的責任
在2002年三月《證券及期貨條例》二讀時,財經事務局局長葉澍堃就政府的立塲作了如下的重要陳述;“我們清楚明白加强證監會的問責性及透明度极為重要,所以條例草案保留了所有現行的問責安排,並且引入多項額外的制衡措施”,“例如在條例草案加入證監會的規管目標,讓市民及業界可以以這些目標作基準,衡量證監會的工作表現”.
在立法會立法通過賦予證監會更大的權力以保障投資者的目標後,出現了涉及數萬宗的史無前例投訴,市民及業界對這樣的監管成效,有何感想呢?雖然大部分的投訴是針對銀行,但證監會是不可能將責任全數推給金管局及投資者的,理由是根據《證券及期貨條例》,證監會是有「監管、監察及規管」銀行銷售證券產品的權力及責任,雖然條例亦指出,證監會可以根據不同情况而行使酌情權,以决定部分或全部依賴金管局代他們執行對銀行的前線監管.但他們亦可運用酌情權,不完全依賴金管局,並要求直接抽查懷疑違規的銀行,法例是完全允許的.
再者,證監會亦可與金管局商討修改他們雙方訂立但沒有法律效力的《備忘錄》,以讓證監曾可直接監管銀行對這些結構性金融產品的銷售,這種安排亦是有法可依的.但證監會並未有積極考慮這些做法.面對可能出現的金融危機,仍然是默守成規地按章工作.
知悉問題不作堵塞
除上述的權責外,證監會對結構性產品進入市場,是有守門員的責任.披露為本的監管政策主要體現在審批、監察及規管章程、廣告及持續披露,讓投資者能評估產品的投資價值及風險.對披露不足的文件不作登記,產品便不能向公眾發售.根據證監會的執行董事日前在立法會上作供時表示,證監會招股章程組是按《公司條例》附表三的條款,審批結構性產品的章程,他承認該條款對監管這此包含了CDS(信貸違約掉期)產品的章程是過時,且承認該小組並沒有審批這些複雜的保險及衍生產品的財務及精算人才.
其實證監會對這個漏洞巳知悉多年,但一直只停留於諮詢而不作堵塞.早於二00三年,證監會已就修改招股章程展開了三個階段的諮詢,在二00五年最後一次諮詢文件中清楚指出,《公司條例》附表三是為監察具有實體業務的公司發債及招股而設的,不適合規管經營衍生產品的公司發債.
證監會於二00六年九月就該諮詢發表總結報告,提出可考慮將含有CDS及CDO(債務抵押債券)一類的結構性產品剔出債券的定義範圍,使其章程及廣告受《證券及期貨條例》,而非不合適的《公司條例》所規管.若證監會當時加速立法並嚴格執行,便沒有今天的雷曼事件.
調查組披露執法漏洞
在聆聽證監會两位高層人員的作供後,可看到四個重要的事實.
第一.證監會於二00五年巳確認《公司條例》對監管結構性產品的章程及廣告是過時的;
第二.招股章程組對審批具有保險特性的債券章程並無相關的尃業人才;
第三.《公司條例》雖然有很多漏洞,但其中多項條款仍可發揮作用,讓證監會可要求發債人披露更具體的風險及可能的利益冲突,但章程組並沒有積極運用該等條款,以要求發債人披露更重要的資料,讓投資者作出有依據的决定.
第四.證監是可以引用《證券及期貨條例》第105(1)條,對申請審批的廣告加上任何附加限制,以保障投資者不受廣告的誤導,但章程組對廣告的審批採取過分寬鬆的標準.
結構性金融產品引致龐大數量的投訴,究竟與證監會這種被動式的執法有多大關連?他們應該負上多大的責任?市民應可用當年葉澍堃在立法會上所提的立法目標作基準,以“衡量證監會的工作表現”並回答上述的問題.
《信報》2009年8月4日 曾廣海、尹靖廷
在立法會立法通過賦予證監會更大的權力以保障投資者的目標後,出現了涉及數萬宗的史無前例投訴,市民及業界對這樣的監管成效,有何感想呢?雖然大部分的投訴是針對銀行,但證監會是不可能將責任全數推給金管局及投資者的,理由是根據《證券及期貨條例》,證監會是有「監管、監察及規管」銀行銷售證券產品的權力及責任,雖然條例亦指出,證監會可以根據不同情况而行使酌情權,以决定部分或全部依賴金管局代他們執行對銀行的前線監管.但他們亦可運用酌情權,不完全依賴金管局,並要求直接抽查懷疑違規的銀行,法例是完全允許的.
再者,證監會亦可與金管局商討修改他們雙方訂立但沒有法律效力的《備忘錄》,以讓證監曾可直接監管銀行對這些結構性金融產品的銷售,這種安排亦是有法可依的.但證監會並未有積極考慮這些做法.面對可能出現的金融危機,仍然是默守成規地按章工作.
知悉問題不作堵塞
除上述的權責外,證監會對結構性產品進入市場,是有守門員的責任.披露為本的監管政策主要體現在審批、監察及規管章程、廣告及持續披露,讓投資者能評估產品的投資價值及風險.對披露不足的文件不作登記,產品便不能向公眾發售.根據證監會的執行董事日前在立法會上作供時表示,證監會招股章程組是按《公司條例》附表三的條款,審批結構性產品的章程,他承認該條款對監管這此包含了CDS(信貸違約掉期)產品的章程是過時,且承認該小組並沒有審批這些複雜的保險及衍生產品的財務及精算人才.
其實證監會對這個漏洞巳知悉多年,但一直只停留於諮詢而不作堵塞.早於二00三年,證監會已就修改招股章程展開了三個階段的諮詢,在二00五年最後一次諮詢文件中清楚指出,《公司條例》附表三是為監察具有實體業務的公司發債及招股而設的,不適合規管經營衍生產品的公司發債.
證監會於二00六年九月就該諮詢發表總結報告,提出可考慮將含有CDS及CDO(債務抵押債券)一類的結構性產品剔出債券的定義範圍,使其章程及廣告受《證券及期貨條例》,而非不合適的《公司條例》所規管.若證監會當時加速立法並嚴格執行,便沒有今天的雷曼事件.
調查組披露執法漏洞
在聆聽證監會两位高層人員的作供後,可看到四個重要的事實.
第一.證監會於二00五年巳確認《公司條例》對監管結構性產品的章程及廣告是過時的;
第二.招股章程組對審批具有保險特性的債券章程並無相關的尃業人才;
第三.《公司條例》雖然有很多漏洞,但其中多項條款仍可發揮作用,讓證監會可要求發債人披露更具體的風險及可能的利益冲突,但章程組並沒有積極運用該等條款,以要求發債人披露更重要的資料,讓投資者作出有依據的决定.
第四.證監是可以引用《證券及期貨條例》第105(1)條,對申請審批的廣告加上任何附加限制,以保障投資者不受廣告的誤導,但章程組對廣告的審批採取過分寬鬆的標準.
結構性金融產品引致龐大數量的投訴,究竟與證監會這種被動式的執法有多大關連?他們應該負上多大的責任?市民應可用當年葉澍堃在立法會上所提的立法目標作基準,以“衡量證監會的工作表現”並回答上述的問題.
《信報》2009年8月4日 曾廣海、尹靖廷
2009年9月3日 星期四
CNBC news: M. Stanley, Moody's, S&P Must Defend Fraud Claims
Source of CNBC news: http://www.cnbc.com/id/32667231.
Published: Wednesday, 2 Sep 2009
A U.S. federal judge ruled that Morgan Stanley and two credit rating agencies must defend fraud charges in a class-action lawsuit accusing them of masking the risks of an investment linked to subprime mortgages, and which eventually collapsed.
U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin on Wednesday rejected efforts by Morgan Stanley [MS 27.09 -0.36 (-1.31%) ] , Moody's [MCO 26.10 -0.32 (-1.21%) ] Moody's Investors Service and McGraw-Hill's [MHP 32.31 -0.95 (-2.86%) ] Standard & Poor's to dismiss fraud claims brought by the plaintiffs, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and King County in Washington state.
She dismissed the plaintiffs' remaining claims, and all claims against a fourth defendant, Bank of New York Mellon [BK 27.95 -0.15 (-0.53%) ] , while granting permission for the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.
Scheindlin's ruling could affect other lawsuits brought by pension funds and other investors, seeking to hold banks and credit raters responsible for hyping the value of complex debt to win fees and causing investor losses as the debt collapsed.
The case concerned the Cheyne Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV), which went bankrupt in August 2007 after the quality of its assets plummeted. Many investors in Cheyne-related notes lost much or all of their investments.
SIVs are complex packages of loans and debt, including collateralized debt obligations, that once held some $350 billion of assets before falling out of favor.
The California Public Employees' Retirement System, the nation's largest public pension fund, in July sued Moody's, S&P and Fitch Ratings over losses on Cheyne and other SIVs.
In the New York case, the plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley wrongly marketed Cheyne as a high-quality investment, and that the rating agencies assigned improperly high ratings.
The complaint also accused Bank of New York Mellon, acting as a depositary and processing agent, of improperly valuing Cheyne's assets and delivering reports to the rating agencies.
In a 68-page ruling, Scheindlin said the plaintiffs pleaded enough facts to let the fraud claims case go forward.
"Where both the rating agencies and Morgan Stanley knew that the ratings process was flawed, knew that the portfolio was not a safe, stable investment, and knew that the rating agencies could not issue an objective rating because of the effect it would have on their compensation, it may be plausibly inferred that Morgan Stanley and the rating agencies knew they were disseminating false and misleading ratings," she wrote.
Scheindlin set an Oct. 1 status conference in the case.
McGraw-Hill spokesman Frank Briamonte said the company was pleased that Scheindlin dismissed all but one of 11 claims it faced, and said it was "confident" it would prevail on the remaining claim.
Bank of New York Mellon spokesman Kevin Heine had no immediate comment. The rest of the parties did not immediately return calls or e-mails seeking comment.
The case is Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan), No. 08-7508.
Published: Wednesday, 2 Sep 2009
A U.S. federal judge ruled that Morgan Stanley and two credit rating agencies must defend fraud charges in a class-action lawsuit accusing them of masking the risks of an investment linked to subprime mortgages, and which eventually collapsed.
U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin on Wednesday rejected efforts by Morgan Stanley [MS 27.09 -0.36 (-1.31%) ] , Moody's [MCO 26.10 -0.32 (-1.21%) ] Moody's Investors Service and McGraw-Hill's [MHP 32.31 -0.95 (-2.86%) ] Standard & Poor's to dismiss fraud claims brought by the plaintiffs, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and King County in Washington state.
She dismissed the plaintiffs' remaining claims, and all claims against a fourth defendant, Bank of New York Mellon [BK 27.95 -0.15 (-0.53%) ] , while granting permission for the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.
Scheindlin's ruling could affect other lawsuits brought by pension funds and other investors, seeking to hold banks and credit raters responsible for hyping the value of complex debt to win fees and causing investor losses as the debt collapsed.
The case concerned the Cheyne Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV), which went bankrupt in August 2007 after the quality of its assets plummeted. Many investors in Cheyne-related notes lost much or all of their investments.
SIVs are complex packages of loans and debt, including collateralized debt obligations, that once held some $350 billion of assets before falling out of favor.
The California Public Employees' Retirement System, the nation's largest public pension fund, in July sued Moody's, S&P and Fitch Ratings over losses on Cheyne and other SIVs.
In the New York case, the plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley wrongly marketed Cheyne as a high-quality investment, and that the rating agencies assigned improperly high ratings.
The complaint also accused Bank of New York Mellon, acting as a depositary and processing agent, of improperly valuing Cheyne's assets and delivering reports to the rating agencies.
In a 68-page ruling, Scheindlin said the plaintiffs pleaded enough facts to let the fraud claims case go forward.
"Where both the rating agencies and Morgan Stanley knew that the ratings process was flawed, knew that the portfolio was not a safe, stable investment, and knew that the rating agencies could not issue an objective rating because of the effect it would have on their compensation, it may be plausibly inferred that Morgan Stanley and the rating agencies knew they were disseminating false and misleading ratings," she wrote.
Scheindlin set an Oct. 1 status conference in the case.
McGraw-Hill spokesman Frank Briamonte said the company was pleased that Scheindlin dismissed all but one of 11 claims it faced, and said it was "confident" it would prevail on the remaining claim.
Bank of New York Mellon spokesman Kevin Heine had no immediate comment. The rest of the parties did not immediately return calls or e-mails seeking comment.
The case is Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan), No. 08-7508.
2009年9月2日 星期三
銀行迫迷債事主啃6成方案 ，情何以堪 ！
（(轉載自經濟日報 9月2日)
在現代社會，公關手法經常有助扭轉事件發展。上星期日新疆發生特大騷亂，舉世震驚。中央政府在星期一立即安排國內外媒體採訪騷亂現場，爭取輿論主動。可見在信息年代，連一向以威權見稱的中央政府也明白公關造勢的重要性。
銀行公關造勢 迫證監低頭
遠在海角一隅的香港，近日為了證監會應否同意16家零售銀行用雷曼迷債60%的價值（下稱「6成方案」）來全面性解決雷曼事件，也掀起一場公關造勢戰。本星期三有公關同行在他報的專欄把有份協助雙方的公關專才名字點了出來，甚至說證監會韋奕禮以公帑來聘請一些資深公關人是為了締造人民英雄形象。又說「銀行自動求和」，明眼人一看便知道是為銀行造勢，企圖令證監會低頭，接受銀行6成方案建議。但這個結果是對雷曼苦主不利的。為了苦主的利益，筆者要把自己知道的情況說出來，以正視聽。
筆者先申報利益，我自己雖屬公關界，但我本人和我所屬公司都沒有接任何涉及雷曼一方的生意。筆者只是以個人身份義務地幫雷曼苦主。筆者身為民主黨核心黨員，也是公開資訊；筆者評論雷曼事件時從來沒有藏頭露尾，在不申報利益情況下，借助自己的專欄去為商業利益服務。
銀行一毛不拔 損失全歸事主
雷曼苦主大聯盟主席陳光譽先生在6月底時已指出，銀行（當時主要指中銀）若真的以6成方案來解決雷曼事件，其實是把抵押品的價值照價還給苦主而已。銀行可謂分毫不出、一毛不拔。對於中銀這種錙銖必算的行徑，我兩周前已在本欄內指出中銀這樣做，有違其企業社會責任，更加有負國家刻意在香港締造和諧的苦心。沒有國家數年前把以千億計金錢注入中銀以充實其資本，中銀集團根本不可能在香港上市。現在國家為了在香港締造和諧，絞盡腦汁、扭盡六壬。中銀集團卻袖手旁觀，捂着荷包不肯多賠一點予雷曼苦主。用內地的話講，這是不懂政治，不顧全大局的宗派思想。左派陣營經常扣民主派破壞安定團結的帽子；但中銀集團明知雷曼苦主們失去了自己畢生積蓄卻依然只肯賠6成，客觀上是迫雷曼苦主走向極端，甚至走向絕路（辛瑞英女士的不幸，令人神傷）。其對香港安定團結的破壞，莫此為甚。
用內地的話來說：「錢是人民的」，不是你中銀集團袞袞諸公個人所有的。倘若中銀集團有份直接或間接聘用專業公關來為其6成方案造勢，迫證監會及雷曼苦主硬啃這個骨頭。那更是用人民的錢來破壞香港人民的和諧，迫同屬中國公民的雷曼苦主接受城下之盟。真的是情何以堪﹗中聯辦理應介入，訓斥中銀集團高層只見樹木不見森林，和中央政府的和諧政策對着幹！
公關文過飾非 愧讀聖賢書
至於說證監會堅持要100%賠償才接受令事件膠着，令雷曼苦主繼續受折磨。實情是雷曼苦主大聯盟早已明確要求銀行百分百賠償。今次證監會恰巧是站在人民的一面，和人民對着幹的反而是零售銀行及其公關們。雷曼苦主目睹證監會成功迫使新鴻基及凱基兩家證券行同意百分百賠償，一眾苦主拍手稱快都來不及，又怎會在乎多等一會。證監會若在輿論下低頭，6成方案一旦執行，損失的是雷曼苦主，埋下的是未來社會不穩定的因素，得益的是有錯不認還要賺到盡的零售銀行。
金融海嘯下，我明白一眾同業的生意壓力，但置公義於不顧來為有錯不認的零售銀行造勢，令我想起了文天祥的四句詩：「讀聖賢書 所學何事 而今而後 庶幾無愧」。
謹以此與各同行共勉！
撰文:馮煒光 中產動力主席
在現代社會，公關手法經常有助扭轉事件發展。上星期日新疆發生特大騷亂，舉世震驚。中央政府在星期一立即安排國內外媒體採訪騷亂現場，爭取輿論主動。可見在信息年代，連一向以威權見稱的中央政府也明白公關造勢的重要性。
銀行公關造勢 迫證監低頭
遠在海角一隅的香港，近日為了證監會應否同意16家零售銀行用雷曼迷債60%的價值（下稱「6成方案」）來全面性解決雷曼事件，也掀起一場公關造勢戰。本星期三有公關同行在他報的專欄把有份協助雙方的公關專才名字點了出來，甚至說證監會韋奕禮以公帑來聘請一些資深公關人是為了締造人民英雄形象。又說「銀行自動求和」，明眼人一看便知道是為銀行造勢，企圖令證監會低頭，接受銀行6成方案建議。但這個結果是對雷曼苦主不利的。為了苦主的利益，筆者要把自己知道的情況說出來，以正視聽。
筆者先申報利益，我自己雖屬公關界，但我本人和我所屬公司都沒有接任何涉及雷曼一方的生意。筆者只是以個人身份義務地幫雷曼苦主。筆者身為民主黨核心黨員，也是公開資訊；筆者評論雷曼事件時從來沒有藏頭露尾，在不申報利益情況下，借助自己的專欄去為商業利益服務。
銀行一毛不拔 損失全歸事主
雷曼苦主大聯盟主席陳光譽先生在6月底時已指出，銀行（當時主要指中銀）若真的以6成方案來解決雷曼事件，其實是把抵押品的價值照價還給苦主而已。銀行可謂分毫不出、一毛不拔。對於中銀這種錙銖必算的行徑，我兩周前已在本欄內指出中銀這樣做，有違其企業社會責任，更加有負國家刻意在香港締造和諧的苦心。沒有國家數年前把以千億計金錢注入中銀以充實其資本，中銀集團根本不可能在香港上市。現在國家為了在香港締造和諧，絞盡腦汁、扭盡六壬。中銀集團卻袖手旁觀，捂着荷包不肯多賠一點予雷曼苦主。用內地的話講，這是不懂政治，不顧全大局的宗派思想。左派陣營經常扣民主派破壞安定團結的帽子；但中銀集團明知雷曼苦主們失去了自己畢生積蓄卻依然只肯賠6成，客觀上是迫雷曼苦主走向極端，甚至走向絕路（辛瑞英女士的不幸，令人神傷）。其對香港安定團結的破壞，莫此為甚。
用內地的話來說：「錢是人民的」，不是你中銀集團袞袞諸公個人所有的。倘若中銀集團有份直接或間接聘用專業公關來為其6成方案造勢，迫證監會及雷曼苦主硬啃這個骨頭。那更是用人民的錢來破壞香港人民的和諧，迫同屬中國公民的雷曼苦主接受城下之盟。真的是情何以堪﹗中聯辦理應介入，訓斥中銀集團高層只見樹木不見森林，和中央政府的和諧政策對着幹！
公關文過飾非 愧讀聖賢書
至於說證監會堅持要100%賠償才接受令事件膠着，令雷曼苦主繼續受折磨。實情是雷曼苦主大聯盟早已明確要求銀行百分百賠償。今次證監會恰巧是站在人民的一面，和人民對着幹的反而是零售銀行及其公關們。雷曼苦主目睹證監會成功迫使新鴻基及凱基兩家證券行同意百分百賠償，一眾苦主拍手稱快都來不及，又怎會在乎多等一會。證監會若在輿論下低頭，6成方案一旦執行，損失的是雷曼苦主，埋下的是未來社會不穩定的因素，得益的是有錯不認還要賺到盡的零售銀行。
金融海嘯下，我明白一眾同業的生意壓力，但置公義於不顧來為有錯不認的零售銀行造勢，令我想起了文天祥的四句詩：「讀聖賢書 所學何事 而今而後 庶幾無愧」。
謹以此與各同行共勉！
撰文:馮煒光 中產動力主席
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