2010年12月29日 星期三

韋奕禮請辭揭監管危機 - 王岸然

2010年12月29日

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮於本月9日突然請辭,此事反映政府在金融危機與雷曼事件爆發之後,並無認真正視危機及汲取教訓,進而要迫走韋奕禮這一類國際級的行政專才,令香港的金融監管變得更加虛假和人治。

一個人的去留,本來不應與一個制度的存廢掛鈎,但若然將這幾年間發生的重要財經事件與韋奕禮的突然離任串在一起,便看到香港的深層次危機再次顯現,政府已經為財團操控,獨立的監管制度已名存實亡。

人才離職 庸才到位

香港只有一個證監會,證券監管工作予人與其他獨立非政府機關,如申訴專員或私隱專員屬同樣的東西,主管其事者不過是一名首長級人物而已,其位置可以隨便更換。不同的是,韋奕禮年薪900多萬,比特首高出幾倍,比負責監管他的財經事務局局長陳家強及財政司司長曾俊華高出更大比數;為何他值那樣的高薪?

韋奕禮不是那些一生在本地官僚系統內打滾的人物,而是國際證監集團人才的一員,有沒有工作一回事,身價與個人名譽是國際級別,毋庸置疑。證監是一門國際化的專業,國際證監會有一百八十多個會員,全世界的證券業九成以上受到同一類別的證監制度所監管(英、美、澳、加的證監為先進的代表模式);世上比香港先進的監管制度其實不多,香港能夠付出比先進地區更為優厚的薪酬,卻不能留住人才,高薪位置由本地或是來自國內的人治庸才所佔據,這就是金融災難及失誤連番出現的原因。

苦主不忿 抗爭至今

韋奕禮「劈炮」之後,政府透過自己的媒體放出消息,指韋是另有高就,會返回倫敦交易所任職云云。事實上,韋當年正是失意於倫敦交易所的人事鬥爭,已經回到鄉下準備搞點小生意終老,適逢香港證監會總裁有空缺,所以到來搵食。當然,此一時、彼一時,今天韋奕禮衣錦還鄉,有更高成就,是完全可能的事。不過,高級任命不可能不會多等三個月、到韋9月合約期滿為止;今天韋奕禮主動辭職,繼任無人,並不是好來好去的安排。

眾所周知,韋奕禮在雷曼事件的立場,一直是投資產品持牌者若有違規銷售的問題(mis-selling),會依國際證監的慣例,要銷售者負起全責,亦因而證監成功迫令包括新鴻基在內的三家雷曼產品分銷商要百分百賠償。這是去年初的事。

問題在於,經銀行監管出售同一類產品之時,監管之責與權全在銀行,而銀行的監管者任志剛卻站到銀行一邊,於是出現同一雷曼事件,卻出現不同賠償的六成方案;亦所以被迫接受六成賠償的苦主心存不忿,抗爭到今天,依然堅持事件尚未解決。

韋奕禮與任志剛的分別在哪裏?不是誰更有能力,而是一個是過江龍,以國際證監的監管標準為念;一個則是一生在香港的官僚與商界銀行之間打滾為生的地頭蟲。 大家同樣面對特區政府可在適當時候另請高明的局面,韋堅持保護投資者為優先的國際證監專業,另一人則盤算要與業界打好關係, 準備退休之時還可有再上層樓的空間。 香港的官僚莫不如是。

自11月底,雷曼苦主不停向證監會施壓,要求證監依〈證券及期貨條例〉第一百零七條檢控銀行從業員;這一着擊中銀行的死穴,因為執行證券大法的權力還在證監之手,不須得到金管局的同意,因為不是業界監管而是刑事檢控。

問題是政府在最初就經由陳家強與曾俊華提議銀行先支付六成的所謂和解方案,作為政府不再追究的交換條件,而曾政府一直以官僚應付刁民的思維看問題,以為一人讓一步是最好的方案,只是這個六成和解方案本質是「不平等條約」,迷債苦主固然從不順氣,迷債以外的雷曼苦主只能私下與銀行和解,賠償有多有少,但亦無一人順氣,雷曼問題從無解決。

轉向國際 提出申訴

過去兩個月的中環,雷曼苦主的示威威力比法輪功更強大,證監會不肯接受苦主報案的笑話,連外國金融報章亦已開始報道;這本是金融中心的天大笑話,只是香港人面對曾政府多樣的施政荒謬,已經麻木不覺。

這就是韋奕禮提早盡快離職的主要原因。去年政府拋出六成方案之時,是趁韋奕禮放假不在港,要證監會董事會通過決議接受;韋奕禮揹了黑鍋,卻受制於保密法例不能多言,今天面對苦主的天天示威,為保一己的清譽,只好提早離任。

可以預見,面對這樣一個官商橫行、不講法治的政府,證監會之內的國際人才專家會紛紛離去,國際的證監專才亦望而卻步,不肯來港,香港的監管制度名存實亡。

還有年半時間的曾蔭權不會拆彈,這是官僚習性,人人只會在任內自保。能藉第一百零七條迫銀行合理賠償的,只有政府及證監會,政府不動,苦主豈非無望?

筆者以為,苦主應將事件帶到國際層面,苦主可以直接向各國的證監會提交事件的報告,也可以直接向國際證監會組織(International Organization of Securities Commissions)提出申訴,給全球一百八十多個證監會評評道理,讓拒絕依法保護投資者的香港證監與香港政府在國際上名譽掃地。


2010年11月30日 星期二

檢控銀行職員 雷曼事件新發展

檢控銀行職員 雷曼事件新發展 - 王岸然, 2010年12月1日

過去個多星期在中環上班而又有機會行經遮打大廈的中產一族,一定十分奇怪,為何遮打大廈似乎已經被示威者封鎖了,但新聞沒有報道是什麼事。幾個示威者到中聯辦請願,議題耳熟能詳,新聞報道不會缺少,但百多名雷曼苦主圍困了一座內有大量國際投資公司的大廈個多星期,沒有報道也沒有分析文章告訴大家發生了什麼事情。本文可能是大家疑惑的唯一解說資訊。

只知追逐慣性新聞的記者也許應該上雷曼苦主大聯盟的網頁參考一下那些Youtube,以決定事件是否符合新聞價值,但對一直有評論雷曼事件的筆者而言,這是一件涉及以百億計的金融大案,結果可能是有數以千計的銀行家(從業員)被刑事檢控,事件是從根基上動搖了香港的金融中心地位。這樣的大事沒有新聞價值乎?

似乎也不盡然,上星期地方法院開審了第一宗雷曼銷售過程的刑事檢控,依據的是《證券及期貨條例》第一○七條,被告的銀行經理涉嫌「以欺詐地或罔顧實情地誘使他人投資金錢」,經理被控九項控罪,涉及誘騙六名客戶近680萬元購買迷債產品。

雙重標準非法治

此案肯定只屬冰山一角,成千上萬的苦主有類似經歷,並曾經到證監、金管局及警方申訴,只是大多苦主及市民對事件屬刑事(詐騙投資者),還是民事(投資失誤,不良銷售手法)根本搞不清楚,普通市民還以為在所謂六成賠償方案之後,事件已經了結。殊不知整批雷曼產品以不同名目有問題的銷售手法,落入投資者手中涉及240億元,所謂六成和解的迷債項目,只涉數十億元,而和解只涉及民事,不涉及刑事的責任。

本欄早在本年3月31日已經清楚介紹什麼是一○七條,同時建議雷曼苦主應發動一次萬人報案大行動,不能讓事件不了了之。這不單是關係個別苦主的私人投資得失問題,而是關係我們的金融經濟體系之內,不能容許大量詐騙性的銷售行為,而我們的法治體系,亦不能容許雙重標準,對小販商戶欺詐一塊幾毛就嚴厲執法,但大商家大銀行就享有特權,中資銀行就更享有特權中的特權,大家反而不聞不問。

大家以為事件已經曲解,忽略了和解只屬迷債系列,在整個雷曼產品的銷售過程之中只佔五成多的比例,而和解只屬民事,沒有解決違法欺詐銷售的更嚴重問題,而所謂和解方案,只及六成,那是銀行必定能從雷曼遺下的抵押產品取回的金額,銀行不單沒有承認任何責任,更可以有掙!投資者是在沒有選擇的情況下接受了「不平等條約」,去年有社論級的評論讚賞和解方案,呼籲苦主接受,報刊更從此當完成了輿論監督的責任,社會的反智沉淪,豈是偶然?

事隔兩年零三個月,始有第一宗依據第一○七條的刑事檢控,這個延誤何等驚人,背後的政治含義如何且不論,法治原則是延誤就會破壞公平(delay defeats equity),兩年間已經有不少年紀大的苦主因病過身或成危疾,如果一年只檢控幾人,要多少年才能完成還苦主一個公道的責任?苦主要等政府先檢控,取得勝訴的結果,才能展開民事的訴訟,因為這才有取勝的把握。民事官司從來是燒金錢的遊戲,香港沒有集體訴訟(class action)的制度,對無財勢的小投資者如何公道?正義大狀議員當年高調干預,抽完政治油水就不聞不問,這是哪一門子的正義?

爭取權益要團結

上星期五在地院檢控的中銀經理張瑰瑰案,傳媒算是有詳細報道,案件的內容,大家若不善忘,兩年前就聽過不少類同的故事。銀行職員形容雷曼產品是「保本」,與七大企業掛鈎,與一般基金或是定息債券無異,這都是典型的失實陳述手法,從來都是法律所不容許,只是有財勢的銀行不承認責任,背後給予特區政府壓力,靠銀行家支持上位的任志剛終於下台之後,政府才肯進行第一單案件的檢控,這與「六四」時的中共領導人一天不死盡,「六四」不會平反一樣,這是人話,不是法治,香港在這方面日漸與大陸「統一」。

公權力不可靠,跟紅頂白的傳媒也不主持公道之時,雷曼苦主能依靠的,只有自身的力量,公民直接行動(Direct Action)爭取自身的權益,從來是最為有效。菜園村的村民只有一百幾十人,但行動堅定勇敢,就令到政府的收地行動一再延後。

雷曼苦主也不團結,也不是人人積極,坐待別人行動,坐待政府行動的大有人在,這與社會的大環境一樣,但還是有少數人努力不懈;遮打大廈是證監會所在,證監會本來有法定責任接受投案,但由於在枱底下與金管局達成協議,同意銀行的六成和解方案就是事件的了結,所以今天在沒有合理法律理由的情況下,拒絕雷曼苦主報案,造成過去個多星期遮打大廈外又棺材又打鼓的奇景。證監會的職責本來是要當小投資者的守護天使,但在官僚政治之下反而出賣了小投資者的利益,於心無愧嗎?

2010年9月24日 星期五

迷債,銀行銷售,風險披露,騙局,

騙局,騙子, 西裝革履的騙子,道貌岸然的銀行家, 這之間都有甚麼聯繫呢?

電影“Public Enemy”, 一貫以搶劫銀行為生的大盜對在銀行里的客戶說:“我們只搶劫銀行,我們不搶劫銀行客戶”。

電影“華爾街”的格言是:“貪婪是好” ("greedy is good")。
從設計和銷售迷你債券,星債,和精明債券的銀行和銀行家身上,我們看到了 “greedy is good” 的精神。

現在“華爾街2:Money Never Sleeps" 要上映了。不知會有甚麼新的格言。


迷債發行章程的「本公司債券是甚麼?」一節,
有「誰應購買本公司債券?本公司債券是否適合所有人?


本公司債券僅適合以下投資者:

 尋求美元或港元定息季度利息收入;

有信心所述的七間該等相關主體在本公司債券發行日至到期日前第二個營業日不會受到信貸事件 (即「破產」、「未能償債」或「重組」,包括例如未能償還大額借貸、破產、進行不利的債券重組)影響等事件,且可以承擔當發生任何上述事件後可能損失投資的風險;

 願意接受本公司可選擇延長A組及/或B組債券的到期日;及

 就任何組別的本公司債券而言,願意接受本公司可選擇在二零零七年九月十五日或其後任何付息日提早償還本金額。



這四點具體要求大概是最容易讓零售客戶讀懂的,也是對潛在客戶的一個簡明要求。

大家可見,這只是提到7間著名公司,完全沒有提到CDO裏面信貸掛鉤的100多個公司。寫出這麼個簡要的“誰應購買本公司債券?本公司債券是否適合所有人?”,目的是甚麼呢? 令投資者誤以爲迷債的風險只跟6-7個著名公司信貸掛鉤 ?

2010年8月13日 星期五

Court Filing (abstract)

Case 1:10-cv-00017-WHP, Filed 08/09/10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
USDC SDNYDOCUMENTELECTRONICALLYFILED
DOC #:
DATE FILED:~$ ~(C)

KA KIN WONG, et al.,10 Civ. 0096 (WHP)Appeal from Bankruptcy
Plaintiffs/Appellants,Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)
-against-
HSBC USA, INC., et al.,Defendants/Appellees.

WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge:

Plaintiffs/Appellants Ka Kin Wong and six other noteholders appeal from twoorders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Peck,Bankr. J.)(the "Bankruptcy Court") dated November 23, 2009 and December 3, 2009 dismissingtheir Class Action Complaint (the "Complaint") with prejudice. While the events giving rise tothis adversary proceeding are complicated, two discrete issues are presented on appeal: (1)whether Plaintiffs have standing to sue, and (2) whether amendment of the Complaint would befutile.For the following reasons, this Court affirms in part, reverses in part, and vacates in part the Bankruptcy Court's orders.

BACKGROUND

1.Parties on Appeal

Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of purchasers of structured finance notes-alsoknown as "Minibonds"between June 16, 2003 and September 15, 2008. (Appellants'Designation of Contents of the Record Designation Number ("DN") 1: Complaint against HSBC,USA, et al. dated Mar. 12, 2009 ("Compl.") ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs brought claims against PacificInternational Finance Limited ("Pacific Finance" or the "Issuer"), the issuer of the Minibonds, aswell as several other entities and individuals. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-38.) The underlying transactionsand relationships among the various entities are opaque.

On appeal, Plaintiffs pursue their claims against only two entities: HSBC BankUSA, N.A. ("HSBC Bank" or the "Trustee"), and Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.("LBSF"). HSBC Bank is the trustee of collateral securing Pacific Finance's paymentobligations to the Minibonds holders and LBSF. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs mistakenly namedHSBC Bank's predecessor as trustee, (DN 6 Ex. 2: Affidavit of Song Qun Sworn, ProgrammeProspectus dated Mar. 12, 2007 at 7), and now appeal the Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave toamend the Complaint to name HSBC Bank. Defendant LSBF is a bankrupt Delawarecorporation and a debtor in the underlying bankruptcy proceedings, which involve severalLehman entities (the "Lehman Bankruptcy"). (Compl.IT38, 67.)


II.The Minibonds Program

Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief relating to $1.6 billion in Minibonds issued by Pacific Finance in separate, but virtually identical, series. (Compl. ¶ 45.) PacificFinance sold the Minibonds to retail investors located primarily in Hong Kong, and marketedthem as "credit-linked" to financially stable companies and backed by AAA-rated collateral.(Compl. ¶¶ 45, 47, 51.) As a consequence of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.'s ("LehmanBrothers") collapse, the Minibonds are now worthless. (Compl.T~67-69, 101-04.)

While the Minibonds were issued by Pacific Finance, Lehman Brothers and otherLehman entities designed the Minibonds program. (Compl. ¶¶ 46, 48, 50, 82.) The details ofLehman Brothers' involvement emerged during an inquiry conducted by Hong Kong regulatoryauthorities. In that proceeding, officers of HSBC Holdings Plc ("HSBC Holdings"), thecompany at the top of the HSBC pyramid, testified that Lehman Brothers appointed HSBC Bankas trustee of the Minibonds collateral.'(Compl. ¶ 82.) Lehman Brothers also compiled theprospectus for each Minibonds series. (Compl. ¶ 82.) Pacific Finance existed only "to issue the[Minibonds]. It [was for] all intents and purposes a creature of Lehman's design .... [PacificFinance was] not an active company ... and HSBC's role as a Director [was] not an active role.. . ." (Compl. 182.) Indeed, the Complaint alleges that Lehman Brothers and LBSF, not the Issuer, "selected the collateral" for the Minibonds. (Compl. ¶ 50.)

Pacific Finance secured its obligation to pay interest to the Minibonds holdersthrough two related transactions.'First, Pacific Finance purchased notes from Saphir FinancePublic Limited Company (the "Saphir Notes"). (DN 9 Ex.1, Ex. B: Tenth Supplemental Trust

1 The Hong Kong testimony in the Complaint does not distinguish among the various HSBC andLehman entities. At times, it is difficult to discern the specific entity referenced in the testimony.

Deed ("Tenth Deed") at 1.) The Saphir Notes were placed in trust with HSBC Bank as Trustee.(Tenth Deed at 1.) Pacific Finance also executed a credit default swap agreement with LBSF.(Tenth Deed at 1; Compl. 154.) Under the credit default swap, LBSF agreed to pay PacificFinance a sum equal to what Pacific Finance owed the Minibonds holders in exchange for theinterest earned by Pacific Finance on the Saphir Notes. (Tenth Deed at 15-16.) Because LehmanBrothers and LBSF exercised control over the Minibonds program, Plaintiffs assert that LBSF"negotiate[d] with itself over the essential terms of the swap agreements." (Compl. 150.)

The Saphir Notes are governed by a principal trust deed and a supplemental trustdeed issued for each series of Minibonds. (Compl.IT84-85.) These trust deeds and theprospectuses advertising the Minibonds sale set forth the "duties and obligations" of the Trusteeand the Issuer. (Compl.~T84-87.) The trust deeds contain,inter alia,provisions governing thepriority of payment in the event the Saphir Notes are liquidated. (Compl.IT84, 90.) The partiesdisagree about the operation of these provisions and who has priority to the Saphir Notes.Choice of law provisions in the trust deeds provide that they are to be construed under Englishlaw. (DN 9 Ex. 1: Principal Trust Deed ("Principal Trust Deed"), Sec. 17(a).) The prospectusesrepresented that "neither Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. nor any of its subsidiaries or affiliateshas any equity interest in, or any control over, us [Pacific Finance/HSBC]." (Compl. ¶¶ 84, 87.)

According to the Complaint, Pacific Finance is controlled by HSBC Bank(Cayman) Limited ("HSBC Cayman"). (Compl. 129.) In turn, HSBC Cayman is controlled byHSBC Holdings. (Compl. ¶ 31.) HSBC Holdings also controls the Trustee's predecessor,

2 Plaintiffs brought claims against other entities and individuals alleging rights to collateralpurchased as part of additional transactions. (Compl.118,32-37, 110, 118.) Because Plaintiffsdo not appeal the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of these claims, that collateral is not at issue.

HSBC Bank USA.3(Compl. 13 1.)
Another HSBC entity---HSBC Bank Plc-filed a claim for $234 million in theLehman Bankruptcy. (DN 30 Ex. 6: Amended Schedule of Assets and Liabilities for LehmanBrothers at 3.) In addition, a Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner's report published after the orderson appeal discloses that HSBC Holdings and Lehman Brothers cooperated extensively duringLehman's collapse to ensure that Lehman Brothers satisfied its obligations to HSBC Holdings.(Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, dated Mar. 11, 2010 at 1321-26.)

III.Procedural History

On October 3, 2008, LBSF filed for bankruptcy. (Counter-Designation of ItemsTo Be Included In Record On Appeal ("C-DN") 10: Supplement to Proof of Claim in Chapter 11Case of LBSF ¶ 10; Compl. ¶ 67.) Thereafter, LBSF's counsel informed HSBC Bank that anyattempt to liquidate the Saphir Notes may be subject to the automatic stay provisions of theUnited States Bankruptcy Code and demanded the Trustee cease all further action. (DN 30 Ex.5: Pls.' Opp'n to Def. [LBSF's] Mot. to Dismiss the Compl., Letter dated Nov. 25, 2008.)HSBC Bank complied.

On March 12, 2009, Plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding in the BankruptcyCourt. Count One of the Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the Minibonds collateral isthe property of the Minibonds holders, not the bankruptcy estate, based on breaches of contractand fiduciary duty by the Issuer and Trustee. (Compl. ¶¶ 97-108.) Count Two seeks to enjoin LBSF and the Trustee from impairing the Minibonds collateral and requests transfer of the

3 This Court presumes that an amended complaint would include the same allegation.

collateral to the Minibonds holders. (Compl.IT109-13.) Count Three seeks a resulting orconstructive trust on the Minibonds collateral for the benefit of the Minibonds purchasers.(Compl. ¶¶ 114-21.) Finally, the remaining counts of the Complaint-Counts Four throughThirteen-assert damages claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence,unjust enrichment, and aiding and abetting against the Trustee, the Issuer, and the Issuer'sdirectors and parent company. (Compl. ¶¶ 122-89.)

On May 27, 2009, LBSF and HSBC Bank USA each moved to dismiss theComplaint. (DN 5: Notice of HSBC USA, Inc.'s Mot. to Dismiss the [Complaint], Abstain orStay the Adversary Proceeding; DN 9: Notice of Mot. of [LBSF] for an Order Dismissing theAdversary Compl.)

In a ruling from the bench, Bankruptcy Judge Peck dismissed the Complaint. TheBankruptcy Court dismissed Counts One through Three for lack of standing on three principalgrounds. First, relying on the trust deeds and English law, the Bankruptcy Court held thatPlaintiffs lack standing to bring a direct claim against Defendants. The relevant provisions of thetrust deeds state that "[a] person who is not a party to [the deed] has no right under the Contracts(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 [("Contracts Act of 1999")] to enforce any term of [the deed]except and to the extent (if any) that [the deed] expressly provides for such Act to apply to any ofits terms." (Principal Trust Deed at 3; Tenth Deed at 3). The Bankruptcy Court held that"[t]hese provisions fit squarely within the tenets of governing English law," which "provides thatit is a trustee and not a beneficiary of a trust that is the appropriate party to bring an action onbehalf of the trust beneficiaries." (Tr. of Nov. 18, 2009 Hr'g (the "Bankr. Ct. Ruling") at 25.)

Second, the Bankruptcy Court held that it would be futile to allow Plaintiffs to amend the Complaint to bring a derivative claim on behalf of the Trustee. (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at26.) Construing English law, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that a trust beneficiary may stepinto the shoes of the Trustee and sue on its behalf only in special circumstances. (Bankr. Ct.Ruling at 26.) Applying this standard, the Bankruptcy Court reasoned that (i) the "mere fact thatthe trustee has not filed a lawsuit [seeking to enforce Plaintiffs' right to the Minibonds collateral]is not a sufficient `special circumstance;"' and (ii) the fact that an HSBC affiliate filed a proof ofclaim in the Lehman Bankruptcy does not establish that the Trustee is conflicted because "thereis no allegation of any actual conflict." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 26.)

Third, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that it would be futile to allowamendment of the Complaint to name the proper trustee-HSBC Bank-"for the reasons setforth in this ruling." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 22.) However, it is not apparent from the transcript ofthe ruling what those reasons were.

The Bankruptcy Court also dismissed Counts Four through Thirteen because theywere "not related to the debtors' proceedings." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 29.) The Bankruptcy Courtstated that an adversary proceeding is considered related to a bankruptcy case "if the outcomemight have a conceivable [e]ffect on the estate." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 28.) After noting thatCounts Four through Thirteen "involve tort, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary dutyclaims against various defendants, none of whom are debtors" in the Lehman Bankruptcy,(Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 27), the Bankruptcy Court held that "[i]nasmuch as Counts [Four] through[Thirteen] comprise actions governed by foreign law between two or more non-debtors, suchclaims, regardless of the outcome, will not affect the debtor's bankruptcy cases.... Resolutionof these claims will have no [e]ffect on the rights of debtors or creditors in the debtors' bankruptcy cases, nor will it have any [e]ffect on the debtors' estates." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 29.)DISCUSSION

1.Standard of Review

A district court reviews a bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear error and itslegal conclusionsde novo.Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013;In re Vouzianas,259 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir.2001);In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.,146 F.3d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1998). The dismissal of acomplaint is a legal conclusion which is subject tode novoreview.Selevan v. N.Y. ThruwayAuth.,584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) ("We reviewde novoa district court's dismissal of acomplaint for lack of standing.");see alsoRaine v. Lorimar Prods., Inc.,71 B.R. 450, 452(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (`Because this is an appeal from [a Bankruptcy Court's] decision on a motionto dismiss for failure to state a claim, purely legal considerations are involved, and thus thiscourt's review must bedenovo.").When reviewing such a dismissal, a court "accept[s] allfactual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor."ATSI Commcn's, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).

Generally, "[a] bankruptcy court's denial of a request to amend [the complaint] isreviewed for abuse of discretion."In re Calpine Corp.,406 B.R. 463, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)(citingIn re Enron Corp.,419 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). However, "[i]f that denial wasbased on an interpretation of law," such as the determination that an amendment would be futile,a court employsde novoreview. SeeDougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of ZoningAppeals,282 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2002);see alsoRicciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,941 F.2d119, 122-24 (2d Cir. 1991) (reviewingde novothe lower court's determination that amendment would be futile).

A court "should freely give leave [to amend the Complaint] when justice sorequires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Particularly where a court grants a motion to dismiss, "theusual practice is to grant leave to amend."Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau,180 F.3d 42, 53 (2d Cir.1999).A court may deny leave to amend as futile only "if the proposed claim could notwithstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)."Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Mach.Corp.,310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002). Indeed, futility means that it is "beyond doubt that theplaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his amended claims."Pangburn v. Culbertson,200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotations and citations omitted).

II.Claims Against LBSF: Counts One & Two

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their direct claims against LBSF and the denialof leave to replead those claims derivatively. This Court addresses Count Three of theComplaint separately for the reasons articulated in Section IV,infra.

a. Direct Claim Against LBSF

Plaintiffs appeal the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of their direct claims againstLBSF on two principal grounds: (1) Plaintiffs have standing under English law to sue LBSFdirectly because LBSF is a co-beneficiary under the trust; and (2) the Bankruptcy Court'sreliance on the provisions of the trust deeds prohibiting non-parties from enforcing the deeds'terms was misplaced. Because Plaintiffs lack standing under English law to bring a direct claimagainst LBSF, this Court need not address Plaintiffs' second contention.

Under English law, a trustee generally has "a duty to protect and preserve the trust estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries ...."Alsop Wilkinson v. Neary,[ 1996] 1 W.L.R.1220, 1224 (Ch.). As such, "[n]ormally [it is] the trustee who has a right of action [and] is theproper person to enforce [the trust]."Hayim v. Citibank NA,[1987] A.C. 730, 733 (P.C.); seealsoAlsop,1W.L.R. at 1224 ("Trustees have a duty to ... represent the trust in a third partydispute."). Plaintiffs seek to circumvent this general principle by invoking the so-called"beneficiaries dispute" theory.Under that theory, "where the dispute is between rival claimantsto a beneficial interest in the subject matter of the trust.... the duty of the trustee is to remainneutral and ... leav[e] it to the rivals to fight their battles."Alsop,1W.L.R. at 1225.

Plaintiffsargue this theory applies here because LBSF persuaded the Bankruptcy Court that it is abeneficiary rather than a third party under the trust.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs mischaracterize the Bankruptcy Court's ruling.The Bankruptcy Court did not describe LBSF as a trust beneficiary. Instead, relying onGregsonv. HAE Trs. Ltd.,[2008] EWHC 1006 (Ch.), the Bankruptcy Court found that the Trustee wasthe appropriate party to bring an action on behalf of the trust beneficiaries, InGregson,a trustbeneficiary brought suit against the director of a corporate trustee for impairment of trustproperty. The beneficiary argued that a corporate trustee's claims against its directors are heldfor the trust's beneficiaries, thereby empowering them to sue directly.Gregson,EWHC 1006 at119,22.TheGreszsoncourt rejected this notion and described the general rule that "a director ofa trustee company does not owe a fiduciary duty to the beneficiary of the trust," and absent thatduty, a trust beneficiary has no direct claim against the director.Gregson,EWHC 1006 atIT44,56, 69.

As the Gregsonanalysis illustrates, the core inquiry is whether the potentially liable third party owed a duty to the trust's beneficiaries. SeeGregson,EWHC 1006 at¶T44,46, 57-58 (stating that if a direct claim against the directors was valid, it would "circumvent theclear and established principle that no direct duty is owed by the directors to the beneficiaries");see alsoRoberts v. Gill & Co,[2010] UKSC 22, ¶¶ 46, 110 (S.C.) (beneficiary sought to amendto bring a derivative claim where it was "accepted that a claim that the [third parties] owed aduty of care to the beneficiaries would be difficult to sustain").While LBSF is a party to thetrust deeds, Plaintiffs do not allege the existence of any fiduciary relationship betweenthemselves and LBSF, Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court properly held that Plaintiffs lackstanding under English law to sue LBSF directly.

b.Derivative Claims Against LBSF

The Bankruptcy Court also concluded that re-pleading derivative claims againstLBSF would be futile because Plaintiffs cannot allege the existence of special circumstances. Inmaking this determination, the Bankruptcy Court considered Plaintiffs' allegations that theTrustee failed to bring suit against LBSF and that an HSBC entity filed a proof of claim in theLehman Bankruptcy.

Under English law, a trust beneficiary may bring a derivative suit against a thirdparty when "special circumstances" are present. The "special circumstances"rule, articulated inHayim v. Citibank NA,provides:

[A] beneficiary has no cause of action against a third party save inspecial circumstanceswhich embrace a failure, excusable orinexcusable, by the trustees to the beneficiary to protect the trustestate or to protect the interests of the beneficiary in the trustestate.Hayim,A.C. 730 at 748. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom recently addressed the "special circumstances" rule and summarized the relevant authorities as follows:
The special circumstances which were identified in the earliestauthorities as justifying a beneficiary's action were fraud on thepart of the trustee, or collusion between the trustee and the thirdparty, or the insolvency of the trustee, but it has always been clearthat these are merely examples of special circumstances, and thatthe underlying question is whether the circumstancesaresufficiently special to make it iust for the beneficiary to have theremedy.Roberts,UKSC 22 at746, 114 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of the United Kingdomnoted that a court has "wide latitude in evaluating ... special circumstances," taking into account"all [of] the relevant circumstances."Roberts,UKSC 22 at ¶¶ 76, 78, 114.

Through the prism of these English law principles, this Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs cannot allege special circumstances. Despite representations in the Minibonds prospectuses that neither Lehman Brothers nor any of itssubsidiaries exercised control over the Issuer, Lehman Brothers designed the Minibonds programand directed the Issuer's activities.As a party to the trust deeds, LSBF was substantiallyinvolved in that process. The Issuer then created a trust that, in certain circumstances, distributesits only collateral to aLehmanentity, rather than the trust'ssolebeneficiary. Juxtaposed againstthe promise that the Minibonds would be secured by highly-rated collateral, this is an odd result.SeeRoyal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v. Tan,[1995] 2 A.C. 378, 386-87 (P.C.) ("If, for his ownpurposes, a third party deliberately interferes in that relationship by assisting the trustee indepriving the beneficiary of the property held for him by the trustee, the beneficiary should beable to look for recompense to the third party as well as the trustee.");see alsoRoberts,UKSC22 at ¶¶ 46, 114 ("[T]he underlying question is whether the circumstances are sufficiently specialto make it just for the beneficiary to have the remedy.");In re Field,[ 1971 ] 1 W.L.R. 555, 561

Case 1:10-cv-00017-WHP
Document 14Filed 08/09/10
Page 13 of 18

(Ch.)(holding that special circumstances existed and "justice require[d] that the plaintiff, who isthe only other person interested [in the property], should be allowed to have [his claim] properlytried before a court"), Furthermore, the recently released Examiner's report reveals cooperationbetween HSBC and Lehman Brothers at the highest levels during Lehman Brothers' collapse.

Given the totality of these circumstances, this Court cannot find that it is "beyond doubt that theplaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] amended claims."Pangburn v.Culbertson,200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999).

On appeal, the parties advance arguments concerning the operation of the trustdeeds' payment priority provisions and potential class certification problems caused by asettlement arranged by Hong Kong regulatory authorities.While interesting, these arguments areextraneous to the issue of standing; they concern the merits of Plaintiffs' claims and are notbefore this Court on appeal. At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs should be permitted toreplead Counts One and Two as derivative claims against LBSF. The Bankruptcy Court's denialof leave to replead is reversed.

III.Claims Against the Trustee: Counts One & Two

Plaintiffs also contend that the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying leave to amendthe Complaint to name HSBC Bank as the Trustee. The Bankruptcy Court held that amendingthe Complaint would be futile for the reasons set forth in its ruling, but did not articulate thosereasons.

As an initial matter, the Bankruptcy Court's analysis of English case law ignoredthe differences between Plaintiffs' relationship with the Trustee and Plaintiffs' relationship with LBSF and the other dismissed entities. Under English law, "the basic right of a beneficiary is tohave the trust duly administered in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument ... andthe general law."Target Holdings Ltd. v. Redferns,[1996] 1 AC 421, 434 (H.L.).When atrustee unlawfully administers the trust, a trust beneficiary may sue the trustee directly. SeeHayim,A.C. at 735 ("The beneficiaries have a right to enforce the trust directly against the ...trustee.");Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co. Ltd.,[1980] 2 W.L.R. 430, 444, 452 (Ch.)(holding a trustee liable to the trust beneficiaries for willful "breach of trust");see alsoTargetHoldings,1AC at 437 ("A trustee who wrongly pays away trust money ... commits a breach oftrust and comes under an immediate duty to remedy such breach.").

The Bankruptcy Court heldthat the trustee is the proper party to bring suit on behalf of a trust beneficiary.While that mayexplain Plaintiffs' lack of standing to sue LBSF directly, it does not resolve the issue of whethera beneficiary has standing to sue his trustee. Indeed, Counts One and Two are premised onalleged breaches of contract and fiduciary duty by the Trustee for failing to distribute the SaphirNotes to Plaintiffs.

The standing provisions of the trust deeds provide that a non-party to the trust hasno right under the Contracts Act of 1999 to enforce any of the deeds' terms.While theBankruptcy Court held that these provisions fit squarely within English law, it merely quoted theprovisions without analyzing their language or the statute on which they rely. Notably, theContracts Act of 1999 allows a non-party to a contract to enforce the contract's terms if they"purport[] to confer a benefit on him," Contracts Act of 1999, c. 31, § 1 (U.K.), but expresslystates that it does not "affect any right or remedy of a third party that exists or is available apartfrom th[e] Act." Contracts Act of 1999, c. 31, § 7. Thus, while the trust deeds deprive Plaintiffs of rights derived from the Contracts Act of 1999, Plaintiffs may hold rights outside of the Act, anissue the Bankruptcy Court did not consider.

Finally, the Bankruptcy Court's rationale for dismissing Counts Four throughThirteen fails to render futile an amended complaint naming the correct trustee. The BankruptcyCourt reasoned that these counts involve questions of foreign law which will have no effect onthe rights of debtors or creditors in the underlying bankruptcy. The applicable rule is that "[a]proceeding is `related to' a [bankruptcy] case ... if the outcome might have a `conceivableeffect' on the estate."In re New 118th LLC,396 B.R. 885, 890 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citingIn re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.,980 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1992)). A conceivable effect is onewhich "could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positivelyor negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of thebankrupt estate."In re New 118th LLC,396 B.R. at 890 (citingIn re Pacor, Inc.,743 F.2d 984,994 (3d Cir. 1984),overruled on other grounds byThings Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,516U.S. 124, 134-35 (1995)). In this case, Plaintiffs seek to prevent the transfer of the SaphirNotes-worth $1.6 billion-to the bankruptcy estate. The effect of $1.6 billion on thebankruptcy estate is self-evident.Moreover, by instructing the Trustee to postpone distributionof the Saphir Notes, LBSF-not Plaintiffs-tethered the Saphir Notes to the LehmanBankruptcy. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave to replead Counts One andTwo against the Trustee is reversed.

IV.Constructive & Resulting Trust Claims: Count Three

In Count Three of the Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to impose a constructive or resulting trust on the Mimbonds collateral.While the Bankruptcy Court made a passingreference to these claims, it provided no analysis in its ruling. Understandably, the BankruptcyJudge was juggling a host of complex and urgent issues. Nonetheless, this Court cannot discernwhy the constructive and resulting trust claims were dismissed. SeeIn re Gucci,309 B.R. 679,685 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("This Court ... has no way of knowing whether and to what extent thedefense or elements thereof were rejected as a matter of law, [and] the reasons for any suchrejection ....").A constructive trust relies on equitable, as opposed to contractual and formaltrust, principles.See, e.g.,Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co„194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Aconstructive trust is an equitable remedy ... [whose] purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment.").Without some analysis of why standing principles derived from the trust deeds' and English lawapply to claims for a constructive or resulting trust, denial of leave to replead Count Threeagainst both the Trustee and LBSF was inappropriate. SeePanaburn,200 F.3d at 70 (denial ofleave to replead is warranted only when it is "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set offacts in support of [the] amended claims").Moreover, it is not evident whether these claims aregoverned by English law, an issue the Bankruptcy Court did not address. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Count Three is vacated and remanded for further consideration.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Counts One andTwo against LBSF is affirmed, and its denial of leave to replead those claims derivatively against LBSF is reversed. The Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave to replead Counts One and Twoagainst the Trustee is reversed. The Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Count Three is vacated.This action is remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with thisMemorandum and Order.

Dated: August 9, 2010
New York, New York

SO ORDERED:

WILLIAM H. PAULEY IIIU.S.D.J.

Counsel of Record:

Jason C. Davis, Esq.
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP100 Pine Street, Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94111

Counsel for Appellants

Howard Grant Sloane, Esq.Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP80 Pine Street
New York, NY 10005

Counsel for the HSBC Appellees

Richard W. Slack, Esq.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10153

Counsel for Appellee Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.

David S. Cohen, Esq.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP
1850 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Counsel for Intervenor Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lehman Brothers HoldingsInc. et al.

2010年8月9日 星期一

Lehman, HSBC May Be Sued by Hong Kong Investors in New York

Aug. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and HSBC Holdings Plc may be sued over $1.6 billion in worthless securities sold to retail investors in Hong Kong, a judge in New York ruled yesterday.

U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley III reversed part of a decision by Lehman’s bankruptcy judge, who threw out a suit by seven holders of structured financial notes called minibonds. The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of investors in the notes from June 16, 2003, to Sept. 15, 2008, Pauley said in his decision.

An estimated $1.8 billion of minibonds were sold to about 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, according to local regulators. Lehman’s bankruptcy in 2008 wiped out the value of the investments, resulting in protests outside bank branches that have continued even after last year’s government-brokered settlement between sellers and buyers of minibonds.

This shows that the courts around the world have investor protection at heart and investors should be protected against mis-selling by those that gain commissions from these types of investment products,” said Lewis Man, a partner at Hong Kong law firm Gall.

Hong Kong doesn’t have a mechanism for filing class action lawsuits.

David Hall, a Hong Kong-based spokesman for HSBC, didn’t immediately have a response to the ruling. Kimberly Macleod, a Lehman spokeswoman, didn’t return a voice-mail message left yesterday seeking comment.

Dismissal Reversed

In two orders, issued in November and December, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that any attempt to revise their complaint would be futile. Pauley yesterday reversed the dismissal of one count against HSBC and Lehman and permitted the plaintiffs to amend two dismissed counts.

Pacific International Finance Ltd. issued the minibonds and marketed them as linked to the credit of financially sound companies and backed by AAA-rated collateral, Pauley said. A Hong Kong regulatory investigation disclosed that Lehman designed the minibonds program, the judge said. HSBC Bank USA was selected as trustee of the collateral securing the notes, Pauley said, citing testimony in the Hong Kong proceeding.

Public outcry over the collapse of the minibonds led to street protests in Hong Kong and an investigation by regulators into how banks sold the products. The head of the city’s securities watchdog, Martin Wheatley, was called repeatedly to testify before Hong Kong’s legislature.

Two BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd. managers in June pleaded not guilty in the city’s District Court to charges of fraudulently selling minibonds. BOC Hong Kong was the biggest seller of the securities. The trial of the two employees starts in November.

Hong Kong banks offered to pay at least 60 cents on the dollar to investors in July last year as part of a buyback agreement brokered by the SFC. In an Aug. 6 press release, Hong Kong’s central bank said more than 13,000 cases were resolved by the repurchase agreement, and 179 Lehman-related complaints remain under investigation.

To contact the reporter on this story: Bob Van Voris in New York atrvanvoris@bloomberg.net; Debra Mao in Hong Kong atdmao5@bloomberg.net

2010年7月21日 星期三

2010年7月17日星債苦主記招新聞稿

(转)2010年7月17日星債苦主記招新聞稿
2010年7月17日新聞會講稿

(關於7月14日) 証監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation 債券達成協議 (下稱協議)

是一份官商勾結, 互相卸責, 嫁禍於人的協議.

是一份不公開, 不公平, 不公正的三不公協議.



Constellation 債券受害苦主 (包括得到和解與得不到和解者)會繼續抗爭, 行動升級, 考慮對協議中某些條款進行司法覆核, 去信立法會. 請求第六次傳召星展作供. 并且追究星展銀行違反香港証監及期貨條例第107條, 欺詐地或罔顧實情地誘使他人投資金錢的罪行. 直至星展公開承認誤導, 退賠100%苦主, 100%本金.


1) 不公開

a) 協議稱: “星展香港在不承認任何責任下提出和解”, 有別於不承認任何錯失. 金管, 証監在調查過程中, 是否發現星展銀行”有錯”? 什麼錯? 必須公開.

b) 協議中, 証監會關注點的第1,2點, 可以理解為, 星展內部對星債評級有爭議, 一個評高, 一個評低. 現在看來, 評低的是錯, 評高的才對. 但錯在哪裡, 對在哪裡? 資料理據必須公開.

2) 不公平

a) 對被評為4級或5級風險類別客戶不公平

協議只說: “產品評為較高風險級別”. 但葉約德在証人陳述書14.10段寫明在2008年3月星展已將星債風險變為第5級高風險.第4級風險的客戶應該也不能買到第5級風險的產品,點解無得賠?

b) 即使被評為4或5級風險客戶,購買時見到產品風險是2而不是4或5, 難道他便不可以買低風險的產品嗎? 好像一個著名的賽車手,有一天他駕着一輛普通私家車時被其他車撞到,可否說他常常揸跑車,所以應該知駕車危險而不作賠償?當然不能,只要那宗交通意外不是他引致便有賠償。

c) 協議中証監會顧及:〝客戶若有較高的風險承受能力, 且具備衍生工具交易的經驗及知識,Constellation 債券可能本應是適合他們的投資產品”, 那麼有較高的風險承受能力, 但沒有衍生工具交易的經驗及知識的客戶便同是不適合購買星債,所以理應一樣獲得全賠。


d) 未見過有政府機構在嚴肅文件中, 採用”可能本應是”這種不定向的, 猜度的字眼, “可能是”, 亦可以”可能不是”, 50/50. 但協議則在這種靠估的前題下, 要執行一些真實的行動.太離譜.

3) 不公正


a) 單就產品風險一項而言, 星展在星債的申購表格, 白紙黑字標明: 產品風險程度2, 賣給客戶. 星展在交立法會迷你債券小經陳述書14.5段解釋原因時, 遺漏了星債掛勾公司”首先失責” (即一間死, 等於八間死晒) 為基準這一要項, 巳經違反証監及期貨條例298條, “披露虛假或具誤導性的資料以誘使進行交易的罪行. 葉約德在立法會答問, 回應債券掛勾多間公司, 說是分散風險, 也是遺漏星債”首先失責”條款. 協議又講 “星展香港另一部門曾將同一產品評為較高風險級別產品”. 是否顯示星展銀行高層自己都未明白產品結構和風險. 何況銷售員工? 不能做到”認識你的產品”, 星展巳屬違規, 如此明顯嚴重罪行, 不予揭露. 遣責, 處罰. 甚至起訴. 反而為星展開脫, 卸責, 并幫星展轉嫁損失, 轉嫁麻煩. 其實是証監知道星展有罪, 自己也難逃監管疏忽之責. 互相幫忙, 共同卸責. 對苦主太不公!


b) 星債產品風險定錯, 是銷售誤導. 理應通賠. 協議卻不賠予被星展香港列為較高風險級別客戶. (即4或5級), 要這些人經星展香港投訴處理程序逐一覆核, 真是豈有此理?! 這種先判你該死再要你自己舉証申訴方法, 不符合香港律法的”無罪推定”精神, 為此將考慮司法覆核.


c) 協議稱: 即使証監會成功對星展香港及/或其主管人員及僱員採取法律處分, 亦不能達到此協議取得結果. 講得冠冕堂皇, 其實是欺人之談. 只要金管, 証監判定星展 “失實陳述”. 根據香港法例284章, 苦主購買星債時所訂立的合約就有權撤銷. 撤銷合約, 苦主當然可以取回100%本金, 并可追討損害賠償. 百分之百苦主受惠.


d) 星展給客戶進行風險評級, 是以推銷產品為目的. 其中種種不良手法, 留待苦主向各位作証.

最後要說的是, 星展, 金管, 証監做出這樣協議, 非常不智.

(1) 時代不同了, 看一看美國政府告高盛, 高盛想和解. 除支付罰款, 還要認錯.

(2) 星展不賠給4或5級風險的客戶, 這些人會放過星展嗎? 星展有明顯的銷售誤導, 難道有人可以隻手遮天? 最後還是要賠. 不如就早點賠!


From: 2010年7月17日星債苦主記招新聞http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/2010E5B9B47E69C8817E697A5E6989FE582B5E88BA6E4B8BBE8A898E68B9BE696B0E8819EE7A8BF9236.php

證監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation債券達成協議

2010年 7月 14日 新聞稿
證監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation債券達成協議
(From: http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/TC/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=10PR80)


證券及期貨事務監察委員會(證監會)及香港金融管理局(金管局)今天公布,就星展銀行(香港)有限公司(星展香港)分銷與雷曼兄弟集團相關的Constellation債券(雷曼相關Constellation債券)的事宜,與星展香港達成協議(註1及2)。

繼證監會早前作出調查後,星展香港在不承認任何責任下,同意提出有關雷曼相關Constellation債券的和解計劃。根據有關和解協議:
星展香港將會向已購買雷曼相關Constellation債券的星展香港客戶,提出總額約6.51億元的付款建議,這些客戶必須是在購買該等債券時,獲星展香港按照其投資風險評估系統評為屬低至中級風險,即第1、2或3級風險類別的客戶(低風險客戶)(註3);
星展香港將會向低風險客戶支付一筆款項(和解款項),金額相等於有關低風險客戶對雷曼相關Constellation債券的投資總額,加上這筆投資總額若在投資當日以定期存款形式存入星展香港,在投資當日直至今天日期為止,星展香港就該筆款項應付予有關客戶的利息,再減去迄今已支付予他們的票息後所得款項(註4);
對於那些已經與星展香港達成和解協議的低風險客戶,星展香港將會向他們提出補發款項的建議,以達至這批客戶得以與其他低風險客戶享有相同待遇;
至於星展香港列入較高風險級別的客戶(即評定為第4或5級風險類別的客戶)所進行的雷曼相關Constellation債券的交易,星展香港將以加強的投訴處理程序逐一覆核有關這些交易的投訴(註5);及
對於星展香港在今天日期前售出的雷曼相關Constellation債券以外的非上市結構性產品,星展香港將會採用加強的投訴處理程序,覆核有關這些產品分銷事宜的客戶投訴。

證監會在調查過程中提出以下關注:
星展香港將雷曼相關Constellation債券售予高風險級別及低風險級別這兩類客戶時,將雷曼相關Constellation債券評為低至中級風險產品(按照星展香港的風險評級制度,這些產品在1至5級的風險評級(低至高風險)中,獲評為2級風險);
星展香港另一部門曾將同一產品評為較高風險級別的產品;

有關發行章程已述明,準投資者可能會損失全部或大部分對該等Constellation債券的投資;及
對於當時在客戶風險評級中,那些應選擇保守、穩健及均衡型投資的低至中級風險類別的客戶,雷曼相關Constellation債券未必適合他們。

這項協議的作用是,約2,160個帳戶的低風險客戶若接納上述和解計劃,便可以取回投資款項及利息並扣減作為債券持有人已收取的票息後的款項,而高風險客戶的投訴亦可獲星展香港根據加強的投訴處理程序,全面覆核有關個案。

證監會根據《證券及期貨條例》第201條達成此項協議,在考慮星展香港將提出的和解計劃時,已顧及到銷售雷曼相關Constellation債券與銷售雷曼兄弟迷你債券兩者之間多項不同之處,因此本個案的和解協議條款與迷你債券個案的不盡相同。證監會在考慮過程中顧及的重要因素包括:
有別於雷曼兄弟迷你債券,雷曼相關Constellation債券並沒有可分發予投資者的抵押品;
根據與16家銀行就迷你債券事宜達成的協議,分銷銀行同意交出從銷售迷你債券所得佣金,以成立追討基金,加快取回相關抵押品,但在本個案中,星展香港無需提供有關款項;及
有別於那些接納迷你債券協議所提出的回購建議的客戶,雷曼相關Constellation債券的持有人並無機會獲額外或補發款項或發還債款,換言之,星展香港的付款將會是低風險客戶唯一可獲付的款項。

證監會在考慮此協議的條款時,亦顧及到以下幾點:
客戶若有較高的風險承受能力,且具備衍生工具交易的經驗及知識,Constellation債券可能本應是適合他們投資的產品;
加強的投訴處理程序會處理涉及第4至5級風險類別客戶的每宗個案;對於獲星展香港投資風險評估系統評為風險承受能力較高的客戶,上述投訴處理程序應足以處理星展香港將雷曼相關Constellation債券分銷予這批客戶的過程中,可能出現的其他不規範情況;
星展香港承諾委聘獨立機構,檢討分銷制度及監控措施,確保星展香港日後以適當方式分銷非上市結構性產品;
此協議使本個案得到適當的解決,對星展香港及其客戶均有利;
即使證監會成功對星展香港及/或其主管人員及僱員採取紀律處分,亦不能達到此協議取得的結果;及
此協議取得的結果,可為雷曼相關Constellation債券的其他分銷商提供指引,從而解決已購買這些產品的客戶的投訴。

證監會及金管局認為,就它們向星展香港在監管方面提出的關注,星展香港提出的和解計劃屬合理及適當;協議亦符合公眾利益。

鑑於星展香港提出上述和解計劃,證監會將不會就雷曼相關Constellation債券的分銷事宜,對星展香港及其僱員採取進一步執法行動,但有關方面涉嫌犯有不誠實、欺詐、欺騙或屬刑事性質行為的情況除外。金管局已知會星展香港,對於那些接納星展香港和解建議的低風險客戶,金管局不打算就該等客戶的雷曼相關Constellation債券個案,對星展香港採取執法行動。

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮先生(Mr Martin Wheatley)表示:"對於從星展香港購入雷曼相關Constellation債券的全部客戶而言,是次協議為他們取得成果;對於銷售這項產品的其他銀行及中介人,這項協議提供有用的指引,有助其解決較低風險客戶的相關投訴。"

他續說:"中介人向客戶提供投資意見時,必須運用適當的專業知識和技能。證監會就雷曼相關的結構性產品個案進行的調查,清楚顯示證監會《操守準則》所訂的各項準則,是中介人行事的重要依據。認識產品、了解客戶的情況並向客戶提供清晰正確的資料,都是中介人必須履行的職責。這不但可以確保客戶的利益永遠居於首位,亦同時能夠保障銷售產品的中介人。"

韋奕禮先生指出:"證監會一直竭力減低香港市場出現不當銷售的風險。今次這類和解計劃,使大家更清楚認識到,若我們將來未能妥善處理有關事宜,所有市場參與者將要為此付出高昂的代價。"

金管局副總裁阮國恒先生表示:"金管局歡迎這項和解計劃。金管局相信,這項和解計劃既合適且合理,在考慮到各種情況下提供一個務實的解決方法,符合投資者的利益。"



備註:

1. 星展香港是根據《證券及期貨條例》獲發牌從事第1類(證券交易)、第4類(就證券提供意見)、第6類(就機構融資提供意見)及第9類(提供資產管理)受規管活動的註冊機構。

2. Constellation債券的發行商為Constellation Investment Ltd,安排人則為星展香港的有聯繫實體DBS Bank Ltd(星展銀行有限公司)。2004年至2007年間,星展香港向香港公眾分銷了以港元或美元計值的約77個系列的Constellation債券。

Constellation債券中,系列34至37、43至46、55至58、59至62、63至66、67至70、71至74及78至81債券屬信貸掛鉤票據,雷曼兄弟是上述系列的其中一家信貸參考機構(或稱"相關機構")。星展香港向約3,400個客戶帳戶分銷雷曼相關Constellation債券,當中涉及約4,380宗交易,款額約13.16億元。

雷曼兄弟於2008年9月申請破產保護後,星展銀行有限公司宣布,受雷曼兄弟的信貸事件所影響,雷曼相關Constellation債券變得一文不值。

Constellation債券的其中一項主要特點是,投資者買入有關債券後,實際上要承擔的風險是,包括雷曼兄弟在內的信貸參考機構中,任何一家可能會出現破產等信貸事件。因應投資者承擔了這項風險,星展銀行有限公司在Constellation債券的投資期內,向投資者支付一項承擔風險款額。若債券到期時,信貸參考機構中並無信貸事件發生,投資者便可取回投資本金。然而,若發生信貸事件,投資者便可取回所謂"信貸事件贖回款額",金額相等於雷曼兄弟的參考債項(或稱"相關債項")的價值,但這些參考債項在雷曼兄弟申請破產後的買賣價已跌至接近零。雷曼兄弟在美國申請破產保護後,便出現上述的情況。

3. 星展香港分銷雷曼相關Constellation債券時,根據在星展香港投資風險評估問卷上所填寫的資料,將客戶列入五大級別,第1級為保守型,第2級為穩健型,第3級為均衡型,第4級為增長型,第5級為進取型。

另一方面,星展香港亦為其分銷的各項投資產品定下風險評級。產品風險評級分為五個級別,第1級為低風險,第2級為低至中風險,第3級為中風險,第4級為中至高風險,第5級為高風險。

若投資產品的風險評級低於或相等於有關客戶的投資風險評級,星展香港便會認為該產品適合該客戶投資。

4. 星展香港會以每名投資雷曼相關Constellation債券的低風險客戶的名義投資總值為基準,採用星展香港就不同到期日的定期存款所支付的最高利率,即向12個月定期存款戶所支付的利率,計算出由有關雷曼相關Constellation債券的發行日開始,直至今天日期這段期間的利息。根據星展香港計算,已付予每名低風險客戶的票息,與就有關投資的上述名義價值應支付的利息之間的差額,約為1,300萬元。

5. 加強的投訴處理程序由證監會制訂,旨在確保星展香港深入覆核高風險客戶的相關交易,確保星展香港以公平合理方式處理有關這些交易的投訴。有關程序與分銷銀行根據迷你債券協議所執行的投訴處理程序相同。

6. 請按此連結閱覽有關星展香港的建議和解計劃的問題解答。

2010年6月27日 星期日

腰斬迷債回購方案的司法覆核申請理何在?

<转载>
腰斬迷債回購方案的司法覆核申請理何在?

迷債回購方案的司法覆核不被批准進行決非是香港司法史上的小漣漪,而是對司法獨立的衝擊。
讓我們看看迷債回購方案的司法覆核是如何被腰斬的。

首先,迷債苦主代表的法律援助不被批准,理由竟然是該代表包括迷債購入成本在內的資產稍微超過援助標準的上限(17萬元)。 其實,迷債的價值就是算到了今天仍然無法從法律上確實,世界公認的會計審慎原則都只能將其列為損失。法律援助署的官員自己也承認此不批准理由會有很大的爭議,但這那是甚麼法律觀點的爭議,將無法確定的將來資產也列為現有資產,這猶如依據你持有明天開彩的彩券而確定你今天就是百萬富翁一樣,完全是荒唐的政治決定。

第二,綜合各媒體的報導,在申請司法覆核許可的的聆訊上,“法官指此案牽連甚廣,除了十六家分銷銀行外,更有二萬四千八百八十八名已接受回購方案的雷曼事主可能受影響,因為一旦申請人獲判勝訴,證監會的調查要繼續,另一答辯人香港金融管理局也可向銀行採取執法行動,已取回六成或七成本金的事主可能因而被銀行要求退款,法官質疑申請人是否足以代表其他事主,而其他事主也可能不想再受噩夢糾纏”。

眾所周知,司法覆核是就政府的公共事務的政策、決策所進行,必然是牽連甚廣, 甚至牽連到司法體制所涵蓋的全社會。進行司法覆核是對政治尋求法律層面的裁決,而不是政治裁決。其實香港早前已有非常著明的與整個香港社會牽連甚廣案例,就是港人內地出生子女居港權的官司。終審法院並沒有就官司結果是否會對香港社會的經濟帶來嚴重影響的角度去裁決,而是從本身對基本法的理解去作出裁決,雖然事件最後由政府提請人大釋法而推翻原終審法院的裁決而結束,但終審法院的原裁決正是體現了當時參與的法官對司法獨立的堅守。如果法官也考慮社會政治因素,那麼所謂司法獨立就無存在的必要,社會的爭議就交由政治家來解決好了,要麼是通過議會決議,要麼是用革命手段推翻政府,但這決非社會之福,司法與政治應是凱撒的歸凱撒,上帝的歸上帝。

法官憂慮,“一旦申請人獲判勝訴,證監會的調查要繼續,另一答辯人香港金融管理局也可向銀行採取執法行動”。但是次司法覆核正是要求推翻證監會與金管局停止調查的政治決定,尋求社會公義。停止調查無非是放棄對銀行違規違法行為的追究,這難道是公正正義社會的應有之義嗎?

法官質疑其他事主也可能不想再受噩夢糾纏,當然是懷有高尚的、悲憫的人文情懷,但法官也應該關懷那些受騙而又被迫接受六至七成回購方案的苦主的噩夢糾纏。其實公認的法律之神是蒙上了雙眼,只從法律中尋找答案,而不是貢獻滔滔的憐憫淚水。以個人感情代替法律判斷,也不是司法的應有之義。

法官也質疑申請人是否足以代表其他事主,當然是合理的懷疑,但法官也沒有展開正式的聆訊,他又是如何推斷其他事主“噩夢糾纏”之說?沒有足夠充分的證據,司法程序是允許主觀臆測斷案嗎?

迷債的回購方案是由兩方面的內容組成,一是證監與金管局為監管一方,16家銀行為另一方的協議,協議的主要內容是16家銀行願意以六至七稱成本金回購迷債,監管方停止對16家銀行的迷債銷售調查;二是16家銀行向迷債持有者回購迷債的商業協議。如果司法覆核正如法官所言,最後由苦主方取勝,那麼法官的頒令也只能影響到證監與金管局的政治決策,而要取消銀行與迷債持有者的回購迷債協議,應須按協議雙方的自願行事,如苦主一方不願的話,我們認為也只能通過司法的程序。實在不明白法官“已取回六成或七成本金的事主可能因而被銀行要求退款”而使苦主“噩夢糾纏”之言,難道銀行會要脅或強搶?還是銀行要與二萬多苦主逐個進行司法訴訟?監管當局與銀行只要付出願意承擔過失的誠意,以新鴻基及凱基證券與證監的和解協議為藍本,重新提出公平的回購方案,那麼,二萬多苦主、政府、銀行本身、以至香港社會才不會再噩夢糾纏。

迷債回購方案的司法覆核在一波三折下還未開始就被腰斬,法官在拒絕批出司法覆核許可的判詞中大致重覆了他在聆訊上所表述的上述觀點,這只能讓人相信,法官在許可聆訊之前就已有定案, 並且充分表露在他的聆訊發言中。法官並且認為苦主如仍不滿可再向監管機構投訴,法官大人確真是上帝派來的天使,充滿了爛漫的天真,只聽監管當局一面的美言,但卻不花一點時間了解一下監管當局因忌諱本身的監管過失,而在一年多來的所謂調查是如何袒護銀行、塞責敷衍。

法律援助署不批准我們的援助申請,使我們無財力上訴,法官的判詞也沒有使我們相信判決是合理的,而我們只能深信,迷債回購方案的司法覆核被腰斬是香港近年來大資本大財閥獨大的政治體制的結果,中低下階層的反抗雖愈趨激烈,但大多敗下陣來。是忍氣吞聲,還是愈挫愈戰,這是普羅大眾正面臨的選擇,也是雷曼苦主面臨的選擇。

2010年6月10日 星期四

Goldman Sachs Hudson CDO Said to Be Target of Second SEC Probe , 高盛面臨美證監第二項調查

June 10 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc.’s $2 billion Hudson Mezzanine collateralized debt obligation, sold in 2006, is the target of a probe by the Securities and Exchange Commission, according to a person with knowledge of the matter.

The inquiry into the CDO may not lead to any additional actions against the New York-based securities firm, said the person, who declined to be identified because the investigation isn’t public. Michael DuVally, a spokesman for Goldman Sachs, declined to comment, as did SEC spokesman John Nester. The Financial Times reported the probe yesterday.

The U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, led by Levin, released e-mails in April related to Goldman Sachs’s mortgage-linked deals, including the Hudson Mezzanine transaction. In one October 2006 e-mail, a Goldman Sachs employee describes how the Hudson deal might be viewed by investors as “junk.”

Hudson Mezzanine

The Hudson Mezzanine 2006-1 CDO contained credit default swaps that referenced $2 billion in subprime, BBB-rated residential mortgage-backed securities, according to the documents released by Levin’s committee. While Goldman Sachs selected the assets in the deal, the firm was also the only investor buying credit protection on the entire transaction , the documents show.

Goldman Sachs created and sold the Hudson CDO in late 2006, near the time documents released by Levin show senior executives wanted to reduce the firm’s exposure to subprime mortgages.

“The CDO imploded within two years. Your clients lost; Goldman profited,” Levin said in an April 27 hearing during which he questioned Goldman Sachs Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein about the Hudson deal and other CDOs. “To go out and sell these securities to people and then bet against those same securities, it seems to me, is a fundamental conflict of interest and is -- raises a real ethical issue.”

(From Bloomberg: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aSNYXMe69Kh8&pos=3)

信報 2010年6月11日: 高盛面臨美證監第二項調查

面臨多項調查的高盛據報正面對美國證監第二項調查,調查目標是該行二○○六年出售的二十億美元「赫德森夾層」債務抵押債券(Hudson Mezzanine CDO)。

涉「赫德森夾層」CDO

彭博社昨天引述知情人士報道,美國證券及交易委員會(SEC)進行相關調查工作後,未必會向高盛採取進一步行動。

《金融時報》引述知情人士報道,SEC最近數周正收集「赫德森夾層」CDO交易的資料。

報道引述內部文件指出,高盛出售這些金融產品之際,亦同時沽空「赫德森夾層」CDO,以保障這批CDO的全部價值。

法律專家預期,「赫德森夾層」CDO交易的調查將集中查明,高盛是否向投資者透露足夠的資料。高盛在推廣文件中表明,其利益與投資者利益相同,因為高盛購入這些CDO。

這項調查是SEC針對華爾街有關CDO活動的更廣泛調查的一部分。《華爾街日報》昨天報道,SEC同時調查摩根士丹利等主要大行的多宗按揭相關交易。

根據參議員萊文(Carl Levin)領導的參議院常設調查小組委員會的文件,高盛這批二○○六年一級「赫德森夾層」CDO包含一批信貸違約掉期(CDS),這些CDS涉及合共二十億美元的BBB級次按抵押證券。

SEC四月十六日提出起訴高盛在二○○七年出售名為Abacus的CDO時涉嫌欺詐後,高盛股價已下跌百分之二十六。

遭澳洲對沖基金索償

在該訴訟中,SEC表示,高盛及其一名職員沒有向投資者透露,對沖基金Paulson & Co.在設計該CDO及對賭那些CDO的角色。

另外,澳洲對沖基金Basis Capital周三入稟紐約曼哈頓聯邦法院,向高盛索償十億美元,指該公司購入高盛的次按證券後,被迫清盤。

Basis Capital的代表律師表示,高盛以明知錯誤的賣點推銷,強迫投資者把有毒證券的風險從賬目中撇除,是欺詐行為■

2010年6月2日 星期三

Moody's 'Gave Up Its Analytical Distinctiveness,' Ex-Employee Says

Moody's 'Gave Up Its Analytical Distinctiveness,' Ex-Employee Says

BUSINESSJUNE 2, 2010, 9:33 A.M. ET

By AARON LUCCHETTI

A former Moody's Corp. lawyer who worked in the ratings firm's structured-finance group for a decade planned to tell a congressional panel that the company "gave up its analytical distinctiveness," partly by intimidating analysts who were too tough or angered influential investment bankers .

In written testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Mark Froeba accused Moody's managers of having "deliberately engineered a change to its culture intended to ensure that rating analysis never jeopardized market share and revenue."

Mr. Froeba is one of three former Moody's employees set to testify Wednesday at a hearing by the bipartisan commission into the credibility of credit ratings, the investment decisions based on those ratings and their role in the financial crisis.

The New York hearing also will include billionaire Warren Buffett, whose Berkshire Hathaway Inc. has long owned a stake in Moody's. Mr. Buffett, who provided no prepared testimony before the hearing, was subpoenaed by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission after declining an invitation to appear voluntarily.

The 10-member panel, led by former California Treasurer Phil Angelides, is required to submit a report on its findings by Dec. 15. Four previous hearings have zeroed in on investment banks, subprime mortgages and regulatory oversight of Wall Street, financial firms and government-sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Wednesday's hearing is set to begin at 8:30 a.m. ET. Mr. Buffett is expected to testify at about 11:30 a.m. with Moody's Chief Executive Raymond McDaniel, who has led the ratings firm since 2005.

Mr. McDaniel, in his written testimony, told the panel how the firm has improved its internal procedures. He also emphasized the limitations of credit ratings, which focus on the risk of default on debt payments.

Still, the CEO is likely to face tough questions about why the Moody's Investors Service unit of Moody's and its two biggest rivals, the Standard & Poor's unit of McGraw-Hill Cos. and Fimalac SA's Fitch Ratings, gave Triple-A marks to thousands of mortgage-related securities that later plummeted in value and suffered sharp downgrades. The three companies generated combined revenues of $3.6 billion on bond ratings last year.


Last month, Moody's disclosed it had received notice from the Securities and Exchange Commission that the ratings firm may face an enforcement action for allegedly misleading regulators in a 2007 license application. Moody's has said it fixed issues related to the SEC's concerns and has described the problem as isolated.

In his written testimony, Mr. Froeba cited as an example of undue efforts by Moody's to preserve the firm's market share a rating of European collateralized debt obligations that was one or two notches higher than justified. Mr. Froeba is particularly critical of former Moody's President Brian Clarkson, who carried out orders from Mr. McDaniel and the company's board to make the firm more friendly and responsive to bond issuers, according to the written testimony.

Under Mr. Clarkson, analysts were forced to explain even tiny slips in market share on deals, the former Moody's lawyer told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in his written testimony. Such pressure was a repudiation of the independence long cherished by the firm, Mr. Froeba wrote in his prepared remarks for the panel.

"I reject any suggestion … that Moody's sacrificed ratings quality in an effort to grow market share," Mr. Clarkson said in his prepared remarks submitted to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Mr. Clarkson left Moody's in 2008 and is set to make his first public comments about the financial crisis when he testifies Wednesday afternoon.

In his prepared remarks, Mr. Clarkson told the congressional panel that he was "disappointed" in the performance of Moody's ratings. But the firm's assumptions and methodologies "were overwhelmed by the magnitude and velocity of the unprecedented economic deterioration."

Mr. Clarkson said rating firms and investors need better disclosure from issuers about structured-finance bonds, suggesting that regulators look into stronger rules for mortgage brokers and underwriters.

Ratings firms face the likelihood of toughened oversight under financial-overhaul legislation being debated this month by a conference committee of the House and Senate. The proposals include measures to make rating firms more transparent and effective, while removing some of their market clout and stripping bankers of the ability to shop around for the firm that will give the highest rating.

At Wednesday's hearing, former Moody's rating executive Gary Witt is expected to describe how he removed a legal analyst from collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, created byGoldman Sachs Group Inc. after the securities firm asked that the analyst "not be assigned to further Goldman Sachs CDOs for the next year," according to Mr. Witt's written testimony.

Mr. Witt told the panel that he worried Goldman would complain to his superiors if he failed to do what the firm wanted, potentially costing the analyst his job. After discussing the matter with the Moody's analyst, "we both agreed that the best course of action was to comply with Goldman's request," according to Mr. Witt's testimony.

—Erik Holm in New York contributed to this article.
Write to Aaron Lucchetti at aaron.lucchetti@wsj.com

Related stories:

S & P: "We’d Do a Deal Structured by Cows" And Other Rating Agency Dirty Linen

Employees at Moody’s Investors Service told executives that issuing dubious creditworthy ratings to mortgage-backed securities made it appear they were incompetent or “sold our soul to the devil for revenue,” according to e-mails obtained by U.S. House investigators.

“The story of the credit rating agencies is a story of colossal failure,” Committee Chairman Henry Waxman, a California Democrat, said at the hearing. “The result is that our entire financial system is now at risk.”…

Former executives from S&P and Moody’s told lawmakers today that credit raters relied on outdated models in a “race to the bottom” to maximize profits.

2010年5月13日 星期四

Bank probes expanding with new investigation

2010-05-13



Bank probes expanding with new investigation



(Reuters) - U.S. authorities are expanding their probes of past mortgage securities deals, with New York's attorney general opening an investigation into whether eight banks misled rating agencies, a source familiar with the matter said.


New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo's office on Wednesday served subpoenas on four U.S. banks and four European lenders, the source said.

Cuomo is targeting Citigroup, Credit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs Group Inc, Morgan Stanley, UBS and Merrill Lynch, now owned by Bank of America, the source said.

The investigation comes as Wall Street and major banks around the world are attracting scrutiny from regulators stemming from transactions that occurred in the run-up to the subprime mortgage meltdown and financial crisis.

The Wall Street Journal on Wednesday reported that U.S. federal prosecutors, working with securities regulators, were conducting a preliminary criminal probe into whether four banks misled investors about their roles in mortgage bond deals.

The banks under early-stage criminal scrutiny are JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and UBS, the newspaper reported on its website, citing a person familiar with the matter.

The banks have also received civil subpoenas from the U.S. Securities and Exchanges Commission as part of a sweeping investigation of banks' selling and trading of mortgage-related deals, the report said.

A spokesman for JPMorgan told the Journal the bank had not been contacted by federal prosecutors and was not aware of any criminal investigation. The other banks either declined comment or were not immediately available.

美檢察機關對華爾街數家投行展開刑事調查

《紐約 時報》引述消息人士稱,紐約司法部門正調查8間銀行,是否向評級機構,提供誤導資料,提升次按產品評級。

消息人士稱,紐約檢察總長安德魯已向8間華爾街大行,發出傳票,進行調查,涉及銀行包括高盛、摩根士丹利 、花旗、瑞信、德銀、美林 、瑞銀及東方匯理等。

美國 證券交易委員會已民事起訴高盛,涉嫌隱瞞資料,誤導客戶。而紐約今次的調查則擴大至8間銀行,不單只涉及銀行與客戶的交易,而是涉及銀行與評級機構的關係。

當局將集中調查銀行在樓市大跌前,如何向評級機構提供資料,影響他們的按揭產品評級。市場一直批評評級機構,未能正確評價有關次按產品,令投資者受損。 涉及的標級機構包括標普、穆迪及惠譽國際。

'Out of thin air': Synthetic CDOs, inflated the credit bubble

From Marketwatch:
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/out-of-thin-air-synthetic-cdos-pumped-bubble-2010-04-26,

SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWatch) -- The securities at the crux of the Securities and Exchange Commission's case against Goldman Sachs Group Inc. inflated the credit bubble, leaving even more losses when it popped, structured-finance experts and investors said in the wake of the recent civil-fraud charge against the investment bank.

"Derivatives and synthetic securities have been used to create imaginary value out of thin air," George Soros, chairman of $27 billion hedge-fund firm Soros Fund Management, wrote in a column posted on his Web site last week.

"More triple-A CDOs were created than there were underlying triple-A assets. This was done on a large scale in spite of the fact that all of the parties involved were sophisticated investors," he added. "The process went on for years, and culminated in a crash that caused wealth destruction amounting to trillions of dollars. It cannot be allowed to continue."

"Synthetic CDOs should be abolished," Janet Tavakoli, a structured-finance specialist who wrote a book about CDOs in 2003, said in a recent interview. "They're too complex and provide no real benefit. They only existed to game the system or hide losses."

The SEC alleged that Goldman Sachs (GS 147.20, +5.23, +3.68%) didn't tell investors in a synthetic CDO called Abacus 2007-AC1 that hedge-fund firm Paulson & Co. helped structure the deal, and also was betting against it. Goldman and Paulson have denied wrongdoing.

Because they weren't based on real assets, such investments were tricky to value. When the housing market collapsed, the existence of such hard-to-value securities in the financial system caused havoc as counterparties struggled to find out who had lost money.

Fabrice Tourre, the Goldman banker named in the SEC's case, described such problems in a January 2007 email, just as the subprime-mortgage meltdown was gaining steam.

"I'm trading a product which a month ago was worth $100 and which today is worth $93 and which on average is losing 25 cents a day," Tourre wrote, according to recent Goldman disclosures.

"When I think that I had some input into the creation of this product (which by the way is a product of pure intellectual masturbation, the type of thing which you invent telling yourself: 'Well, what if we created a 'thing', which has no purpose, which is absolutely conceptual and highly theoretical and which nobody knows how to price?') it sickens the heart to see it shot down in mid-flight," Tourre added in the email.

Packaging

Synthetic CDOs sat at the end of a long chain of boom-time transactions that began with the origination of mortgages and other loans. These assets were packaged up by investment banks and sold as asset-based securities, including residential mortgage-backed securities, or RMBS.

CDOs were created by taking pieces of RMBS and other securities, packaging them up again and reselling them.

Demand for such investments was so strong during the credit boom that there weren't enough underlying assets to build new ones. So Wall Street came up with a way of creating CDOs that didn't need actual assets.

The result was synthetic CDOs. These are formed by writing credit-default swaps on bits of RMBS and other asset-backed securities. (These swaps pay out in the event of default.) Once enough of these derivatives contracts were written, investment banks bundled them up into new CDOs and sold them.

More than $110 billion worth of synthetic CDOs were sold in 2006 and 2007, according to Thomson Reuters data.

Raynes, who used to work at Moody's Investors Service (MCO 22.29, +0.53, +2.44%) and co-authored a book on structured finance, said the rating agency put AAA ratings on many parts of CDOs, giving investors the confidence they needed to buy the products.

"You needed a third party to analyze the structures," he added. "That's what provided the value for these deals."

2010年5月2日 星期日

(信報轉載) 高院否決雷曼苦主司法覆核

高院否決雷曼苦主司法覆核 - 2010年5月1日

高等法院昨天拒絕接納之前有雷曼苦主提出的司法覆核申請,證監會對此表示欣慰,而雷曼苦主大聯盟則未決定下一步行動。

證監感欣慰

證監會發言人回應本報查詢時表示,對昨天高院的判決感到欣慰,但目前沒有進一步評論。

雷曼苦主大聯盟召集人陳光譽表示,暫定於下周二與其他雷曼苦主會面,討論下一步的行動,惟現在沒有任何決定。

證監會和金管局去年七月就雷曼迷債事件公布回購方案,以賠償最小百分之六十本金予苦主,換取終止調查迷債事件;同時,金管局不會再向銀行採取任何行動。其中一名拒絕接受回購方案的苦主石麗珊指出,證監會拒絕承擔責任,於三月二十二日要求高等法院批准其司法覆核申請。

至於立法會的雷曼研訊,昨天完成傳召首家銀行的工作。星展銀行(香港)行政總裁葉約德昨天回應議員提問時,否認銷售手法有欺詐成分,強調銷售產品時有經過產品介紹及風險說明。

有議員希望了解金管局去年十一月採取紀律處分星展前僱員的個案,但葉約德表示,該行處理的相關投訴超過二千七百宗,令她忘記個別個案的情況。

立會下周傳召洪丕正

星展香港的三次公開研訊已經結束,立法會研究雷曼兄弟相關迷你債券及結構性金融產品所引起的事宜小組委員會主席何鍾泰說,稍後將傳召葉約德出席閉門研訊,了解該行未能提交部分資料的原因。

下周五的研究將傳召第二家銀行,渣打集團(香港)行政總裁洪丕正和另一名銀行代表將出席。

根據金管局的公布,截至四月三十日,二萬一千六百零二宗雷曼兄弟相關投訴個案中,二千七百八十三宗個案完成詳細調查並正進行紀律程序,另外有一百九十八宗個案仍在調查中■

2010年4月18日 星期日

Goldman Abacus, DBS Constellation Notes & Lehman Minibond, 高盛ABACUS, 雷曼迷債/ 星展星債

From the news:

“The product was new and complex but the deception and conflicts are old and simple,”
SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami said in the statement.

The SEC alleged that Goldman did not tell investors "vital information" about the CDO , called ABACUS. This included that a major hedge fund, Paulson & Co, was involved in choosing which securities would be part of the portfolio, and had taken a short position against the CDO in a bet its value would fall.

美國證監指控,高盛未向投資者披露大型對沖基金保爾森公司對該產品沽空的「關鍵信息」。

高盛自辯:
[ it provided “extensive disclosure” to IKB and ACA about the risk of the underlying mortgage securities. ]


高盛的客戶是機構投資者,是真正的經驗投資者了!高盛給這些大客戶們提供了跟 CDO 相關的詳細披露。唯一沒有給這些機構投資者提供的信息是產品的對家以及銷售該產品的真正原由。

類似的 合成CDO 產品 賣給 機構投資者的時候, DBS / 雷曼 的做法也是跟高盛一樣,給機構投資者們提供跟 CDO 相關的詳細披露 “extensive disclosure” 的。可是,當DBS / 雷曼 把 合成CDO 產品 打包成 面向零售銀行客戶們的信贷挂钩产品的時候,DBS / 雷曼 給客戶們提供了些甚麼披露呢?

DBS Constellation / 雷曼迷債 的投資者都是零售銀行的客戶。關於 Constellation Notes / 迷債 underlying securities “合成CDO”得到些甚麼披露呢? 是否需要得到 (如其它機構投資者們一樣)同等程度的 “extensive disclosure” ?

DBS Constellation Notes 章程 / 雷曼迷債章程 對於其 underlying securities 可是甚麼具體披露都沒有啊!

雷曼迷債章程提到 迷債抵押品為 3A 評級,提到了“合成CDO”這個名詞而毫无任何解释,尽管迷债章程有关于债券的解释。看来雷曼迷债章程制作人认为迷债章程读者有必要了解何为债券,却无必要了解新产品“合成CDO”的特征。對於迷債 underlying securities (所謂的迷債抵押品 “合成CDO”) 可是甚麼解释和具体披露都沒有啊!更不要提“extensive disclosure” 了!此处暫且不論跟迷債的“合成CDO”的起因(終極買賣對手)有關的信息。暫且不論披露 Underlying Securities 的起因(終極對手) 有關的信息.

DBS Constellation Notes 章程 提到 抵押品為 3A 評級,卻根本不提這抵押品究竟為何類產品,連“合成CDO”都欠奉。以 3A 評級 來帶過這抵押品實為另一層信貸掛鈎產品的實質。3A 評級 是 DBS Constellation Notes 投資者們 得到的 關於 抵押品 的 披露。

“3A 評級 ” 是 跟 “合成CDO”相關的唯一「關鍵信息」嗎? “3A 評級 ” 是 客戶們 應該得到的 關於星展星債 的 唯一「關鍵信息」嗎? 為甚麼 Constellation Notes 投資者們沒有(如其它非機構投資者們一樣)得到通常應該得到的關於“合成CDO”的「關鍵信息」??

DBS 可是 Constellation Notes 的 策劃/設計者,安排者和 銷售銀行。還有誰可以比DBS更清楚Constellation Notes 的 underlying securities 的 本質和相關風險了呢?

「為何風險最高的貸款產品會賣給最不在行的借款人?答案就在問題中──最不在行的借款人是最容易被哄騙買入這些產品的。」
("金融改革的終局" - Paul Krugman)

衍生工具複雜且深藏危險,迷債 / 星債 之設計者和銀行分銷商都是金融界的專業人員,更是深明此理。
如果發行產品的投行和銷售商們給客戶們介紹了產品的真實面目,這樣買入者就不會有悔。当然,众多的客户们很可能在可以理解产品的真实特征和风险之前,就已经决定不买这么复杂,听不懂的产品了。

迷債.星債的問題在於用漂亮的騙局幌子來跟銀行的客戶們介紹和銷售迷債,投行和銀行分銷商根本不想讓客戶瞭解迷債的真實特徵和風險,如果可以大講跟7個公司信貸掛鈎,為甚麼卻不可以明確提醒客戶:”迷債還要跟100多個各種評級的公司信貸掛鈎“???

看看在雷曼事件上,香港證監會和金管局是如何做的?
香港證監會和金管局只是竭盡其所能,替行騙者們開罪。

DBS Constellation Notes 可不是只發行了一個系列的產品,Constellation Notes 是以類似的結構,從2003至2007年間發行了的諸多個系列的產品!Constellation Notes 章程對於其underlying securities 一貫是甚麼具體披露都沒有!是太複雜而無法披露,還是太嚇人而不想披露给投资者知道?

星展 自稱有指引,認為對職員的培訓和銷售上無系統失誤。請 星展:
- 把它給銀行職員的相關產品的培訓指引(產品的主要風險特徵等)公佈於眾,
- 把它給銀行職員的相關產品的銷售指引公佈於眾,


對於迷債這麼個複雜的產品,香港證監會不但不敢指出迷債章程的誤導欺騙性,證監會調查報告第一強調的就是迷債章程寫了“本產品不保本”!! 完全不敢指出章程裡完全沒有披露的迷債的合成CDO 的相關信息!完全不敢指出迷債的合成CDO是關乎迷債風險和價值的「關鍵信息」。 證監會卻為迷債章程辯護:指出迷債合成 CDO有了3A 評級的信息就足以。

迷債可不是只發行了一個系列的產品,迷債是以類似的結構,從2003至2008年間發行了的36個系列的產品!迷債章程對於其underlying securities (所謂的迷債抵押品 “合成CDO”) 是甚麼disclosure都沒有!


相关文章:

雷曼夢魘將醒乎? 雷曼事件之真相研究報告-1
解構迷你債券結構 -比較三種結構式產品的披露水平: 雷曼事件之真相研究報告-4 , & 雷曼事件之真相研究報告-5
披露為本: 雷曼事件之真相研究報告-6

雷曼骗局之根源 Root Cause of Lehman Minibond Fraud;監管機構 身兼金融騙局共謀者


Related readings:
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (1);
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (3);
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (5): II. Dissecting the ‘Piggybacked Structure’;
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (8);
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (9);
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (10);
Report on the Lehman-related Securities (11): III. Disclosure-based Regulation;

Bloomberg: Abacus Let Goldman Shuffle Mortgage Risk Like Beads

April 17 (Bloomberg)

-- From July 2004 through April 2007, as credit markets boomed, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. created 23 financial transactions called Abacus, the word for a relatively crude counting tool involving the shuffling of beads.

Yesterday, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued the bank for securities fraud in what would be the penultimate offering in the series, according to Bloomberg data.

The bank used the deals to off-load the risk of mostly subprime home loans and commercial mortgages to investors, either as hedges for similar positions or to bet against securities itself. While the data show New York-based Goldman Sachs issued at least $7.8 billion of Abacus notes, the risk passed to investors was multiples higher.

The Abacus transactions are so-called synthetic collateralized debt obligations, which marry two financial innovations that contributed to the worst collapse in financial markets since the Great Depression.

“Investors needed to ask some questions about synthetics they didn’t need to ask with other CDOs,” Joseph Mason, a finance professor at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, said in a telephone interview.

The financial tools, often called technologies, are credit- default swaps, used to transfer the risk of losses on debt, and securitization, used to slice the risk in a pool of assets into various new securities.

Abacus deals were filled with default swaps that offered payouts to Goldman Sachs if certain mortgage bonds didn’t pay as promised, in return for regular premiums from the bank.

Upfront Cash
Some of the cash needed for the potential payouts to Goldman Sachs would be raised upfront, and essentially placed in escrow, from sales of Abacus CDO notes with varying ratings. The grades were tied to how many of the underlying securities needed to default before the CDO classes would.

Such securitization enabled debt with the lowest investment-grade ratings to be transformed, in part, into AAA securities that turned out to not be as safe as that ranking suggested. At least $5 billion of Abacus slices now carry junk ratings, below BBB-, from Standard & Poor’s, or have defaulted, Bloomberg data show.

The SEC said that Goldman Sachs created and sold Abacus 2007-AC1 without disclosing that hedge fund Paulson & Co. helped pick the underlying securities and also bet the CDO would default. Paulson was proved correct, and his hedge fund eventually turned a $1 billion profit and CDO investors lost a similar amount, according to the SEC.

ACA Management

The deal was different from most Abacus CDOs in that Goldman Sachs said that a third-party, ACA Management LLC, was choosing the underlying debt instead of the bank itself, according to prospectuses.

At least $192 million of the debt was granted top grades by credit-rating companies, and an additional $1.1 billion was supposedly even safer, according to Bloomberg data. The latter, super-senior portions were derivatives and not securities.

“This would never have been possible if the ratings had been correct,” said Gene Phillips, director of PF2 Securities Evaluations, a New York-based advisory firm. “For these trades to come out so well for Paulson, the ratings agencies would not have been able to identify as well as Paulson did that these were crappy assets.”
Synthetic CDOs

An explosion in synthetic CDOs began in December 1997, with the first of the so-called BISTRO deals created by a predecessor to JPMorgan Chase & Co.. The transaction involved the bank laying off some of $9.7 billion of its risk tied to financing for 307 companies, according to “Fool’s Gold,” a book by Gillian Tett (Free Press, 2009).

Shortly after that, JPMorgan helped Bayerische Landesbank of Germany unload the risk of $14 billion of U.S. mortgages and then completed one more mortgage-linked BISTRO transaction, before stepping out of the market for home-loan deals because it couldn’t get comfortable assessing the risk it needed to retain amid a lack of historical data on how the debt would perform, according to the book.

UBS AG, in a series called North Street from at least 2000 through at least 2005, and Deutsche Bank AG, through its Start program in at least 2005 and 2006, also issued synthetic CDOs tied to mortgages, according to Bloomberg data. Doug Morris, a spokesman for Zurich-based UBS, and Renee Calabro, a spokeswoman for Frankfurt-based Deutsche Bank, declined to comment.

Goldman’s Role

In 2006 and 2007, the distinction between synthetic mortgage-bond CDOs and “cash” ones, or those made only of actual debt, broke down as “hybrid” deals, filled with both securities and credit swaps, began to dominate the market, meaning that almost every major bank was underwriting CDOs filled in part with their own bets against homeowners.

Investors “came to Goldman Sachs and other financial intermediaries to establish long and short exposures to the residential housing market,” and the bank’s protection against home-loan bond defaults represented a way to offset risk it took on by selling the opposite position to clients, Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein said in the company’s annual report.

In 2006 and 2007, when the residential and commercial mortgages with the highest default rates now were made, the bank created more than $4 billion of Abacus notes, Bloomberg data show.

That figure doesn’t reflect the fact that banks such as Goldman Sachs often would retain some of the slices they created. The bank said in a statement yesterday that it lost $90 million on the transaction the SEC sued it over. The $7.7 billion in Abacus CDOs doesn’t include most of the so-called super-senior tranches that were supposedly safer even than AAA debt. Super-senior transactions were often private.

Super-Seniors

For instance, with Abacus 2005-3, initially 68 percent linked to subprime-mortgage securities, Goldman planned to create a $1 billion super-senior class along with $825 million of notes, according to a May 10, 2005, preliminary term sheet. Super-senior classes, or those in which the cash that would be potentially paid out to Goldman Sachs wasn’t collected upfront, often made up larger portions of the deals.

American International Group Inc., the insurer whose mortgage losses led to its need for a U.S. bailout, took on the super-senior risk on the 2005-3 deal, along with six others, according to an internal memo posted on CBS News’s Web site.
That included the last Abacus deal, which priced April 17, 2007, and focuses on commercial-mortgage securities, Bloomberg data show. Its most-senior class below the super-senior one is now rated CCC by Fitch Ratings, its third-lowest level.
$6 Billion

AIG guaranteed $6 billion through Abacus deals, a person with knowledge of the matter said this month. That figure shrank to $4.3 billion by November 2008 as some of the mortgages linked to the derivatives were repaid or refinanced, the person said.
The insurer last year terminated about $3 billion of the swaps with Goldman Sachs that made up the super-seniors, resulting in $1.5 billion to $2 billion of realized losses, said the person, who declined to be identified because the specific transactions weren’t disclosed. AIG, based in New York, has about $1.3 billion in remaining swaps tied to the CDOs, the person said.
The swaps weren’t included in AIG’s 2008 government rescue because they insured pools of derivative bets, rather than actual securities. AIG and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York retired $62.1 billion in swaps by fully reimbursing bank counterparties in exchange for obtaining the securities, which are held in a taxpayer-funded vehicle called Maiden Lane III.
Other CDOs

Still, some Abacus classes are in Maiden Lane III, because they’re held by other CDOs. One is Davis Square III, a CDO underwritten by Goldman Sachs in 2004 and managed by TCW Group Inc. that bought $24 million of Abacus slices, including some created after Davis Square III was, according to Moody’s Investor Service reports.
Erin Freeman, a spokeswoman for TCW, a unit of Paris-based Societe Generale, said none of the CDOs managed by TCW purchased the Abacus deal at the center of the SEC suit.

The holdings of CDOs by other CDOs mean that some bond buyers and insurers may not know they’re exposed to Abacus deals. Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, the bank now controlled by the U.K. government, was the bigger loser in the deal in which the SEC alleges Paulson & Co. was involved, paying out $840.9 million to Goldman Sachs in 2008, most of which it then passed to Paulson’s hedge fund, according to the SEC complaint.

Even as subprime defaults soared in 2007, more than $1.1 trillion of CDOs were created, about the same as in 2006, according to JPMorgan data. The figures, which also include CDOs backed by assets such as buyout loans and bank capital securities, include unfunded super-senior classes. Funded issuance totaled about $1.05 trillion during those two years.
New Investments

Some of Goldman’s Abacus CDOs were “static,” meaning the portfolio of securities they referenced didn’t change over time, while others allowed for reinvestment into different investments as initial holdings paid down, with Goldman choosing the new securities.

That’s partly because investors including Dusseldorf, Germany-based IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, a buyer of part the CDO the SEC is suing over, asked for the reinvestment because they would be given higher yields, a person familiar with the matter said earlier this year.

‘Inferior Quality’

A dispute over replacement collateral involving UBS landed in New York Supreme Court in 2008. Hamburg-based HSH Nordbank AG, the world’s biggest shipping financier, said in a complaint that UBS had been “deliberately selecting inferior quality” assets for a synthetic CDO called North Street 2002-4.

Goldman Sachs may have lost money on Abacus 2007-AC1 because in at least some Abacus deals, the bank used the cash raised from note sales, which would be owed to either the owners or itself, to buy securities including AAA-rated mortgage bonds and CDOs, according to Fitch and Moody’s Investors Service.

It then guaranteed that, in most cases, it would buy the escrow account securities at face value if needed to pay the owners of the Abacus notes, unless those escrow holdings defaulted, according to the rating firms’ reports. Declines in the value of the purchased securities could limit how much Goldman Sachs could pay itself.

Bloomberg: Abacus Let Goldman Shuffle Mortgage Risk Like Beads

2010年4月16日 星期五

How the Synthetic CDO "Abacus" was set up

The Abacus transactions are so-called synthetic CDO.

Abacus deals were filled with default swaps that offered payouts to Goldman Sachs if certain mortgage bonds didn’t pay as promised, in return for regular premiums from the bank.

Such securitization enabled debt with the lowest investment-grade ratings to be transformed, in part, into AAA securities that turned out to not be as safe as that ranking suggested. At least $5 billion of Abacus slices now carry junk ratings, below BBB-, from Standard & Poor’s, or have defaulted, Bloomberg data show.

The SEC said that Goldman Sachs created and sold Abacus 2007-AC1 without disclosing that hedge fund Paulson & Co. helped pick the underlying securities and also bet the CDO would default. Paulson was proved correct, and his hedge fund eventually turned a $1 billion profit and CDO investors lost a similar amount, according to the SEC

From Bloomberg http://mobile.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2065100&sid=aMVnYAF6bYCw

“The SEC’s charges are completely unfounded in law and fact and we will vigorously contest them and defend the firm and its reputation,” Goldman Sachs said in a statement today.

The firm put together the Abacus deal in 2007, a year in which Goldman Sachs earned a then-record $11.6 billion, a figure it surpassed in 2009, when it earned $13.4 billion. Goldman Sachs paid Blankfein $68.5 million for 2007 -- $600,000 in salary, plus a $67.9 million bonus.

According to the SEC’s complaint, Tourre, now 31, sent an e-mail to a friend in January 2007 saying, “The whole building is about to collapse” in reference to CDOs tied to subprime mortgages.

‘Fabulous Fab’

“Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab standing in the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all of the implications of those monstrousities!!!” Tourre wrote in the e- mail, according to the SEC. The agency didn’t identify the recipient of the note.

Reached at his London office today, Tourre declined to comment. “I need to jump, thank you, goodbye,” he told Bloomberg News before hanging up. A call to Pamela Chepiga , a lawyer for Tourre at Allen & Overy LLP, wasn’t returned. Tourre, a graduate of Ecole Centrale Paris, one of France’s top engineering schools, and Stanford University, joined Goldman Sachs in July 2001, according to his LinkedIn profile.

Goldman Sachs and Tourre knew it would be difficult, if not impossible, to sell the CDO if they disclosed to investors that Paulson played a significant role in selecting the collateral and was also betting against it, the SEC said.

‘Surreal’ ACA Meeting

The bank also knew that at least one potential investor, Dusseldorf, Germany-based IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG , wasn’t likely to invest in a CDO that didn’t have a collateral manager to analyze and select the portfolio, according to the complaint.

In January 2007, Goldman Sachs approached ACA Management LLC , a firm that analyzes credit risk, to select the portfolio for a CDO transaction sponsored by Paulson. In an internal memo on March 12, 2007, Goldman said it would “leverage ACA’s credibility and franchise” to help distribute the transaction, the SEC said.

Paulson, Tourre and a representative from ACA met in February 2007 to discuss assets that would be included in the residential-mortgage backed security, the SEC said. While Paulson and Tourre knew Paulson intended to short the security, ACA wasn’t in the loop.

“I am at this ACA meeting,” Tourre wrote in an e-mail to an unidentified Goldman Sachs employee during the meeting. “This is surreal.”

Goldman’s ‘Extensive Disclosure’

Goldman Sachs also said that it lost more than $90 million because it had an investment in the deal, overwhelming the $15 million it made in fees. The firm said it provided “extensive disclosure” to IKB and ACA about the risk of the underlying mortgage securities. Goldman Sachs never told ACA that Paulson was going to be a “long” investor in Abacus, and ACA selected the underlying securities, the firm said.



《博客主的建议》

建议高盛邀请香港金管局和证监会为他们辩护.

香港金管局和證監會會說:
合成 CDO "Abacus" 有 AAA的評級,不需要多講其它,風險披露也講了“本產品不保本”,這就是足夠的風險披露了, 就是[“vital information" about the CDO]了,不需要披露其它甚麼 [“vital information" about the CDO], 況且買家(投資者)是專業機構投資者。
看看我们香港的银行散户是什么水平。银行,雷曼亚洲以及有关的人员和机构都是只要跟散户讲雷曼迷债/星展Constellation Notes /大摩精明债券是 ’跟几个著名公司信贷挂钩,本产品不保本。抵押品是 AAA的評級‘ 就足够了! 根本不需要解释产品的抵押品的实质,特征以及具体详情呢!抵押品实为跟100多个公司信贷挂钩以及挂钩公司的信息都是多余,是不需要的信息!

什么是 “vital information" about 雷曼迷债/星展Constellation Notes /大摩精明债券? ‘ ’跟几个著名公司信贷挂钩,本产品不保本。’就是 “vital information" !

我们香港的银行散户就都会完全明白这雷曼迷债/星展Constellation Notes /大摩精明债券的真实特征和重大风险了。



Related reading:
SEC Sues Goldman Sachs, Alleging Fraud in CDO Tied to Subprime

SEC Sues Goldman Sachs, Alleging Fraud in CDO Tied to Subprime

1. SEC Sues Goldman Sachs, Alleging Fraud in CDO Tied to Subprime
By Gregory Mott

April 16 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc. was sued by U.S. regulators for fraud tied to collateralized debt obligations that contributed to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The firm’s shares tumbled as much as 16 percent and financial stocks slumped.

Goldman Sachs misstated and omitted key facts about a financial product tied to subprime mortgages as the U.S. housing market was starting to falter, the Securities and Exchange Commission said in a statement today. The SEC also sued Fabrice Tourre, a Goldman Sachs vice president.

“The product was new and complex but the deception and conflicts are old and simple,” SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami said in the statement. “Goldman wrongly permitted a client that was betting against the mortgage market to heavily influence which mortgage securities to include in an investment portfolio, while telling other investors that the securities were selected by an independent, objective third party.”

The SEC alleged that Goldman Sachs, led by Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein, 55, structured and marketed CDOs that hinged on the performance of subprime mortgage-backed securities. The New York-based firm failed to disclose to investors that hedge fund Paulson & Co. was betting against the CDO, known as Abacus, and influenced the selection of securities for the portfolio, the SEC said. Paulson wasn’t accused of wrongdoing.

Financial Stocks Slump

A gauge of banks and brokerages in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index sank 3.9 percent for the top loss among 24 groups after the SEC announced its action. Bank of America Corp. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. lost at least 3.5 percent as all 27 companies in the S&P 500 Diversified Financial Index declined.

“This gave the politicians everything they need to push for stronger financial reform and it’s going to further shake investor confidence in Wall Street,” said Matthew McCormick, a banking-industry analyst and portfolio manager at Bahl & Gaynor Inc. in Cincinnati, which oversees $2.8 billion.


2. Goldman Sachs charged with fraud by SEC
NEW YORK, Fri Apr 16, 2010 11:05am EDT

(Reuters) - Goldman Sachs Group Inc was charged with fraud on Friday by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in the structuring and marketing of a debt product tied to subprime mortgages.

The SEC alleged that Goldman structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt obligation that hinged on the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities, and which cost investors more than $1 billion.

It alleged that Goldman did not tell investors "vital information" about the CDO, called ABACUS. This included that a major hedge fund, Paulson & Co, was involved in choosing which securities would be part of the portfolio, and had taken a short position against the CDO in a bet its value would fall.

According to the SEC complaint, Paulson & Co paid Goldman $15 million to structure the CDO, which closed on April 26, 2007. Little more than nine months later, 99 percent of the portfolio had been downgraded, the SEC said.

The SEC said Goldman Vice President Fabrice Tourre was principally responsible for creating ABACUS. It also charged him with fraud.

3. 美證監控高盛欺詐 累投資者損失10億美元

美國證券交易委員會向高盛集團提出民事訴訟,指控高盛在設計及銷售與次按相關的債務抵押債券(CDO)時,涉嫌欺詐,令投資者損失超過10億美元。高盛發表聲明,否認欺詐,形容指控毫無根據。

美國證監指控,高盛未向投資者披露大型對沖基金保爾森公司對該產品沽空的「關鍵信息」

證交會稱,保爾森公司07年向高盛支付約1500萬美元的設計和行銷費用,安排交易。購入CDO的為2間歐洲銀行,當中荷蘭銀行(ABN Amro)損失了8.41億美元,另1間德國銀行IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG則損失1.5億美元。
遭到起訴的還有高盛副總裁陶爾(Fabrice Tourre),他涉嫌在美國樓市開始下跌時,透過不實陳述及隱瞞與次按相關事宜,欺騙投資者,應對事件負主要責任。

美國證監法規執行部董事Robert Khuzami認為,有關產品是創新及複雜的,但是其原理卻很簡單;高盛則誤導客戶相信有關產品涉及的次按證券是由獨立第三者ACA所揀選,事實上有關證券是一名對沖基金巨擘所選擇



My Comments:

(a) The Lehman Minibond sold in Hong Kong, was arranged by Lehman Brothers Asia, the CDO & Structured Credit Group headed by Leon Hindle.

Why did Mr. Leon Hindle lie about the purpose of the CDS which was actually the underlying securities for a Minibond Series ?

雷曼亚洲安排了迷债及迷债最为隐藏之部分:合成CDO。雷曼亚洲让迷债发行商Pacific International Finance (汇丰所属)买入雷曼自己安排的合成CDO("Septermber 25, 2006 Derivatives Week")。雷曼亚洲之结构产品部门主管 Leon Hindle 却在新闻发布上讲:此产品是“通过直接销售和第三者分销商卖给各类投资者”。

Leon Hindle 掩盖了此产品其实是作为迷债抵押品, 100%全數直接卖给Pacific International Finance的事实。掩盖了此产品是为迷债抵押品而设计的事实, 掩盖了此产品跟雷曼迷你债券的关系。 掩盖了雷曼一手操纵此产品之买卖双方之事实。

A deception ?

(b) When banks in Hong Kong selling Minibond to their retail clients,

- did banks / banks staff tell clients ''vital information" about the so-called Minibond collateral (or: Minibond underlying securities) which is essentially another layer of credit-linked products?

- did banks tell banks staff ''vital information" about the so-called Minibond collateral (or: Minibond underlying securities) which is essentially another layer of credit-linked products, during banks training session /or banks guidance on the related products?


2010年4月9日 星期五

Citi Offers To Buy Back Lehman Notes Sold To Spanish Clients

8 Apr 2010

MADRID -(Dow Jones)- Citigroup Inc. said Thursday it has agreed to buy back structured notes created by Lehman Brothers and sold to clients in Spain that later became nearly worthless when Lehman went bankrupt.

The New York bank's Spanish unit, Citibank Espana SA, is offering 55% of the nominal value of the EUR78 million it sold in Lehman notes, according to a press release.
Hundreds of clients that purchased the securities from Citi sued the bank in Spanish courts on charges that it sold a high-risk product aggressively to retail investors without adequately explaining the risks.

"It was sold as an alternative to long-term deposits, as a secure financial product," said Jordi Ruiz de Villa, a partner at Barcelona law firm Jausas, who together with Madrid law firm Zunzunegui advised 122 clients in the case against Citibank.

Ruiz de Villa said the Lehman products have a market value of somewhere between 20% and 30% of their nominal value.

Citi isn't the only bank in Spain that sold these products. Last month, Bankinter SA (BKT.MC) was ordered by a Spanish court to compensate some of the clients that bought Lehman Brothers products through the bank. Bankinter has said it will appeal.
According to Jausas' Ruiz de Villa, Deutsche Bank AG (DBK.XE) and Credit Suisse Group (CS) are also facing lawsuits for the sale of similar products to Spanish clients.

-By Christopher Bjork, Dow Jones Newswires ; 34 91 395 8123;
christopher.bjork@dowjones.com

Source:
"News Citi Offers To Buy Back Lehman Notes Sold To Spanish Clients"from Morningstar
http://news.morningstar.com/newsnet/ViewNews.aspx?article=/DJ/201004080702DOWJONESDJONLINE000431_univ.xml

2010年4月6日 星期二

(转载)遲來的正義 -- 作者: 老馬

遲來的正義

據報警方商業罪案調查科採取行動,拘捕兩名中國銀行的前線女職員,她們涉嫌用欺詐手段誘使他人投資雷曼迷債產品。
警方在有數千人報案後的一年多才有所行動,可以說是太遲了。但遲了,總比完全不執法進步。無論政府如何想掩蓋事實真相,但真相被完全揭發只是時間的遲早;『證券及期貨條例』早已立法,雷曼苦主對法例的覺悟也只是時間的遲早。 警方的動作究竟是對此有所警醒,還是政府的政治算計,都不重要,因為正義總會到來。

社會上恐怕也有同情該前線職員,事實上銀行的前線職員是處於整個劇毒的雷曼結構性產品利益鏈條的最末端:吞噬了大部份暴利的是雷曼的職業經理們,疑是同謀的經銷機構、銀行高層也吃下了豐厚的報酬,前線的職員只收繩頭小利。但雖如此,作為有專業資格的從業員,應嚴格規守專業的操守、道德規範,而不是僅僅為了繩頭小利,為了迎合上司的不合理指示而損害顧客的利益。雖然,我們都相信絕大多數的前線職員都不會故意做出欺詐的行為,但沒有主觀的意圖,不等於不會造成客觀的傷害。這猶如一個肇事的汽車駕駛者,他主觀上可能沒有傷人意圖,但如果客觀上造成人命財產的傷害,他還是要負上刑事責任。每一個汽車駕駛者都應該明白,一旦拿起方向盤,他就要承擔起道德和法律的責任。每一個證券專業的從業員也應該明白,他們是提供資產管理服務的專業人士,他們也要為自己的行為負上法律及道德上的責任。從各方面的調查都表明,百分之七十多的購置雷曼相關結構性產品者都不是合適的投資者,或者說,這些不合適的投資者損失了這些資產,就再也無能力找回來,對那些用作養老金的人來說,更是嚴重的傷害。

『證券及期貨條例』第107條正是針對那些罔顧自己職責及道德責任的專業從業員,並非只是故意的欺詐才負上刑責,罔顧職責,罔顧實情的失實陳述也屬犯罪。 雷曼事件對香港的警示也正在於此:在過去數年,銀行業大規模擴充證券業務,但無論從監管當局,到銀行高層,到前線員工,都罔顧現行的法律,罔顧道德規範,大規模地違反專業操守,造成的大規模的傷害。但非常令人憤慨的是,香港政府為了掩蓋少數人的失職,僅將事件定性為商業糾紛,而沒有真正吸取事件的教訓,採取措施糾正錯誤,平復社會創傷。

政府應該改弦更張,與利益各方商討平復社會創傷的方案,使受害者與銀行在公平的基礎上達到合理的和解,而不是單方面具強迫性的6至7成之迷債方案,才是一個人民的政府,而不是少數財閥寡頭的代理,才不會被歷史所唾棄。

老馬
31/03/2010

雷曼苦主申請覆核 團體發動簽名支持

1. 雷曼苦主申請覆核 團體發動簽名支持 04 Apr 2010 [大公報]

一名買入雷曼產品的女子上月向高院申請司法覆核,指兩大監管機構當日的決定不合法。庭上法官表示擔心,一旦申請人獲判勝訴,已取回六至七成本金的事主,可能因而被銀行要求退款。法官質疑申請人是否足以代表其他事主,將案件押後裁決。雷曼苦主大聯盟昨日發動簽名行動,數百名苦主聯署簽名,表示甘願放棄回購以尋找真相,支持高院繼續司法覆核。

雷曼苦主大聯盟昨日開會,聚集超過六百苦主。大聯盟召集人陳光譽引述庭上法官說,案件牽連甚廣,除了十六家分銷銀行,更有近二萬五千名已接受回購方案的雷曼事主可能受影響,擔心申請人訴求不能代表其他苦主意願。

陳光譽在會上向苦主表示,司法覆核不會損害第三者的利益,同時事關「查找真相」,呼籲苦主簽名支持,表達甘願放棄回購來尋找真相,給法官了解苦主心聲。他的呼籲得到在場過百人支持,苦主留下姓名、聯絡電話和金管局投訴編號,並簽名支持行動,當中包括不少已接受回購方案的人士。陳光譽表示,會將收集到的簽名整理後交給法官。他還稱,大聯盟經費嚴重不足,希望苦主支援。

雷曼迷債回購方案提出後,證監會和金管局在去年七月與十六家分銷銀行達成和解協議,並即時停止調查。上月底該名女子入稟法院,要求司法覆核。庭上更爆出證監會已完成中銀的調查。

2. 雷曼苦主興訟籌得90萬 04 Apr 2010 [星島日報]

雷曼苦主早前申請司法覆核,期望推翻監管機構跟銀行就迷債回購方案的決定,法院將於本月19日決定是否接納申請。雷曼苦主大聯盟暫籌得90萬元作打官司之用,仍未達預計的150萬元。

大聯盟前召集人陳光譽不滿政府當事件已完結,懶理涉款達100億元、逾萬名非雷曼迷債苦主個案仍未解決,他們會繼續與銀行及政府周旋。

望籌得150萬元

雷曼苦主大聯盟不滿證監會和金管局跟16家銀行,去年達成迷債回購方案,九成人只獲七成賠償的決定,其中一名女苦主已就此申請司法覆核。為打這場官司,大聯盟希望籌得100萬至150萬元。

大聯盟昨舉行簡報會,約有500名苦主出席,陳光譽指由去年10月至今約籌得90萬元,如司法覆核獲得接納,先前已接受和解、只獲部份賠償的苦主,就有機會再爭取十足賠償,亦有利仍未取得分毫賠償的信貸相聯債券、精明債券及掛票據等苦主,繼續抗爭。

對涉嫌誤導投資者的兩名前中銀職員被捕,陳光譽表示警方至今未有向他查詢,大聯盟暫未接觸到涉案苦主。

大聯盟召集人陳浩偉希望捐款越多越好,因一旦打官司,時間越長所需費用越多。不少出席簡報會的苦主昨日也踴躍簽名支持司法覆核,購買了50萬元渣打掛票據的苦主陳小姐說,現時要求已不高,能取回四成已足夠。

另一苦主李先生雖已獲永亨銀行賠償八成本金,但仍到場聽取最新進展及捐款,「一定支持,佢(政府及銀行)個方案唔賠足係唔。」

2010年3月28日 星期日

[星島日報] 雷曼苦主申司法覆核 法庭未決定是否受理

雷曼迷債回購方案提出後,證監會和金管局在去年7月與16家分銷銀行達成和解協議,並即時停止調查。但一名以4萬元買入雷曼產品的女子,指兩大監管機構當日的決定不合法,昨向高院申請司法覆核許可,而一直未有公布調查下文的證監會,於庭上爆出已完成中銀的調查。法官押後裁決。

昨有近80名雷曼事主到庭旁聽,雷曼苦主大聯盟主席陳光譽以有利益人士身份發言,矛頭指向證監會及金管局,聲言:「找出迷債真相、社會公義,是今日之目的」,語畢即全場拍掌以示支持。

答辯人證券及期貨事務監察委員會一方,由資深大律師馮華健代表,對申請人石麗珊(譯音)一方指證監會按《證券及期貨條例》,要全面徹底調查後才可以停止,馮於庭上指條文並不要求證監會與銀行和解前要做到百分百完成調查,更披露證監會的調查已經「大體上(substantially)」完成,而就申請人購買迷債的分銷銀行中銀而言,調查更已「全面(fully)」完成」,馮指申請人的事實基礎已出錯,認為法庭不應頒下司法覆核許可。

庭上爆「中銀調查已完成」

法官認為證監會去年7月22日公布回購方案時,未有交代部分調查已完成,准許證監會3日內作出解釋及存檔有關證據。不過,證監會這個說法卻惹來一眾雷曼事主不滿。陳光譽於庭上說:「如果不到法庭,永遠不知中銀調查已完成」,形容監管機構的態度是「無透明度」。

法官又指此案牽連甚廣,除了16家分銷銀行,更有24,888名已接受回購方案的雷曼事主可能受影響,一旦申請人獲判勝訴,證監會的調查要繼續,另一答辯人香港金融管理局也可向銀行採取執法行動,已取回60%或70%本金的事主,可能因而被銀行要求退款,法官質疑申請人是否足以代表其他事主,而其他事主也可能不想再受惡夢糾纏。法官要求申請人三思及限制其訴求範圍。

申請人最後同意加入聲明訴求,指達成和解而終止調查銀行的安排屬不合法,代表的資深大律師戴啟思表示,單純的聲明不會影響第三者利益,法官亦有酌情權為今次案件「度身訂造」判決。而陳光譽也於庭上說:「有時銀紙好重要,但找出真相、找出公義都重要」,明言可以發起簽名行動,讓事主表達甘願放棄回購來尋找真相的意願。

4萬購迷債 婦拒回購方案

49歲婦人石麗珊於申請書指出,她2008年1月在中銀職員失實陳述下,以4萬元購入雷曼迷債35B系列,雷曼爆煲後,去年8月7日中銀向她提出60%回購和解方案,條件是永久終止任何投訴及法律程序,她拒絕接受,認為《證券及期貨條例》第201條並不賦予證監會停止調查的權力,真正解釋是證監會全面徹底調查後才可以停止。

申請人認為證監會的調查不全面,分銷銀行也沒有承認任何責任,故證監會及金管局停止調查的決定不合法、不合理及有違申請人對證監會及金管局的合理期望。

據雷曼苦主大聯盟資料顯示,申請人的法援申請遭否決,聯盟就其官司費用展開募捐,截至今年1月籌得捐款約88萬元。

【案件編號:HCAL115/09】

整合自:2010年3月23日(二) 星島日報 A19版

2010年3月1日 星期一

獨立機構保障消費者 (选自 "金融改革的終局")

"金融改革的終局" - Paul Krugman 2010年3月2日

(...)

消費者需要更佳的保障是毫無疑問的。

曾積極要求前聯儲局主席格林斯平(Alan Greenspan)對付有害貸款的已故聯儲局理事格拉姆利赫(Edward Gramlich),在2007年完美地簡述了相關理據:
「為何風險最高的貸款產品會賣給最不在行的借款人?答案就在問題中──最不在行的借款人是最容易被哄騙買入這些產品的。」

獨立機構保障消費者

這種保障由一家獨立機構來提供很重要嗎?一定是的,否則說客不會那麼努力地反對成立這個機構。

原因不難理解。有人認為保障消費者的工作可以、並應該由聯儲局來做,或是如一個目前看來不太可能實現的妥協方案中所提到的──或財政部屬下一個單位處理。但要記得,不久之前,格林斯平是聯儲局主席,而斯諾(John Snow)是財長。理據再明顯不過了。在未來可能出現的反監管管治下──相信我,金融說客的影響力如此大,將來是會有這種政府的──消費者唯一得到保護的方法是由一個只是為了監管銀行操守而存在的機構。



博客主看法:

衍生工具複雜且深藏危險,迷債之設計者和銀行分銷商都是金融界的專業人員,更是深明此理。
如果發行產品的投行和銷售商們給客戶們介紹了產品的真實面目,這樣買入者就不會有悔。当然,众多的客户们很可能在可以理解产品的真实特征和风险之前,就已经决定不买这么复杂,听不懂的产品了。迷債的問題在於用漂亮的騙局幌子來跟銀行的客戶們介紹和銷售迷債,投行和銀行分銷商根本不想讓客戶瞭解迷債的真實特徵和風險,如果可以大講跟7個公司信貸掛鈎,為甚麼卻不可以明確提醒客戶:”迷債還要跟100多個各種評級的公司信貸掛鈎“???
證監會對於“全面披露“的要求可是”清晰,準確,無誤導“

發行產品的投行和銷售商們發現如果把產品的實質講一點出來的話(如:迷債利息跟150個公司的信貸掛鈎-系列6),買迷債的人就會大為減少。而加了個漂亮的騙局“跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎”,買的人就會放心這7個著名公司。

迷债系列6寫明保本跟150 個公司信貸掛鈎, 利息為 5%。這個高息跟150 個公司信貸掛鈎:6 個或以上信貸事件:利息為 0。

2003年9月銷售的系列6 之之銷售結果是最差的,僅為 4百75 萬美金。
於同年6月發行的系列 5 之 銷售總額 是 過了 1千萬 美金。
於同年11 月發行的系列 7 的 銷售總額則 是多達 4千 6百 多萬 美金。
於次年2004年5月發行的系列10 的 銷售總額也是多達 是 4千4百多萬美金。

系列6 之年息卻是最高的,利息為 5%。兩年期,2005年9月到期。
而系列5 的 利息僅是 3。8%,
系列 7 的利息只是 4。2%,
系列 10 的美元系列利息也是: 4。25%,
系列 5 , 7 和 10 的利息 均低於 系列 6 這麼個保本迷債, 鎖定年期也不比系列6 短。

為甚麼銀行客戶們會捨系列6 之高息誘惑而選擇其它低息的迷債系列呢? 參見“從 迷債系列 6 看 雷曼迷你債券騙局手段之 完美完善過程
.

同樣由雷曼亞洲一手安排的在澳洲銷售的信貸掛鈎票據 Mahogany Notes 就清晰地介紹了
- 該信貸掛鈎票據之本金跟50個公司信貸掛鈎(7個破產就會失去100%本金),
- 該票據之利息跟150個公司信貸掛鈎(破產事件跟票據利息之關係)
- 該票據所有信貸掛鈎主體之評級(AA 到 BBB- 及 低於 BBB- 之公司數目,等)和公司之業界類別等信息。
- 該票據明確指出其資金不是投入於任何信貸掛鈎主體(公司)。

Mahogany Notes 票據買的人明確瞭解它們買入的產品是甚麼,所以雷曼暴煲之後,Mahogany Notes 票據持有者們沒有高呼上當,沒有投訴銷售結構。因為他們知道他們買的是甚麼。