2009年11月21日 星期六

證監前高層自願於雷曼調查做供,被拒絕

1. 《蘋果日報》11月21日 報導
證券及期貨事務監察委員會前任非上市投資產品高級經理高秉忠,主動要求出席立法會調查雷曼事件小組作供「爆料」觸礁。

雷曼苦主大聯盟召集人陳光譽昨日會見傳媒透露,幾日前在香港人權監察總幹事羅沃啟陪同下與高秉忠見面。陳光譽引述高秉忠說,任職證監會期內,曾負責非上市投資產品(包括雷曼相關產品)審批工作,主動要求出席立法會雷曼專責小組作供,是出於良知驅使。希望指證證監會在雷曼事件錯在何處,指出如何防止同樣錯誤再發生,並願意「爆料」提供一些內幕資料。不過,小組要求他要冒違反《證券及期貨條例》保密條款約束,先行向小組提交資料及性質,供與已作
證的證監會證人資料比對有何不同。


立法會調查雷曼事件小組主席何鍾泰說,大家不想在沒有基本資料情況下,隨便傳召某些人作供,小組成員期待高秉忠的回覆。證監會發言人昨日證實,高秉忠是今年8月離職的僱員。


2.《東方日報》11月21日 報導: ”陳光譽促傳召證監一高層“

雷曼苦主大聯盟主席陳光譽昨日召開記者會,要求立法會調查雷曼小組傳召前證監會外務科一名姓高的高級經理作供。高在證監會工作近二十年,主要從事非上市投資產品的規管工作,審批雷曼產品亦屬其工作範圍,陳認為高在調查雷曼事件上是一個很關鍵的證人。

陳光譽指出,由於當事人擔心書面陳述會觸犯保密條款,所以強烈要求該會主席何鍾泰傳召高到立法會作證,相信有助雷曼事件找出真相。

參與審批雷曼產品
一名早前離職、有份參與審批雷曼產品的證監會高級經理,主動聯絡立法會調查雷曼小組委員會作供,但基於他受「證券及期貨條例」保密條款約束,所以要求在立法會權力及特權法的傳召下才作供,但小組委員會反要求他在不違反保密條款下作書面陳述。雷曼苦主大聯盟主席陳光譽認為,雷曼小組的要求並不合理,並促請該會在特權法下,傳召該名前高級經理以專家身份作證。

3. 信報 2009年11月23日: 證監前高層被拒向雷曼小組作供

4. 高秉忠先生與立法會雷曼小組致函 及覆函撮要

高秉忠先生致函立法會雷曼小組 – 28/10/09
1) 我的名字叫Harold Ko。 直到今年8月份, 有近20年, 我一直服務於證監會, 並且主要從事非上市投資產品的規管(見附件)。 我相信我可以協助「雷曼小組」研究有關雷曼事宜。但是, 作為證監會前僱員, 我受到「證劵及期貨條例」保密條款的約束。 若果「雷曼小組」要我協助, 我願意在立法會「特權法」第9節的傳召下, 到小組前作證。


立法會雷曼小組覆函 – 05/11/09

2) 28/10 來函已呈交「雷曼小組」正副主席及小組成員。依小組主席指示, 你如能提供資料的範疇及議題, 希望你能再來函申明, 並解釋為何你能協助小組的研訊。

致函 – 08/11/09
3) 作為證監會非上市投資產品的規管, 最長服務期的僱員, 我自信可以從監管角度, 就雷曼事件錯在何處, 以至如何防止同樣錯誤的發生, 提供一些深刻的認識(insights)。

覆函 – 11/11/09
4) 在並無違反「證劵及期貨條例」(法例571章) (SFO), 請你向小組提供下述資料:
a) 你在證監會的不同職務及責任, 特別是 12/3/2002 (SFO成立) 到 15/9/2008 (雷曼破產)
b) 證監會已有證人到小組作證, 你所能提供資料的種類及性質將會有何不同
c) 若可以, 請提供你的資料大綱

以上為函件翻譯及撮要, 一切以英文原件為准。

http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/E9AB98E7A789E5BFA0E58588E7949FE88887E7AB8BE6B395E69C83E99BB7E69BBCE5B08FE7B584E887B4E587BD-E58F8AE8A686E587BD6108.php

2009年11月17日 星期二

Goldman CEO Apologizes for Role in Financial Crisis

NEW YORK (Reuters) - Goldman Sachs Group Inc chief executive Lloyd Blankfein said his firm "participated in things that were clearly wrong" in the lead-up to the financial crisis, Bloomberg News reported on Tuesday.

Lloyd Blankfein, told a corporate conference in New York that the bank regretted taking part in the cheap credit boom that had fuelled the pre-crisis bubble. “We participated in things that were clearly wrong and have reason to regret,” said Mr Blankfein. “We apologise.”

Mr Blankfein also told the conference he wished he had not told the UK’s Sunday Times newspaper that Goldman did “God’s work” – a remark that was seized upon by the bank’s critics – and said it had been meant as a joke.

As a result of the crisis, Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS - news) and competitors received billions of dollars in bailouts from taxpayers.


Related Links:
1. http://seekingalpha.com/news/market_currents/post/36688
2. http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/goldman-ceo-apologizes-for-role-in-crisis-report-reuters_molt-059f53cecd70.html?x=0
3. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/782afd66-d3bd-11de-8caf-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1

2009年11月9日 星期一

「披露為本」: 哪些重大風險是需要得到清晰,準確,無誤導的披露的?

「披露為本」是个好听的万金油和遮羞布。因为不需要定义和解释哪些風險是重大風險, 不需要定义和解释哪些重大風險是需要得到披露的,更无须定义和解释何谓清晰,準確,無誤導的风险披露。一切可以是读者之想像力.


1。 以迷你債卷為例,「披露為本」该披露哪些重大风险呢?
- 風險到底是跟7個著名公司挂鉤,還是跟132個各類評級公司挂鉤?
- 迷債的錢是投入於實質資產還是沒有投入於任何實質資產而隻是賣保險等,
如何清晰准確均衡無誤導地,真真實實地把真實特征和風險給客戶介紹,這才是問題的關鍵。

不追究清楚何種“風險”为重大風險, 何種重大风险需要“披露”的話,「披露為本」又能披露多少真實相關風險呢?

如果「披露為本」簡化為兩句話:
第一:本產品不保本。
第二:本產品是高風險。
可否會作出世界第一流的高水準的風險披露呢?

至于具体有些什么风险呢,是那些具体因素可能会造成“高风险”或“失去本金”呢,就是读者“清者自清”,运用你自己的想像吧。

2。 迷債 之最大問題在於“”一大堆銷售文件“卻 無披露 重大風險,極盡欺騙和誤導之術,

迷債 “一大堆銷售文件”幾十頁紙,介紹了一大堆7个著名公司信貸掛鈎及相關信息,卻不提重大風險之一:合成CDO 的風險,

洋洋洒洒的几十页的文件,卻不肯清楚地告訴讀者:合成CDO 實為信貸掛鈎產品,而非傳統債券, 可能跟幾十或上百個公司的信貸掛鈎。既然抵押品和迷債 的實質均為信貸掛鈎,為甚麼跟100多家公司信貸掛鈎的抵押品之特徵和風險無須給客戶介紹, 跟7個公司信貸掛鈎的特徵和風險卻要用諸多篇幅去介紹? 這是清晰,準確,無誤導的風險披露嗎?

至今為止,沒有一個政府機構敢於以迷債為例,給出一個“披露為本”之風險披露簡要。甚至在講到“披露為本”的時候,連“清晰,準確,無誤導地披露風險”之 要求都不敢再次提起。

政府和監管機構究竟是在保護誰的利益?

2009年10月24日 星期六

銀行主动停止銷售雷曼迷你債券之決定:揭示了銀行對於迷債真實風險之理解

2003-2008: 銀行一直以跟 7個著名公司信貸掛鈎作為銷售迷債的風險介紹。銀行眾多職員們對於迷債的重大風險的瞭解似乎僅限於跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎之風險.此處暫且不談銀行職員對於”如果出現一個破產事件“之後的迷債價值的理解和介紹。

從2007年下半年起,諸多雷曼迷你債券的長期忠實的經驗分銷銀行開始陸續停止銷售迷債。為甚麼? 發生了甚麼變故?是甚麼令銀行改變主意,開始對雷曼迷債說‘不’? 相同期間,星展 DBS 和大摩也不再繼續發行 Constellation 和 精明債券系列了。

信貸破產掉期 CDS 等信貸掛鈎產品的目的之一是為銀行界服務. 有著理解並且買賣 CDO / 合成 CDO / CDS / 信貸掛鈎票據 的專業知識和多年豐富投資經驗的銀行界, 是 出于对于系列 34/35/36 的 7 個著名掛鈎主體有可能出現破產事件之担心,还是其它不可公开的因数和忧虑而使银行決定停止銷售迷債的呢 ? 銀行掌握了些甚麼信息? 银行之决定是否揭示了銀行從未告知客戶的關於雷曼迷債之真實特征和相關風險?!

- 系列 34 信貸掛鈎主體 : 中國,匯豐,太古, 新地, 和黃,星展,置地;
- 系列 35 信貸掛鈎主體 : 中國,匯豐,太古, 新地, 和黃,港鐵,渣打;
- 系列 36 信貸掛鈎主體 : 中電, 匯豐,中海油,星展,和黃,港鐵,渣打。 
系列 34/35/36 抵押品: 3A 評級 實質為信貸掛鈎產品 之 合成 CDO,合成 CDO之主要风险是一篮子挂钩主体之信贷事件风险;


(a) 永亨銀行 ,
永亨銀行是最早參與迷債銷售的銀行之一。從2003年的迷債系列 5 開始,一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售,直至2007年中的系列33。
自2007年10月起,是甚麼發生了變化?是甚麼原因促使永亨銀行決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 34/35/36 ? 銀行是出于甚麼考慮而決定停止銷售“中風險”評級的迷債? (注:永亨銀行對於迷債的風險評級一直是“中風險”)。

(b) 富邦銀行
從 2005 的 系列21 開始銷售迷債。在銷售了迷債2年之後,
自2007年10月起, 是甚麼原因促使富邦銀行不再參與銷售迷債系列 34/35/36

(c) 上海商業銀行,工商銀行亞洲.
二者都是最早參與迷債銷售的銀行之一。從2003年的迷債系列5 開始,一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售,直至2007年底的系列34。
自2007年12月起, 是甚麼原因促使上海商業銀行和工商銀行亞洲 決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 35/36

(d) 中信嘉華銀行
從2004年8月起的迷債系列12 開始,一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售,直至2007年底的系列34。
自 2007年12月起, 是甚麼原因促使中信嘉華決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 35/36

(e) 中國銀行 .
中銀作為迷債銷售量最大的分銷商,叢2004年2月的迷債系列 8 開始,一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售,直至2008年1月的系列35。
自2008年3月起, 是甚麼發生了變化?是甚麼原因促使中銀決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 36

(f) 集友銀行,南洋商業銀行 .
二者一直是迷債的長期忠實分銷商。
自2008年3月起, 是甚麼原因促使二者決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 36

(g) 荷蘭銀行
自2008年3月起,是甚麼原因促使荷蘭銀行決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 36

对信贷挂钩产品有丰富经验的银行,陸續停止銷售佣金慷慨的迷債,是否揭示了銀行對於迷債真相之真實理解程度? 等於把銀行從未告知公眾的真話公佈與世?

1. 銀行是根據甚麼因數和考慮而决定对迷債说”不” ?是甚麼发生了變化而使銀行改變了對於銷售迷債的態度?

2. 銀行是否出於擔心迷債抵押品出現爆煲而決定停止銷售
對CDS/CDO/信貸挂鉤產品有著豐富知識和經驗的銀行應該完全明白抵押品為信貸掛鈎產品而非傳統債券,應該完全明白抵押品的挂鉤主體數目很可能是跟100多個主體信貸掛鈎。換言之,盡管給客戶的風險介紹和銷售章程均是大肆介紹 7個 著名掛鈎主體信貸風險, 只字不講抵押品有著跟100多個主體信貸挂鉤之特徵和風險。銀行心知抵押品內的信貸掛鈎主體出事的可能性是遠遠高於那大肆宣揚的 7 個掛鈎主體的。

至今, 銀行以及金管局公開堅持聲稱沒有必要對客戶介紹迷債的抵押品.
- 聲稱因為抵押品是 3A 評級,可卻從不解釋:既然抵押品和迷債的實質均為信貸掛鈎,為甚麼以跟一籃子主體信貸掛鈎為主要特徵的抵押品之信貸掛鈎風險無須給客戶任何介紹和解釋, 跟7個公司信貸掛鈎的特徵和風險卻要用諸多篇幅去介紹?

- 同時又聲稱:由於每一個系列的迷債的抵押品在銷售期間之間還沒有買入,在每一迷債系列的銷售期間銀行也不知道該系列抵押品的詳情。可卻從不敢公開說明:銀行方面是否認為(實為信貸掛鈎票據之)抵押品的相關信息 是 '信貸掛鈎票據:雷曼迷你債券'的相關重大風險和重大信息?

- 中國銀行給迷債的風險評級是“高風險”, 給與客戶的解釋是:所有信貸掛鈎產品評級都是高風險。 依此類推, 實為信貸掛鈎產品 之 抵押品應該是當仁不讓地也同屬於“高風險“類別了!
可中國銀行卻從不敢公開說明:同屬於信貸掛鈎產品,“高風險”類別的抵押品之重大風險和信息是否屬於迷債相關的重大風險和信息? 為甚麼無須給客戶介紹和解釋?


3. 儘管銀行聲稱在銷售迷債的時候不瞭解該迷債系列抵押品之詳情, 銀行的產品相關部門和銀行主要相關管理層看來對於抵押品實為信貸掛鈎之主要特徵和相關風險是一直有所瞭解而且一直關注相關的市場變化。這就解釋了為甚麼諸多迷債的長期經驗分銷銀行從2007年下半年開始陸續停止銷售迷債 。因為他們知道迷債抵押品實為(第二層)隱藏的信貸掛鈎產品,而表面的7個著名公司只是招牌。真正帶來利息(收入)和重大風險的都是藏於 實為信貸掛鈎產品的抵押品(合成CDO)之中。一旦市場變差,抵押品中的質素參差不齊的100多家公司破產爆煲的機會就會快速大大增加,迷債的真實風險被原形畢露的機會大大增加,迷債的謊言被戳穿的機會也大大增加。

4. 以迷債系列 34 為例,銷售系列 34 的時候,銀行或許不知道系列 34 的抵押品之詳情。但是,銀行的產品相關部門和銀行主要相關管理層對於比系列34 早的那些系列 5 - 33 的抵押品之主要特徵和相關風險等看來卻是有相當程度的瞭解的, 因而對於系列 34 抵押品很可能又是“跟100-150多個公司信貸掛鈎”之相關重大風險和特徵也是有著清晰的理解的。這就解釋了隨著市場變差,銀行開始逐漸停止銷售迷債。因為銀行擔心從未跟客戶解釋的迷債抵押品之謎會容易原形畢露。

 [附註-1]:  迷債系列銷售商
• 系列 33:一共 16 個 分銷商。 銷售期間:2007年 7月;
• 系列 34:一共 14 個 分銷商。 銷售期間:2007年11月;
• 系列 35:一共 11 個 分銷商。 銷售期間:2008年 1月;
• 系列 36:一共 7 個 分銷商。 銷售期間:2008年 4 月;



[附註-2]:無獨有偶,2007年底,當諸多雷曼迷你債券的長期忠實的經驗分銷銀行們開始逐漸對銷售雷曼迷債說“不”的時候,

• 星展DBS 於 2007年8月發行了 Constellation 系列82-86,隨后就徹底停止發行Constellation, 而且並沒有再推出跟Constellation類似的跟幾個著名公司信貸挂鉤票據了。 
• 而大摩 於2007年9月發行了的精明債券系列21-22 之後, 隨后就徹底停止發行精明債券, 而且並沒有再推出跟精明債券類似的跟幾個著名公司信貸挂鉤票據了。 

2007年底, 是甚麼原因促使星展和大摩決定停止發行 Constellation 和 精明債券 ?

(i) 是由於經濟環境變差,而不易找到 7-8著名公司來掛鈎了呢?
(ii) 還是由於經濟環境變差,擔心包藏於抵押品內的真實風險容易暴煲,有著漂亮外表的騙局極有可能被原形畢露?


相關文章: 從 迷債系列 6 看 迷債騙局手段之 完美完善過程
.......

2009年10月20日 星期二

轉載 : 司法覆核不能少了你 - 筆者: 老馬



如果你對雷曼苦主大聯盟準備協助就迷債的回購方案進行司法覆核有不明白,那麼就請你看看以下所言:
銀行欺騙或誤導你購買結構性的衍生產品,使你遭受損失,或重大的損失,甚至損失畢生的積蓄;使你鬱抑、氣憤,甚至使你的生活受到影響;
銀行對你的投訴以扭曲事實的回覆來應付你,使你憤慨、懊怒、不知所措,氣結難平,遭受再次的打擊;
證監及金管主導的迷債回購方案分明是損害迷債投資者利益,損害公平、公正的社會核心價值,但你卻無可奈何地接受;
你是非迷債的苦主,到今天仍在苦海中掙扎,不知何時何處是岸。

所有的這一切一切,使你冤難訴,氣難消,因為司法門檻高,官府門戶深。你渴望可以將那些誤導你、騙你的銀行被帶上法庭的被告席,你渴望可以將犯有過失的銀行輕輕地帶過的監管當局帶上法庭的被告席,但你卻沒有金錢和能力做得到,那麼,司法覆核就是這樣一個去實施你的渴望的機會!

雖然不能說銀行就一定會真實地站到司法覆核的被告席上,但就迷債的回購方案進行司法覆核將無可避免地將銀行所犯過錯的事實、將監管當局偏袒銀行的瀆職事實,放在法律的天秤上來審判,放在公眾的放大鏡下仔仔細細地拷問

雖然我們不能確定官司的勝負,但能夠將雷曼事件帶上法庭,就是平民對權勢的勝利

雖然司法覆核不能直接補償你所遭受的損失,但能為你一舒心中的鬱悶,能一洗被那些流言蜚語所蒙上的不白之冤也 是非常值得的。

因此,司法覆核不能少了你的參與,有錢出錢,有力出力,無論出多少的錢,無論出多大的力,只要參與了,努力過,就是對得起自己。

筆者: 老馬

*********************************

『司法覆核』是變相的集體訴訟!

雷曼事件壹周年過去了,對整個運動發揮關鍵性作用有兩個里程碑:一個是去年11月中旬立法會通過引用“權力及特權法”調查雷曼事件,另一則是今年3月份在美國紐約州法院成功入稟,為所有迷債苦主進行集體訴訟。這兩個事件仍在發展,仍然對整個抗爭行動帶來深遠而廣泛的影響。

當前的一個成果就是,22/7證監、金管和16家銀行的迷債回購方案。但是這個方案只是政府與銀行私下協議,大前提是保障銀行,漠視苦主訴求,不顧社會整體利益,不折不扣是一個掩耳盜鈴的方案。

面對這個不合理的情況,並且惦記着毫無着落的非迷債苦主,包括ELN、星債、精債、袖珍及其他雷曼票據的苦主。我們別無選擇,只好訴諸法律途徑,對這個方案進行司法覆核。

官商勾結,小市民無可奈何。可是,當前出現了個難得的機會,並且是我們發動總反擊的一個機會。我們要在21/10之前在法院立案,申請覆核。這不僅為了迷債苦主,不僅是為了“經驗投資者”受屈苦主,更重要是為了非迷債苦主,為後者繼續抗爭製造有利條件,簡而言之,這是一個變相的集體訴訟。

天若有眼,這會是雷曼事件的第三個里程碑。

發動總攻擊,要等候機會,當前就是這個機會,這個機會不會重現,我們不要失之交臂!

時乎,時不再來!

*********************************************************************************************************

! !"司法覆核" 請踴躍捐助 ! !
捐款方法如下: 請按: 雷曼苦主大聯盟 (http://www.lbv.org.hk/)

********************************************************

2009年9月30日 星期三

"警方搜查安永拘一人"相關新聞和評論


彭博新聞報道,安永會計師事務所正協助警方商業罪案調查科,調查一宗涉及雅佳控股清盤的案件,又指警方星期二到過安永的辦公室調查,懷疑涉及一宗偽造文件案,並拘捕一名四十一歲姓鄧的男子,懷疑涉案。
家用電器公司雅佳控股二千年清盤,清盤前由安永做核數,雅佳的清盤人2004年以疏忽的名義,向安永追討賠償。到本月23日,雙方在高等法院達成和解,消息指,安永同意賠償超過十億元。安永是本港四大會計師事務所之一。
(安永同意向雅佳清算人支付巨款:http://www.ftchinese.com/story.php?storyid=001028907).


讀者評論
和解了,只是代表赔偿与苦主.但刑责还在,走着瞧.

誰說投資失利皆因貪財起,怪不了人?
誰不貪財?投資,銀行放款當然是風險自負,
但對家存心欺騙,告之,錢追不了,也要討個公道,把騙子繩之於法, 以正公義,以警效猶。
就如捉殺人犯,捉了,死者也不會番生,唔通咁就唔捉

2009年9月19日 星期六

【明報】證監難拒交報告 顯示銀行有系統性失誤

【明報專訊】2009-9-16.

立法會調查雷曼迷債事件的專責委員會,曾不止一次要求證監會交出銀行銷售迷債的調查報告,遭證監會以妨礙調查為由拒絕。據本報了解,在銀行與大部分事主達成和解協議後,證監會內部研判,繼續拒交報告的法理依據已變得相當薄弱,報告羅列的證據,足以證明大多數銀行銷售迷債確實存在系統性失誤。

 銀行或多或少犯下四大錯誤

 據悉,證監會的調查報告載有銀行系統性違規銷售的證據,專責委員會看完報告後,可能毋須花太多時間傳召銀行界人士作供也能得出清楚的結論。消息人士解釋,所謂系統性違規銷售,不一定是事主和媒體常說的誤導性銷售,如強調迷債是安全的債券或等同長期定期存款,也包括:

 (1)沒有對產品作獨立的盡職審查,研判產品的風險特性;

 (2)沒有針對產品的風險特性制訂適切的培訓教材和安排前線銷售人員接受專業的培訓;

 (3)沒有制訂專業的測試辦法,準確地評估客戶對結構投資產品的風險承受能力;

 (4)沒有針對特別脆弱客戶群,如高齡、低教育程度、殘障、全副身家投入等類別客戶,制訂額外的程序,確保客戶理解和接受產品的風險。

 消息指出,銷售迷債的銀行大部分犯了以上一項或多項的錯誤,不管個別銷售個案中有沒有誤導性言論,都已經構成違規銷售。這種違規銷售是系統性的,因為誤導性陳述可能是個別前線人員違規,但培訓材料若未能準確講出產品核心風險,前線銷售人員便不可能解釋清楚給客戶知道,便會令每一宗銷售都出問題,所以是系統性的失誤,深植於銀行內部制度。銀行願意接受證監會提出的六至七成回購建議,或多或少是看到,若被檢控定罪的機會很大。

 現公開報告不涉妨礙司法

 消息指出,證監會拒絕向立法會專責委員會交出雷曼調查報告,法理依據是調查尚未結束,若銀行拒絕接受證監會為保障投資者提出的和解建議,調查所得將用於檢控銀行違規,向立法會披露調查所得可能會妨礙檢控和審訊,導致議會和媒體公審,有違司法公平原則。不過,現時絕大部分涉及雷曼有關產品投訴的銀行已經向客戶作出和解建議,證監會不會提出檢控,調查工作已經告一段落,原來拒絕交出報告的依據已經不存在。

 消息稱,雖然證監會與被調查銀行達成和解協議載有保密條款,不得對外披露調查的內容,但立法會專責委員會若行使法定權力要求閱覽報告,《立法會(權力及特權)條例》的法律約束力將凌駕於證監會與銀行之間的協議,證監會為履行法例所定責任交出調查報告,不算違反保密協議。

 至於尚有3間沒銷售迷債但涉及雷曼信用掛鹇票據的銀行,尚未與客戶和解,會否影響證監會交出報告,消息指調查報告可以隱去與這些銀行有關的資料,對和解談判應該沒有實質影響。

2009年9月13日 星期日

從 迷債系列 6 看 雷曼迷你債券騙局手段之 完美完善過程

2003年9月銷售的迷債 系列 6 的銷售額是迷債系列中最低的,連 5 百萬美金都未達到。 而其5%之年息卻比同期前後幾個系列都高。為甚麼系列6 會 這麼不受銀行客戶們的 青眯 呢?


比較迷你債券系列6及其前後系列, 可以看到迷債產品表面結構的“進化”和產品宣傳的“神話”過程,看到產品披露的“精化” 和 “簡化”過程,
可以看到金融精英們是如何在政府監管部門的縱容和庇護下逐步地把迷債債券精心包裝成安全形象的產品,以達到大量向銀行客戶們銷售的目的。



1。2003年9月銷售的系列6 之銷售結果是最差的。

系列 6 的總 銷售額僅為 4百75 萬美金。
於同年6月發行的系列 5 之 銷售總額 是 過了 1千萬 美金。
於同年11 月發行的系列 7 的 銷售總額則 是多達 4千 6百 多萬 美金。
於次年2004年5月發行的系列10 的 銷售總額也是多達 是 4千4百多萬美金。

2。 系列6 之年息卻是最高的。
系列 6 之利息為 5%。兩年期,2005年9月到期。
到期時,發行商有權把期限延長至2009年3月,延期後的利息預定為 8% 。 發行商 行使了這個延期權,
而系列5 的 利息僅是 3。8%,
系列 7 的利息只是 4。2%,
系列 10 的美元系列利息也是: 4。25%,
系列 5 , 7 和 10 的利息 均低於 系列 6 這麼個保本迷債, 鎖定年期也不比系列6 短。

為甚麼銀行客戶們會捨系列6 之高息誘惑而選擇其它低息的迷債系列呢?

3。 系列 6 寫明跟150 個公司信貸掛鈎。

根據銷售章程,系列 6 聲稱是 保本的(條件之一是:如果抵押品不出現完全損失的情形的話)。 可是,這個高息卻是有條件的
於2003年9月-2005年9月間, 這150 個公司信貸掛鈎中如果出現
-----------------
0 個信貸事件:利息為 4。2%;
1 個信貸事件:利息為 4。15%;。。。。。。
5 個信貸事件:利息為 0。8%;
6 個或以上信貸事件:利息為 0;
-----------------

於2005年9月-2009年3月間, 這150 個公司信貸掛鈎中如果出現
-----------------
0 個信貸事件:利息為 8%;
1 個信貸事件:利息為 6。65%;。。。。。。
5 個信貸事件:利息為 1。3%;
6 個或以上信貸事件:利息為 0;
-----------------

看來可以鎖定2-6年的喜歡穩定高息的銀行客戶們多數並不喜歡這個跟150公司信貸事件掛鈎的條件


4。迷債表面之信貸掛鈎主體.

系列 6 寫明跟 150 個 公司 信貸掛鈎。銷售章程列出了 這 150 家公司的 名稱 和信貸評級。
系列 5 寫明跟 1個參考主體信貸掛鈎, 銷售章程列出了 這 1 家公司的 名稱 和信貸評級 (Hutchison Whampoa )。
系列 7 寫明跟 6 個 公司信貸掛鈎。銷售章程列出了 這 6 家公司的 名稱 和信貸評級 (Citigroup, DBS, HSBC, Hutchison Whampoa, Standard Chartered Bank, Wing Hang bank; )。
系列 10 寫明跟 7 個 公司信貸掛鈎,銷售章程列出了 這 7 家公司的 名稱 和信貸評級 (Coca-Cola, IBM, McDonald, BMW, Hutchison Whampoa, SBC, MTR; )。

從表面上看,跟150 個公司信貸掛鈎之 系列 6 令銀行客戶們缺乏安全感,儘管高息,依然令眾人卻步。
而跟1 /6 /7 個 公司信貸掛鈎之其它系列,儘管利息比系列6 的低,卻給人以“穩陣”的感覺。
而選為表面掛鈎主體的公司“質素”也愈來愈高,尤其是後期系列之表面信貸掛鈎主體均選用著名企業,迷債最為大肆宣揚的賣點就是跟幾家著名企業掛鈎,更與人以“安全”的錯覺。

5。 迷債抵押品之實質均為信貸掛鈎產品。
所有的迷債系列均未有提供抵押品的具體內容和詳情。儘管系列 6 / 5 / 7 / 10 的 抵押品其實都是投入於信貸掛鈎票據。
系列 5 / 6 / 7 之抵押品是由雷曼發行的跟多達150 個主體掛鈎的信貸掛鈎票據。
而系列10 之抵押品則是由雷曼 SPV 發行的 跟125 個主體信貸掛鈎的 信貸掛鈎票據(合成 CDO)。

由此可見,儘管表面之信貸掛鈎公司數目不盡相同,迷債系列 5 / 6 / 7 / 10 之抵押品實質其實是大同小異,均為跟多至125-150個主體信貸掛鈎產品。 換言之,
系列6 實質是 跟 [ 150 (表面 ) + 多達 150 個(抵押品)]信貸掛鈎的產品;
系列 5 實質是 跟 [ 1 (表面 ) + 多達 150 個(抵押品)]信貸掛鈎的產品;
系列 7 實質是 跟 [ 6 (表面 ) + 多達 150 個(抵押品)]信貸掛鈎的產品;
系列 10 實質是 跟 [ 7 (表面 ) + 多達 150 個(抵押品)]信貸掛鈎的產品;


但是銀行客戶們並不知道這些抵押品的實質,銀行客戶們並不知道隱藏於抵押品之中的第二層跟多至125-150個主體信貸掛鈎之重大信息和對於迷債的重大風險。銀行客戶們只看見和聽見了表面的幾個掛鈎公司之介紹。

6。 銷售章程實質內容之簡化
迷債 系列 6 只有 一本 銷售章程 , "Prospectus".
而由 迷債 系列 9 (2004年3月) 開始,發行商提供 兩本章程: Program Prospectus 和 Issue Prospectus .

那麼系列 10 的 兩本章程 是否提供多一些 關於迷債之重大內容和重大相關風險所介紹的內容呢?
系列 6 銷售章程
(i) 明確要求分銷商給客戶介紹包括抵押品文件在內的所有相關文件,
(ii) 明確指出會提供包括抵押品在內的一些通常文件於分銷商處。
(iii) 明確指出 會於迷債發行日起,抵押品相關文件可供於分銷商處查看。

系列10 以及之后的所有迷债系列的洋洋洒洒之两大本Program Prospectus 和 Issue Prospectus :
再也没有明确写出以上之3点。只是用”可以到雷曼公司去查阅所有文件“一语带过, Issue Prospectus 发行章程 详细地 提供了许多页的关于表面6-7个信贷挂钩公司之相关评级 和信息,并大谈“如果你相信这7个挂钩公司不会有破产事件的话。。。”, 发行章程还提供了关于“债券”等诸多产品之定义和解释,却没有解释何谓合成CDO 及其主要特征。


系列6 之分銷商們
按照系列 6 之銷售章程,分銷商們都應該於發行日起收到迷債抵押品之詳細文件。 分銷商們應該是看過並清楚地瞭解迷債抵押品之詳情。 至於分銷商們有沒有跟客戶介紹迷債抵押品文件並讓客戶查看迷債抵押品之詳細文件就是另當別論了。

7。包裝迷債騙局的手段之進一步升華和完善

經過系列 6 失敗銷售一役,以及之後的系列 7-10 之成功銷售,金融精英們明白了以下真諦, 進一步完善了包裝迷債騙局的手段:
要提高銷售額,必須打造出有漂亮表面的迷債產品。告知客戶的掛鈎產品是越少越好,告知客戶的掛鈎主體是越少越好,告知客戶的掛鈎主體之信貸評級是越高越好,抵押品之內容則萬萬不可以告知客戶,那會嚇跑客戶的。

於是,表面掛鈎的公司的數量只是6-7個,而選用的掛鈎主體的質素則越來越高,
“如果你相信 China Mobile (等7個)不會破產的話。。”。 讓人覺得出現破產事件的機會是零的假象,讓人產生迷債是個非常“安全”的產品之錯覺,

把真實的重大風險和真正可以帶來收入的信貸掛鈎內容全部隱藏到抵押品之中,對於抵押品的內容和風險從不明確解釋,至於抵押品之實質為信貸掛鈎產品之事實更是隱晦不談。

讀者若非具有 CDS/CDO 之專業知識,就萬萬想不到這抵押品其實是第二層信貸掛鈎產品,

銀行客戶們萬萬想不到的是:迷債除了有著跟表面6-7個公司信貸掛鈎之風險,迷債還同樣承受著 跟這從未披露 的 100-190多個 主體信貸掛鈎之重大風險, 而且抵押品出現信貸事件的概率是遠高於那表面幾個掛鈎公司的,因為抵押品內是跟 包括了低於投資評級(BB / B / CCC)在內的 100-190多個一籃子 主體信貸掛鈎的。換言之,把評級差一些的的信貸掛鈎主體全部藏入抵押品的信貸掛鈎條款。以7個著名公司的表面假象來吸引銀行客戶 。。。

而星債,精明債券等各類假債券,也紛紛以漂亮的表面掛鈎公司做招牌來推銷, 而把產品實質和風險深藏於避而不談的抵押品之中。

8。迷債騙局之辯護士們:

在這[ 7 個掛鈎公司 之風險] + [ 100-190 個公司 部分破產之風險] 的 2 個風險 中,
最最不可能發生的破產事件應該是那7個掛鈎公司。

金融精英們和政府监管机构的精英们在為無須披露抵押品內容而辯護的時候,可否請解釋一下:
如果廣告和章程可以大肆張揚解釋這發生可能性最小的風險,為甚麼不明確解釋另外發生可能性更高一些的風險呢 (即: [ 100-194 個公司 部分破產之風險])? 这是什么样的有选择性的风险披露呢?

或者拿出專業機構投資者們買入類似產品,而始終從未收到過合成CDO(信貸掛鈎產品)之詳細文件之例子?

参考1: "Lehman Minibond Series 6 解读迷债系列6"
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/lehman-minibond-series-6.html

参考2: Lehman Minibond Series 6 Prospectus::
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/lehman-minibond-series-6.html

2009年9月11日 星期五

轉載:證監難拒交報告 顯示銀行有系統性失誤

調查雷曼迷債事件的專責委員會,曾不止一次要求證監會交出銀行銷售迷債的調查報告,遭證監會以妨礙調查為由拒絕。據本報了解,在銀行與大部分事主達成和解協議後,證監會內部研判,繼續拒交報告的法理依據已變得相當薄弱,報告羅列的證據,足以證明大多數銀行銷售迷債確實存在系統性失誤。
銀行或多或少犯下四大錯誤


據悉,證監會的調查報告載有銀行系統性違規銷售的證據,專責委員會看完報告後,可能毋須花太多時間傳召銀行界人士作供也能得出清楚的結論。消息人士解釋,所謂系統性違規銷售,不一定是事主和媒體常說的誤導性銷售,如強調迷債是安全的債券或等同長期定期存款,也包括:


(1)沒有對產品作獨立的盡職審查,研判產品的風險特性;


(2)沒有針對產品的風險特性制訂適切的培訓教材和安排前線銷售人員接受專業的培訓;


(3)沒有制訂專業的測試辦法,準確地評估客戶對結構投資產品的風險承受能力;


(4)沒有針對特別脆弱客戶群,如高齡、低教育程度、殘障、全副身家投入等類別客戶,制訂額外的程序,確保客戶理解和接受產品的風險。


消息指出,銷售迷債的銀行大部分犯了以上一項或多項的錯誤,不管個別銷售個案中有沒有誤導性言論,都已經構成違規銷售。這種違規銷售是系統性的,因為誤導性陳述可能是個別前線人員違規,但培訓材料若未能準確講出產品核心風險,前線銷售人員便不可能解釋清楚給客戶知道,便會令每一宗銷售都出問題,所以是系統性的失誤,深植於銀行內部制度。銀行願意接受證監會提出的六至七成回購建議,或多或少是看到,若被檢控定罪的機會很大。


現公開報告不涉妨礙司法


消息指出,證監會拒絕向立法會專責委員會交出雷曼調查報告,法理依據是調查尚未結束,若銀行拒絕接受證監會為保障投資者提出的和解建議,調查所得將用於檢控銀行違規,向立法會披露調查所得可能會妨礙檢控和審訊,導致議會和媒體公審,有違司法公平原則。不過,現時絕大部分涉及雷曼有關產品投訴的銀行已經向客戶作出和解建議,證監會不會提出檢控,調查工作已經告一段落,原來拒絕交出報告的依據已經不存在。


消息稱,雖然證監會與被調查銀行達成和解協議載有保密條款,不得對外披露調查的內容,但立法會專責委員會若行使法定權力要求閱覽報告,《立法會(權力及特權)條例》的法律約束力將凌駕於證監會與銀行之間的協議,證監會為履行法例所定責任交出調查報告,不算違反保密協議。


至於尚有3間沒銷售迷債但涉及雷曼信用掛鈎票據的銀行,尚未與客戶和解,會否影響證監會交出報告,消息指調查報告可以隱去與這些銀行有關的資料,對和解談判應該沒有實質影響。

轉載自:明報 2009年9月11日(五) A版

2009年9月10日 星期四

Bloomberg: London Suicide Connects Lehman Lesson Missed by Hong Kong Woman

Sept. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Yu Lia Chun, a retired hospital orderly in Hong Kong, never heard of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. before she got a call last September from her banker.

“He said, ‘Did you hear the news? Something has happened to Lehman,’” Yu, 66, recalled in an interview in June. “I didn’t get it.”

Yu, who has a sixth-grade education, said she thought her money was in a savings account. She didn’t know she had lent it to a bankrupt American securities firm. Eventually, she found out that her HK$1.2 million ($155,000) nest egg was gone. Her children lost another HK$3.8 million because Yu had persuaded them to make similar investments.

“There is no way a person like me could understand any of this,” Yu said, dabbing her eyes with a tissue in a coffee shop in Hong Kong’s financial district. “Sometimes I feel like jumping off a building.”

What hit Yu and her family was a tidal wave triggered halfway around the world by the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history. The Sept. 15, 2008, collapse of Lehman, with $613 billion in liabilities, had unforeseen and far-flung consequences that devastated those, like Yu, who didn’t know their fates were tied to the New York-based investment bank.

‘Quicker This Time’

The chief operating officer of a private-equity firm in London jumped in front of a commuter train because he blamed himself for leaving the company’s money in a Lehman account, according to a coroner’s report. The Israeli managers of a hotel construction project on the island of West Caicos, northeast of Cuba, were taken hostage by Chinese workers when an anticipated Lehman loan didn’t materialize and wages weren’t paid. In Hong Kong, Yu and thousands of others who had invested in Lehman products camped out in the rain, thumping drums and chanting, “Give us our money back.”

The realization that a U.S. securities firm so woven into the financial system couldn’t pay its debts radiated out from New York, panicking investors around the world. It was a doomsday scenario that former International Monetary Fund chief economist Simon H. Johnson likened to Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s 1963 novel “Cat’s Cradle,” in which a single crystal of the fictitious substance ice-nine hardens all of the planet’s water.

What differentiated Lehman from previous financial crises was how fast the panic spread, said Richard Sylla, an economic and financial historian at New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business in New York.

“Communications made things happen faster,” Sylla said, describing how it took six months for the 1931 failure of Austria’s Creditanstalt bank to put stress on the British financial system. “The news of everything got spread around much quicker this time.”

Goldman Sachs Debt

The freezing of global credit markets following Lehman’s demise began with professionals who traded commercial paper in New York. They were the first to feel the chill when the Reserve Primary Fund, the oldest money market fund, was inundated with requests for redemptions and seized up hours after the bankruptcy filing. The $785 million that Reserve had lent to Lehman was deemed worthless by 4 p.m. the next day.

Fear that more banks and financial firms might fail meant most investors stopped lending to anyone other than the government. Even New York-based Goldman Sachs Group Inc., which earned $11.6 billion in 2007, more than any U.S. securities firm in history, wasn’t immune. The average annual cost of insuring $10 million of Goldman Sachs debt for five years soared to a record $545,000 from $182,557 in the three days after Lehman failed, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Plummeting Prices

Lehman’s demise triggered a panic. Money fund managers were forced to raise cash to pay off investors. They tried selling what securities they held and couldn’t. The market was flooded, and prices were plummeting -- if prices could be obtained at all. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index suffered its worst decline in six years. Mistrust leaked into the corporate bond market.

The most widely traded 30-year bond of General Electric Capital Corp., the world’s biggest issuer of commercial paper, dropped by as much as 30 cents on the dollar to 62 cents by Sept. 18 because of doubts that GE would be able to persuade money funds to renew its short-term notes.

At that price, the three-day loss for owners of the issue was more than $1.9 billion, according to prices provided by Trace, the bond-trade reporting system of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.

The U.S. responded within a week to guarantee money markets and bank-to-bank lending. Within a month, Congress agreed to spend $700 billion to prop up banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. guaranteed new bank debt, and Federal Reserve lending to financial institutions ballooned by $1 trillion.

Lehman Minibonds

Those programs, which succeeded in stemming the panic, remain in place today. What they didn’t do was save Yu and thousands of other investors in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and elsewhere who had bought equity-linked notes or so-called minibonds connected to Lehman.

Equity-linked notes combine attributes of both bonds and stock by investing part of the proceeds in share options and the remainder in fixed income. Minibonds are custom-made securities linked to the creditworthiness of companies, backed by collateralized-debt obligations and sold in denominations of $5,000. They functioned like credit-default swaps in reverse, where the investor stands to lose his principal when the firm named in the note can’t pay its debts.

‘Information Asymmetry’

Yu, a mother of six who emigrated from mainland China in 1962, didn’t have a chance, according to Joseph Stiglitz, a Columbia University economics professor who won a Nobel Prize for his work on the effect of unequal access to information on buyers and sellers in financial markets.

“As securities got more complex, the opportunities for gaming, to the disadvantage of ordinary people, increased,” Stiglitz said. “Complexity opened up new venues for information asymmetry, which banks exploited.”

Asia became Lehman’s highest growth region in 2007, taking in more than $3.1 billion in revenue, or 16 percent of the firm’s business. Revenue was up more than 41 percent from 2005 in Asia, while it climbed 3 percent in the U.S. in the same period, according to Bloomberg data.

Yu said she went to an export trade show in Hong Kong two years ago and met Chow Chi Chung, a salesman for Amsterdam-based ABN Amro Holding NV. He offered her a better return on her savings if she switched banks, she said. So she did.

Two-thirds of Yu’s money, about $100,000, came from a settlement with her employer after an elevator fell half a floor, injuring her pelvis, according to Yu, who still drags her right leg when she walks.

Didn’t Read Prospectus

A month after their meeting, Yu said Chow called her to say he had a new product that could return as much as 20 percent a year because it was linked to the stock performance of three large Chinese companies -- China Communications Construction Co.,China Merchants Bank Co. and Ping An Insurance Co.

Yu said she didn’t read the fine print, trusting Chow when he told her she couldn’t lose her principal. Had she looked at the prospectus and understood it she would have discovered that she had essentially bought three call options -- contracts that would capture gains if the shares of the three companies rose by a certain amount -- coupled with the equivalent of a Lehman corporate bond. If Lehman defaulted, her money would be gone.

Cash Bonus

ABN Amro, now part of Edinburgh-based Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, also recruited Yu to sell the same product to her family, giving her a cash bonus of about $155 for each person who signed up, she said.

Yuk Min Hui, a Hong Kong-based spokeswoman for RBS, declined to comment about Yu’s case. She said in an e-mail that if the bank determined that “sales processes and guidelines were not properly followed,” it would offer “appropriate remedies.” Only a small number of investors fall in this category, she said.

Chow couldn’t be located.

There are 873 issues of such Lehman equity-linked structured notes outstanding with a combined face value of about $8.7 billion, all now in default, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Bonds were denominated in pounds, Swiss francs and Hungarian forint, as well as Australian and Hong Kong dollars.

Banks also sold $1.8 billion of Lehman minibonds to an estimated 43,000 investors in Hong Kong, where the notes were first marketed in 2003, according to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. The biggest seller was BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd., a unit of Beijing-based Bank of China Ltd.

Financial Dumplings

The minibonds were all issued by a Cayman Islands-based entity called Pacific International Finance Ltd., set up by Lehman with trustees from London-based HSBC Holdings Plc. The notes were financial dumplings -- derivatives contracts tied to the creditworthiness of major companies wrapped inside Lehman corporate bonds. Series 19 notes, for instance, were linked to securities dealers including Citigroup Inc. and Goldman Sachs. If any of those businesses or Lehman defaulted, the investor wouldn’t get paid.

In effect, investors in Series 19 notes bought the losing end of credit-default swaps, or insurance policies pegged to the survival of financial institutions. If any of those companies failed, the noteholders were the ones responsible for paying off the principal on the derivative.

Lehman took payments from investors in exchange for a guaranteed yield, then placed the cash in a Lehman-managed money market fund and issued commercial paper to borrow more money. Those funds were in turn used to invest in CDOs sold by Lehman off-balance-sheet entities in places such as Ireland and the Cayman Islands.

‘Blood and Sweat’

Sun Kwan, a 58-year-old retired parks worker, was among those who bought Lehman minibonds. He stood outside the I.M. Pei-designed Hong Kong headquarters of the Bank of China on June 15, along with Yu and 51 other protesters, banging a chipped red drum with a stick every two seconds. Raindrops beaded on the brim of his blue cap. A sign around his neck, hand-lettered in Chinese characters, read: “The Bank of China is a hooker. Give me back my money earned with blood and sweat.”

Sun, who has a high school education, invested about $285,000 in Lehman Minibond Series 12 notes, sold to him by BOC Hong Kong, which paid about 4 percent interest a year.

He said he thought he was putting his money into a certificate of deposit. Instead, as the prospectus explained, the notes were a bet against the default of the Chinese government and five companies, including Hutchison Whampoa Ltd., which operates ports and telecommunications services, Chinese state-owned oil producer CNOOC Ltd. and Lehman.

As an incentive, he was given $26 in supermarket coupons.

Rhinos, Whales

Sun also purchased $40,000 worth of Octave Series 10 notes, a similarly structured product created by Morgan Stanley, in which the investor would lose all of his money if Lehman or any of six other companies defaulted. He said he never heard of Lehman and thought the notes were backed by the People’s Republic of China because most of the businesses were state- owned.

Nick Footitt, a spokesman for Morgan Stanley in Hong Kong, declined to comment.

Each minibond series was custom-made, so their characteristics differed. Packagers skipped using some numbers, including 4, which is considered unlucky in Chinese culture and would make the bond difficult to market. Investors got prizes, including video cameras and flat-screen televisions, according to newspaper advertisements and fliers handed out at banks. The ads, in both Chinese and English, featured rhinoceroses, whales and other symbols of potency, luck or profit.

‘Rotten Deal’

“It’s all gone,” Sun said in an interview conducted through a Chinese translator at the demonstration. “I almost wanted to kill myself. I’ve been crying for months, even though I am a man.”

He said he hadn’t yet told his 25-year-old son, Sun Chi Yan, what had happened to his nest egg, most of which came from a settlement when the government bought his family’s land.

Sun and Yu were among investors who staged protests almost every business day for nine months, sparking a Hong Kong legislative investigation and calls for more protection for retail customers. The raucous demonstrations in the city’s financial district, including a tent encampment and bullhorns connected to an iPod that blared the looped chant “Rotten Deal -- Money Back,” became an embarrassment to the banks.

In a city of 7 million, where only 30 percent of workers had pensions before 2001, the Lehman protesters struck a chord, according to Audrey Eu, one of 60 members of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council.

Bank Offer

“A lot of them lost their life savings,” Eu said in an interview in June. “They’re all crying. They work as cleaners, and $50,000 is a lot of money to them.”

Angel Yip, a spokeswoman for BOC Hong Kong, said in an e- mail that “we understand and sympathize with customers” who lost money as a result of the Lehman collapse. She said advertisements and prospectuses distributed by the bank “contained a detailed description of the structure and risks” of the investments.

In July, 16 retail banks, including BOC Hong Kong, offered to repay minibond investors at least 60 cents on the dollar, a deal brokered by the city’s securities regulator that would amount to $813 million. About two-thirds of eligible noteholders accepted the offer, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority said in a statement on Sept. 4. Sun said he hadn’t yet made up his mind.

“The compensation offer is totally unfair and based on groundless calculations,” Sun said. “If we have to accept it eventually, it’ll be because we’ve exhausted all other means.”

‘Grotesquely Wrong’

While investors in Hong Kong have the right to sue banks, there are no class-action laws or contingency fees, making it difficult to find lawyers willing to take cases.

Patrick Daniels, a lawyer with Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP in San Diego, has filed a class-action suit against Lehman in federal court in New York on behalf of minibond holders like Sun in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore seeking $1.6 billion from Bank of New York Mellon Corp. The money, mostly shares in Lehman’s Institutional Money Market Fund, is being held by the bank as collateral to secure the minibonds, Daniels said. Other Lehman creditors are trying to get the same funds from the Bank of New York Mellon, which isn’t accused of wrongdoing. The case is pending.

“Something is grotesquely wrong here,” Daniels said in an interview in July. “These people were just flat-out lied to and stolen from.”

Neither the lawsuit nor the settlement applies to Yu or other holders of equity-linked notes from Houston to Singapore.

London Suicide

Hong Kong retirees weren’t the only victims. Even professional investors were stuck with Lehman losses.

The stocks and bonds of Lehman’s London brokerage customers, used as collateral to borrow more money, were frozen on Sept. 15. About 3,500 clients, including 700 hedge funds, couldn’t get access to an estimated $65 billion of assets. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Lehman’s U.K. bankruptcy administrator, is still sorting out who should get paid and how much. Some firms have closed, and others may have to wait as long as a decade to get their assets back, Tony Lomas, the PwC partner in charge of the U.K. administration, said in August.

It took only 10 days for the ice-nine to get to Kirk Stephenson, chief operating officer of Olivant Ltd., a London private-equity firm run by former UBS AG Chairman Luqman Arnold. On Sept. 25, Stephenson, 47, jumped in front of a train going 125 mph at a station in Taplow, 28 miles (45 kilometers) west of London.

The coroner’s office for the county of Buckinghamshire ruled the death a suicide. Stephenson, a native of New Zealand, was despondent about the financial crisis and talked about killing himself one week after Lehman’s demise, according to a statement from his wife read at the coroner’s inquest.

U.K. Lock-Up

Lehman Brothers International (Europe) was Olivant’s prime broker. It held the firm’s 2.78 percent stake in UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank by assets, according to a statement from Olivant on Oct. 1. The shares were worth 1.6 billion francs ($1.44 billion) at the time.

The hedge fund lock-up led the U.K. to reconsider its procedures when firms fail. While Lehman’s broker-dealer in the U.S. stayed out of bankruptcy long enough to process many of its trades, the business seized up in the U.K.

“In the U.S., everything was wrapped in cotton wool for four days,” said PwC’s Lomas. In the U.K., “everything failed come 7:56 a.m. that Monday morning.”

‘Black Hole’

The U.K. had an advantage in attracting hedge fund assets before the Lehman bankruptcy. While U.S. prime brokers face limits on how much they can loan hedge funds, those rules could be circumvented with overseas units like Lehman’s in London. Some U.S. clients didn’t know they were customers of Lehman Brothers International (Europe).

“If you didn’t pay attention to what you were signing, you would have missed it,” said Michael Romanek, principal at Rise Partners Ltd., which arranges financing for funds from London. “It was called enhanced prime brokerage, where they could be more accommodating with more leverage or loans. It just took signing some extra papers in New York. Most people didn’t realize it.”

Some fund managers with frozen assets say they’ve gone from extreme anger to resignation that they’ll have to wait a long time to see any return.

“I still don’t know if I’ll ever get any money back,” said Edward Chin, whose Hong Kong-based Pride Revelation Fund used Lehman as its sole prime broker. “We’re in a black hole.”

$30 Billion Gap

The ice-nine also halted construction projects from Wall Street to the Turks and Caicos Islands.

Lehman borrowed against property investments that couldn’t easily be sold, such as construction loans. So when the property market turned sour and creditors demanded more collateral for the loans or their money back, the investment bank was stuck.

The property portfolio doomed Lehman when a rescue still seemed possible. On Saturday, Sept. 13, 2008, Timothy Geithner, then president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and now U.S. Treasury secretary, asked a team of the world’s top bankers to evaluate Lehman’s real estate holdings as part of an effort to facilitate a sale of the investment bank to London-based Barclays Plc.

The team, including representatives from Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse Group AG, determined that Lehman had overvalued its real estate investments by $20 billion to $30 billion, according to people who attended meetings at the New York Fed last September.

Watergate Hotel

When Barclays pulled out of an agreement to buy the firm, Lehman was forced to file for bankruptcy. Only then did Barclays buy Lehman’s U.S. securities business, including its headquarters in Manhattan’s Times Square.

The bankruptcy deprived the international real estate market of a major source of financing. The bank was known for doing deals nobody else would touch, according to a former Lehman executive.

The Watergate Hotel, made famous by the 1972 break-in that led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon, was sold at auction in August for $25 million after its owner, Washington- based Monument Realty LLC, defaulted on its mortgage. Monument was financed by Lehman.

A condo conversion at 25 Broad St. in Manhattan, two blocks from Goldman Sachs’s headquarters, was suspended by developers. It too was financed by Lehman.

SunCal, Depfa

Irvine, California-based SunCal Cos., a closely held developer, said it had $1.6 billion in financing from Lehman. Since the bank’s failure, 19 projects, all in California, have filed for bankruptcy, SunCal said. Work has stopped on all of them, including the 248-acre Marblehead Coastal community in San Clemente, which was supposed to feature 69 single-family homes, 244 other residences, a movie theater, parks and hiking trails.

Munich-based Hypo Real Estate Holding AG received 102 billion euros ($143 billion) in debt guarantees and credit lines from the German government after its Depfa unit was stuck without short-term funding following Lehman’s bankruptcy. Like Lehman, Hypo funded long-term real estate assets with short-term loans such as commercial paper.

German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck defended the bailout of the lender because the global financial system was just “millimeters from the abyss.”

Molasses Reef

On West Caicos, an otherwise uninhabited island 250 miles northeast of Cuba, work stopped on the Molasses Reef Ritz- Carlton Hotel and Residences, slated to include a cluster of $6.5 million cottages. About 400 Chinese employees of Tel Aviv- based construction firm Ashtrom Properties Ltd. didn’t get paid when Lehman funding dried up, according to Jonathan Siegel, New York-based managing director of Logwood Hotel Development Co.

About 60 electrical workers rebelled, taking a dozen managers hostage and refusing to let them leave the island.

“We had 400 to 500 unhappy men, and we were concerned violence would erupt,” Siegel said. “The Turks and Caicos government was very unhappy with the situation. There was a limited supply of food and water.”

Ashtrom ended the standoff after a week by paying what it considered “a ransom,” Siegel said. The project, about 70 percent completed, is still on hold, said Verona Carter, Ritz- Carlton Hotel Co.’s director of public relations for the Caribbean area.

Financial Leadership

The vulnerability of the global financial system revealed by Lehman’s bankruptcy -- from ordinary investors like Sun and Yu to London hedge funds and German lenders -- makes it all the harder to regulate.

“The difficulty you have in getting control is that you need a global alliance,” said former World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn in an e-mail. “You need all the finance ministers to come together, because if a transaction can’t be done here, it can be done in Lichtenstein or France or the Far East.”

Lehman’s bankruptcy also poses a challenge to America’s financial leadership.

Wall Street profited by arranging financing that allowed other countries to tap global capital markets to build offices, factories, resorts and housing. What’s broken now is the trust the rest of the world had in U.S. banks, said Phillip Yin, a native of Seattle who is managing director of Asia Investors Partners Ltd., a Hong Kong-based research firm.

“All that has happened since -- the job losses, the slump, everything -- is tied to one thing and one event,” Yin said. “And that’s Lehman.”

(Lehman’s Lessons: Next, Too Big to Fail)

To contact the reporters on this story: Mark Pittman in New York at mpittman@bloomberg.net; Bob Ivry in New York at bivry@bloomberg.net.



from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aNFuVRL73wJc

2009年9月6日 星期日

《信報》證監在雷曼事件應負的責任

在2002年三月《證券及期貨條例》二讀時,財經事務局局長葉澍堃就政府的立塲作了如下的重要陳述;“我們清楚明白加强證監會的問責性及透明度极為重要,所以條例草案保留了所有現行的問責安排,並且引入多項額外的制衡措施”,“例如在條例草案加入證監會的規管目標,讓市民及業界可以以這些目標作基準,衡量證監會的工作表現”.
在立法會立法通過賦予證監會更大的權力以保障投資者的目標後,出現了涉及數萬宗的史無前例投訴,市民及業界對這樣的監管成效,有何感想呢?雖然大部分的投訴是針對銀行,但證監會是不可能將責任全數推給金管局及投資者的,理由是根據《證券及期貨條例》,證監會是有「監管、監察及規管」銀行銷售證券產品的權力及責任,雖然條例亦指出,證監會可以根據不同情况而行使酌情權,以决定部分或全部依賴金管局代他們執行對銀行的前線監管.但他們亦可運用酌情權,不完全依賴金管局,並要求直接抽查懷疑違規的銀行,法例是完全允許的.
再者,證監會亦可與金管局商討修改他們雙方訂立但沒有法律效力的《備忘錄》,以讓證監曾可直接監管銀行對這些結構性金融產品的銷售,這種安排亦是有法可依的.但證監會並未有積極考慮這些做法.面對可能出現的金融危機,仍然是默守成規地按章工作.
知悉問題不作堵塞
除上述的權責外,證監會對結構性產品進入市場,是有守門員的責任.披露為本的監管政策主要體現在審批、監察及規管章程、廣告及持續披露,讓投資者能評估產品的投資價值及風險.對披露不足的文件不作登記,產品便不能向公眾發售.根據證監會的執行董事日前在立法會上作供時表示,證監會招股章程組是按《公司條例》附表三的條款,審批結構性產品的章程,他承認該條款對監管這此包含了CDS(信貸違約掉期)產品的章程是過時,且承認該小組並沒有審批這些複雜的保險及衍生產品的財務及精算人才.
其實證監會對這個漏洞巳知悉多年,但一直只停留於諮詢而不作堵塞.早於二00三年,證監會已就修改招股章程展開了三個階段的諮詢,在二00五年最後一次諮詢文件中清楚指出,《公司條例》附表三是為監察具有實體業務的公司發債及招股而設的,不適合規管經營衍生產品的公司發債.
證監會於二00六年九月就該諮詢發表總結報告,提出可考慮將含有CDS及CDO(債務抵押債券)一類的結構性產品剔出債券的定義範圍,使其章程及廣告受《證券及期貨條例》,而非不合適的《公司條例》所規管.若證監會當時加速立法並嚴格執行,便沒有今天的雷曼事件.

調查組披露執法漏洞
在聆聽證監會两位高層人員的作供後,可看到四個重要的事實.
第一.證監會於二00五年巳確認《公司條例》對監管結構性產品的章程及廣告是過時的;
第二.招股章程組對審批具有保險特性的債券章程並無相關的尃業人才;
第三.《公司條例》雖然有很多漏洞,但其中多項條款仍可發揮作用,讓證監會可要求發債人披露更具體的風險及可能的利益冲突,但章程組並沒有積極運用該等條款,以要求發債人披露更重要的資料,讓投資者作出有依據的决定.
第四.證監是可以引用《證券及期貨條例》第105(1)條,對申請審批的廣告加上任何附加限制,以保障投資者不受廣告的誤導,但章程組對廣告的審批採取過分寬鬆的標準.
結構性金融產品引致龐大數量的投訴,究竟與證監會這種被動式的執法有多大關連?他們應該負上多大的責任?市民應可用當年葉澍堃在立法會上所提的立法目標作基準,以“衡量證監會的工作表現”並回答上述的問題.
《信報》2009年8月4日 曾廣海、尹靖廷

2009年9月3日 星期四

CNBC news: M. Stanley, Moody's, S&P Must Defend Fraud Claims

Source of CNBC news: http://www.cnbc.com/id/32667231.

Published: Wednesday, 2 Sep 2009

A U.S. federal judge ruled that Morgan Stanley and two credit rating agencies must defend fraud charges in a class-action lawsuit accusing them of masking the risks of an investment linked to subprime mortgages, and which eventually collapsed.

U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin on Wednesday rejected efforts by Morgan Stanley [MS 27.09 -0.36 (-1.31%) ] , Moody's [MCO 26.10 -0.32 (-1.21%) ] Moody's Investors Service and McGraw-Hill's [MHP 32.31 -0.95 (-2.86%) ] Standard & Poor's to dismiss fraud claims brought by the plaintiffs, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and King County in Washington state.

She dismissed the plaintiffs' remaining claims, and all claims against a fourth defendant, Bank of New York Mellon [BK 27.95 -0.15 (-0.53%) ] , while granting permission for the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.

Scheindlin's ruling could affect other lawsuits brought by pension funds and other investors, seeking to hold banks and credit raters responsible for hyping the value of complex debt to win fees and causing investor losses as the debt collapsed.

The case concerned the Cheyne Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV), which went bankrupt in August 2007 after the quality of its assets plummeted. Many investors in Cheyne-related notes lost much or all of their investments.

SIVs are complex packages of loans and debt, including collateralized debt obligations, that once held some $350 billion of assets before falling out of favor.

The California Public Employees' Retirement System, the nation's largest public pension fund, in July sued Moody's, S&P and Fitch Ratings over losses on Cheyne and other SIVs.

In the New York case, the plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley wrongly marketed Cheyne as a high-quality investment, and that the rating agencies assigned improperly high ratings.

The complaint also accused Bank of New York Mellon, acting as a depositary and processing agent, of improperly valuing Cheyne's assets and delivering reports to the rating agencies.


In a 68-page ruling, Scheindlin said the plaintiffs pleaded enough facts to let the fraud claims case go forward.

"Where both the rating agencies and Morgan Stanley knew that the ratings process was flawed, knew that the portfolio was not a safe, stable investment, and knew that the rating agencies could not issue an objective rating because of the effect it would have on their compensation, it may be plausibly inferred that Morgan Stanley and the rating agencies knew they were disseminating false and misleading ratings,"
she wrote.

Scheindlin set an Oct. 1 status conference in the case.

McGraw-Hill spokesman Frank Briamonte said the company was pleased that Scheindlin dismissed all but one of 11 claims it faced, and said it was "confident" it would prevail on the remaining claim.

Bank of New York Mellon spokesman Kevin Heine had no immediate comment. The rest of the parties did not immediately return calls or e-mails seeking comment.

The case is Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan), No. 08-7508.

2009年9月2日 星期三

銀行迫迷債事主啃6成方案 ,情何以堪 !

((轉載自經濟日報 9月2日)
在現代社會,公關手法經常有助扭轉事件發展。上星期日新疆發生特大騷亂,舉世震驚。中央政府在星期一立即安排國內外媒體採訪騷亂現場,爭取輿論主動。可見在信息年代,連一向以威權見稱的中央政府也明白公關造勢的重要性。

銀行公關造勢 迫證監低頭

遠在海角一隅的香港,近日為了證監會應否同意16家零售銀行用雷曼迷債60%的價值(下稱「6成方案」)來全面性解決雷曼事件,也掀起一場公關造勢戰。本星期三有公關同行在他報的專欄把有份協助雙方的公關專才名字點了出來,甚至說證監會韋奕禮以公帑來聘請一些資深公關人是為了締造人民英雄形象。又說「銀行自動求和」,明眼人一看便知道是為銀行造勢,企圖令證監會低頭,接受銀行6成方案建議。但這個結果是對雷曼苦主不利的。為了苦主的利益,筆者要把自己知道的情況說出來,以正視聽。

筆者先申報利益,我自己雖屬公關界,但我本人和我所屬公司都沒有接任何涉及雷曼一方的生意。筆者只是以個人身份義務地幫雷曼苦主。筆者身為民主黨核心黨員,也是公開資訊;筆者評論雷曼事件時從來沒有藏頭露尾,在不申報利益情況下,借助自己的專欄去為商業利益服務。

銀行一毛不拔 損失全歸事主

雷曼苦主大聯盟主席陳光譽先生在6月底時已指出,銀行(當時主要指中銀)若真的以6成方案來解決雷曼事件,其實是把抵押品的價值照價還給苦主而已。銀行可謂分毫不出、一毛不拔。對於中銀這種錙銖必算的行徑,我兩周前已在本欄內指出中銀這樣做,有違其企業社會責任,更加有負國家刻意在香港締造和諧的苦心。沒有國家數年前把以千億計金錢注入中銀以充實其資本,中銀集團根本不可能在香港上市。現在國家為了在香港締造和諧,絞盡腦汁、扭盡六壬。中銀集團卻袖手旁觀,捂着荷包不肯多賠一點予雷曼苦主。用內地的話講,這是不懂政治,不顧全大局的宗派思想。左派陣營經常扣民主派破壞安定團結的帽子;但中銀集團明知雷曼苦主們失去了自己畢生積蓄卻依然只肯賠6成,客觀上是迫雷曼苦主走向極端,甚至走向絕路(辛瑞英女士的不幸,令人神傷)。其對香港安定團結的破壞,莫此為甚。

用內地的話來說:「錢是人民的」,不是你中銀集團袞袞諸公個人所有的。倘若中銀集團有份直接或間接聘用專業公關來為其6成方案造勢,迫證監會及雷曼苦主硬啃這個骨頭。那更是用人民的錢來破壞香港人民的和諧,迫同屬中國公民的雷曼苦主接受城下之盟。真的是情何以堪﹗中聯辦理應介入,訓斥中銀集團高層只見樹木不見森林,和中央政府的和諧政策對着幹!

公關文過飾非 愧讀聖賢書

至於說證監會堅持要100%賠償才接受令事件膠着,令雷曼苦主繼續受折磨。實情是雷曼苦主大聯盟早已明確要求銀行百分百賠償。今次證監會恰巧是站在人民的一面,和人民對着幹的反而是零售銀行及其公關們。雷曼苦主目睹證監會成功迫使新鴻基及凱基兩家證券行同意百分百賠償,一眾苦主拍手稱快都來不及,又怎會在乎多等一會。證監會若在輿論下低頭,6成方案一旦執行,損失的是雷曼苦主,埋下的是未來社會不穩定的因素,得益的是有錯不認還要賺到盡的零售銀行。

金融海嘯下,我明白一眾同業的生意壓力,但置公義於不顧來為有錯不認的零售銀行造勢,令我想起了文天祥的四句詩:「讀聖賢書 所學何事 而今而後 庶幾無愧」。

謹以此與各同行共勉!
撰文:馮煒光 中產動力主席

2009年8月29日 星期六

Lehman Minibond Series 6 解读迷债系列6

解读迷债系列6,
因为系列6是2003-2004两年间提供最高利息的迷债系列(跟系列5 或系列7-10相比),却是销售量最低的系列(低于5百万美金),其表面挂钩公司也跟其它系列不同:跟多达150个公司信贷挂钩。

Series 6 was issued in Sep.2003, and matured in Sep.2005, but was extended (by issuer) to Mar.2009.

Why Series 6?

It would be interesting to learn how the early Minibond Series was introduced. For Series 6, there was only a "PROSPECTUS". For Series 10 and later, Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus are offered.

Because Series 6 showed us how Minibond's upfront facade / marketing selling point had been evolved over years, It also showed us how the disclosure level of Underlying Securities related information had gone from LESS to the LEAST, while the prospectus was expanded into Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus . Similar reduction in disclosure is also observed in the DBS Constellation Notes, if one compares the much polished prospectus for Constellation Series 59 versus the Constellation Series 34-37. The Prospectus for Minibond Series 6 also showed us what banks knew at the early stage about the true features and material risks of Minibond.

Summary of Minibond Series 6.
1. Maturity Term.
Series 6 was issued in Sep.2003, with initial Maturity date in Sep.2005.
Upon maturity, the issuer has the right to extend the maturity date to Mar.2009.

2. It is credit-linked to 150 reference companies ("referecne portfolio") .
The Prospectus listed the 150 reference companies name, and their rating.

3. Prospectus listed the impact to the interest-rate with the number of default event of the 150 reference entities.
- For Sep.2003 - Sep.2005:
0 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 5%:
1 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 4.15%: ........
5 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 0.80%:
6 or more default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 0:

- For extended Sep.2005 - Mar.2009:
0 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 8 %:
1 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 6.65%: ........
5 default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 1.30%:
6 or more default => Minibond (Series 6)'s Interest Rate is 0:


4. Where did the Minibond Money go?
According to Prospectus, it would be used on purchasing "Underlying Securities" with maturity date at Mar.2009.
The Underlying Securities in fact was another structured products.
My Comments:
Prospectus did not use the term 'collateral', the document used 'Underlying Securities'.


5. It claimed to be principal protected. but it also said that if something happened to the Underlying Securities, the principal will be at loss (or total loss).

6. Procedures and Information related to the 'underlying securities' in the Prospectus.

(a) page 53: "APPLICATION PROCEDURES"
(...)
Relevant Dealers will inform prospective investors that copies of the documents listed under paragraph 10 in the section headed "General Information" are available for inspection at the office of the Arranger specified herein ."

(b) in Page 95, "General Information" ,
"10. (...) copies of the following documents will be available .....and the Initial Dealers " (i.e. the distributing banks).

(c) page 96: "(xii): Information Memorandum and all other relevant programme documentation relating to the Underlying Securities Issuer's US $18,000,000,000 EUR Medium-Term Notes Program guaranteed (...)"

(d) page 96: "(xiii) Pricing Supplement relating to the Underlying Securities which supplements the master terms and conditions of the Underlying Securrities set out in the Information Memorandum referered to in (xii) above to form the terms and conditiosn of the Underlying Securities"

My comment:
- The "(xiii)" , i.e. (d) above, refers to the crucial Underlying Securities information document.
- The Underlying Securities Information Documents were available at selling agent (distributor banks) office.
- The "APPLICATION PROCEDDURE" and "General Information" were in fact requiring selling-agent /distributors
(i) to inform clients/potential minibond-buyers all the document information including Underlying Securities Information Document,
(ii) to let clients/potential minibond-buyers inspect all the document information including Underlying Securities Information Document, at selling-agent's office (i.e. at banks if the distributor is a bank). => Both Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus for later Minibond Series never invited clients to inspect such information/documents at selling agents / distributors office any more.
- Similar requirements for inviting clients to inspect the Underlying Securities Information Documents were also found in the prospectus of Constellation Series 34-37 (in the name of "Charged Asset Information" ), but NOT in the prospectus of Constellation Series 59.

- Did selling agents/distributors inform and give clients Underlying Securities Information Document?
- Did selling agents/distributors read through Underlying Securities Information Document which were available at their site?
* What did they learn about the Underlying Securities' true feature and risks?
* How did the Underlying Securities Information affect Banks' understanding on the Minibond's true features and risks?
* How did the Underlying Securities Information affect Banks' understanding on the Minibond's material risk and material information?
- Is there a connection between such information with the Questions regarding to disclaimers in Wing Hang Bank's Minibond Purchaser Confirmation Form?
Questions: in http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/question-regarding-wing-hang-banks.html


(e) page 96: "Copies of the (...) refered to in (...) (xii), (xiii) and (xiv), will be avialable for inspection as aforesaid with effect from the Issue Date. (...)"

My Comment:
- The Prospectus disclosed that some information (e.g. Underlying Securities Information Document) will be available from the Issue Date, i.e. not available before the Sale-offer closed.
- Similar information on the availability of "Charged Asset Information" (i.e. Underlying Securities equivalent) was also found in the Constellation Series 34-37, but was not found in the prospectus for later Constellation Series (e.g. Constellation Series 59).
- Similar information (disclosure) was dropped forever in the Program Prospectus & Issue Prospectus for Minibond series 10 and later. The Program Prospectus and Issue Prospects never mentioned about the availability of Underlying Securities Information Document.

In the later series (of Minibond and Constellation notes), not only there was no mentioning of the availability of Underlying Securities (collateral) Information document, the well polished Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus never invited clients to inspect such information/documents at selling-agents/distributors office any more.
WHY?
Because such information did not carry material information and was not relevant material information for understanding the true features and risks of Minibond / Constellation notes ?



7. Distributors of Minibond Series 6:
Dah Sing Bank,
ICBC (Asia),
Mervas Bank,
Shanghai Commercial Bank,
Sun Hung Kai Investment Services Limited,
Wing Hang Bank,
WIng Lung Bank;

8. Sales of Early Minibond Series (based on data from HSBC USA Trustee).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 5: $10.6 million USD; Reference Entities: 1 ; Interest Rate at 3.8%; Jun.2003- Jul.2010;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 6: $4.75 million USD; Reference Entities: 150 ; Interest Rate at 5% for year 1-2, 8% from 3rd year-maturity, pending on number of default event; Sep.2003 - Mar.2009;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 7A: $15.2 million USD; Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 4.2%: Nov.2003 - Dec.2008;
Series 7B: $32 million USD ($250 million HKD); Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 4.2%:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 9A: $22 million USD; Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 3.7% year 1-3, 4.3% year 4-maturity: Mar.2004 - Sep.2009;
Series 9B: $353 million USD; Reference Entities: 6 ; Interest Rate at 3.5% year 1-3, 4.1% year 4-maturity:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 10: $44.6 million USD; Reference Entities: 7 + Additional 125 undisclosed reference entities hidden in CDO Collateral ; USD Interest Rate at 4.25% year 1-3, 4.75% year 4-maturity: May 2004 - Nov.2009;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Series 11: $42 million USD; Reference Entities: 1 + Additional 125 undisclosed reference entities hidden in CDO Collateral ; fixed + Libor linked float Interest Rate: Jun.2004 - Jun.2010;
------------------------------------------------------------


My Comment:
- Series 6 was offering a higher interest rate comparing to other series because Series 6 has 150 reference entities at up front.
- Series 6 Sales was the lowest amongst all the Minibond Series.
- Comparing the Interest Rate (and sales results) offered for Series 6 versus Series 10:
Both are credit linked to over 100 reference entities. But Series 6 listed 150 reference entities at up front, Series 10 listed 1 reference entities at up front and addded another 125 reference entities in the never disclosed CDO.




参考1: Series 6 Prospectus:
http://www.sfc.hk/sfcCOPro/EN/displayFileServlet?refno=0550&fname=Minibond%20Series%206_Prospectus_ENG2.pdf

参考2: 從 迷債系列 6 看 雷曼迷你債券騙局手段之 完美完善過程
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/09/6_4956.html
.
.

2009年8月25日 星期二

美國聯邦法官拒絕在證券委和美銀和解書上簽字-起時

轉載“起時”博客:(link: http://blog.wenxuecity.com/blogview.php?date=200908&postID=31745)

金融危機發生近一年,雖然金融系統幾乎崩潰, 經濟遭巨大創傷,失業率高昇,人心惶惶,政府用納稅人的錢救助了那些“太大”的金融機構。奧巴馬,布什及所有華盛頓的官員都在譴責華爾街的“貪婪”,但迄今為止,沒有一個人,無論是華爾街,或華盛頓公開站出來,為他們的行為向納稅人道歉。迄今為止,沒有一個主要負責人人因此受到司法的追究。華爾街的銀行盈利照舊,金融衍生品照賣,華盛頓的“國會代表”們只會在無任何法律效力的聽證會上,裝模作樣痛斥華爾街的執行長,企圖換取選民的支持。但金融危機到底如何造成的,誰造成的,為甚麼會造成那麼大的損失,難道只是簡單的“貪婪”?和“投機”? 這裡邊隱藏的巨大欺騙,和黑幕,不知那天才能暴露於天下。

今天的一個新聞讓我分外注意,就是證券委(SEC) 再次試圖和美銀( Bank of America)和解,美銀同意支付三千三百萬的罰款,為去年美林(Merrill Lynch)的年終分紅接受罰款,與證券委和解,並要求聯邦法官傑德· 瑞考夫 (Jed S. Rakoff)在和解書上簽字。美銀去年9月在保森和美林前執行長約翰·贊 (John Thain) 的“欺騙”下,先與美林“訂婚”,12月又在保森和博南克的“槍口下”,被迫“完婚”。而美林隱瞞第四季高達140億的損失,在公佈季報之前,悄悄發了近四十億的奬金。

這是證券委和美銀第二次的企圖了。上次就被瑞考夫駁回,要求提供更多的證據,解釋為甚麼要和解。今天,瑞考夫再次質問證券委和解的原因,如果美銀的管理層撒了謊,證券委為甚麼不起訴,而只要求和解。

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125123100930658077.html

證券委申訴了理由,但被法官駁回。 法官瑞考夫認為證券委的解釋是“不符常理“。

法官瑞考夫強調有義務使“和解”公平和符合公眾的利益。

我在另一篇博文中講到,美國的司法近乎癱瘓,尤其是“白領犯罪”,無法可循,無理可證,用諾貝爾得奬克魯格曼的話說“華爾街的所有手法都是合法”。奧巴馬政府天天嚷著要金融改革,但卻不做改革,不追究危機發生的責任,這樣做,只會掩蓋事實,反而使下次危機發生的可能性更高。而財長蓋特納也在多次場合表示,是錯誤(mistake) 造成了危機的發生。這麼大的錯誤,可能只有“華盛頓”和“華爾街”能犯吧?

這個案子,就是另一例奧巴馬政府企圖用“和解”掩蓋欺騙,掩蓋犯罪,試圖用納稅人的人為犯罪買單。別忘了,我們納稅人已經為美銀投資了450億了。這三千三百萬的罰款是納稅人的錢,我不知道證券委會拿多少分成,納稅人養著他們,而他們卻連一個麥道夫都抓不到。

但願瑞考夫法官能主持正義,讓納稅人給回一點對司法的信心。請繼續關注。

2009年8月22日 星期六

王子犯法:無罪?有罪的是抗議王子犯法的庶民們?

(據8月23日太陽報)“警方證實,由今年一月至本月二十日,中區警區共接獲十九宗與雷曼事主示威活動有關的報案,當中涉及傷人、恐嚇及於公眾地方行為不檢等。現時共有十六人被捕,當中八人因證據不足獲釋,其餘八人保釋候查。
法律界人士梁永鏗指出,任何人在示威過程中作出過激行為,例如刑事毀壞及傷人等,社會絕不會接受,但如果苦主只是透過帶有激烈性字眼的口號,藉以宣洩不滿情緒,梁則認為是情有可原。另一方面,他促請證監會及金管局做好自己的角色,搜集足夠證據,向涉嫌違規的銀行作出處分。



現實是:
- 在近日已經有兩個苦主突然被警察就未有確實的證據、而且非常輕微的事故帶返警局調查
- 2008年9月至今以來,由受害人個人(不是有錢勢的金融機構或財團)給警方提出的數千宗對金融機構及其職員之金融欺騙的相關報案,警方對於相關金融機構和職員做出過甚麼相關調查呢?

警方連續對2至3個月前在某一大銀行示威的苦主採取行動, 但卻對銀行銷售產品過程中偽造罪行的報案置之不理,明顯是有強烈的政治意圖。難道說:當金融機構行騙的時候,司法機關就可以一拖再拖(以冠冕堂皇的理由)而最終不了了之了?

當金融機構對一些參與抗議的苦主們有投訴的時候,警方就會迅速採取相應的行動。對無權勢無商業巨頭機構做背景的普通百姓極盡威嚇恐赫之能。參見“關於警察濫用職權,給警察局的一封公開信”。這簡直是黑色恐怖!

深受金融詐騙的苦主們的相關投訴呢?警方一定是在“認真”處理的過程之中吧?這麼複雜的產品,警方大概是看不明白的? 銀行大概也是被雷曼欺騙了,銀行可能是只理解傭金而不理解產品的真實特徵和風險,而蒙查查地做了幾年的產品銷售。誠如一個藥品銷售商給學生們賣了幾年毒品,可是毒品並不是該藥品銷售商製造的呀。要抓,也要抓毒品製造商和買毒品的學生們呀。怎麼可以怪到藥品銷售商的頭上來了呢?

金管局象保護心愛王子一樣地庇護銀行。 證監會,也只有在回購談判的最後關頭跟銀行家們叩頭投降最後的回購建議不僅僅連究竟誰錯證監會對於銀行有甚麼錯/或有甚麼關注等根本不提,乾脆連“錯”和“關注”都不敢寫入。監管機構和政府的態度這讓警方怎麼能夠因為有幾千名苦主報案就因此去調查銀行了呢? 警察要向政府/特首負責。而特首的主要責任之一是對銀行和銀行家負責,對吧?特首是來自警察之家,當然理解警察向政府/特首負責的心態和制度。還是束之高閣慢慢地調查調查吧,“一萬年久”。過了今生還有來世... 特首不是來自雷曼苦主之家,自然不能理解苦主們信任“銀行理財”的後果是:過去的存定期時的“悠閒生活” 變成了現在的“遊行生活”。。。

與此同期間,關於金融欺騙, 紐約的 檢察官 和 FBI 們做了些甚麼呢? 請按此連接

http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/08/while-hk-police-have-busy-with.html

2009年8月20日 星期四

Open Letter to Commissioner of Police Regarding to Police Abuse of Powers

(轉載)
An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of Police Abuse of Powers

Mr. TANG King Shing

Commissioner of Police , Police Headquarters,

Sirs,

I write on behalf of Ms. Tracy Ho as well as the Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims in Hong Kong to complain against your officers who authorise the ‘dawn raid’ against Ms. Ho for reason that she is suspected of having committed an act of common assault.
The alleged assault takes place at about 1625 hours on 21st May 2009 outside the Bank of China Building, which is situate at no. 1 Garden Road, Central. In addition to the gross disproportion between police action and the nature of the allegation, there are numerous dubious acts on the part of your officers during the process that could only be explained as intending to maximize the harassment and distress inflicted on Ms. Ho and her family.

The Dawn Raid

2. At about 07:30 hours on 19th August 2009 five detectives (three male and two female) in plain clothes claiming to be attached to the Central Police District or Division knocked on the door of Ms. Ho’s Residence in Choi Hung. The visit is a total surprise and when Ms. Ho answered the door your officers insisted that they wanted to enter the premises before they would reveal the purpose of their visit.

3. With utmost reluctance and distress of her family, Ms. allowed the officers into her home. One of the officers then produced a photograph to Ms. Ho and asked if she is the person in it. Although the photograph does not show her face, Ms. Ho recalled the scene which is the protest outside the Bank of China Building mentioned above.

4. When Ms. Ho was about to admit that she is the lady on the photograph, one of the officer threatened her to immediately produce the clothes and shoes she worn that day or else they would search for the items themselves. Perplexed by the sudden police interest in the event that happened months ago and pressured by the threatening language, Ms. Ho complied with the demand and produced the items accordingly. She was then asked to follow the officers to the police station for further enquiries but before leaving the premises she was asked to sign on the notebook of one of the officers that it was not an arrest and she was not therefore handcuffed.

A Trivial Offence

5. Ms. Ho arrived at the Central Police Station at Arsenal Street at about 0930 hours after having been taken to and asked to wait at the Ngau Tau Kok Police Station for some time during which your officers were presumably completing some formalities to record their action in another police area.

6. In the Central Police Station, Ms. Ho was shown a video footage lasting for about 10 to 15 seconds in which her right foot seemed to have a momentary contact with the buttock of a bank staff. Apparently the footage was shot in a commotion where attempt was made by the bank staff to forcibly remove the protesters. It is understandable that in such circumstances people were jostling against each another and what Ms. Ho was doing then is crucial in establishing the plausibility of the allegation against her.

7. Ms. Ho has a flair for electronic video and audio devices and she has been responsible for filming the public activities of the Alliance almost since the creation of it. When the assault was allegedly taken place, Ms. Ho was actually holding her video device filming the forcible removal of the protesters by the bank staff. Her attention was on the action in front of her and the display screen of her video. It is, to say the least, very unlikely that a person would in the circumstances feel like joining the fray.

8. There is another factor that discounts the truthfulness of the allegation. Ms. Ho is a small, slim young lady whose weight would not be much more than 90 lbs. Could a person with that physique be inclined to provoke a fight? And could a lady like Ms. Ho who has taken part in so many protests relating to the fraud of Lehman Brothers and has always behaved properly, suddenly and without any provocation whatsoever, acted contrary to her personality and disposition? The allegation is so preposterous that no person in his right mind would seriously entertain it. Yet your officers have concluded that the offence is so grave that it justifies a deployment of five officers to carry out a dawn raid for an allegation of common assault where the supposed victim does not seem to have suffered any visible or detectable injury and does not complain for months after the event.

Assault on Law by Abuses of Powers

9. How should the public comprehend a dawn raid by five detectives against a young lady suspected of common assault? Does it not indicate the new low of the state of policing in this city under your watch?
But that is not all in so far as the outrageous police conduct is concerned. For almost one year now Ms. Ho has been the contact person between the police and the Alliance on many occasions especially in respect of application for approval to assemble and conduct procession. Your officers at the Police Community Relations Office in Central District know Ms. Ho well and it would take only a phone call to get Ms. Ho to the Central Police Station to view the video footage and to assist police investigation into the allegation. The differences between asking Ms. Ho to the police station and the dawn raid are that only the latter could inflict the distress, sudden sense of fear, and helplessness on Ms. Ho and her family.

10. The connection between the decision to harass Ms. Ho and another assault complaint against the bank staff at the scene of protest is clear. As mentioned above, the moment when Ms. Ho was accused of committing assault on the anonymous bank staff, she was filming an assault in progress by the bank staff against a protester.
It is hardly surprising that the protester would sustain injury given the way she was man-handled by the bank staff. As it was, she was taken to hospital, and stayed there for days for medical treatment. We also learn that a complaint of assault was lodged with the police by her or subsequently with the medical findings of the injury she sustained. Despite the evidence, no action has been taken against the bank or the assailant by the police, just like other crimes related to the Lehman Brothers fraud.

11. In the circumstances, it is an irresistible inference that the police harassment against Ms. Ho is motivated by the desire to please certain influential individuals affiliated with the bank.

12. The allegation against Ms. Ho is so trivial that she is granted a police bail of HKD100. Against an allegation of common assault that could, technically speaking, be committed by everyone in this crowded community, the police deployed five detectives to conduct a dawn raid on the basis of the flimsiest evidence which comes into being in a commotion caused largely by the bank itself. The commotion would not have happened had the police had the courage and sense of decency to enforce the law. Against the banks for fraud that is proven by documentary evidence that no government official would dare to dispute, not a single officer of yours has the courage to follow your own orders to classify the complaints after almost one year of their lodgments with the Commercial Crime Bureau. Insofar as the Lehman Brothers fraud is concerned, the victims have been deprived of any legal rights and remedies. Would any of the government officials to whom this complaint is addressed care to respond to this latest episode of police abuse of powers?

c.c.
Mr. TANG Ying Yen, Henry, Chief Secretary for Administration
Mr. Wong Yan Lung, Secretary for Justice
Mr. Ian Grenville Cross, Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Ian McWalters, Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions
Mr. Lee Ka Chiu, Director of Crime & Security, HKP

======================================================
From: An Open letter to the Commissioner of Police regarding to the latest episode of police abuse of powers

2009年8月19日 星期三

Is HK now a Heaven for Banking Crooks ?



What have HK Police / Justice department done regarding all the financial fraud related complaints by Minibond / Constellation / Octave victims /other-products, since 15 sept. 2008?
(a) act upon banks' request & demand: Arrested and raided some minibond / constellation victims who participated in protesting banks' over 5 years' fraudulent act;
(b) Taking photos of those who participated in the demonstrations ...
(c) What ELSE ????????

While HK Police have been busy with responding to banks' request & demand: searching & raiding Minibond/Constellation victims because of their involvement in protest against Banks' cheating behavior on Minibond / Constellation / Octave,
What have the financial center New York's legal system done so far?


In the recent news:

1. "New York Attorney General sues Charles Schwab over securities sales" (Aug.17)
NEW YORK - New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo filed a lawsuit Monday against the brokerage unit of Charles Schwab Corp., claiming the firm misled customers about the safety of auction-rate securities.
Cuomo's office has been at the forefront of pushing brokers and underwriters of auction-rate securities to repurchase them from investors who were left with steep losses after the market for the investments collapsed in early 2008.
The suit against Schwab is aimed at forcing the retail brokerage firm to repurchase the securities at face value from investors.
...
Last month, Cuomo's office notified San Francisco-based Charles Schwab that it was planning to file the suit against the retail brokerage firm for claiming the securities were safe investments while selling them to customers.
In a statement Monday, Cuomo said: "Charles Schwab owed its customers a duty to properly understand and make accurate representations concerning auction-rate securities. Today we commenced a lawsuit to remedy Schwab's repeated breach of that duty."
...
related link: http://www.cnbc.com/id/32447041

2. "Credit Suisse broker convicted of fraud" (Aug.17)
A former Credit Suisse broker was on Monday convicted by a jury of fraudulently selling risky auction-rate securities in one of the first criminal prosecutions to emerge from the two-year-long credit crisis.

The guilty verdict against Eric Butler, 36, comes after a three-week trial in which prosecutors accused him and his former colleague, Julian Tzolov, of scheming to generate higher sales commissions by lying to clients about what kind of securities they were being sold.

“The defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations saddled investors with unknown risks they did not bargain for,” said Benton Campbell, US attorney for the eastern district of New York.

“This case shows that those who engage in such schemes will be held to account for their criminal activity.”

related links:
- http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE57G4HK20090817?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticNews (reuters)
- http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/nyfo081709a.htm (FBI press release)

3. 2008-News:
US Regulators alleged that brokerages misled investors into believing that auction rate securities were safe, cash-equivalent products, when in fact they faced increasing liquidity risk. Major financial companies Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia Corp.,and others that sold auction-rate securities have reached 100% buy-back settlements.


2009年8月10日 星期一

Questions Regarding Wing Hang Bank's Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form

In the Wing Hang Bank's Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form, for Minibond Series 30 (January 2007),
the "Declaration " has Clause 11 as the following:
"11. I/We understand that I/we can read copies of the display documents as listed in the Programme Prospectus at the offices of the arranger as set out in the Programme Prospectus;"

However, the 'Clause 11' does not detail what the ‘display documents’ are.
By contrast, the same provision about ‘display documents’ is not available in the Minibond Purchaser Confirmation and Instruction Form for Series 27 (August 2006).


The Question is:
What are the 'display documents' referring to in the 'Clause 11' ?

Wing Hang Bank has been an experienced Minibond distributor since 2003. Why can't Wing Hang Bank clarify this?

關於永亨銀行迷債“購買者確認及指示表格”之疑問

永亨銀行於2007年1月銷售的迷債系列30之“購買者確認及指示表格” 的 “聲明" 之第11條有如下內容:
11。我/我們明白我/我們可親臨安排人於計劃章程所述的辦事處,查閱計劃章程內列為可供查閱的文件;”

可是,這第11條並沒有指出這些“可供查閱的文件”究竟具體是指哪些文件。
永亨銀行為甚麼不明確指出這些“可供查閱的文件”究竟具體是指哪些文件呢?給銀行的詢問也沒有回答。
- 另一令人疑惑之處是,在2006年銷售的迷債(如8月銷售的系列27)之“購買者確認及指示表格“,並無此第11條的內容。
為甚麼2007年開始有這第11條,而2006年的就沒有呢?

永亨銀行自從2003年開始就銷售迷債了(包括系列2003年9月的迷債系列6以及更為早期的迷債系列),直至2007年7月的系列33。 儘管並沒有參與系列34-36的銷售。永亨銀行也可算是迷債的經驗分銷商了。為甚麼永亨銀行不可以 回答關於銀行自身的“購買者確認及指示表格”的問題呢?
??????
??????

2009年8月9日 星期日

香港 的銀行,金融監管機構和政府還有信用可言麼?

對於銀行家而言:
客戶不可貴,誠信價更低,若為傭金故,一切皆可拋。

對於金管局和政府而言:
市民不可貴,公眾價更低,若為銀行故,一切皆可拋。

香港到底是金融中心呢? 還是縱容金融騙局的金融詐騙中心呢?

銀行行騙和庶民行騙不同罪
我們的政府/議員/法律機構等, 對於倫敦金或祈福黨/跌錢黨等欺騙市民的集團,
是否會施以同樣的寬容, 並以現在為銀行辯解的理由 來為這些集團之欺騙行為辯護?

當受監管的金融機構銀行欺騙市民們的時候, 就不是欺騙了?
就可以對銀行網開一面,不受懲罰, 而要求受騙人來承擔責任?

Cheat me once, Shame on You.
Cheat me twice, Shame on me.

看了迷你債券之銷售和現在銀行+監管+政府之態度,香港的市民會有甚麼體會呢?
大概都意識到了銀行跟老千的關係,意識到政府跟銀行家的關係,
明白自己是萬萬不可以再信任銀行的了!

香港的銀行和銀行家們對普通市民而言還有信用嗎?
香港的監管機構(金管局和證監會)對普通市民而言還有信用嗎?
香港政府對普通市民而言還有信用嗎?

請聽一位苦主的肺腑之言:
[ ...... 然而銀行/金管/証監/特首/議員真的不知答案嗎?
只是他們都認同了香港是一個不需要講道理的地方! 是講權勢,是講錢財.........
我真的無語問蒼天, ... 因為銀行同政府的信用對我來說是全無價值!
.....只見滿目是不義的事,只見遍地是無望的眼神,怎也是無法接受,
但轉眼間郤見自己的影子在其中

2009年8月7日 星期五

《转载》有感於 銀行家 之 霸道

十月奔走討商奸
官商勾結暗往還
六折換得假公義
半生積蓄血淚斑

轉載自:作者 "adam100w", http://www29.discuss.com.hk/viewthread.php?tid=10193929&extra=&page=14

2009年8月4日 星期二

SCMP:Watchdog accused over Lehman probe decision

4 August 2009

Lawmakers criticised the financial regulator for suspending an investigation over the selling of non-minibond products after banks agreed a HK$6.3 billion deal to repay Lehman Brothers minibonds buyers.

Securities and Futures Commission chief executive Martin Wheatley said the commission had not only ended its top-down inquiry into minibonds, but also suspended investigation of other products from the 16 banks under the agreement.

He was speaking at a hearing of the subcommittee on the debacle surrounding the sale of Lehman Brothers financial products.

Democrat James To Kun-sun told the five-hour meeting: "It's about the minibonds agreement with the banks, but you {hellip} voluntarily suspended your statutory duty to investigate the systematic failure [over the selling] of non-minibonds products."

Another democrat, Kam Nai-wai, asked Mr Wheatley if he thought the interests of other buyers who bought Constellation Notes, a derivative similar to minibonds also issued by Lehman Brothers, or equity-linked notes had been sacrificed.

Lehman Brothers minibonds holders will receive letters before Monday from the banks who will repay them at least 60 per cent of the value of their initial investment.

Mr Wheatley said the investigation into non-minibonds products, involving about 500 cases, had been suspended because the latest deal required the banks to immediately implement improved complaints-handling procedures to resolve all complaints they received.

He said the investigation of three other banks, which were not included in the payout deal because they sold Lehman-related products apart from minibonds, continued. Investors should first turn to banks if they had complaints, and then the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.

Subcommittee chairman Raymond Ho Chung-tai said it would ask the commission to submit an original copy of the agreement, investigation findings of the 16 minibond-selling banks, as well as e-mail exchanges the commission had with the Monetary Authority and financial officials before it reached the deal.

Minibonds are not corporate bonds, but consist of high-risk credit-linked derivatives, and are marketed as a proxy investment in well-known companies. Hong Kong investors lost billions of dollars on minibonds guaranteed by Lehman Brothers when the US investment bank went bankrupt last September

From SCMP:Watchdog accused over Lehman probe decision

2009年8月2日 星期日

[60%+X%]回購計劃 之[X%] "進一步付款" 的陷阱

儘管對新鴻基及凱基證券的100%本金回購方案,證監會考慮了“符合投資者的最佳利益”和“客戶目前蒙受的損失得到補償”。
銀行回購方案卻是不需要如新鴻基般去考虑符合银行客戶之“最佳利益”,而銀行客戶目前蒙受之損失也不需要如新鴻基客戶般“得到補償”,
這個[60%+X%] 回購計劃之[X%]"進一步付款"計劃,顯然是符合銀行和銀行家們之“最佳利益”

因為,如果真是執行這個回購計劃,其實是沒有任何具體措施來保障客戶可得知抵押品 之真實價格並得到應該得到的回購價格。

目前的[60%+X%]回購計劃看似跟抵押品價格掛鈎,[X%} "進一步付款" 計劃之具體執行操作(價格,費用,時間,。。。)等完全不提,一旦迷債持有者將迷債權益轉給銀行,銀行會公平公正地告知我們不在公開市場上流通的抵押品之真實價格以及相關信息麼?
- 回購計劃毫無保障迷債受害人得到這[X%}相關的權益和條款,
- 回購計劃同時卻無條件地要求和明確指出:[迷債受害人就必須撤回及永久終止因迷你債券引起或與迷你債券相關而正在進行的法律訴訟或調解。],和 [證監會將會停止就迷你債券的銷售對分銷銀行進行調查]。
- 新鴻基客戶尚可以同意以上兩個條款,畢竟新鴻基作出100%本金賠償。 回購計劃卻讓銀行以「六成」本金之購迷債.

[60%+X%} 回購計劃 之[X%] "進一步付款" 計劃 令人感覺就好像當初買迷債一樣,‘如果相信這7個公司不會破產,可以買入迷債“。。。看似只需知道7個掛鈎公司的信息。
- 從2003年至今為至,銀行還從未給過迷債受害人任何關於抵押品內容或價格之信息。
- 銀行在4-6年間的迷債銷售中完全是只重傭金,不顧客戶,毫無誠信可言。
- 在迷債真相暴露之後又百般抵賴,毫無誠意。
- 整個回購計劃之暴光過程和最後方案,再次顯示銀行為達其目的而機關算盡和神通廣大之本領, 毫無公平合理可言。

以銀行至今之表現,尤其當客戶們將迷債所有權轉讓給銀行,而且必須根據銀行和證監會指示,撤回及永久終止一切迷你債券相關的訴訟, 加上‘證監會將會停止就迷你債券的銷售對分銷銀行進行調查’,
- 如何令人相信銀行不會利用回購計劃,用合法的名義,在抵押品價格上為銀行牟取 最佳利益,而再次罔顧客戶之利益?? 如何做到,我們現在是不會知的,也是想像不到的。誠如當初不知道迷債抵押品其實是跟百多個公司信貸掛鈎一樣,誠如當初不知道迷債之價格和風險極大地取決於迷債抵押品內百多個掛鈎公司一樣。
- 如何令人相信銀行會有誠信,去公平合理地執行這個回購計劃的全部內容?

或者說:我們只能是祈禱上蒼,希望僅僅這一次,銀行和銀行家們會有一些良心,表現出一些對客戶的誠信和 Duty of Care, 顧及一下迷債受害人的利益?

这就是所谓的”建議合理,而且符合公眾利益“?
- 因為是銀行和 銀行家們提出的“ 建議 ”,所以 證監會認為 是 “ 合理 ”?!
- 因為銀行 和 銀行家們的利益是’公眾利益‘ 之主體,所以 證監會認為 是“符合公眾利益”?!

2009年8月1日 星期六

為甚麼證監會對銀行網開一面,不要求100%回購, 卻強求受害人必須永久放棄一切相關訴訟?



The Minibond Repurchase Agreement by SFC-HKMA-Banks showed us how Powerful & Irresponsible & Greedy & Shameless (PIGS) that banks and bankers are. Most Minibond victims can't go through legal channel to defend themself and can only rely on Government/ Regulators. I am deeply saddened by the fact that SFC and our Legco members were willing to bend to banks & bankers' demand in the name of distressed victims who felt hopeless & helpless under the current HK system. It is such a shame to see that SFC and government bent to banks & bankers' demand in the name of public interest.


證監會跟銀行达成的回購方案,是基於甚麼原因或關注而達成的呢?為甚麼證監會對於新鴻基投資和凱基的懲罰是100%本金回購,而對銀行卻是網開一面, 不要求銀行做出100%本金回購?銀行的迷債銷售是否有錯? 證監會為甚麼選擇性執法?

新鴻基為諸多銀行提供迷債相關的培訓,許多銀行的迷債銷售都是直接跟新鴻基合作而沒有跟雷曼亞洲直接打交道。現在,新鴻基做出100%賠償。銀行卻可以得到寬待處理,不必對迷債投資者做出100%回購? 原因何在?

更有甚者,回購建議不僅 讓銀行以「六成」之低價回購投資者手上的迷債並以強權的方式要求迷債受害人必須永久放棄一切相關訴訟,令人以為證監會是銀行公會的一個分枝部門。

在銷售迷債問題上,銀行的錯誤跟新鴻基投資的錯誤有甚麼不同而受到證監會的寬待呢 ?


1。 為甚麼證監會對銀行的六至七成回購方案認為:”建議合理,而且符合公眾利益“?
但對新鴻基及凱基證券的100%本金回購方案,證監會認為是“符合投資者的最佳利益”、“客戶目前蒙受的損失得到補償”。
換言之,
(a) 銀行回購方案不需要如新鴻基般符合客戶之“最佳利益”, 銀行客戶目前蒙受之損失也不需要如新鴻基客戶般“得到補償”,原因何在?
(b) 銀行的迷債銷售是否有錯?
(c) “建議合理 ” 之 "合理 ” 的 參考原則和標準是甚麼? 因為是銀行提出的“ 建議 ”,所以 證監會認為 是“ 合理 ”的,對嗎?
(d) “符合 公眾利益 ”之 “符合"的 參考原則和標準是甚麼?
何為 “公眾利益 ”? 銀行 和 銀行家們的利益是’公眾利益‘ 之主體?
因為是銀行提出的“ 建議 ”,所以 證監會認為 是“ 符合公眾利益 ” 嗎?


2。 證監會表示考慮和解方案時,會根據 3 項原則,
(一),是能否補償投資者損失、
(二),是有關機構能否確保日後避免再犯及改善錯失、
(三),是要反映若干懲罰性。

目前的回購建議到底是遵守還是違背了以上3項原則呢?
根據證監會引用的安永會計師為銀行公會提供的“迷債結構和定價”報告(2008年12月)和目前報章所登載之迷債信息,諸多系列之抵押品價格在60%-70%之間。按照回購建議,即為:
- 對於多數65歲以下之迷債受害人來說,极有可能必須承受30%之損失(得到:60%+10%)作為信任銀行買入迷債之懲罰,
- 而銀行之損失則极有可能處於 0%至10%之間,反映作為對銀行之‘若干懲罰性’?
這變相解釋了為甚麼銀行同意60%回購?
[迷債回購方案中投資者和銀行損益計算表2]

3。以下為證監會對於新鴻基投資的四項關注, 銀行在這四個方面是否有證據證明 做得好呢?

(一)、新鴻基在分銷雷曼迷債前,對產品進行的盡職審查是否足夠;
(二)、對前線人員提供的培訓是否足夠,從而確保投資者理解產品涉及的一切重大風險;
(三)、評估新鴻基在以下三方面的工作——迷債系列的風險水平;向零售銷售人員傳達迷債風險評級的信息;及採取理應採取的措施,確保銷售人員會因應迷債風險回報情況,與客戶的個人情況進行配對,提供合理適當意見;
(四)、就給予合資格客戶的投資意見,及客戶提出的疑問備存紀錄。
銀行是否有證據證明銀行沒有錯,一切培訓銷售指引等已經做足手續,解釋得清清楚楚 ?


4。證監會跟銀行的回購建議要求:迷債受害人一旦同意此回購建議,
-證監會將會停止就迷你債券的銷售對分銷銀行進行調查;
-迷債受害人就必須撤回及永久終止因迷你債券引起或與迷你債券相關而正在進行的法律訴訟或調解。
這不是強權式的不平等條約是甚麼?!
’銀行+證監會+金管局‘ 聯手欺壓無權無勢又無銀行之財力的香港普通市民。
新鴻基客戶尚可以同意以上兩個條款,畢竟新鴻基作出100%本金賠償。

迷債受害人仍然面臨這多達30%-40%損失之可能,卻要不得不放棄跟迷債相關的一切權益,
而犯了錯的銀行和銀行家們卻仍然可以逍遙法外,以60%之價格去把迷債之100%權益買下,並且不用擔心迷債受害人的任何投訴。
可以理解,這是銀行和銀行家們所期待的。
可是,證監會根據甚麼法規去俯首聽從銀行和銀行家的指令呢? 銀行包庇法?
證監會根據甚麼原則去決定同意這麼個不顧迷債受害人利益,旨在保護銀行和銀行家利益之決定的呢?


5。 是否因為銀行屬於財大勢大之強權集團,是需要證監會和政府全力維護的,所以證監會必須聽從銀行之要求,對銀行盡量網開一面?
證監會和政府是否認為:香港为成為金融中心就必须得聽銀行和銀行家的話,必须以銀行和銀行家的利益為第一利益?

6。 回購建議除了規定60%回購價和永久放棄相關訴訟以外,其它就只給出一個看似跟抵押品價格掛鈎,貌似簡單,並無任何實質執行措施的‘’"進一步付款"。
如果真是執行這個回購計劃,有甚麼具體措施來保障客戶可以得知抵押品 之真實價格並得到應該得到的回購價格?

目前的回購計劃看似跟抵押品價格掛鈎,,"進一步付款"之具體執行操作(價格,費用,時間,。。。)等完全不提,一旦迷債持有者將迷債權益轉給銀行,銀行會公平公正地告知我們不是在公開市場上流通的抵押品之真實價格以及相關信息麼?

從2003年至今為至,銀行從未給過迷債受害人任何關於抵押品內容或價格之信息。(按照前銀行公會主席和廣北先生於2008年9月27日之相關評論,直至2008年9月之前,對於所有迷債系列之抵押品之性質,銀行好像都是不確切瞭解。)。

這個回購計劃令人感覺就好像當初買迷債一樣,‘如果相信這7個公司不會破產,可以買入迷債“。。。看似只需知道7個掛鈎公司的信息。可真到了評估迷債價格的時候,就必須看其它百多個掛鈎主體,就必須對抵押品的百多個掛鈎公司名稱評級及破產事件條款等等有詳細瞭解之後才可以估價,原來抵押品之具體掛鈎內容對於迷債之價格有著非常重大的影響,是評估迷債之不可缺少的重大因數。
銀行在4-6年間的迷債銷售中完全是只重傭金,不顧客戶,毫無誠信可言。
在迷債真相暴露之後又百般抵賴,毫無誠意。
整個回購計劃之暴光過程和最後方案,再次顯示銀行為達其目的而機關算盡和神通廣大之本領, 毫無公平合理可言。
現在,如何令人相信銀行會有誠信,去公平合理地執行這個回購計劃的全部內容,讓客戶得到應該得到之最佳利益呢?

以銀行至今之表現,尤其當客戶們已經將迷債所有權轉讓給銀行,而且不得不根據銀行和證監會之指示,為此回購計劃而必須撤回及永久終止因迷你債券引起或與迷你債券相關而正在進行的法律訴訟或調,只能令人覺得銀行會利用這個回購計劃,用合法的名義,在抵押品價格上去為銀行牟取 最佳利益,而再次罔顧客戶之利益。

這個"進一步付款"計劃,顯然是於銀行有利,而不利於迷債受害人之“最佳利益”。
請證監會解釋:為甚麼證監會認為這個“進一步付款”建議是“合理”且““符合 公眾利益 ”?
證監會認為這個“進一步付款”建議是有利於迷債受害人之“最佳利益”麼?
證監會的參考原則和標準是甚麼?


7。 銀行一直強調客戶之文化教育水平和投資經驗。
(a) 是否因為銀行比新鴻基投資/凱基 在投資方面經驗少一些,於是,銀行有了錯誤證監會可以多諒解一些?
(b) 是否因為銀行相關產品部門管理以及銀行職員之文化教育水平和投資經驗知識,都低於新鴻基投資/凱基之職員的素質,於是,銀行有了錯誤證監會可以多諒解一些?
(c) 是否因為銀行客戶之文化教育水平和投資經驗都高於新鴻基投資客戶之文化教育水平和投資經驗,於是,銀行有了錯誤就主要是客戶的責任,而新鴻基投資有了錯誤就主要是新鴻基投資之責任?證監會可以多諒解銀行之錯誤?

8。回購建議把專業投資者或經驗投資者給除外。原因何在呢?
暫且不談何謂專業投資者或經驗投資者之定義。
銀行本身應該是CDS/CDO信貸衍生市場上最為專業最有經驗的專家級別的經驗/專業經驗投資者 。
如果銀行都可以持續幾年如一日地犯同樣的錯誤,誤導客戶,
那麼,銀行有甚麼理由認為“專業投資者”/"經驗投資者"客戶會比銀行自己這麼個信貸衍生市場上最為專業的專家級別的專業+經驗投資者還要瞭解迷債之從未披露的真實風險和特徵呢?
當然,如果某些銀行的“專業投資者”/"經驗投資者"客戶是從事於CDO/CDS 相關的專業/職業人士的話,那就是另當別論了。

9。諸多迷債受害人由於對政府和監管機構/法律系統已經非常失望,認為銀行可以達到一手遮天, 而願意接受銀行給與的不平等條約。
證監會是否因為看到受害人的心態 而乘虛而入,決定給與銀行一個優惠待遇?因為受害人已經是身心疲憊和極度失望了。


請聽一位願意接受 ’60%+X ‘ 建議的 苦主的悲憤肺腑之言:
[ 然而誰没想過妳提的問題嗎?
誰不為此氣憤嗎?
然而銀行/金管/証監/特首/議員真的不知答案嗎?
只是他們都認同了香港是一個不需要講道理的地方! 是講權勢,是講錢財.........
我真的無語問蒼天, ... 因為銀行同政府的信用對我來說是全無價值!
.....只見滿目是不義的事,只見遍地是無望的眼神,怎也是無法接受, 但轉眼間郤見自己的影子在其中 ]

銀行回購建議,是向全香港市民,向全世界通告:
香港不再是一個有法治、講道理的社會,而是一個有強權、無公理、以強凌弱,保障大財團銀行/銀行家之利益的社會!
令公眾對香港銀行、金融及監管制度 喪失信心!

<轉載>向銀行購買投資產品, 誤導銷售和失實陳述的風險比雷曼破產前無一點減少,客戶保障更減少

[明報 2009年8月1日:
... 曾表示難以接受繁瑣銷售過程的銀行公會主席王冬勝,昨日指出現時客戶多「捨難取易」,甚至透過「銀行體系以外的機構」購買投資產品,影響銀行生意。....]

[轉載 Mr. JY Comments]

現在客戶到「銀行體系以外的機構」購買投資產品,影響銀行生意,這是會直接減少銀行收入。 但並非所有客戶傾向「捨難取易」,投入股市、樓市。而且向「銀行體系以外的機構」購買投資產品所需要受的風險及保障未必比向銀行為高!

迷債事件為例:向証券商購買同一種產品比向銀行更有保障,更無大石壓死蟹和官商勾結和包備之風險。現在向銀行購買任向投資產品, 誤導銷售和失實陳述的風險比雷曼破產前無任向一點減少,客戶保障更減少。

首先証監會審批標準無大改善,一樣可用虛假名稱,監管大原則亦只是依靠銷售人員作產品特質和風險的全面披露,其他一切不立監管。

金管局主要監管銀行是否正常運作,在有需要情况下提供恊助,保障客戶不受誤導和欺詐並不是其主要工作,只是非常低層次而己!

以迷債事件為例:只是用盡方法設立條件替銀行減少投訴個案,因為以調查事實真相作為唯一依歸的標準,可以肯定是銀行的系統性誤導銷售,並無依足証監會定下銷售程序,這樣銀行便會需要向客戶十足賠賞,短期損失是百多億,但因抵押品有價,最終損失不會太大,此乃非主要考慮;而是銀行的系統性誤導銷售,亦非只是唯一出現迷債,而是所有投資產品都有相同的違規失誤,最後會引發全面性投訴和索賞,銀行到時吾死十足都會死八九成,政府高官到時一定會死傷無數,剩下的和新上任又不能不做嘢,一定大力加強監管銀行銷售程序,銀行吾死吾掂!

所以政府高層一開始便定性為投資者因金融海潚下的投資失誤,証監會表示監管大原則是依靠銷售人員作產品特質和風險的全面披露,不會審查產品和發表意見,即是產品無乜監管,

一切靠自己証監會講明吾好靠佢監管!而金管局講明是監管銀行是否正常運作,保障客戶不受誤導和欺詐並不是其主要工作,因此為保銀行業,保金融穩定,存戶的合法權益是可犧牲,政府可作吹虛說假騙市民,寶貴的法冶更可暫時放棄!

正是基本法所講50年不變,以前一樣,現在亦一樣,將來都係一樣,保障大財團銀行的利益,即保障特區金融穩定,

市民的犧牲是理所當然,法冶有需要時亦要讓路!

轉載 From:
http://chukwokhung.mysinablog.com/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=1858107

2009年7月30日 星期四

Repeating History after Ignoring It - Lehman's mini-bonds scandal ends with a whimper

[Article from Asia Sentinel]

Hong Kong's Lehman mini-bonds saga, in which outraged investors lost millions with the collapse of what was once thought to be an impregnable American financial institution, appears to be finally coming to an end, potentially drawing the curtain on a 10-month nightmare for both investors and regulators, given what the Securities and Futures Commission reportedly described as a 'good compromise."

But before crediting the SFC for putting an end to the misery of the 30,000 beleaguered investors, or before the regulator champions itself for its masterstrokes, be forewarned that the impact of the Lehman mini-bonds saga could have been minimized, if not prevented, if the SFC had acted decisively three years ago in a similar case involving Clerical Medical Insurance, a unit of Halifax Bank of Scotland. But from its inception, the SFC has been a largely toothless watchdog, occasionally gumming on some luckless small offenders and largely leaving the heavyweights alone.

Under the terms of the Lehman settlement, announced July 23, 16 banks agreed to return US$807 million - about 60 cents on the dollar -- to investors, with BOC Hong Kong Holdings agreeing to stump up nearly half of that, at US$401 million. The 16 banks sold an estimated US$1.8 billion of the so-called mini-bonds, which fell sharply in value after the US investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings was forced into bankruptcy last September.

Just as with Lehman, the CMI case involved gross mis-selling of financial investment products - larger in scale in dollar terms but less well known.


The SFC could have punished the wrongdoers to send out the right message, restructured the regulatory landscape to prevent any similar episodes and seized the opportunity to demonstrate its seriousness in dealing with misconduct of financial institutions.


No, thank you. The SFC did none of the above. What it eventually did - investigate the case but take no action - was to splash out television advertisements to forewarn investors to be alert and ask the right questions when making investment decisions, without tackling the core of the problem. The timing was critical: had the SFC taken the right measures then, it would have been between 2005-2006 when the Lehman minibonds were flowing into the Hong Kong market.

Obviously those splashy TV ads didn't work but the SFC has once again resorted to an even larger scale commercial campaign to accompany its new television advertisements following the Lehman case.

The earlier case refers to a product generally known as "offshore with-profits" (OWP) funds, sold in Hong Kong via several carriers but largely through market leader Clerical Medical Insurance (CMI) which alone has reportedly over 7,000 wealthy investors, mostly expatriates, with what many said amounted to some billions of US dollars invested - CMI was part of HBOS (Halifax Bank of Scotland), the largest mortgage and savings provider in the United Kingdom, which was bought by Lloyd's early this year and subsequently bailed out by the British government.

The OWP products were never sold directly by CMI but through many independent financial advisers , or IFAs, acting as intermediaries. Potential investors were encouraged to gear up to three times their own investment to maximize gains, given the supposedly good track records of these funds. These investors later said their advisers, motivated by extra commissions, only emphasized the upside but never forewarned them of the potential downside risks involved with gearing. The IFAs in turn claimed the marketing materials they used originated from CMI - whose products were approved by the SFC - though the company denied it ever promoted gearing.

The investors who geared up not only lost most of their principal but had to repay part of their loans when the value of their fund holdings pledged as collateral fell sharply, after the OWP funds performed badly following market shocks in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001, when CMI found itself on the wrong sides of the equation in the investment markets.

While not all investors were geared, all who tried to get out of the funds were subject to exit penalties, known as "market value adjusters" (MVAs), which reached more than 25 percent at some stage - neither did CMI nor the IFAs explain much about these MVAs or mentioned how high the MVA rates would reach in their sales pitch, according to many angry investors.

Either way, these investors found themselves stuck with huge losses and some are still pursuing lawsuits today to fight their cause.

Much like the Lehman mini-bonds case, the CMI matter was one of gross mis-selling to potential and unwary investors - in the latter, mostly highly educated professionals. Just like the Lehman case, the CMI products were approved by the SFC.

And like the Lehman case, the CMI products were sold through a retail distribution channel with frontline sales staff carrying approved brochures. More importantly, both cases featured gross mis-selling with commission-driven sales staff allegedly more eager to secure signatures than to explain in detail the complexity of the financial products, if they understood them at all, on the table.

With such parallels, and perhaps sadly on hindsight, one may be tempted to blame the SFC for not doing enough to protect the interest of the public.

One may also argue that the SFC did the right thing in both the Lehman and CMI cases: that investors took their risk, informed or ill-informed, calculated or speculative, even though the products were approved and by that token the SFC can only resort to public education via commercial advertisements.

Granted, but the reality is the public placed trust in the regulators to have the house in order with little or hopefully no room for any propensity to mislead potential investors, rich or poor alike. The regulators of today's ever increasingly complex financial markets are also expected to have an iron grip on the conduct of its players and act swiftly to correct any disequilibrium.

But in the Hong Kong context, there is much more the SFC could have done over the years to build a more efficient and better regulated financial market to protect the public - and thus prevent the resulting bad press from the Lehman mini-bonds saga.

For starters, one may question if the frontline sales staff of financial products, including professional independent financial advisers, are properly qualified. After all, much like doctors and surgeons whom we count upon for life or death, the men on the street rely on these financial intermediaries for their financial well-being - the Lehman case in particular has thrown this issue into the spotlight given the highly complex financial instruments involved.

Regulators and related supervisory trade bodies in Hong Kong will be quick to point out the Continuing Professional Development (CPD) program, found in several professional industries as a well managed way to update its members and also renew licenses.

Sounds good? But what good can there be if the IFAs (with a considerable number of non-Chinese speaking Western expatriates) cannot understand a word in some of these Cantonese-only classes? This was the situation faced by some insurance professionals and IFAs, according to sources, and all they need is to find ways to kill time and mark their attendance at the end of the courses to gain the necessary credits.

"They do not even check if you are fluent in the language in which the course is given," said a practicing insurance broker. "Most attendants just sit in the venue for 2 hours playing games on their mobile phones, or by catching up with sleep. The quality of the speakers, most of the time staff of law firms eager to advertise their firm's name and they work free of charge, as I understand, is poor to very poor."

Certainly not the best way to update on the latest financial literature.

With the blurring of lines in the modern financial sectors, cross-selling has become commonplace, thus we find insurance companies selling investment-type products and banks selling insurance-related products. Consequently, insurance professionals and IFAs need the appropriate licenses to sell complex financial investment products. In Hong Kong, insurance professionals with the appropriate license from any of the two respective insurance brokers associations earned the license to sell while those who gained a license from the SFC, being the IFAs, have the license to advise on investment-type products, industry sources say.

The implications may not be obvious to casual observers, according to some market professionals. A person with only a license to sell means he cannot offer any advice on the products he tried to push to his potential client. Consider the client may (inevitably) ask questions about the products. What can the financial intermediary say? "Sorry, I can only sell you these and not licensed to offer advice. So just pick one and sign"?

Sorry, that is not how the real world works.

Perhaps the regulators should get rid of the license to sell and offer just the license to advise requirement so as to better protect the public interest?

The one other troubling issue that remains: commissions. In both the Lehman and CMI cases, the financial intermediaries were allegedly motivated by commissions earned from the sales transacted. How else do you suppose salesmen work - thus we cannot possibly remove commissions out of the equation, can we?

Hence, the SFC took the right stance that investors take their own risks given the best information they can gather - ie, market risk. However, if the financial markets are not properly regulated, giving way to mis-selling, investors are exposed to further (non-market) risks.

Sadly, Hong Kong investors have short memories, especially when faced with lucrative offers. With the Lehman mini-bonds saga soon to be behind us, one can only hope that the SFC took cues and promptly put things in order before another similar episode surfaces.

From Asia Sentinel: "http://asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1984&Itemid=224